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Abstract 
De facto states are not the likeliest candidates for state building, due to their limited 
financial capabilities and external parent state pressures. While some de facto states 
built relatively stable state structures without an external patron state (e.g. 
Somaliland), others are largely dependent on the backing of patrons to provide basic 
public services and goods (e.g. Northern Cyprus). This thesis uncovers the extent to 
which patron states influence state and institution building efforts of de facto states. 
A case study of Russian involvement in Abkhazia’s state building pursuits 
complements statistical analyses of a data set of 34 de facto states between 1945 
and 2011. This thesis argues that patrons nurture the dependence of de facto states 
on patron support by pursuing a multi-layered policy of granting de facto state 
agency in an international setting of limited alternatives and providing aid that 
discourages self-sufficiency. Patrons support de facto states in guaranteeing minimal 
civilian governance to ensure a degree of sustainability and internal legitimacy. 
Patrons provide little state building assistance beyond this stage to ensure the status 
quo of dependence. Russia, for instance, concentrates on infrastructural 
reconstruction rather than capacity development in Abkhazia and takes on 
government responsibilities from the de facto authorities. By distinguishing between 
direct and indirect diffusion influences of patrons, this thesis clarifies why Abkhaz 
elites adjusted their actions according to perceived Russian interests and activities 
even during Abkhazia’s period of partial isolation. Due to the limited availability of 
viable alternative choices, de facto regimes are less likely to resist coercive influences 
and more susceptible to indirect diffusion influences. The agency of dependent de 
facto states is therefore bound by patron interests and activities, which encourages 
legislative and institutional isomorphism. Despite limited room for manoeuvre, 
Abkhazia has repeatedly displayed agency in the fields of language and private 
property policies. 
 
Keywords: De facto states, state building, institution building, public service 
provision, patron states, Abkhazia, Russian foreign policy  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers, local leaders, politicians and other citizens of Somaliland gather in early 
2018 for the official inauguration of the new regional office of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Gabiley, a mid-sized city in Western Somaliland. A regional 
administrator of the breakaway republic addresses the crowd and thanks the de facto 
government for its continued interest and financial commitment to the region’s 
agricultural development. Following his speech, Somaliland’s Minister of Agriculture, 
Ahmed Mumin Saad, stresses the importance of agriculture and food sustainability 
for the unrecognised entity.1 Four years earlier, on April 10th 2014, three days after 
the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and one month prior to its 
declaration of independence, the provisional government of the DPR appoints 
Ekaterina Yuryevna Gubareva as its first Minister of Foreign Affairs in the republic’s 
 
1 Radio One Somalia (2018). Somaliland: Minister of Agriculture officially opens new 
Ministry of agricultural development Gabiley regional offices. Retrieved from: 
http://radio1somalia.com/somalilandminister-of-agriculture-officially-opens-new-ministry-
of-agricultural-development-gabiley-regional-offices/  
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young history.2 Approximately 1,500 kilometres further south and yet another six 
years earlier, Nechirvan Bazari, Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, solemnly 
inaugurates the International School of Choueifat in Erbil. During his speech, Bazari 
highlights the significance of education and the construction of new schools (or what 
he refers to as ‘educational capacity-building’) for the future of the autonomous 
region.34 
These three events exemplify, rather whimsically, the variety of possible state 
building activities of a state, ranging from the appointment of government ministers 
to the development of civic infrastructure that ensures the provision of public 
services and goods to its citizens. Concurrently, the three events represent the 
symbolic value of state institutions, infrastructure projects and public service 
provision for the leadership of de facto states to convince the public of their state 
building abilities (Bakke et al. 2013: 1). The symbolic nature of such institutions, 
however, addresses audiences far beyond the domestic arena; state institutions and 
public services are repeatedly portrayed by de facto state representatives as 
indicators of successful state building and even democratisation. This means that de 
facto states justify their sovereignty not only with arguments surrounding national 
self-determination and human rights violations, but increasingly with the viability 
and effectiveness of their democratic state institutions (Caspersen 2011: 337-8; 
Johnson & Smaker 2014: 6). Caspersen (2014: 6) refers to this phenomenon as the 
pursuit of “earned sovereignty.” Indeed, the legitimacy of an entity depends not only 
on its moral right of independence, but also on its ability to provide tasks usually 
associated with a state (Bartmann 2004: 15).  
 
2 Vesti.ru (2014). Екатерина Губарева: юго-восток не отступит от своих требований. 
Retrieved from: 
https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1468524#/video/https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vgtrk.com%2F
iframe%2Fvideo%2Fid%2F786688%2Fstart_zoom%2Ftrue%2FshowZoomBtn%2Ffalse%2Fsi
d%2Fvesti%2FisPlay%2Ftrue%2F%3Facc_video_id%3D591130 
3 Kurdistan Regional Government (2008). Prime Minister Barzani speaks at International 
School of Choueifat opening ceremony. Retrieved from: 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=010000&l=12&a=26887 
4 Kurdistan Regional Government (2008). Prime Minister's speech at opening of 
International School of Choueifat. Retrieved from: 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?r=268&l=12&s=02040100&a=26889&s=010000 
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Beyond the symbolic meaning of state and institution building in de facto 
states, state building serves as a significant contributing factor for a de facto state’s 
successful transition to statehood (Florea 2017). Furthermore, the ability of de facto 
authorities to provide public services and goods to their citizens may promote the 
internal legitimacy of these entities, their leadership and institutions (Caspersen 
2012: 78-79; Bakke et al. 2013: 3). Particularly de facto regimes that are in a position 
to guarantee security (Lake 2010) and establish the monopoly of legitimate force in 
their contested territory (Weber 1946) are likely to legitimise their rule (Bakke et al. 
2013: 3).  
Numerous de facto states appear to have succeeded in their endeavour to 
develop centralised governance institutions that ensure at least basic levels of state 
capacity and public service and goods provision (Caspersen 2012: 51; de Waal 2018).5 
A variety of in-depth case studies have identified institutional bases for statehood 
and service provision across diverse regions of the world covering Somaliland 
(Richards 2014; Richards & Smith 2015; Johnson & Smaker 2014), Kosovo (Capussela 
2014), Iraqi Kurdistan (Richards & Smith 2015) as well as a variety of post-Soviet de 
facto states (von Steinsdorff 2012; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008). Thus, most de facto 
states perform at least the basic responsibilities of a comparable de jure state (King 
2001; Ishiyama & Batta 2012: 124) and thereby warrant referring to these 
unrecognised entities as ‘states’ (refer to Caspersen (2012: 11) and Pegg (1998: 28) 
for the most prominent definitions of de facto states).6  
 
5 The de facto states in question have achieved state building according to the 
operationalisation of state building proposed by this thesis, that considers both state 
capacity and public service and goods provision as indicators of state building. See chapter 2 
for a more detailed engagement with the concept of state building. 
6 Caspersen (2012: 11) definition of unrecognised states claims that “ 
• An unrecognized state has achieved de facto independence, covering at least two-thirds 
of the territory to which it lays claim and including its main city and key regions.  
• Its leadership is seeking to build further state institutions and demonstrate its own 
legitimacy.  
• The entity has declared formal independence or demonstrated clear aspirations for 
independence, for example through an independence referendum, adoption of a 
separate currency or similar act that clear signals separate statehood.  
• The entity has not gained international recognition or has, at the most, bee recognized 
by its patron state and a few other states of no great importance.  
• It has existed for at least two years.”  
15 
 
Despite the prevalence of institutional structures and service provision in de 
facto states, some structures may be more symbolic in nature or predominantly 
reliant on external support from actors such as external patrons, diaspora 
communities or international organisations. Particularly the involvement of patron 
states7 is repeatedly used by parent states and political analysts to discredit the 
feasibility of state structures and sovereignty ambitions of de facto states by referring 
to the de facto governments as puppets or pawns of their respective patron state 
(von Steinsdorff 2012: 201-202). Expectedly, dependencies present a common 
thread in representing patron-de facto state relations. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008: 
495), for instance, stress that the South Caucasian de facto states are not in a position 
to provide the necessary services to their population “without relying heavily on 
external support and infrastructure.” Zartman (1995) goes even further by stressing 
the risks of “effective foreign control” by patron states over unrecognised entities, 
which may result in the transformation into ‘puppet states’. Caspersen (2009) and 
Broers (2015), on the other hand, caution the predominant emphasis on 
international factors in studies on de facto states and that endogenous factors play 
a significant role in the development of de facto states. Comai (2018a: 87), 
meanwhile, refers to “the relative normalcy of their [de facto states’] external 
dependence” on the patron that does not exclude a degree of agency of the de facto 
regime.  
One can broadly distinguish between two types of de facto states in terms of 
their reliance on external patrons. Some de facto states have built relatively 
successful state structures without the backing of a patron in their state building 
endeavour (i.e. Somaliland, Eritrea, Iraqi Kurdistan). Other unrecognised entities 
 
Caspersen (2017: 13) now accepts the predominant usage of de facto states instead of 
unrecognised states. See chapter 2 for alternative definitions of de facto states. 
7 Building on Shoemaker and Spanier’s (1984: 13) conceptualisation of patron-client relations 
in the Cold War period, patron states are commonly referred to as states that fulfil four 
criteria: First, the military capabilities between patron and client state is sizably different. 
Second, the client state plays a prominent role in the competitive race of two or more patron 
states. Third, the patron-client state relationship needs to be perceived as such by the 
international community. Fourth, the relationship between patron and client is asymmetric, 
not necessarily mutually beneficial and focuses mostly on the enhancement of security. See 
chapter 3 for an updated conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations.  
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have been largely dependent on the financial, political and military support of 
patrons to provide basic public services and goods to their citizens (i.e. South Ossetia, 
Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara, Republika Srpska). The degrees to which patron 
states influence the state and institution building processes of the latter group of de 
facto states vary in intensity, across time, among patrons and cover a wide array of 
patron instruments ranging from restricted military support to protect the de facto 
state borders to the tight management of the domestic political domain of these 
unrecognised entities.  
This dubiety surrounding the degrees of patron involvement raises a set of 
questions about our preconceived understanding of the role of patron states. If one 
assumes that de facto states are strategically and geopolitically important actors for 
patron states, why do patrons occasionally restrict their involvement in the state and 
institution building processes of de facto states? Conversely, if one presumes that de 
facto states are dependent on patron states, why do some patrons make concerted 
efforts to influence the legislative and institutional design of de facto states? This 
thesis explores why patrons display these variations in engaging with the state and 
institution building processes of de facto states by analysing the extent to which 
direct and indirect influences shape the state capacity and the provision of public 
services and goods in de facto states. The theoretical framework of this thesis 
distinguishes between direct coercive diffusion influences, on the one hand, and 
indirect diffusion influences of the patron in form of mimicry, normative and 
competitive diffusion, on the other hand. While direct diffusion channels represent 
immediate patron involvement with de facto state authorities through change agents 
that inform the institutional or legislative outcomes of de facto states, indirect 
diffusion channels refer to legislative and institutional developments in de facto 
states that were initiated by the de facto authorities and indirectly shaped by the 
presence of the patron.  
A novel conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations and the 
application of diffusion models serve as conceptual and theoretical tools for the 
analysis of central state building trajectories in Abkhazia in the context of partial 
dependence on Russian support and offer potential explanations for the varying 
degrees of patron involvement in the state and institution building processes of de 
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facto states. This thesis ultimately captures the ways in which patrons can nurture 
the dependence of de facto states on patron support by pursuing a multi-layered 
policy of granting de facto state agency in an international setting of limited 
alternatives and providing aid that discourages self-sufficiency. Due to the ensuing 
degrees of dependence, direct military, financial and political involvement of the 
patron is not always necessary, as de facto elites tend to pursue the perceived patron 
interests in their state and institution building development without direct patron 
engagement.  
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1.1 Research Questions  
This thesis explores why patrons ever so often restrict their involvement in the state 
and institution building processes of de facto states and proposes explanations for 
the variations in patron state involvement ranging from extensive direct engagement 
to limited interference in the domestic state building endeavours. This thesis argues 
that the variations in patron involvement can be explained with the potential of 
patron states to shape state and institution developments in de facto states both 
directly and indirectly, due to the de facto states’ dependence on patron support. As 
de facto authorities tend to adapt their state building processes to the patron, direct 
patron engagement is not always necessary. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the 
research of this thesis explores two research questions that specify the ways in which 
patron states directly and indirectly influence de facto states and capture the effect 
of these interrelated diffusion channels on the state and institution building 
processes of de facto states.  
 
Research Question I 
To what extent do patron states influence the domestic state and institution building 
developments of de facto states?  
 
Most studies on de facto states do not differentiate between direct and indirect 
patron influences, but instead refer to patron involvement in de facto states as a 
whole or focus on specific support channels such as military and financial aid. Gerrits 
and Bader’s (2016) application of linkages and leverage to Russia’s engagement in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for instance, provides a wealth of detail on Russian 
involvement in the two de facto states, but does not distinguish between immediate 
policies from the Russian side and developments that are due to de facto elites 
mimicking Russian policies or institutions without direct Russian involvement. This 
can have significant implications for assessing patron interference in de facto states, 
the agency of de facto regimes in the context of dependency relations and the extent 
to which similarities between patrons and de facto states are due to direct coercive 
patron instruments. To ensure a comprehensive understanding of patron state 
influences, this thesis proposes a theoretical framework that applies diffusion 
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theories to state building in de facto states, which distinguish between direct 
coercive influences, on the one hand, and indirect influences of the patron in form of 
mimicry, normative or competitive diffusion, on the other hand (see chapter 2 for 
the theoretical framework).  
Thus, the first research question captures the degree to which patrons 
directly and indirectly shape the state and institution building processes of de facto 
states. By following the causal chains of direct and indirect diffusion channels laid out 
in the theoretical framework and applying process tracing to the source material, the 
in-depth case study of Russia’s influence on state building in Abkhazia (chapters 6, 7 
and 8) empirically establishes that both direct and indirect diffusion is at work in 
Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes. Chapter 6 covers detailed 
accounts of domestic state building patterns and trajectories in de facto states in 
order to examine the extent to which indirect diffusion influences shape the state 
and institution building processes of de facto states. The perceived interests of a 
patron state, trade links and even the relative power vis-à-vis the parent state, for 
instance, may change the behaviour and actions of domestic elites without direct 
patron facilitation. Due to the limited availability of alternative support sources, 
domestic actors need to navigate their actions according to the interests of those 
countries that choose to recognise them and indirect diffusion are more likely to 
shape domestic affairs of de facto states. In contrast, chapter 7 captures direct patron 
diffusion influences by exploring the ways in which Russia coercively encourages 
institutional and legislative reforms in Abkhazia through foreign policy instruments, 
such as agreements, financial contributions and institution sharing. The case study 
thereby highlights the contexts and conditions that facilitate the predominance of 
direct and indirect diffusion influences.  
  
Research Question II 
What are the effects of direct and indirect diffusion influences of patron states on the 
state and institution building developments of de facto states? 
 
The second research question delves deeper into the observable implications of 
direct and indirect diffusion influences of patron states on state and institution 
building in de facto states. The statistical analyses of chapter 5, for example, measure 
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whether the presence of patron states has a statistically significant impact (without 
distinguishing between direct and indirect diffusion influences) on the formation of 
governance institutions8 and the state building development of de facto states. The 
quantitative chapter also tests a hypothesis regarding the impact of competition 
between the patron and parent state on state and institution building, which 
captures competitive diffusion influences. The case study chapters, meanwhile, 
explore how the varying degrees of Russian involvement affect the state and 
institution building processes of Abkhazia and result in observable implications such 
as similarities across Abkhaz and Russian state and institution structures, institution 
sharing or enhanced public service provisions. 
  
 
8 I understand governance institutions as institutions that enable groups or societies to 
organise and make decisions. Governance in that sense embodies a broader idea of norms, 
principles and practices related to governing certain groups. While governments are 
common bodies of such authority, governance institutions are not restricted to governments 
but can be employed by groups as wide ranging as civil society bodies and private companies. 
Government institutions, on the other hand, refer to particular physical governmental bodies 
that are in charge of implementing policies and therefore simultaneously represent potential 
governance institutions (see Stoker 1998; Rosenau 1992; Rhodes 1996). Unless otherwise 
stated, this thesis focuses predominantly on governance institutions of the central de facto 
state government, such as government institutions, the military or schools. I only 
occasionally refer to alternative governance structures, such as clans or non-governmental 
organisations on the de facto territory of Abkhazia. 
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1.2 Literature Review  
This thesis can be situated in the academic literature on state building, de facto states 
and international patron-client relations. It also touches on the post-conflict 
literature surrounding state building in failed or war-torn states. The Venn diagram 
below (figure 1) represents the contribution of this thesis at the intersection of the 
three circles.  
 
Figure 1 Literature Review 
 
 
1.2.1 State Building in De Facto States 
Several in-depth case studies of state building in de facto states illustrate the varying 
state building processes in de facto states ranging across entities such as Somaliland 
(Richards 2014; Johnson & Smaker 2014; Richards & Smith 2015), Kosovo (Capussela 
2014), Iraqi Kurdistan (Richards & Smith 2015), Bougainville (Ghai & Regan 2006), 
Taiwan (Chu & Lin 2001) as well as a variety of Eurasian de facto states (von 
Steinsdorff 2012; Zabarah 2012; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; 2017; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 
2011; Berg & Mölder 2012; Comai 2018a). Other works attempt more general 
overviews of de facto states instead that in certain instances touch on state building 
(see e.g. Pegg 1998; King 2001; Kolstø 2006; Bahcheli et al. 2004; Caspersen 2012; 
Florea 2017; Ishiyama & Batta 2012). Some of these studies directly or indirectly 
explored the reasons for relatively successful state building within the unfavourable 
context of limited international recognition. Richards (2014) and Richards and Smith 
De Facto States 
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State Building 
State building in de facto states without a 
patron (e.g. Richards 2014; Johnson & 
Smaker 2014; Richards & Smith 2015) 
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Comai 2018a; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012; 
Caspersen 2009) 
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(2015), for instance, illustrate in gripping detail Somaliland’s state building 
trajectories without extensive external support. This thesis intends to contribute to 
this literature by accounting for the role of patron states in the state and institution 
building endeavours of de facto states with an external patron. In order to grasp the 
direct and indirect influence of patrons on state and institution building in de facto 
states, it is necessary to outline prevailing state and institution building 
developments in these unrecognised entities.  
A set of common de facto state characteristics, such as the limited 
international recognition (Pegg 1998; King 2001), security and survival concerns 
(Caspersen 2012; Kolstø 2006; Johnson & Smaker 2014: 13), ethno-nationalistic 
tendencies (Caspersen 2011: 6), informal practices and corruption (Caspersen 2012; 
Kolstø 2006; Lynch 2004; Pegg 1998) and “weak econom[ies] and state structures” 
(Kolstø 2006: 723; Caspersen 2012) represent an additional layer of complexity to 
the state building processes of de facto states (a more detailed discussion on state 
building in de facto states can be found in the theoretical framework of this thesis in 
chapter 2). Despite the variations in state building levels and approaches, most de 
facto states have at least attained basic statehood functions (Caspersen 2012: 51). 
The post-Soviet de facto states, for instance, successfully built the territorial and 
institutional basis for statehood (von Steinsdorff 2012: 202) and developed the 
groundwork for achieving internal legitimacy of the entities, leaderships and 
institutions (Caspersen 2012: 78-79; Bakke et al. 2013: 3). De facto states exemplify 
thereby that international sovereignty in itself is not a necessary condition for state 
building (von Steinsdorff 2012: 201). Indeed, statehood in form of high levels of 
centralised control and capacity does not automatically increase the provision of 
public services and goods (Lee et al. 2014: 636). Studies by Ó’Beacháin (2012) and 
Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2012) even argue that the lack of international recognition can 
benefit state building and democratisation in de facto states. This is in line with 
Johnson and Smaker’s (2014: 18) and Richards and Smith’s (2015: 1718) claim that 
the potential prospect of recognition may facilitate state building and internal 
legitimacy by presenting a unifying narrative for the population. At the same time, 
limited international involvement and oversight may facilitate a degree of stability 
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and enable nascent de facto states to adapt institutions and governance to domestic 
structures and needs (Kolstø 2006; Richards & Smith 2015: 1718).  
Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) disentangle the state building process in 
Transnistria into different overlapping phases from securing physical control over the 
contested territory, over to establishing the monopoly of legitimate use of force and 
basic public service provision and finally developing internal sovereignty and nation 
building. Their subsequent study (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012) refers to state and nation 
building processes in the de facto states of the South Caucasus as the establishment 
of territorial control, institutionalisation of power through elections and the 
development of institutions as well as identification with the unrecognised entity. 
Similarly, Caspersen (2012: 78-79, 85) refers to two integral processes of domestic 
state building in de facto states in form of establishing central coercive control and 
establishing internal legitimacy. Rather than referring to state building phases, this 
thesis explores state building trajectories and prioritisation in Abkhazia’s state 
building development of the 1990s to reflect the likely decision-making approaches 
of domestic authorities towards state building. This method uncovers patterns of 
state formation that are informed by the geopolitical and economic considerations 
of the young de facto state, explores the bounded agency of state builders and 
reveals areas of potential access to the Abkhaz state for external actors.  
 
1.2.2 The Role of Patron States in External State Building  
Post-conflict states may receive external support in a variety of forms ranging from 
economic, security, democratisation and governance aid to the provision of public 
services and goods (see e.g. Fearon & Laitin 2004; Krasner & Risse 2014). The limited 
international recognition of de facto states does not automatically imply a lack of 
external support. Indeed, de facto states can derive support from a variety of 
external sources, such as patrons, diaspora groups, cross-border communities and 
even their parent state (Caspersen 2012: 51). Zartman (1995: 272) and Caspersen 
(2014) stress the usefulness of such external assistance for state building in de facto 
states.  
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Conversely, Lake (2011; 2016) describes the limitations and dilemmas of 
external state building interventions of internationally recognised, but failed states. 
External state building is more likely to succeed if external actors commit extensive 
resources long-term, the involvement is institutionalised and legalised, 
responsibilities are clearly set up, processes are observed by an authority and local 
conditions are considered (Krasner & Risse 2014: 559). Moreover, some post-conflict 
and development studies are critical of the success of externally led state building 
and stress that state building processes must originate within the state to establish 
‘local ownership’ (see e.g. Chesterman et al. 2004; Narten 2006; Etzioni 2004). 
Clearly, several of these conditions, particularly the observation by an authority are 
not present in the case of external state building in de facto states.  
In weak or failed (but internationally recognised) states, there are mixed 
findings about the ability of external actors to provide public goods and services in 
sectors such as health care and education (Lee et al. 2014: 646). Nascent states, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that are unable to provide basic public services and 
goods to their citizens due to financial constraints or preoccupation with security 
concerns may rely on non-state actors, such as aid organisations, NGOs, businesses 
or diaspora groups to offer these services to the public (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 18). 
In these cases, financial support does not necessarily pass through the government, 
but to other development actors, such as aid agencies that take on the service 
provider position of some traditional state sectors. Somaliland, for example, is reliant 
on its diaspora, international organisations (such as the UNDP) or non-state 
organisations to invest in public infrastructure projects, development aid and the 
provision of public services (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 18).  
Until recently, the de facto state literature rarely accounted for the 
implications of using the term ‘patron state’. Prominent works on de facto states 
(Pegg 1998; King 2001; Caspersen 2008; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008), for instance, do 
not define patron states despite using the term repeatedly in their work. Even most 
accounts that directly engage with the role of patron states, patronage or patron-
client relations (e.g. Bakke et al. 2018; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012; O’Loughlin et al. 
2015; Gerrits & Bader 2016; Comai 2018a; 2018b) neither offer a definition of patron 
states nor do they refer back to definitions of patron states or patron-client relations 
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in preceding literature. However, over the past few years, some scholars started 
engaging with patron-client relations to analyse de facto states (Devyatkov 2017; 
Berg & Pegg 2018; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2017; Berg & Vits 2018) by either relying on 
the patron-client models of the Cold War period (most prominently Shoemaker & 
Spanier (1984) and Carney (1989)) or on Veenendaal’s (2017) understanding of 
patron-client relations in the context of micro states.  
The concrete influences and contributions of patron states on the state 
building processes of de facto states also remain insufficiently explored. While a 
number of articles and books (Caspersen 2008; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Gerrits & 
Bader 2016) have assessed the influence of patron states on de facto states in the 
military, financial and political spheres, few studies examine the effect of patron 
states on the capacity of authority structures and the provision of public services and 
goods in de facto states. Caspersen’s (2009), Blakkisrud and Kolstø’s (2012) studies 
as well as Comai’s (2018a) PhD thesis touch upon the role of patron states in the state 
building processes of post-Soviet de facto states and are notable exceptions in this 
regard. Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2012), for instance, specify the role of patron states 
beyond mere security, financial and infrastructure assistance, by also referring to 
their position as providers of practicalities such as telecommunication, postal and 
transportation links as well as passports that enable de facto state citizens slightly 
wider international access. Comai (2018a: 73) argues that “it is external assistance 
that allowed these entities [post-Soviet de facto states] to enhance state capacities.” 
Yet, Comai (2018a: 34) also perceives patron-led state building practices in de facto 
states to overlap with patron state integration.  
The de facto state literature does not agree on the concrete contribution of 
patron states on the state building development of de facto states and to what extent 
high levels of patron support may be advantageous or unfavourable for de facto 
states. Comai (2018b: 182) argues that the “state-capacity and political economy [of 
post-Soviet de facto states] is largely determined by the technical and financial 
assistance they receive from external actors.” Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008) find that 
state building in de facto states in the South Caucasus is influenced by exogenous 
political aspects as well as the position and strength of both the parent and patron 
state. The stance of the challenger state, a consistent patron state and a generous 
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and active diaspora enhance state building in de facto states, according to their 
study. Additionally, the relative strength of a patron in international politics can 
impact de facto states in terms of international recognition and state and nation 
building (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Sterio 2010; Coggins 2011; Caspersen 2015).  
Caspersen (2009) and Broers (2015) caution the predominant emphasis on 
patron states and instead shift the focus on domestic state building developments of 
de facto states, the role of de facto elites and local ownership. The focus on external 
actors, for instance, does not answer how de facto states secure resources and how 
the resources and opportunities available to them shape their state and institutional 
structure (Broers 2015: 138). This thesis contributes to the discussion surrounding 
the role of patron states by differentiating between direct and indirect patron 
diffusion influences on the state building process of de facto states in a context of 
dependency and bounded agency. Moreover, this study statistically explores the 
extent to which patrons shape the state building developments and number of 
governance institutions in these unrecognised entities.  
 
1.2.2.1 Legitimacy Dynamics in Domestic and External State Building 
Legitimacy represents an underlying or arguably even central theme of the state 
building literature. Particularly for regimes of post-conflict, nascent or secessionist 
entities legitimacy embodies a key objective of their state building ventures 
(Caspersen 2015; Walter 2006; Bakke et al. 2018; Richards 2014; Ghani et al. 2006; 
Ghani & Lockhart 2008). Separatists, for instance, not only need to win the 
secessionist conflict, but also demonstrate that they are able to establish state 
foundations, assume governance responsibilities and provide the population with 
public services and goods in order to ensure their legitimacy (Bakke et al. 2018: 159; 
Bakke et al. 2013: 3). It is therefore not surprising that the de facto state literature 
has placed increasing emphasis on internal legitimacy dynamics in de facto states 
(Caspersen 2012; Berg 2012; Berg & Mölder 2012; Bakke et al. 2013) 
Regimes that pursue domestically led state building in de facto states without 
a patron, on the one hand, depend on the legitimacy of the local population to 
continue their exercise of sovereignty (Richards 2014: 56-57). This means that the de 
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facto leadership needs to convince the public of their ability to build a state, instil 
stability and security in the contested territory and protect the public from external 
threats in order to legitimise the de facto regime (Bakke et al. 2013: 1, 3). Caspersen 
(2012: 78-79, 85) highlights similarly that state builders in de facto states not only 
need to establish central control, but also develop internal legitimacy through public 
service provision or ethno-nationalism. Importantly, Bakke and her colleagues (2013: 
12) not only link Weberian state building ideals surrounding the monopoly of 
legitimate force to internal legitimacy, but also other relational service provisions 
ranging from security to health. 
The leadership of de facto states with an external patron, on the other hand, 
need to achieve internal legitimacy and manoeuvre the potential negative side 
effects of external patron engagement on their legitimisation strategies. While 
military patron support may be essential for the security of de facto states, it can 
have negative consequences for the internal legitimacy of the entity on the receiving 
end (Caspersen 2015: 7). External expectations and demands are likely translated 
into the state building process of de facto states, which may challenge the internal 
legitimacy of the de facto entities (Richards 2014: 56-57, Zartman 1995; Caspersen 
2015: 3). While a combined understanding of the joint legitimacy of both domestic 
and external state builders would benefit the effectiveness of the external 
involvement, this form of negotiated understanding of legitimacy is rarely met 
(Krasner & Risse 2014: 547-548; Boerzel & van Huellen 2014; Lake & Farris 2014). 
Still, the extent to which the population of a given state legitimises the external 
involvement decides the influence of external actors on state capacity and service 
provisions (Krasner & Risse 2014: 555). Similarly, external policies are only 
implemented and sustainable if domestic elites accept them (Chesterman 2004; 
Narten 2006). The involvement of domestic elites and groups, rather than the 
superficial incorporation of domestic elites, in the state building process can increase 
the level of legitimacy (Capussela 2014: 13-14). If the external actor removed an 
unfavourable ruler, this improves the perception of the external actor (Krasner & 
Risse 2014: 552). Some form of institutionalisation, such as interstate agreements 
may benefit the external state building intervention, because it can increase the 
likelihood of local involvement (Boerzel & van Huellen 2014; Krasner & Risse 2014: 
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552). While this thesis touches upon the ways in which de facto elites utilise state 
building in form of public service and goods provisions to legitimise their rule, it 
engages mostly with the ways in which patron involvement is or is not legitimised by 
the local population and stakeholders (further details on legitimacy dynamics can be 
found in chapters 2 and 7).  
 
1.2.2.2 Agency under Dependence 
De facto states that find themselves in patron-de facto state relations tend to be 
reliant on the patron’s economic, military and infrastructure support for their survival 
(Caspersen 2012: 82; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 291). Still, de facto state governments 
show a multitude of signs of agency relating to policy making and implementation as 
well as institution building (von Steinsdorff 2012: 201-202; Caspersen 2012: 82). Also 
Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2012) are critical of a view that considers the de facto states 
of the South Caucasus as puppets in the patron’s strategic ambitions and emphasise 
that the Abkhaz regime has at times tried “to keep […] Russia at arm’s length even if 
it means missing out on economic development” (291). Comai (2018a) takes a slightly 
more pessimistic approach toward de facto state agency. In the context of what 
Comai (2018a: 87) refers to as “the relative normalcy of their external dependence,” 
de facto authorities of the post-Soviet space tend to display agency by pragmatically 
managing relations with their patrons (2018a: 34-35). Yet, Comai argues that the 
post-Soviet de facto regimes pursue the “maintenance of the symbolic attributes of 
sovereignty” (2018a: 34) while moving towards patron state integration.  
In this context, it is important to consider that dependency is in no way a 
static phenomenon, but rather a fluctuating process. The fluctuating dependency is 
shaped by the availability of alternative support sources, the extent of de facto state 
involvement in the international system, the degree of patron involvement and the 
extent to which parent states permit external involvement in the breakaway region 
(Caspersen 2012: 109). The effects of this fluctuating dependence on state building 
and legitimisation are debated. Some scholars argue that even if entities are 
dependent on an external actor, this does not chip away at the internal sovereignty 
of these territories (Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2008: 373). Zartman (1995), meanwhile, 
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argues that patrons are likely to reduce the level of internal legitimacy within de facto 
states. Developing legitimacy under dependence therefore necessitates the 
legitimisation of external involvement while maintaining or growing internal 
legitimacy. 
Thus, rather than understanding de facto states as mere pawns that are under 
complete control of the patron states, it is more fruitful to consider de facto state 
agency and domestic developments within the framework of a dependency 
relationship. This ultimately shifts the focus away from the binary of whether de facto 
states can demonstrate agency or not (because several studies have shown that they 
can), to questions surrounding the extent to which domestic decision-making can 
take place independently from the patron’s perceived interests. Therefore, the 
theoretical framework of this thesis enables considerations of how de facto state 
agency may be bound by the perceived interests and activities of patrons which in 
turn informs the influence of coercive, mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion 
sources in dependency relationships.  
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1.3 Argument and Research Outline 
This thesis argues that patrons can nurture the dependence of de facto states on 
patron support by pursuing a multi-layered policy of granting de facto state agency 
in an international setting of limited alternatives while providing support that 
discourages self-sufficiency. Patrons, for instance, limit the extent to which they 
support state and institution building in de facto states. Patron states support these 
unrecognised entities in guaranteeing minimal civilian governance to ensure a 
degree of sustainability and reduce the likelihood of public discontent by helping the 
de facto leadership in the early phases of its legitimisation process. In the early 
phases of the state building process, de facto state governments are more 
susceptible to the influence of external actors, whereas with proceeding 
developments and more domestic accountability, de facto state governments are 
slightly less reliant on external support. There are few indicators that patron states 
provide state building assistance to de facto states beyond this stage. Patrons appear 
to not support de facto states in achieving coherent government structures including 
an economic extraction and redistribution system, border management and internal 
security, as this would reduce the level of de facto state dependence on the patron 
state. Due to the ensuing degrees of dependence, direct military, financial and 
political involvement of the patron is not always necessary, as de facto elites tend to 
pursue the perceived patron interests in their state and institution building 
development without direct patron engagement. The variations in patron 
involvement in state and institution building processes of de facto states across time, 
intensity and patrons can therefore be explained with the potential of patron states 
to shape developments in de facto states both through immediate patron 
involvement and indirect diffusion influences. 
Striving for a status quo of dependence can also explain why Russian 
involvement is linked predominantly to infrastructural reconstruction rather than 
capacity building in Abkhazia. The case study thereby illustrates the ways in which a 
patron equips a de facto state’s regime with an institutional infrastructure that 
enables basic public service provision but not the necessary skills and capabilities to 
utilise the infrastructure independently. The lack of support for Abkhazia’s soft 
capacity development ties Abkhazia closer to Russia and appears to be the biggest 
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threat to output legitimacy of Russian actions. Nonetheless, Russian support is largely 
legitimised and accepted, partly due to the limited viable alternatives for Abkhazia. 
Moreover, rather than contributing to the development of governance institutions, 
patrons and de facto states pursue a policy of institution sharing, where patrons take 
over government functions and responsibilities from the de facto entity. This may 
explain why the number of governance institutions in de facto states tends to 
decrease when a patron state is present. While it is not possible to identify 
governance institutions in Abkhazia that are outright missing due to Russian 
involvement, the underdevelopment of some Abkhaz state sectors can be traced 
back to Russian patronage. 
The formal changes in the Russo-Abkhaz relationship in 1999 shaped the 
relative importance of direct and indirect diffusion influences. The economic easing 
period encouraged direct coercive diffusion instruments ranging from financial 
contributions to agreements that specified trading regulations between the two 
parties. The growing coercive diffusion influences also encouraged the role of 
normative and mimetic diffusion channels between Abkhazia and Russia. Particularly 
since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence in 2008, Russia has passed 
treaties and agreements with the de facto state that specify state building measures. 
The institutionalisation of the Russo-Abkhaz relationship in form of agreements and 
treaties also increases the likelihood for both mimetic and normative diffusion, 
because they set specific institutional and public service provision standards. At the 
same time, the bilateral nature of the agreements and treaties safeguards Russia’s 
quasi monopolistic position over the external influences on Abkhazia’s state building 
processes. An additional direct instrument that nurtures Abkhaz dependence on 
Russia is the patron’s control of relevant de facto politicians to ensure their loyalty 
through the provision of significant financial contributions and military support. 
While the Russian authorities are not necessarily concerned about micromanaging 
politics and state building in Abkhazia, the patron is interested in having candidates 
in place that have a favourable view of Russia. This can be considered a strategy by 
Russia to encourage mimetic and normative diffusion channels, rather than coercive 
diffusion.  
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Despite this degree of Russian involvement in Abkhazia’s state building 
process, direct engagement and control does not always appear to be necessary for 
the de facto elites to pursue Russian interests. Even during Abkhazia’s period of 
partial isolation, Abkhaz elites adjusted their actions and plans according to 
perceived Russian interests and activities, due to normative, mimetic and 
competitive diffusion influences, which encouraged legislative and institutional 
isomorphism and a degree of endogenous state building. Thus, Abkhazia achieved 
the most notable state building boost during a period of uncertainty and partial 
isolation in the 1990s when Russia did not officially function as Abkhazia’s patron.  
Due to the limited availability of viable alternative choices, de facto regimes 
are less likely to resist coercive influences and more susceptible to indirect diffusion 
influences in form of mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion. The agency of 
dependent de facto states is therefore likely to be bound by the perceived interests 
and activities of the patron. This bounded agency increases the likelihood for 
legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de facto state and its patron. 
Still, in this arena of limited manoeuvre and course of action, the de facto authorities 
and civil society repeatedly displayed agency and signalled autonomy in the symbolic 
fields of language policies and private property provisions. 
This thesis comprises nine chapters. The second chapter develops the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, which combines distinctive sets of 
characteristics of de facto states with state building theories to offer a better 
theoretical understanding of endogenous and exogenous state building 
developments in de facto states. Furthermore, the chapter presents a theoretical 
framework that is predominantly based on diffusion theories that differentiate 
between direct coercive influences of the patron, on the one hand, and indirect 
patron influences that take the form of mimicry, normative and competitive 
diffusion, on the other hand. Considerations relating to the role of legitimacy and 
dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations complement the theoretical 
framework and set the theoretical basis for uncovering layers of patron engagement. 
The third chapter proposes a conceptualisation of patron states in the context 
of patron-de facto state relations that builds on critiques of existing literature on 
patron-client relations from the Cold War period and more recent articles 
33 
 
surrounding patron states and microstates. The proposed conceptualisation of 
patron states encourages a closer engagement with the implications of using this 
concept and concurrently a more precise discussion and assessment of patron 
influences on de facto states. The chapter argues that domestic characteristics of 
patron states cannot account for common factors of patron state identification, but 
that patrons should be examined from a relational perspective. The 
conceptualisation proposes dependencies and foreign policy instruments as the 
defining components of patron-de facto state relations. The ensuing patron state 
conceptualisation challenges Florea’s (2014) coding of patron states and suggests an 
alternative classification of patron states in his data set.  
The research design chapter (chapter 4) introduces the reader to the 
quantitative and qualitative methods employed in this research. The statistical 
methods analyse a modified data set of all de facto states between 1945 and 2011 
that was originally developed by Florea (2014). The alterations encompass the 
inclusion of a set of new dependent and independent variables, an alternative 
conceptualisation of patron states and different statistical models to capture the 
effect of patron states and competitive diffusion on state and institution building in 
de facto states. These findings will be complemented with qualitative research that 
explores the single case study of Russian involvement in Abkhazia’s state building 
development since the early 1990s. The application of process tracing in the 
qualitative chapters empirically establishes that both direct and indirect diffusion is 
at work in Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes. The case study 
predominantly relies on interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Sukhumi,9 Saint Petersburg 
and Moscow in 2017 and 2018, as well as primary sources, such as agreements 
between Russia and Abkhazia, Abkhaz government reports, UN reports and 
photographic evidence from Abkhazia.  
The fifth chapter examines the influence of patron states on state building in 
de facto states by developing state and institution building models using Florea’s 
 
9 This study predominantly uses the translated versions of Russian or Soviet names of cities 
(e.g. Sukhumi) and regions (e.g. Gali). This rather pragmatic choice does not disclose some 
of the subtleties and sensitivities of certain terms, especially in post-conflict contexts. By 
acknowledging my decision, I do not intend to undermine or dismiss alternative names used 
in these settings. 
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(2014) adapted time series cross-sectional data set. The chapter highlights that 
patrons appear to matter most when de facto states go from a stage of separatist 
control over the means of violence to a stage of basic civilian governance including 
minimal public administration, health and education services. Meanwhile, patrons 
do not seem to significantly impact the change from basic civilian governance to 
coherent governmental structures. Furthermore, this chapter shows that patrons 
decrease the number of governance institutions in a given de facto state. 
Additionally, the quantitative results present patron states as indirect competitive 
diffusion sources by highlighting that a militarily stronger parent state increases the 
likelihood of attaining coherent governance structures, while not affecting the step 
to basic civilian governance and even decreasing the number of governance 
institutions.  
Chapter 6 explores the ways in which indirect diffusion sources shaped the 
domestic state and institution building developments of Abkhazia. By following the 
causal chains of indirect diffusion laid out in the theoretical framework and process 
tracing the source material, this case study chapter empirically establishes that 
indirect diffusion (mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion) has a causal effect 
on Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes. Placing the analytical focus on 
indirect diffusion influences reveals how the perceived interests of patron states, 
trade links and even the relative power vis-à-vis the parent state may change the 
behaviour and actions of domestic elites without direct patron engagement. Russian 
mimetic and normative diffusion influences ensured that Abkhaz agency was bound 
by Russian perceived interests without direct Russian involvement which ultimately 
shaped Abkhazia’s state building development in form of legislative and institutional 
isomorphism.  
Chapter 7 identifies the extent to which Russia directly shapes Abkhazia’s 
state building process. This chapter examines Russia’s role as a patron state, how it 
communicates its interests and policy preferences, the presence of change agents on 
the ground, as well as its use of centralised and decentralised support for Abkhazia. 
Moreover, the chapter analyses Russian foreign policy instruments in Abkhazia, such 
as agreements and financial support, and the extent to which Russian involvement 
in Abkhazia is legitimised by the Abkhaz elite, civil society and the wider population. 
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These foreign policy instruments function as coercive diffusion instruments, that 
have simultaneous indirect diffusion influences on the capacity and public service 
provision of the recipient. The chapter argues that Russian support is linked 
predominantly to infrastructural reconstruction rather than capacity building and 
training, as part of Russia’s goal to nurture continued dependence. Meanwhile, 
patrons take on specific governing or service provision tasks from Abkhazia. The 
chapter refers to this process as institution sharing and highlights these shared 
governance responsibilities as a contributing factor for the lower number of 
governance institutions identified in the statistical chapter.  
The final chapter (chapter 8) argues that the combination of Abkhazia’s 
selective neglect of its education sector (including a restricted geographic coverage) 
and Russia’s primary focus on infrastructural support created opportunities for other 
international and domestic actors to emerge as diffusion sources and assume 
responsibilities of the state. The chapter also provides an in-depth analysis of how 
direct and indirect patron involvement and bounded agency have shaped Abkhazia’s 
education sector since the early 1990s. This chapter, for instance, highlights that 
increased competition with the parent state can facilitate both domestic policy 
responses and direct patron involvement. Moreover, diffusion sources from Russia, 
international donors and NGOs do not necessarily compete outside of the Gali 
district, but can instead complement each other. The conclusion of this thesis 
(chapter nine) revisits and reflects on the findings of the thesis, considers some of 
the limitations of the presented research and suggests potential further research 
directions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
Patrons and State Building in De Facto States 
A Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to understand the state and institution building developments of de facto 
states and the extent to which external actors have shaped these processes, it is 
tempting to extract central ideas and theories from the state building literature in 
similarly contested or war-torn states. The state building literature on failed states, 
states with limited statehood, weak states and post-conflict states offers valuable 
theoretical insights into a number of aspects of the state building process ranging 
from international interventions to legitimacy. However, compared to weak or failed 
states, de facto states tend to represent comparatively strong and stable self-
governing entities (de Waal 2018: 6) considering the limited international recognition 
and the precarious international context that these regions find themselves in. 
Therefore, some of the assumptions put forward by the state building literature of 
internationally recognised but weak states may not hold true in the context of de 
facto states. Indeed, state building in de facto states challenges several assumptions 
and theories proposed by the literature on state building in internationally 
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recognised states. The involvement of patron states, for instance, may seemingly 
follow similar paths as those of external actors engaging in the state building process 
of failed or post-conflict states. However, this chapter highlights how patron state 
involvement can challenge common assumptions and intrinsic motivations behind 
external state building practices, which in turn affects dependency and legitimacy 
dynamics in de facto states.  
Given the restricted applicability of some state building frameworks to de 
facto states and since these state-like entities operate in a distinct domestic and 
international context, this chapter combines state building theories of internationally 
recognised states with common characteristics of de facto states. Common 
characteristics of de facto states include their limited international recognition, 
economic capabilities, state building prioritisation and ethnic contexts. By combining 
the distinctive set of characteristics of de facto states with state building theories and 
taking the international isolation of de facto states into account, this chapter enables 
a discussion of the interplay of domestic and international approaches to state 
building in de facto states. Some de facto state characteristics, for instance, may 
benefit the development of state capacity and the provision of public goods and 
services in form of facilitating a consensus-oriented environment (Ó’Beacháin 2012) 
or encouraging institutionalisation to strive for earned sovereignty (Caspersen 2012; 
Broers 2014). Yet, the limited international recognition of de facto states makes 
these entities more susceptible to the influence of countries or actors that choose to 
support them. These potential dependencies on external actors, common among de 
facto states, can result in institution sharing and limited institutional development.  
Following this discussion of the applicability of state building theories to the 
context of de facto states, this chapter presents a theoretical framework that 
captures the influence of patron states on the state building process of de facto 
states. The theoretical framework is predominantly based on diffusion models that 
differentiates between direct coercive influences of the patron, on the one hand, and 
indirect patron influences that take the form of mimicry, normative and competitive 
diffusion, on the other hand. Considerations relating to the role of legitimacy and 
dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations complement the framework.  
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2.1 Operationalising State Building 
State building is an academically contested concept without a universal definition 
and little agreement on what specific aspect of the state building process researchers 
should focus their attention on. The varying conceptualisations and applications of 
this term have resulted in a wide array of research subjects and findings ranging from 
the development of states ministries, the provision of public services and goods, 
power sharing practices, up to good governance ideals. At the same time, state 
building is repeatedly used synonymously or in combination with seemingly related 
concepts such as nation building (Ghai & Regan 2006; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008), 
peace building (Paris 1997), democratisation (Fukuyama 2004b; Huntington 1991) 
and modernisation (Przeworski 2010). The interdisciplinary combination potential of 
state building has had the side effect of losing its capability to identify specific 
research subjects and characteristics that would allow a measurement of state 
building effectiveness.  
In other instances, state building analyses are unnecessarily limiting in their 
research scope by focusing selectively on those processes and institutions that one 
would expect in Weberian ideals of governance. Instead of restrictively analysing the 
development of an institutionalised technocracy or good governance practices, 
research would benefit from taking the local context into consideration, by 
examining what actions local elites pursue in order to survive or to acquire the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force. State building can, for instance, be the 
unintended result of interactions of individuals and groups who struggle for control. 
This brief glimpse into the ambiguous nature of state building highlights the 
importance of justifying the research focus of a study. Thus, the next two sections 
attempt to conceptualise and operationalise state building and apply it to the context 
of de facto states.  
 
2.1.1 The State 
The research focus of this thesis on de facto states requires a cautious handling of 
the term ‘state’, because these unrecognised entities challenge basic assumptions in 
the state building literature related to sovereignty, recognition and control. In order 
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to include the connotations and outcomes associated with state building in this 
thesis, it is therefore imperative to clarify the term state and the potential 
implications of certain assumptions surrounding it. Weber (1946: 78) defines the 
modern state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Skocpol (1979: 29) expands 
Weber’s definition of the physical force and means associated with a modern state, 
by arguing that a state is “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations 
headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first 
and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and 
support coercive and administrative organizations.” Similarly, Krasner (1999: 4) 
refers to the institutional structures of states as “the formal organization of political 
authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective 
control within the borders of their own polity.” Gellner’s (1983: 4) definition focuses 
particularly on the role of institutions within the state. According to him, the state is 
an “institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of 
order.” This thesis utilises the definitions of the state by Weber (1946), Skocpol 
(1979) and Gellner (1983) and understands the state as a set of institutions that are 
executed by an authority in order to establish order. This would mean that de facto 
states not only need to fulfil juridical statehood, but also empirical statehood by 
exhibiting responsibilities of a sovereign state in form of institutional and 
organisational capacity that ensures a degree of authority (Jackson 1990: 21).  
The Weberian conception of what constitutes statehood and governance still 
shapes the state building involvement of states, international donors, NGOs and 
other international organisations in many conflict or post-conflict locations. 
However, the idea that the state follows prescriptions for governance that are in line 
with Weberian (1946) ideals such as a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, a 
rational and rule-based bureaucracy and charismatic or traditional leadership that 
enhances control over the state has received considerable criticism. De facto state 
governance or state building in fragile states, for instance, does not necessarily 
reflect the primary focus on the consolidation of attaining the monopoly over the use 
of force and a rational bureaucracy. The consolidation of power is also not reliant on 
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service delivery in all areas of the territory.10 Furthermore, internal state legitimacy 
in de facto states is not solely based on key-Weberian state functions of stability and 
control, but also on the ability of central governments to provide a variety of other 
services and goods (Bakke et al. 2013). Similarly, Richards (2014: 4) is critical of the 
predominant focus on the monopoly and legitimisation of force and control in the 
state building literature as a first means to achieve and uphold statehood, because, 
statehood has evolved beyond a Weberian idea of the monopoly of force and 
includes social, economic, political and humanitarian “actions of the central 
government outside the realm of physical and territorial security.”  
This expansive understanding of state responsibilities within de facto and 
fragile states including ‘Western’ values and norms, liberal democracies and market 
economies tends to derive from international norms of statehood, that ultimately 
shape domestic state building processes (Richards 2015: 4). Richards (2014; 2015) 
warns that domestic actors considered this predominance of international norms 
harmful for Somaliland’s stability and that domestic contexts and demands to the 
state were included in the entity’s state building development as well. In the case of 
Somaliland, this resulted in a variation of the modern state in form of a hybrid regime 
that encompasses indigenous clan governance and ‘Western’ models of state 
building (Richards 2014: 13).  
Another criticism of a common state perception relates to international 
norms of sovereignty and external involvement in domestic affairs (Lake 2014: 515). 
Krasner (1999; 2004) points out that while Westphalian sovereignty, a system that, 
in simplified terms, excludes external actors from interfering in the domestic power 
structures of entities, has been considered the appropriate model of state 
interactions. Yet, the reality of state practices has not reflected this ideal. Krasner 
(1999; 2004) terms this contradictory phenomenon ‘organized hypocrisy’ and 
identifies involvements of external actors in domestic authority structures across 
history. Meanwhile, de facto states appear to be repeatedly criticised for the 
involvement of external actors, particularly patron states, in their domestic affairs. 
 
10 Thanks to Dipali Mukhopadhyay for this insight in her working paper “Palace Politics as Competition 
Management in Karzai’s Afghanistan” presented on 23rd January 2019 at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science.  
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While the extent of the reliance on external support in de facto states may arguably 
be higher than in many other internationally recognised states, it would be 
‘hypocritical’ to criticise de facto states for external involvement in their authority 
structures.11 Indeed, not the mere existence of support is meaningful, but the extent 
and the area of external involvement. In the case of Abkhazia, for instance, it is 
insightful to study where Abkhaz elites permit external involvement (i.e. security, 
military, financial sector) and where the same elites appear to be more protective 
(i.e. private property, language provisions). 
 
2.1.2 State Building 
This thesis builds its theoretical basis on a rich state building literature from areas of 
limited statehood or failed states (see e.g. Lake & Fariss 2014; Krasner & Risse 2014; 
Brinkenhoff & Brinkenhoff 2002; Lake 2011; 2016) as well as de facto state case 
studies on state building (see e.g. Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2011; 
2012; Bakke et al. 2013; Richards 2014; Comai 2018a). This literature helps to 
operationalise state building, reflect on concerns around legitimacy and dependency, 
as well as identify potential explanations for the development of institutions ranging 
from structural, domestic, external to diffusion causes.  
Despite the varying applications of state building, most definitions have an 
underlying consensus that state building is institution building in one way or the 
other. Scholars predominantly refer to state building as “interventionist strategies to 
restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state” (Scott 2007: 3). These 
interventionist strategies not necessarily originate exogenously but can also have 
endogenous or structural roots. In the case of de facto states, the focus of state 
building is not restricted to the restoration and rebuilding of institutions, but in some 
instances also on the novel creation of such institutions. The context of de facto 
states is ultimately more in line with Fukuyama’s (2004b: 17) understanding of state 
building as the “creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of 
existing ones.” Building on this understanding, Johnson and Smaker (2014: 4-5) argue 
 
11 Comai (2018b) therefore argues that the post-Soviet de facto states act similarly to small 
dependent jurisdictions.  
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that state building refers to the development of centralised institutions that enable 
revenue creation and security and order guarantees, as well as the provision of public 
goods. Yet, according to Richards (2015: 5), state building goes beyond mere 
technocratic institution building, because it manifests itself as “socio-political change 
that creates, sustains and legitimizes a separate political entity, both to the 
international community and to the domestic audience.” This means that when 
armed groups become state builders and take on governance responsibilities in form 
of security, control and provision of public goods, this opens up channels for rebels 
to ensure legitimacy and reduces internal struggles against them through democratic 
involvement, economic support and security provision (Bakke et al. 2013: 3). 
Another set of scholars, most notably Lake (2011; 2016), refers to state 
building as an externally led development. Similarly, Sahin (2015: 1) understands 
state building as  
 
long-term involvement of international agencies in the 
construction of democratic government capacities in 
‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ countries in attempt to prevent the 
recurrence of violent conflict and contain the global 
security implications of their weak or non-existent 
governmental capacity through establishing and 
strengthening the institutional foundations of 
sustainable peace.  
 
Lake (2016) points out that the development of institutional structures is only 
meaningful if the external ‘statebuilder’ achieves legitimacy of the domestic 
authorities. Therefore, the role of external actors is not restricted to ensuring the 
monopoly of violence, but also to enable social transformations (Lake 2016: 4). Based 
on these definitions, in addition to Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s definition of hard state 
building (2008), this thesis conceptualises state building as the formation and 
strengthening of state institutions in order to establish control over the territory and 
population and provide public services and goods in order to achieve internal 
legitimacy.  
In practical terms, this thesis operationalises state building as processes that 
(1) develop centralised institutions that ensure a level of state capacity and (2) the 
ability of the state to provide public services and goods to the public. At first glance 
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these two points may appear closely interlinked or even interdependent, however, 
research in areas of limited statehood has shown that state institutions and capacity 
are not a necessary condition for the provision of public services (Krasner & Risse 
2014: 545; Lee et al. 2014: 635).  
Despite the focus on governance institutions and the provision of public 
services and goods, this thesis does not take an institutionalist stance towards state 
building. This is due to the belief that a state and its authority structures can only 
achieve legitimacy if governance institutions deliver public goods and services such 
as security, public health and education. Thus, rather than understanding democracy 
and free markets as guarantors of legitimacy, this thesis, similarly to Lake (2011; 
2016) and Hobbes (1651/2009), considers legitimacy to stem from relational 
authority in form of public goods and service provision. At the same time, even when 
an ideal type institutional set-up and service provisions are present, this does not 
guarantee the legitimacy and survival of an entity (Lake 2016: 16). Nonetheless, state 
capacity, authority structures and governance institutions may benefit a de facto 
state’s ability to provide services, particularly in cases where they cannot rely on 
external support. 
The first component of state building in form of the capacity (statehood) of 
authority structures refers to the (re)construction of a “state’s monopoly of violence, 
suppression of other violence-wielding groups, and equally reconstituting the 
legitimacy of that monopoly” (Lake & Fariss 2014: 572). Social contract theories 
suggest that individuals are willing to pass over their rights to a state if the state 
offers collective security by taking on the monopoly over the means of violence 
(Hobbes 1651/2009).12 The control over the monopoly over the means of violence 
appears to be a priority in the state building strategies of de facto state. Lee, Walter-
Drop and Wiesel (2014: 637) argue that a state’s rightfulness to rule and to hold the 
monopoly of force needs to be continuously supported through output legitimacy, 
even when citizens internalised the rightful role of the state. In the case of de facto 
states, the provision of public services and goods and continued output legitimacy is 
 
12 This increasing importance of guaranteeing external and international security in exchange 
for passing over one’s rights played an important part in the emergence of states in 16th and 
17th century Europe (Tilly 1992). 
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arguably important as citizens of de facto states may alternatively pursue services 
from their patron or parent state or potentially even favour reintegration. While war 
legacies and animosities reduce the likelihood of reintegration, the case of Abkhazia 
shows that some citizens do indeed take on health services both in the parent 
(Georgia) and patron state (Russia) that are not provided by the Abkhaz authorities.  
Meanwhile, the development of the capacity of authority structures in form 
of public institutions can be a part of a (de facto) state’s nation building strategy as it 
not only encourages smoother public service and goods provision, but it also enables 
a degree of homogenisation and coercion (Tilly 1975: 43). It is exactly this coercion 
ability that enables states to extract the necessary resources for and regulate a 
system that provides public goods and services to its citizens (Lane 1972; Pfeiffer et 
al. 2008).  
Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008: 484) definition of ‘hard’ state building in the de 
facto states of the South Caucasus specifies the functions and actions of government 
institutions that are part of statehood creation by referring to the formation of three 
key areas namely the administration, economy and military. More specifically this 
includes “the establishment of frontier control, securing a monopoly of coercive 
powers on state territory, and putting into place a system for the collection of taxes 
and tolls” (see also Kolstø 2000; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2004: 8-10). Similarly, Florea’s 
(2014) variables ‘degrees of state building’ and ‘number of governance institutions’, 
discussed in the research design chapter of this thesis, represent useful 
measurements of state capacity of de facto states at a given point in time. While the 
number of governance institutions does not necessarily reflect the actual capacity of 
an institution, it provides some indices of the present physical infrastructure and 
institutional priorities in the state building process.  
The second component of state building takes the form of the provision of 
collective goods and services by the state. These good and services range from 
services such as education, health, sanitation to basic social services (OECD 2006) and 
can span as wide as the provision of a clean environment (Krasner & Risse 2014: 546). 
Simultaneously to the advance of the modern state in Europe, the normative 
understanding of what collective goods the state is required to deliver to its citizens 
increased beyond mere security provision (Lee et al. 2014: 636). The focus on the 
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state as the primary provider of public services and goods is shared by large portions 
of the state building literature and development programmes. Not only appears 
there to be a global normative understanding that it is the state’s responsibility to 
provide public goods and services, the state is also considered an appropriate actor 
that either directly or by creating a framework of rules and regulations ensures that 
other actors provide these goods or services (Lee et al. 2014: 635). However, 
decentralisation reforms in a variety of developing countries in an attempt to 
improve the provision of public services and goods have resulted in governments and 
international donors “transferring power to a wide range of local institutions, 
including private bodies, customary authorities and NGOs” (Ribot et al. 2008). It is 
also not uncommon for regimes to receive external support to guarantee the 
provision of public services and goods. Particularly in the case of de facto states, self-
sufficient public service and goods provision is unlikely given the financial and 
economic effects of large-scale international isolation.  
As mentioned above, this thesis considers legitimacy to stem from relational 
authority in form of public service and goods provision and institutions as a way of 
achieving this provision. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the de facto states of 
the South Caucasus, “[p]eople’s concerns about the provision of public goods such 
as democracy, economic development, and health services are, in addition to 
perceptions of safety and security (or lack thereof), important determinants for 
internal legitimacy” (Bakke et al. 2013: 12). Public service and goods provision 
represents a direct link between citizens and their state and plays a considerably role 
in the visibility of the state and its legitimisation to its citizens in terms of justifying 
taking on new powers over their constituents (Lake 2011; Levi 1989, 1997). This 
visibility and potential legitimatisation source is significant for governments of de 
facto states, as the de facto authorities need to simultaneously legitimise the new 
(de facto) state, governance institutions and the leadership in order to decrease the 
risk of being challenged by their citizens. Thus, external patron support does not 
necessarily hamper the legitimisation process of de facto states, as long as a de facto 
regime is able to sustain public service and goods provision by sustaining healthy 
relations with a patron. In this context, it is important to note that public service and 
goods provision is only one of several legitimisation sources for de facto regimes. A 
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restrictive focus on public service and goods provisions does not capture a regime’s 
full range of potential legitimisation strategies and practices.  
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2.2 State Building in De Facto States 
Some de facto states may be considered similar to their sovereign counterparts in 
regard to their populace, territory, government and civil society. Still, these 
unrecognised entities challenge basic assumptions of political and legal legitimacy, 
sovereignty and statehood in the international system. Particularly the limited 
international recognition of de facto states adds further complexities to the state 
building development of these entities by restricting their financial potential while 
simultaneously making the de facto governments arguably more susceptible to the 
influence of those external actors that decide to engage with them. Based on these 
additional dimensions of state building in form of dependencies and limited financial 
means, de facto states should not make the likeliest candidates for state building. 
Nonetheless, state building, statehood and public service and goods provision is not 
only a potential prospect of de facto states but has become a reality in a variety of 
cases across the globe (King 2001; Caspersen 2012; Richards 2014; de Waal 2018).  
Hence, this section combines common characteristics of de facto states with 
state building theories in order to assess the extent to which de facto states may 
challenge some commonly held assumptions of state building developments. 
Capturing these endogenous state building paths in de facto states enables an 
assessment of direct and indirect patron state influences on these developments 
later on. Essentially, this section shows that state building can benefit from limited 
international recognition, because it might incentivise domestic cooperation and 
motivate democratic state building in order to ‘earn sovereignty’ (Caspersen 2012; 
Broers 2014: 152). Moreover, the international context of de facto states that tends 
to be defined by war legacies and geopolitical competition, can enhance the 
development of state capacity particularly in the military sector. Yet, the limited 
international recognition and weak political and economic structures of de facto 
states tends to create dependencies with some external actors and encourages 
institution sharing that in turn may limit the development of state capacity and 
independent provision of public services and goods.  
Despite the terminological disagreements surrounding de facto states and a 
sensible caution to generalise the diverse experiences of de facto states, it is possible 
to identify some broad commonalities across a wide set of de facto states. Most of 
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the de facto state literature, for instance, agrees that de facto states sustain on an 
international and inter-state level despite their lack of widespread international 
recognition and not being considered formally sovereign in international law. Indeed, 
de facto states find themselves in unusual and adverse international environments 
in which only a small number of states, if any, recognise their self-proclaimed 
independence and their participation in international affairs is severely limited. 
Limited international recognition and contested external sovereignty can 
significantly impede the traditional understanding of state building developments. 
State building practices such as international interventions with or without 
international supervision (Lake 2016, Sahin 2015), public-private partnerships 
(Beisheim & Liese 2014) and (neo-)trusteeship (Lake & Fariss 2014; Fearon & Laitin 
2004) are either unthinkable or at least highly unlikely in instances where parent 
states oppose or limit the state building interference of the international community. 
Instead, de facto states tend to rely on patrons, diaspora communities, international 
donors, corporations or NGOs for state building support ranging from basic 
humanitarian aid to more complex sharing of governance tasks. This symbolises that 
the limited international connectedness of de facto states does not automatically 
imply limited external engagement in the domestic developments of these 
unrecognised entities.  
State building activities of external actors in the international community are 
in most cases not harmonised (Ghani et al. 2005; Samuels & von Esiedel 2004; Paris 
2006). This is even less so the case, when a patron state is involved in the state 
building of de facto states, as multilateral state building and oversight does not exist 
as such in these unrecognised entities. Unsurprisingly, de facto states are therefore 
more prone to be affected by the one or two countries that recognise and choose to 
support them. Similarly, as de facto states are unable to access international money 
pools in forms of loans, grants and large-scale aid due to their lack of international 
recognition, they tend to rely on either the above-mentioned external actors for 
support or modifications to trade policies to ensure financial input.  
Thereby, the limited international recognition of de facto states may develop 
dependencies on actors ranging from diaspora groups, patron states, international 
donors and NGOs. Zartman (1995: 272), for instance, argues that external support 
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plays a central role in facilitating state building in de facto states, warning 
simultaneously that long-term reliance on external actors may result in higher levels 
of dependency and vulnerability. Similarly, Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008: 495) argue 
that the de facto states of the South Caucasus are not in a position to provide the 
necessary services to their population “without relying heavily on external support 
and infrastructure.” These dependencies may include the reliance on financial or 
military support but might go as far as the sharing of governance tasks and 
institutions. Dependencies also occur in the state building development of 
internationally recognised states, such as areas of limited statehood. However, in the 
case of de facto states, dependencies ensue due to limited alternative options, rather 
than the inability to perform statehood tasks themselves. 
While limited international recognition may exclude some traditional state 
building strategies for de facto states and makes them more susceptible to the 
(oftentimes unregulated) influence of alternative external actors, a special edition on 
state building and democratisation in de facto states highlights that “the established 
theoretical assumption that uncontested external sovereignty is a necessary 
precondition for internal democratization needs to be reconsidered” (von Steinsdorff 
2012: 201). In other words, de facto states do not require uncontested international 
recognition in order to ensure state building and even democratisation (von 
Steinsdorff 2012: 203). Ó’Beacháin (2012), for example, links the formation of a 
consensus-oriented environment in Abkhazia to its volatile international status, 
which facilitated cooperation and compromises among different political and ethnic 
groups in order to circumvent instability and parent state reintegration.  
A second commonality of de facto states that may affect state building in 
these entities relates to the reasoning of de facto governments behind state building. 
On the basis of the existing literature, it is possible to identify three types of 
motivations for state building in de facto states. First, de facto states tend to appear 
in areas of the world that experience conflict and volatility (Caspersen 2011: 6). 
Under such geopolitical pressures, some de facto state leaders might be driven by 
security or even survival concerns and therefore direct their state building strategies 
towards military power and ethno-nationalism rather than pluralism (Ishiyama & 
Batta 2012: 124). Johnson and Smaker (2014: 13) even go as far as to argue that 
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“militarism is to be expected in nascent states that lack international recognition.” In 
practice, this means that de facto states may prioritise the development of its military 
and police in order to guarantee the safety of the public and combat potential 
external threats (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 5). Somaliland’s security sector, for 
example, accounts for more than half of the de facto state’s expenditures, even 
though Somalia as the parent state does not even present a concrete threat to 
Somaliland (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 7). The de facto government of Puntland, as an 
additional example of high military and police expenditures, spends around 90 per 
cent of its overall budget on its military, police and public administration (Johnson & 
Smaker 2014: 7).  
While control over the territory is an important component of achieving 
statehood in de facto states, these entities tend to overdevelop their security 
apparatus (Caspersen 2012; Kolstø 2006). In the case of Somaliland and Puntland, 
two de facto states without a patron, the lack of international efforts to protect the 
two entities encouraged state building and the development of the security 
apparatus of the two de facto states (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 18). As mentioned 
above, the growth of the security apparatus in light of the absence of international 
protection can be seen as an integral part of the nascent state building efforts of de 
facto states, arguably more so in de facto states without a patron than with a patron. 
Abkhazia’s de facto governments, for instance, allowed and encouraged high degrees 
of institution sharing in the security sector with its patron Russia from 1999 onwards. 
This form of institution sharing, however, disincentivised the development of 
Abkhazia’s own security apparatus.  
Second, a number of de facto states have seceded from their parent states, 
which may facilitate state building in form of competition between the parent and 
the de facto state. Nagorno-Karabakh’s threatened status in addition to Azerbaijan’s 
status as a strong perceived enemy encouraged reforms and service provisions in 
Nagorno-Karabakh to legitimise the entity’s independence, despite high polarisation 
and little compromise incentives (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2012). Similarly, Somaliland’s 
commitment to independent statehood unified leaders, the population and 
facilitated stability (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 12). De facto states that pursue 
reconciliating efforts with their parent states may witness fewer incentives to 
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develop statehood as the examples of Puntland (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 16) and 
Gagauzia suggest (Zabarah 2012). Third, the lack of recognition may serve as a 
motivating force for state building in de facto states. Caspersen (2012) and Broers 
(2014), for instance, highlight that striving for international recognition can be an 
incentive for pursuing (democratic) state building strategies. 
A third commonality of de facto states that can affect state building is the 
oftentimes weak economy and state structure of these entities (Caspersen 2012; 
Kolstø 2006), that are partially due to ‘the economic cost of non-recognition’ (Pegg 
1998: 43).13 In practice, this involves weak tax systems, few trading partners, 
embargos, corruption and limited foreign investment (Caspersen 2012; Kolstø 2006; 
Lynch 2004; Pegg 1998). De facto states that undergo war, for example, oftentimes 
experience more crime that flourishes under limited order (Eide 1999). The low 
development of de facto state economies and state structures can push these 
entities into dependency relationships with external actors and may encourage 
economic reforms and restructuring that ensures budget income through high 
import and export tax (Caspersen 2012: 63). Somaliland, for instance, employs high 
taxes on trade and receives occasional loans from local businesses or diaspora 
(Bradbury 2008).  
Yet, the literature on fragile states (see Reno 2000; Chabal & Saloz 1999) has 
shown that state weakness not necessary results in limited power of domestic elites. 
A weak state apparatus may be a sign of vested power in powerful influential 
informal networks. It is therefore not surprising that political actors in de facto states 
are oftentimes able to operate effectively in these state-like forms, even though the 
political situation is ambiguous and lacks de jure recognition. Reno (2000) argues that 
this perception and symptom of state weakness can be a strategy of authorities to 
grow their power. Indeed, “the creation or attainment of a state (or statehood) is not 
always the dominant strategy of political actors who function within asymmetric 
constraints, even if territory they control appears state-like in form and function” 
(Harvey 2010: 16). Domestic actors or powerful informal networks may even regard 
 
13 Certainly not all de facto states are inherently weak. According to von Steinsdorff (2012: 
202), for instance, “all post-Soviet de facto states succeeded in stabilizing the territorial and 
institutional foundations of their statehood.” 
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state and institution building as a considerable disincentive. Therefore, domestic 
actors within de facto or failed states with informal networks may perform deliberate 
disruptions to reforms which ultimately causes an even weaker institutionalisation 
of control. If we assume that domestic political actors can operate effectively in de 
facto states despite the weakness of the state structures, it is not surprising that 
institution building is not the ultimate aim of authorities within de facto states, but 
rather military and economic security. These factors change our normative 
assumptions about the behaviour and motivations of domestic actors in regard to 
state building and the influence of external actors.  
Unlike most weak, fragile, collapsed or failed state, some de facto states have 
not lost the monopoly on legitimate force and control within their de facto borders 
(Caspersen 2012). However, de facto state with a patron state are more likely to lose 
their monopoly on legitimate violence, due to the strong military component of the 
patron-de facto state relationship. Instead, one can observe a duopoly on legitimate 
violence in these de facto states. There are also examples where external actors take 
on or share institutions or governance tasks with the de facto authorities (what 
Popescu (2006) and Comai (2018a) refer to as “outsourcing (de facto) statehood”). 
Research from areas of limited statehood has found mixed evidence showing that 
external actors “may provide goods and services in lieu of (or alongside) the state’s 
own efforts” (Lee et al. 2014: 649-650). Milli Lake’s analysis of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (2014), for instance, highlights that “governance is frequently 
the product of a complex sharing of sovereignty, involving a multitude of domestic 
and international actors” that work either with or independently from government 
agencies (Lake 2014: 515). In the case of weak or failed states, “state weakness can 
facilitate and be used to justify extraordinary interventions by external actors in the 
domestic authority structures of states” (Lake 2014: 515-516). In the case of de facto 
states, however, external interventions and institution sharing tends to be justified 
by the limited availability of other sources of support.  
The final commonality of de facto states with possible implications for state 
building in de facto states refers to the ethno-national character and status of these 
entities. De facto states, with a few notable exceptions such as Transnistria and 
Gagauzia, tend to follow ethno-nationalistic leanings (Caspersen 2011: 6), which 
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contributes to limited political pluralism (Ishiyama & Batta 2012: 124).14 Ethno-
nationalistic tendencies can, for instance, be identified in Taiwan’s state building 
process, which involved the preferential placement of so called ‘mainlanders’ and 
‘half-mountains’ into government and administration seats, rather than native 
Taiwanese (Chu & Lin 2001: 112). Preferential appointments based on the dominant 
ethnicity or the ethnicity that represents the government appears to be a common 
occurrence in heterogeneous and particularly homogenous de facto states. This is 
not to say that ethno-nationalistic tendencies in the institutional structure and hiring 
processes are impossible occurrences beyond de facto states.  
The ethno-national character of some de facto states ties back to Lake’s 
insistence that “[s]tatebuilding is not just a matter of getting the institutions “right” 
[…], but a process of social transformation that, to be successful, must realign the 
internal cleavages that caused the state to fail in the first place and then, 
paradoxically, were typically deepened by the conflict itself” (Lake 2016: 4). 
Ó’Beacháin (2012) finds that despite Abkhazia’s ethnic heterogeneity and positive 
discrimination favouring ethnic Abkhaz, a consensus focused environment, relatively 
competitive and fair elections and even shifting powers were able to emerge, due to 
the volatile international status that brought both political and ethnic groupings 
together. Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) identify similar state building processes and 
domestic elite behaviour due to external threats in Nagorno-Karabakh. Unlike 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh is ethnically homogeneous, more politically polarised 
and less compromising. These are examples where domestic factors influence state 
building more than external pressures and the presence of a true cause or identity 
(von Steinsdorff 2012: 202). Still, parent state pressures may increase the likelihood 
of preferential treatments and ethnically motivated hiring. 
Gagauzia, as a notable exception, initially opposed a purely ethnic Gagauzian 
polity. However, later on, “the predominance of Gagauz nationals in the regional 
administration and pressure tactics against non-Gagauz were repeatedly criticized” 
(Zabarah 2012: 186). Transnistria represents yet another notable example in that its 
 
14 According to Ishiyama and Batta (2012: 129-130), highly ethnically homogenous de facto 
states that simultaneously have a low GDP per capita and a society that is largely 
unmilitarised are more likely to have a dominant party system. 
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de facto government did originally not pursue a national identity based on an ethnic 
character. Instead, the de facto authorities developed this identity after de facto 
independence, which shows that a national and ethnic identity can be developed at 
a later stage (von Steinsdorff 2012: 202).  
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2.3 Patron States in the State Building Processes of De Facto States 
Patron states shape the state building processes of de facto states not only by directly 
interfering in the institutional and policy developments of these unrecognised 
entities, but also by indirectly representing a source for institution or legislative 
imitation. In order to capture the extent to which patron states influence the state 
building processes of de facto states, it is therefore necessary to grasp both the direct 
and indirect influences of patron states. Henceforth, this section proposes a 
theoretical framework that builds on diffusion models to distinguish between direct 
and indirect patron influences.15 In addition, the framework accounts for legitimacy, 
agency and dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations that shed light 
on the ability of domestic actors to deliberately challenge, justify or internalise 
diffusion influences. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is predominantly based on Gel’man 
and Lankina’s (2013) diffusion model that combines the temporal and elite focus of 
the democratisation literature (e.g. Geddes 1996; Way 2005; Kitchelt et al. 1999) with 
the spatial dimension of diffusion theories (e.g. O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Kopstein & 
Reilly 2000) to explain varying democratisation outcomes in Russian regions. Their 
model builds on Powell and DiMaggio’s (1983) study, that conceptualises diffusion as 
an isomorphic process “that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units 
that face the same set of environmental conditions” (149). The diffusion model 
proves valuable in capturing both direct and indirect patron influences on de facto 
states and explaining institutional and legislative similarities and differences between 
patrons and de facto states.  
Diffusion theories assume that spatial connections and proximity shape 
institutional outcomes. Kopstein & Reilly (2000: 2), for example, measure how 
political and economic conditions in the post-communist space can be explained with 
the “spatial diffusion of influence, institutions, norms, and expectations across 
borders.” Also, Bakke et al. (2018) and Toal (2017) stress the analytical leverage of 
 
15 Previous studies make similar distinctions. An article by Lankina et al. (2016: 230) 
distinguishes between direct and indirect diffusion influences in the context of pre-
communist literacy and post-communist outcomes, where the former not only affects the 
latter directly, but also indirectly through communist party saturation.  
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considering the geographic context of de facto states. Clarifying the nature of 
spatiality in the context of patron-de facto state relations is therefore necessary in 
order to capture the ability of patrons to shape institutional and legislative outcomes 
in de facto states through diffusion. Spatial factors are not necessarily restricted to 
geographic proximity, but also cover the extent of connections and interactions 
between domestic actors and external agents that encourage change (Gel’man & 
Lankina 2013: 45). Thus, Gel’man and Lankina differentiate between two interrelated 
spatial components. On the one hand, spatial proximity in form of geographic 
closeness and, on the other hand, spatial proximity in form of contacts between 
external and domestic actors. While geographic proximity may contribute to the 
extent of connections and interactions between two actors, contiguity or proximity 
is not a necessary condition for extensive exchanges (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 44-
46).  
Diffusion models so far contributed to the analysis of developments across 
internationally recognised states (see e.g. O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Brinks & Coppedge 
2006; Starr & Lindborg 2003; Kopstein & Reilly 2000) and sub-national contexts 
(Gel’man & Lankina 2013). In order to assess the applicability and appropriateness of 
diffusion models to contexts of patron-client relations and de facto states, it is 
necessary to consider whether one can speak of spatial proximity in the case of 
patron-de facto state relations. Even though de facto states are not part of a federal 
network that propagates a specific institutional framework, de facto states are 
exposed to diffusion influences from patrons, diaspora groups, international donors 
and parent states. While many de facto states have patrons in their close proximity 
if not even across their de facto borders, certainly not all de facto states are 
geographically close to their patrons (e.g. Taiwan, Anjouan and Katanga). 
Nonetheless, patron-de facto state relations usually involve strong linkages at least 
in the military sphere, but oftentimes also in the political, economic and social sector. 
These contacts between the elites of patrons and de facto states and in some 
instances even between societal actors allows us to refer to spatial proximity in the 
case of patron-de facto state relations.  
Powell and DiMaggio (1983) differentiate between three non-mutually 
exclusive diffusion influences that result in isomorphic developments: coercive, 
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mimetic and normative diffusion. First, coercive diffusion tends to involve a powerful 
actor, such as a government or international organisation, that purposefully 
influences the institutional or policy choices of another actor (Appuhami et al. 2011). 
Coercive diffusion may take a variety of forms ranging from financial pressures, 
sanctions to attaining the monopoly over information or expertise (Dobbin et al. 
2007). Coercive diffusion appears to be particularly prominent in hierarchical and 
authoritarian systems (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 45). For coercive diffusion to achieve 
the intended legislative or institutional isomorphism, the dominant entity requires 
so-called transfer or change agents, that represent actors on the ground that actively 
shape the decision-making or the desirability of a specific path in the recipient region 
(Evans 2009; Holden 2009; Rogers 1995). Transfer or change agents may, for 
instance, represent NGOs, state representatives, journalists or political parties. In 
Gel’man and Lankina’s (2013) study on Russian regions, for example, United Russia 
embodies the national government’s change agent on the ground that facilitates 
institutional or legislative developments. The causal mechanisms at play are an initial 
provision of financial, military or political incentives and pressures of the patron on 
the de facto authorities through change agents on the ground. By lobbying the 
decision-makers in the de facto state, change agents facilitate institutional or 
legislative amendments. These coercive diffusion influences need to be legitimised 
by the de facto authorities and society in order to take effect (see section 2.3.1). 
Furthermore, de facto authorities also have the ability to challenge certain coercive 
diffusion influences depending on their bounded agency (see section 2.3.2) 
Coercion, in this context, does not explicitly refer to the use of force, but the 
ways in which patron states achieve outcomes in the de facto states that the de facto 
regime was originally unwilling or did not intend to do. In that sense, coercion can be 
facilitated through financial and military incentives or agreements. While 
agreements between the Russian and Abkhaz governments demonstrate some 
degree of de facto state influence on the drafting process, the unequal power 
distribution prioritises the patron’s agenda. Even if Sukhumi incorporated passages 
into a treaty with Moscow, the patron holds the upper hand in deciding whether the 
treaty should be passed and the passage should be included.  
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Second, mimetic diffusion captures processes where actors deliberately copy 
and reproduce policies or institutions from another entity (Dobbin et al. 2007; Shipan 
& Volden 2008). Mimetic diffusion emphasises the centrality of agency of the 
recipient actor, whose ability and willingness to mimic legislations and institutions is 
shaped by necessity and the linkages with the imitated counterpart. Mimetic 
diffusion is prevalent during periods of high uncertainty among the leadership and 
the public concerning the appropriate institutional or policy choices (Mooney 2001), 
because entities that have made institutional or policy choices in similar contexts 
may serve as a guiding example for the uncertain leadership and public (Gel’man & 
Lankina 2013: 45). The causal chain of mimetic diffusion influences can be 
established by identifying legislative and institutional similarities of the patron and 
de facto state that transpire following a time lag. 
Third, normative diffusion refers to soft or material forces that are considered 
“legitimate and reputable” (Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 153) by domestic actors and 
consequently inform the institutional or policy choice of decision-makers. These soft 
or material forces may, for instance, include cultural similarities, propaganda or 
financial incentives and can originate from a wide range of actors such as civil 
societies, international organisations or states. Whether or not forces are considered 
legitimate and reputable and therefore shape the institutional or policy choices of an 
entity is likely to differ depending on the leadership, time and entity. Unlike coercive 
and mimetic diffusion influences, normative diffusion follows less distinct causal 
chains. Still, researchers can search for indicators in interviews and agreements that 
de facto authorities perceive the patron state as an appropriate source for 
institutional and legislative changes in the de facto states and therefore design 
institutions, legislations and service provisions inspired by the patron.  
These three diffusion influences are complemented with a fourth channel in 
form of competitive diffusion. Traditionally, competitive diffusion occurs in contexts 
where entities compete for capital or market shares, which shapes the policy or 
institutional outcomes of the involved parties (Appuhami et al. 2011: 433). 
Competitive diffusion is, however, also transferable to the state building processes 
of de facto states where perceived or actual competition with the parent states or 
other external actors may facilitate policy or institutional developments. In these 
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cases, competition not so much centres around attaining economic leverage, but 
demonstrating to parent states and the international community that a given de 
facto regime is sustainable and able to provide public services and goods including 
territorial security and defence. This means that competitive diffusion plays out in 
the geopolitical realities of de facto states involving patron, parent state and 
international community forces, which can shape the legislative and institutional 
structures of de facto states. Competition between the parent and patron state of a 
de facto state can, for instance, facilitate financial and security guarantee transfers 
from the patron state to the de facto state and encourage legislative and institutional 
isomorphism. In terms of causal mechanisms, competitive diffusion influences 
involve institutional, legislative or service provision changes that are facilitated by 
the de facto state authorities’ perception of competing parent state involvement in 
the de facto state. When a variety of competing diffusion sources reach an entity, 
what Savage (1985: 14) refers to as “poly-nuclear” influences, the institutional 
outcomes on the ground may be uneven depending on the strength of each 
propagation model (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 58). Abkhazia’s education sector, for 
instance, has experienced competing external and domestic influences from Russia, 
Georgia and a set of international donors and NGOs, which shaped the policy and 
institutional outcomes in Abkhazia (see chapter 8). 
The theoretical framework of this thesis proposes that the degree of 
competition in the triadic relationship of patron, de facto and parent states shapes 
the predominance of direct or indirect diffusion channels.16 Assuming that patron 
 
16 Based on the previous theoretical review of state building in de facto states, it is possible 
to make inferences about the central actors and their interests in the state and institution 
building processes of de facto states. The key players are de facto, patron and parent states 
as well as to a limited extent the international community. The main actors in de facto states 
comprise of de facto authorities that serve as the central decision-making bodies and civil 
society groups that can propose policy ideas and legitimise state and institution outcomes. 
De facto states are first and foremost interested in political survival and are therefore willing 
to accept some degree of dependence on their patron. However, challenges to some external 
patron pressures and the pursuit of viable alternative support sources beyond the patron 
(Berg & Pegg 2018; Dembińska & Mérand 2019) serve as indicators that de facto authorities 
do not favour complete reliance on patron support. Patron states comprise of actors such as 
the central government and a range of change agents on the ground including the official 
patron representations such as embassies, military personnel, media outlets and ministers. 
Patrons are interested in sustaining de facto states to uphold their geopolitical advantage, 
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states favour a degree of dependence of de facto states on patron support while 
providing limited financial, military and political involvement, patrons are likely to 
encourage indirect diffusion channels to reduce the costs associated with direct 
diffusion channels. Yet, heightened competition with the parent state is likely to 
encourage a rise in direct and indirect diffusion influences. Due to the necessity for 
further military and financial support to protect the de facto state from perceived or 
actual parent state pressures, direct diffusion influences are expected to rise. Also 
indirect diffusion influences increase during periods of more intense competition, 
because the de facto authorities perceive the patron as the predominant supporter 
and ultimately a source of normative and mimetic diffusion. Thus, heightened 
competition with the parent state encourages similarities in institutional and 
legislative outcomes in de facto states, higher levels of institution sharing and 
potentially less developed state capacity. When competition in the triadic 
relationship is perceived as less severe by de facto and patron authorities, direct 
diffusion influences are likely to decline, because the patron assumes lower demand 
for military and financial support. Indirect diffusion influences, meanwhile, sustain 
unless the de facto authorities have the ability to diversify their support network by 
exploring viable alternative support sources outside patronal support.  
Approaching patron influences on de facto states from a diffusion 
perspective, enables this thesis to theorise the differences between direct and 
indirect patron influences by distinguishing between direct coercive influences, on 
the one hand, and indirect influences of the patron in form of mimicry, normative 
and competitive diffusion, on the other hand (see figure 2 for a visualisation of the 
theoretical framework). The separation between direct and indirect diffusion 
channels distinguishes between the extent of patron involvement in the de facto 
state as well as the agency of the de facto authorities. Direct diffusion channels 
represent immediate patron involvement with de facto state authorities through 
 
while limiting financial and military costs associated with direct involvement in the de facto 
state. This thesis argues that patron states therefore nurture a degree of dependence of the 
de facto state on patron support by providing limited financial, military and political 
involvement that discourages self-sufficiency. Parent states and the international 
community primarily represent a source of potential competition and contribute to some 
extent to the provision of public services and goods. 
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change agents that inform the institutional or legislative outcomes of de facto states 
(e.g. financial incentives, military promises, political pressures, agreements that set 
out institutional and legislative measures). Even though de facto state authorities can 
challenge some direct patron involvement, the recipients have limited agency 
beyond the implementation of the directives. Indirect diffusion channels refer to 
legislative and institutional developments in de facto states that were initiated by the 
de facto authorities and indirectly shaped by the patron (e.g. by setting an imitable 
example, signing agreements that have unintended spill-over consequences).  
The theoretical framework of this thesis thereby addresses the shortcoming 
of the de facto state literature to distinguish between direct and indirect patron 
influences. Framing Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia along the concepts of linkages 
and leverage (Gerrits & Bader 2016), for instance, does not differentiate between 
policies that Russia actively promotes in Abkhazia and legislative and institutional 
isomorphism that is due to Abkhaz elites mimicking Russian policies or institutions. 
In that sense, the theoretical framework offers causal mechanisms that may explain 
the causes of legislative and institutional isomorphism that Gerrits and Bader (2016) 
observed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, the framework guides the 
identification of areas of patron influence where domestic elites are more 
susceptible to diffusion influences. Lankina and Libman (2019), for instance, highlight 
trade and production chain dependencies in Ukraine from the Soviet period that 
facilitate diffusion through institutional path dependencies even in the post-Soviet 
space. 
Two additional variables complement this theoretical framework and equip 
the qualitative analysis of Russian influences on Abkhazia’s state building processes 
with tools to capture the dynamics and nuances of patron-client relations: 
considerations of the role of legitimacy in patron-de facto state relations and the 
implications of bounded agency in dependency relations. Legitimisation and 
bounded agency serve as transition variables (reflected by the orange bars in figure 
2) in the sense that direct and indirect diffusion channels need to transit through a 
legitimisation process and may be challenged by a de facto state’s bounded agency. 
In practical terms, this means that for direct diffusion influences to affect a de facto 
state’s state capacity and the provision of public services and goods, the coercive 
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diffusion channels need to be legitimised by the de facto authorities and public. 
Furthermore, de facto state authorities have the ability to challenge diffusion 
influences despite the unequal power dynamic and de facto state dependence on the 
patron, which is represented by the bounded agency transition variable. These two 
transition variables address a shortcoming of the diffusion literature that 
insufficiently accounts for the necessity of legitimacy to develop and sustain 
institutions as well as the possibility for the recipient regime to challenge direct 
diffusion influences. Thereby, the two variables also complement the argument of 
this thesis by clarifying that direct and indirect diffusion influences do not necessarily 
shape a de facto state’s state and institution building processes unhinderedly and 
immediately.  
 
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.3.1 Legitimacy Dynamics in External State Building Interventions  
The state building literature of failed states and areas of limited statehood 
emphasises the centrality of legitimacy for the sustainability of state building 
developments particularly when external state builders are involved. Essentially, 
Lake (2016: 1) argues that the goal of state building “is to create a state that is 
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regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority.”17 From a 
relational perspective on authority, legitimacy and compliance in external state 
building interventions derives from a social contract that specifies the exchange of 
public services and goods between the external state builder or domestic 
government and the population (Lake 2016: 17). Legitimised external state building 
operations in areas of limited statehood have the advantage of requiring 
comparatively fewer interventions, less funding and minimal institutionalisation 
(Krasner & Risse’s 2014: 547).  
This thesis engages particularly with the ways in which external patron 
engagement is legitimised by the recipient civil society and authorities.18 Broadly 
speaking, legitimacy can be distinguished between empirical and normative 
legitimacy. The former refers to the extent to which domestic actors consider the 
external involvement as appropriate and ultimately worth complying to, whereas the 
latter captures how normative and moral standards justify the external involvement 
(Krasner & Risse 2014: 555). The focus of this thesis is primarily on empirical 
legitimacy, which Scharpf (1999) divides into input and output legitimacy.19 Input 
legitimacy, on the one hand, denotes how the quality of public involvement in the 
decision-making process can increase the likelihood of external actor legitimisation.  
Output legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the target population’s 
perception of the appropriateness and performance quality of state building efforts 
by external actors. Krasner and Risse (2014: 557) identify two ways in which actors 
can attain output legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. First, international actors 
may be considered legitimate if the domestic population or elite awaits a certain 
outcome or trusts the “knowledge and moral authority” of the international actor. 
Second, the legitimacy of an external actor increases if the initial actions meet the 
 
17 Legitimacy, in this context, refers to a social contract where individuals pass over their 
rights to a dominant state in return for public services and goods, such as security and order 
(Lake 2011: 8). 
18 This focus is not to diminish the central role of internal legitimacy in the state building 
developments of de facto states (for studies on internal legitimacy in de facto states see e.g. 
Caspersen 2012; Berg 2012; Berg & Mölder 2012; Bakke et al. 2013). 
19 In addition to input and output legitimacy, Krasner and Risse (2014: 556) also consider “the 
conformity of international norms with moral beliefs held by local or national communities” 
as an important legitimacy source. 
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expectations of the domestic actors (see also Beisheim & Liese 2014; Matanock 
2014). Relatedly, external actors not only need to ensure legitimacy through their 
actions and outcomes, but also by continuously promoting its norms (Boerzel & van 
Huellen 2014).  
 The theoretical framework of this thesis embeds these external legitimacy 
dynamics by considering the legitimacy requirement as a potential transition variable 
that diffusion influences need to cross in order to shape the state building processes 
of de facto states (represented by the orange bar in figure 2). While diffusion 
influences may explain legislative and institutional isomorphism, they do not account 
for the sustainability and legitimacy of these institutional and legislative outcomes. 
Institutional and legislative mimicry, for instance, may shape the de facto 
government’s internal legitimacy and the legitimacy of the institutions. The 
legitimacy dynamics in patron-de facto state relations in general and the case of 
Russian involvement in Abkhazia in particular will be analysed in more detail in 
section 7.3 of this thesis.  
 
2.3.2 Bounded Agency in the Context of Dependency 
Dependencies in patron-client relations shape the nature and translation of diffusion 
influences into the state building developments of de facto states. While relations 
between de facto states and their patrons rarely imply a complete transfer of 
authority, Lake (2016: 1-2) warns that external actors, that are willing to fund state 
building, “are likely to have interests in the future of that country, and will therefore 
seek to promote leaders who share or are at least sympathetic to their interests and 
willing to implement their preferred policies.” This, in turn, can reduce the internal 
legitimacy of the leadership, which Lake (2016: 70-77) refers to as the ‘statebuilder’s 
dilemma’. Furthermore, the acceptance of a dominant state’s involvement reduces 
the subordinate state’s possibilities and privileges of setting their own policies (Lake 
2011: 9).  
Yet, most entities voluntarily accept subordination if they receive something 
for this in return. Also dominant entities are willing to accept financial and possible 
political costs associated with the relationship if they benefit from the engagement 
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(Lake 2011: 7). Within this context, Comai (2018b: 189, 193) identifies a pragmatic 
approach of post-Soviet de facto states toward sustained dependence on their 
patron by striving for “sustainability rather than self-sustainability.” Building on these 
dependency dynamics that capture a degree of agency of the dependent state, the 
theoretical framework of this thesis offers explanatory power as to why domestic 
actors may be more susceptible to mimic, challenge or justify specific diffusion 
practices of external actors. Thus, dependencies should not only be regarded as a 
way for external actors to coerce certain institutional or policy choices on the 
recipient state, but also as a mechanism that shapes the room for manoeuvre and 
courses of action of domestic elites. Understanding de facto state agency in the 
context of dependency and layers of diffusion may offer insights into varying state 
building outcomes. This is why (bounded) agency represents a second transition 
variable, symbolised by the second orange bar in figure 2, that shapes the ways in 
which diffusion sources influence the state building processes of de facto states. 
Diffusion frameworks have the analytical advantage of considering not only 
the reflective nature of the adopting agent, but also the contextual environment that 
may shape the decisions of domestic actors (Strang & Soule 1998: 266-267). Gel’man 
and Lankina (2013) highlight, for instance, how regions may act in contexts of limited 
choice and that entities can resist coercive diffusion in certain settings. They explain 
the varying institution outcomes in Russian regions not only with the aspirations of 
actors involved, but also with fluctuating “propagation structures” (hierarchical 
versus loosely networked (Savage 1985: 14)) as well as the spatial proximity and 
connections of individual regions. In practical terms, this means that depending on a 
region’s penetration of national actors, so called change agents, and the regions 
involvement in the federal network, institutional choices can be influenced by the 
national government. At the same time, the involvement of national governments, 
even in authoritarian systems with strict hierarchies, might not be all-encompassing 
due to challenges from domestic actors or competing external influences (Gel’man & 
Lankina 2013: 46).  
The ability of elites and societies to challenge external coercive diffusion 
influences is also conditioned by the capacity of de facto states, the reliance of patron 
states on the de facto state, the domestic relevance of the patron interference, the 
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availability of alternative support sources and pressures from the parent state. Given 
the limited international recognition of de facto states, these entities have reduced 
financial, political and military capabilities and therefore restricted room for 
manoeuvre in challenging external patron engagement. Also external pressures from 
the parent state reduce the agency of the de facto authorities to challenge patron 
involvement, because of higher demand for military, financial and political support 
from the patron. At the same time, the importance of a given legislation and 
institution for the legitimacy of a de facto regime (private property and language 
legislations in Abkhazia for instance), the availability of viable alternative support 
sources from countries or international institutions as well as the relevance of the de 
facto state for the patron state’s domestic politics loosens the bind on agency and 
increases a regime’s ability to challenge patron involvement.  
The presence of alternative diffusion influences in form of resource streams 
and normative pressures increases the likelihood for resistance in dependent 
entities. However, depending on the propagation structures and organisational 
penetration of diffusion sources, alternative resource support and normative factors 
may be insufficient to counter mimicry or coercive diffusion (Gel’man & Lankina 
2013: 56-58). Hence, due to the limited availability of viable alternative choices, de 
facto regimes are less likely to resist coercive influences and more susceptible to 
indirect diffusion influences in form of mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion. 
The agency of dependent de facto states is likely to be bound by the perceived 
interests and activities of the patron. This bounded agency increases the likelihood 
for legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de facto state and its 
patron. Still, in this arena of limited manoeuvre and course of action, the de facto 
authorities can exemplify agency and signal autonomy. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
Conceptualisation of Patron States in the Context of 
Patron-De Facto State Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding a growing emphasis in the de facto state literature on the agency 
and internal developments of de facto states (see e.g. King 2001; Caspersen 2012, 
Berg & Mölder 2012; Richards 2014; Bakke et al. 2013; Broers et al. 2015; Kopeček 
2020), numerous studies recurrently stress the significance of patron states for these 
unrecognised entities in one form or the other. Florea’s (2014) data set presents 
relations between de facto states and patron states as relatively common 
phenomena in international politics with 21 out of 34 de facto states falling into this 
category. What is more, the term patron state is repeatedly used in de facto state 
scholarship covering diverse regions such as South East Asia, West Africa and the 
South Caucasus, which assumes commonalities across patron state characteristics 
and practices that transcend geographical boundaries. Yet, a wide range of case 
studies have uncovered the varying shapes, motivations and dynamics of patron-de 
facto state relations. Russia’s influence on Transnistria, for instance, is difficult to 
comprehend without contextualising the relative power dynamics of their patron-
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client relationship and its ensuing dependencies (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2017; 
Devyatkov 2017). Meanwhile, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s relationship follows 
arguably different interests and is a prime example of fluctuating dependencies in 
patron-de facto state relations (Broers 2005; Kopeček 2020). 
Judging by the prevalence of patron states in the de facto literature, it is 
somewhat surprising that scholars have not engaged more closely with the concept 
of patron states. The arguably most prominent works on de facto states (Pegg 1998; 
King 2001; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Caspersen 2012), for instance, do not define 
patron states despite using the term repeatedly in their work. Even most accounts 
that directly engage with the role of patron states, patronage or patron-client 
relations (e.g. Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012; O’Loughlin et al. 2015; Gerrits & Bader 2016; 
Bakke et al. 2018; Comai 2018a; 2018b) neither offer a definition of patron states nor 
do they refer back to definitions of patron states or patron-client relations in 
preceding literature. This apparent limitation to present a working definition of 
patron states ultimately avoids considerations of the presuppositions as well as the 
theoretical and practical implications of using the term.  
Recent scholarship has begun to address this omission. Veenendaal’s (2017) 
study on the position of microstates in international relations through the lens of an 
international patron-client model popularised patron states in the international 
politics literature once more and also presented a common basis and reference point 
for subsequent de facto state studies. Some articles started engaging increasingly 
with patron-client relations to analyse de facto states (Devyatkov 2017; Berg & Pegg 
2018; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2017; Berg & Vits 2018) by either relying on the patron-
client models of the Cold War period (most prominently Shoemaker & Spanier (1984) 
and Carney (1989)) or on Veenendaal’s (2017) understanding of patron-client 
relations in the context of micro states. While this shift towards greater clarity in 
terms of patron-client model definitions presents an important development in the 
de facto state literature, this chapter argues that (1) the assumptions of the Cold War 
patron-client relations literature do not neatly fit the context of the post-Cold War 
patron-de facto state relations (e.g. patron competition, international perception of 
patron-client relations) and that (2) de facto states represent a different form of 
client class to micro states, especially in terms of their limited international 
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recognition and the associated limitations of engaging with these entities. Moreover, 
(3) the proposed definitions (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984; Carney 1989; Veenendaal 
2017) do not offer a satisfactory basis for identifying patron-client relations.  
Henceforth, the aim of this chapter is two propose a conceptualisation of 
patron states in the context of patron-de facto state relations, by building on 
critiques of existing literature on patron-client relations from the Cold War period. 
Subsequently, the chapter ascertains whether patron interests, foreign policy 
instruments, domestic capabilities, the relative power dynamics of patrons and de 
facto states or dependencies represent unique identifiers of patron states in patron-
client relations. The final part of this section outlines the ways in which the ensuing 
patron state conceptualisation challenges Florea’s (2014) coding of patron states and 
suggests an alternative classification of patron states in his data set. The novel 
conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relation will form the key independent 
variable in the statistical analysis of patron influences on state and institution 
building in de facto states (chapter 5). 
This chapter argues that as commonalities across domestic characteristics of 
patron states cannot account for common factors of patron state identification, 
patrons have to be examined from a relational perspective, which shifts the focus on 
patron-de facto state relations rather than patron states in themselves. This chapter 
essentially proposes a conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations that 
considers dependencies and foreign policy instruments as the defining components 
of these relations. More specifically, de facto states need to receive the dominant 
share of support from one patron state in order to develop dependencies that make 
up the inherent power dynamics of patron-client relations. Thus, it is necessary to go 
beyond mere asymmetry in patron-client relations to refer to these forms of dyadic 
relations. The proposed conceptualisation of patron states contributes to the clarity 
of debates surrounding patron state influences on de facto states by offering insights 
into behavioural patterns of patron states, motivations behind patron engagement 
and dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations. Understanding the 
dependency dynamics of patron-de facto state relations, for instance, uncovers the 
ways in which these relations shape the domestic realities and agency of de facto 
states. 
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3.1 Common Patron State Characteristics 
The term patron state in the fields of comparative politics and international relations 
originated in the field of anthropology. Anthropologists used the framework of 
patron-cliency as a tool to understand relationships between leaders and their 
supporters within tribes or regions. Subsequently, the field of comparative politics 
adopted this concept to analyse competitions in intrastate, intraregional or intra-
local settings (Carney 1989: 43). Eventually studies such as Wolf’s (1966) and 
Kaufman’s (1974) analyses of patron-client relations in the Cold War period 
successively applied the concept of patron-cliency to contexts of interstate relations, 
which ultimately created a new set of literature on international patron-client state 
relationships. Clapham (1982: 31) defends this shift to interstate relationships by 
arguing that "the elements already identified as conducive to the emergence of 
clientelist styles of politics are present, sometimes to a heightened degree, in the 
international system."  
The extensive patron-client relationship literature from the Cold War period 
(e.g. Wolf 1966; Kaufman 1974; Gellner & Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt & Lemarchand 
1981; Clapham 1982; Shoemaker & Spanier 1984; Carney 1989) provides valuable 
insights into the interests, instruments and commonalities of patron states vis-à-vis 
client states at that time. This literature builds the basis of this chapter’s attempt to 
conceptualise patron states. Yet, de facto states represent a client subgroup that 
challenges some of the preconceived notions of patron-client relations and 
ultimately reproduces different power dynamics between patrons and de facto 
states. Moreover, the literature on patron-client relations was prevalent during a 
period of arguably different international settings and conditions relating to 
international competition and world order. In order for the Cold War literature to be 
applied to patron-de facto state relations, some of the original assumptions on 
competition and clients need to be reviewed. 
Patron-client state relations fall under the umbrella of bilateral relations, 
however, specific elements that characterise the relationships between patrons and 
clients make it possible and necessary to distinguish between these types of 
relationships. According to Kaufman (1974: 285), patron-client state relationships 
represent  
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a special type of dyadic exchange, distinguishable by the 
following characteristics: (a) the relationship occurs 
between actors of unequal power and status; (b) it is 
based on the principle of reciprocity; that is it is a self-
regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the 
maintenance of which depends on the return that each 
actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services 
to the other and which ceases once the expected 
rewards fail to materialize; (c) the relationship is 
particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in 
public law or community norms.20  
 
Further engagements with patron-client state relations correspondingly stress that 
“asymmetry, diffuseness, and reciprocity are basic features of the type of social 
structure that has become associated with political clientelism” (Eisenstadt & 
Lemarchand 1981: 15). Wolf (1966: 16) even considers these relationships a lopsided 
friendship in addition to their inherent asymmetry and reciprocity. Additional 
inherent aspects relate to the fragility of such relationships as well as the role of 
patron competition. Gellner and Waterbury (1977: 330), for instance, argue that “[t]o 
the extent that patronage arenas become competitive, relations with clients will be 
to varying degrees fragile and of short duration."  
Shoemaker and Spanier (1984: 16) criticise the patron-client relationship 
literature for its assumptions that the goals of both the patron and client states are 
constant, that the relationship is understood as static and that crisis situations and 
changes are not sufficiently accounted for. Instead, they propose that “patron-client 
state relationships are in reality fuzzy, fluid, fluctuating partnerships, subject to 
constant change and only becoming sharply defined in the context of crisis” 
(Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 16). Similarly to Gellner and Waterbury (1977), they 
argue further that patron-client relationships “rest upon a tenuous foundation and 
are inherently unstable” (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 17). Despite incompatibilities 
and a basis for conflict, “the patron and client enter into relationships because of 
specific objectives that, for the moment, transcend the underlying antagonism” 
(Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 17). This is one of the reasons why Shoemaker and 
 
20 See Powell (1970), Scott (1972), Wolf (1966), Lemarchand & Legg (1972) and Eisenstadt & 
Roninger (1980) for alternative definitions of patron-client relations that have also served as 
the basis for Kaufman’s (1974) definition.  
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Spanier (1984: 24) argue that patron-client state relationships are essentially 
“bargaining relationships in which each state tries to extract from the other valuable 
concessions at a minimal cost.” 
A central contribution of Shoemaker and Spanier’s analysis is the definition 
of patron-client relationships, which expands the previous definitions of Kaufman 
(1974) and other scholars by associating patron-client relationships as bilateral 
relationships that fulfil four criteria: First, the military capabilities between patron 
and client state need to be sizably different. This also means that a “client cannot, by 
itself, become a major military power in the international community; nor can it, by 
itself guarantee its own security” (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 13). In this aspect of 
security provision by the patron state, transactions are unidirectional going out from 
the patron to the client state. Second, the client state needs to play a prominent role 
in the competitive race of two or more patron states (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 
13). Essentially, Shoemaker and Spanier argue that the international community and 
the relationships between patron states are a necessary sphere of analysis to 
understand patron state behaviour in client states. According to them, patron-client 
state relationships are “the means by which the larger powers compete and are 
therefore inextricably linked to the intensity of the competition between the patron 
states” (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 13). Third, the patron-client state relationship 
needs to be perceived as such by the international community. In other words, there 
is a perceptual dimension to the relationship. Fourth, the relationship is asymmetric, 
not necessarily mutually beneficial and focuses mostly on the enhancement of 
security.  
While Shoemaker and Spanier’s definition represents an insightful 
contribution to understanding patron states, it has a number of limitations related to 
the insufficient engagement with asymmetry and dependencies, a dated 
understanding of patron competition and involvement as well as limited applicability 
to de facto states as a client subgroup. Thus, the following sections attempt to frame 
patron states by recognising unique identifiers of patron-de facto states relations 
across patron interests, foreign policy instruments, relative power capabilities and 
dependencies.  
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3.1.1 Patron State Interests 
The interests behind patron state engagement in client states offer insights into the 
goals of patron states and indicate the emphasis of patron involvement in a particular 
region.21 From a rational choice perspective, patron states engage in client states to 
pursuit interests that outweigh the price of undertaking a potentially militarily, 
economically and diplomatically costly outreach. Shoemaker and Spanier (1984: 17) 
argue that  
 
[t]he nature of the [patron-client] relationship is shaped 
by the contribution the patron believes the client can 
make toward these goals as well as the importance of 
the goals themselves. If the client can provide some 
valuable advantage for the patron over the patron’s 
adversary, the patron will be willing to pay a much 
higher price in the relationship.  
 
Hence, the costs of patron engagement may only be secondary if the patron-client 
relationship contributes to the patron’s competitive advantage. Shoemaker and 
Spanier (1984: 14) go as far as to argue that “[t]he litmus test for determining the 
existence and extent of a patron-client state relationship is an evaluation of the 
durability and nature of a relationship in the absence of patron competition.” Client 
states may utilise this environment of patron competition to their advantage by 
following a strategy that keeps the client open to both competing patrons (consider 
the nominal non-alignment movement for example). In return for political favours, 
 
21 While this section focuses almost exclusively on patron interests, it is worth considering 
briefly the extent to which patron and de facto state interests are compatible and the ways 
in which this influences the patron-de facto state relation. Viacheslav Chirikba and other 
representatives of the Abkhaz government and civil society organisations, for instance, argue 
that Russia could not be considered Abkhazia’s patron, because Abkhazia and Russia have 
diverging interests in some aspects of their relationship (interviews 7 and 12). However, 
patronage does not imply similar or identical interests, as long as the relationship is beneficial 
for both sides to some degree. Shoemaker and Spanier (1984: 17) argue, for instance, that 
while the provision of support is not necessarily mutually beneficial, “the patron and client 
enter into relationships because of specific objectives that, for the moment, transcend the 
underlying antagonism.” Caspersen’s (2009) analysis of patron state interests in de facto 
states describes an environment of mutual interests which provides the basis for the 
relationship. 
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clients can then receive patron support, security guarantees and more leverage 
(Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 12).  
Yet, de facto states present a notable exception as a subgroup of client states 
in this regard, which has tangible implications for patron competition. First, if patron 
competition in patron-de facto state relations motivates the involvement of patron 
states, the competitive element manifests itself differently for the de facto state, 
because the de facto regime is restricted in its ability to navigate between a variety 
of viable patron actors and is oftentimes reliant on the state that offers to support it. 
This is largely due to the limited international recognition of de facto states and the 
diplomatic and financial costs associated with engaging in these territories.22 Second, 
when de facto states operate as client states, patron competition takes place within 
an environment of simultaneous parent state competition. This ultimately 
transforms the dyadic relationship of patrons and clients into a triadic one which 
necessitates considerations surrounding parent capabilities and interests. Patron 
competition may still play out in such a triadic framework where patrons respectively 
support the conflicting parent and de facto state.  
Furthermore, patron competition does not appear to be a suitable instrument 
to identifying patron-client relations in the post-Cold War context. Since the end of 
the Cold War, states that do not fall into the dichotomy of a bipolar world and are 
not considered great powers have emerged as patron states. Meanwhile, the post-
Cold War world order has moved beyond a bipolar towards a multipolar narrative. 
Still, patron-de facto relations tend to entail geopolitical and competitive elements. 
In some instances, competition between great powers appears to be the dominant 
interest facilitating patron engagement (e.g. Taiwan and the Donetsk People’s 
Republic), whereas in other instances, regional competition contributes but is not 
necessarily the central cause for patron involvement (e.g. Tamil Eelam and Eastern 
Slavonia). Patron support would likely sustain in the latter cases even if regional or 
great power patron competition were absent. In other words, while competition 
facilitates patron engagement in de facto states, it rarely explains patron 
 
22 However, Berg & Pegg (2018) outlined that de facto states are likely to attempt to identify 
alternative great power involvement to outweigh the dominance of the patron. 
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engagement singlehandedly. Instead, competition is likely to motivate patron 
involvement in combination with other interests, such as ethnic ties or security 
concerns. Thus, patron competition can no longer be considered the single driving 
force behind patron engagement in de facto states and therefore does not represent 
a unique identifier of patron-de facto state relations.  
This finding has implications for Shoemaker and Spanier’s (1984: 13) 
understanding of the “critical perceptual dimension” of patron-client relationships, 
which “is derived from consistent association between the two states for a 
recognizable, if sometimes only brief, period of time.” In simplified terms, the 
international community needs to recognise the ties between two entities as a 
patron-client relationship (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 13). The significance of this 
perceptual dimension of patron-client relations appears to be largely driven by 
patron competition, where patrons openly demonstrate their support of and control 
over a strategically important region to competing patrons. Only if the competitor 
views the relationship between the other patron and client as such, does it benefit a 
patron’s competitive advantage. In the case of patron-de facto state relationships, 
this distinction is not as clear-cut. While some patrons want to display their 
engagement in de facto states to display geopolitical strength or increase their 
bargaining power and position, other patrons support de facto states covertly to 
avoid the diplomatic costs associated with de facto state engagement.  
Patron objectives and interests can take a variety of forms, which Shoemaker 
and Spanier (1984: 18-20) divide into three categories: ideological goals, 
international solidarity objectives and strategic advantage interests. This 
classification provides an insightful rational-choice perspective of patron state 
interests and underscores that the standard analysis of patron-client state 
relationships in the Cold War period places patron competition at the heart of patron 
state interests. However, Shoemaker and Spanier’s classification (1984) does not 
consider goals and interests that fall out of the rational-choice spectrum such as 
shared ethnicity or history as potential motivating factors for a patron’s engagement. 
The de facto state and secessionist literature recorded a substantial shift beyond 
mere security and military motivations behind patron engagement in de facto states 
in the post-Cold War period. Patron motivations behind de facto state engagement 
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can span ethnic (Saideman 2001; Gokcek 2011), geopolitical/spheres of influence 
(Wood 1981; Götz 2015; 2017), security (Coggins 2011), ideological and historical 
(Heraclides 1991) and economic (Bookman 1992) reasons. This presents a more 
nuanced understanding of patron engagement in de facto states and simultaneously 
expands the patron state definition beyond security and military interests.  
It is important to recall in this context that patron interests are not mutually 
exclusive and that patron and client interests can fluctuate (Shoemaker & Spanier 
1984: 16). Moreover, patron-de facto state relations and their inherent interests 
should not be understood as the outcome of a conflict, because the relationship 
between the patron and the de facto state may have existed beforehand. Patron-de 
facto state relations may also occur in non-conflictual contexts where common 
historic or ethnic ties motivate patron engagement. In these instances, the role of 
path dependencies needs to be taken into consideration. 
To capture this expanded understanding of potential patron interests, all 21 
patron-de facto state relations that were classified as such in Florea’s dataset (2014) 
will be analysed and categorised according to the patron’s interest vis-à-vis the de 
facto state (see table 1). The variable choices in the table and the classification of 
patron interests have been informed by de facto state case studies, studies on 
secessionist regions (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000, Beary 2011), Florea’s codebook 
(2016; 2018) and newspaper article reviews.  
The results of table 1 exhibit that geopolitical interests are the single most 
common factor informing patron engagement in de facto states. Geopolitical 
interests cover, for instance, regional competition (e.g. Western Sahara) and great 
power competition (i.e. Taiwan). Yet, geopolitical interests on their own are 
insufficient to understanding patron interests in de facto states and therefore do not 
serve as unique identifiers of patron-client relations. Instead, geopolitical interests 
tend to be tied to other interests such as shared ethnicity, security or economic 
concerns. Indeed, shared ethnicity,23 history and ideology were identified as 
relatively common patron interests in the table, whereas economic, integration and 
 
23 Shared ethnicity may refer to the dominant ethnic group in a de facto state or a substantial 
minority (Caspersen 2008). 
77 
 
security incentives tend to be the exception. This is line with Caspersen (2015: 7), 
who argues that “appealing to a shared ideology, or other normative standards, may 
well make the unrecognised states more likely to gain patron state support.” 
Interests surrounding the democratic standards of de facto states do not appear to 
inform patron engagement. Russia recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
2008, for instance, does not refer to democratic standards (Caspersen 2015: 6). 
Democratisation may, however, be used as a covert interest to justify patron support 
in the de facto state.  
 
Table 1 Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Interest24 
Patron Interest Sum of Patron-De Facto State Relations 
Geopolitical 19 (90%) 
Shared History 13 (62%) 
Security 13 (62%) 
Shared Ethnicity 10 (48%) 
Shared Ideology 8 (35%) 
Integration 7 (33%) 
Economic 3 (14%) 
Democratisation 0 (0%) 
 
3.1.2 Patron State Instruments 
The term patron stems originally from the Latin word patronus, which refers to an 
individual’s provision of benefits to his or her clients in a hierarchical relationship. 
This section not only highlights the range of benefit provisions on offer for patrons, 
but also which foreign policy instruments patron states tend to prefer when engaging 
with de facto states. From a rational choice perspective, patron states pursue foreign 
policy instruments in de facto states that meet the equilibrium of financial, human 
and diplomatic costs, on the one hand, and national interest gains, on the other hand. 
However, the inherent asymmetry of patron-client relations in form of unidirectional 
transactions differ from other bilateral relationships in that they do not rest on 
economic and security exchanges that are mutually beneficial (Shoemaker & Spanier 
 
24 See appendix A for detailed table breakdown. 
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1984: 14). Therefore, patron-client relations and patron-de facto state relations in 
particular do not fit a rational choice framework.  
The analyses of patron-client state relations from the Cold War era stress the 
prevalence of security transfers and military support between patrons and clients 
(Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 15), whereas economic, social and political support for 
the client were not placed high on the agenda. Also Florea’s (2014) classification of 
patron states is informed by an understanding of patrons as providers of military 
support to de facto states. Military support or security support can take a number of 
forms and channels such as alliances, treaties or security pacts between the patron 
and client (e.g. Taiwan), the transfer of arms (e.g. Bougainville) or even direct military 
involvement and presence in the client state (e.g. South Ossetia), which may include 
the stationing of troops and military bases (Carney 1989: 52). Military support can be 
a powerful tool for the patron to exert influence on a client state and to ensure 
strategic advantage objectives. In this aspect of security provision, transactions are 
unidirectional going out from the patron to the client state. Moreover, arms transfers 
can ensure a patron’s long-term engagement in the security sector of the client state, 
because the weapons have to be operationalised with the right know-how and 
training and the patron needs to provide spare parts (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 
15).  
Financial instruments may cover development or humanitarian aid (e.g. 
Biafra), trade, financial loans or direct budgetary contributions (e.g. South Ossetia). 
Political instruments include the recognition of independence (e.g. Western Sahara), 
but can also include open support for further autonomy rights during a conflict period 
(e.g. Biafra). Soft power instruments can refer to cultural or student exchanges, 
tourism and the use of media and information resources (e.g. Transnistria). State 
building instruments cover support for the provision of public services and goods in 
the de facto state and gatekeeping refers to instruments that the patron employs to 
facilitate the wider international recognition of the de facto state.25  
 
25 Instead of focusing on the sectors that patrons penetrate, Heraclides (1990: 396) 
differentiates between four degrees of external support ranging from mediatory to extensive 
support. This classification highlights that limited, indirect or secretive patron involvement 
does not prevent patronage and offers potential explanations as to why patrons decide not 
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Judging by the result of table 2, it would be pre-mature to focus exclusively 
on military contributions of patron states to understand patron engagement in de 
facto states.26 While financial, political and military instruments are indeed the most 
commonly employed foreign policy channels of patron states in de facto states, state 
building, soft power and gatekeeping are to a lesser extent among the foreign policy 
instruments employed by patron states. These findings highlight that patron 
instruments are rarely restricted to one engagement channel and military support 
tends to be combined with additional engagement layers. In order to sustain de facto 
states and thereby keep the patron competition with the parent state or another 
patron alive, patrons need to offer a mixture of political, military and economic 
support to the de facto regime. In other words, patrons are required to engage 
politically, militarily and financially in de facto states to fulfil their strategic advantage 
objectives.  
 
Table 2 Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Instruments27 
Patron Instrument Sum of Patron-De Facto State Relationships 
Military 21 (100%) 
Political 18 (86%) 
Financial 16 (76%) 
Soft power 9 (43%) 
State building 7 (33%) 
Gatekeeping  6 (29%) 
 
3.1.3 Asymmetries and Relative Power 
Patron states are commonly depicted as great, economic and military powers. 
However, this thesis argues that domestic characteristics of patron states such as 
economic and military capabilities, landmass and population size are unsatisfactory 
 
to engage in a given region. Kopeček (2020) contributes to this discussion by demonstrating 
that external patron engagement can be fluid across time. 
26 As in the previous table, all 21 patron-de facto state relations were analysed and 
categorised according to the patron’s foreign policy instruments in the de facto state. The 
variable choices in the table and the classification of patron instruments have been informed 
by Hewitt & Cheetham 2000, Beary 2011, de facto state case studies, Florea’s codebook 
(2016; 2018) and newspaper article reviews. 
27 See appendix B for detailed table breakdown. 
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indicators of patron states. This becomes apparent when pointing out the significant 
variations across states that tend to be referred to as patron states ranging from the 
United States and Russia, which fit the stereotypical great power status, on the one 
hand, to Armenia and Serbia, that are not usually considered great powers, on the 
other hand. Hence, a patron state cannot be a patron state in and of itself. This is not 
to say that the economic and military power of patron states is insignificant. The 
statistical analyses of chapter 5, for instance, highlight that a de facto state with a 
great or regional power patron is likelier to achieve moderate degrees of state 
building than a de facto state without a patron or with a patron state that is not 
considered a great or regional power. 
As patron states can differ considerably in terms of their domestic 
characteristics, it is necessary to consider patron-client relations from a relational 
perspective in their wider international environment and in the context of their 
inherent power dynamics with the client. This ultimately shifts the analytical focus 
on patron-client relations rather than patron states in themselves. Shoemaker and 
Spanier’s (1984: 13) definition of patron-client relations suggests that the military 
capabilities between patron and client state need to be sizably different and 
asymmetric in order to distinguish patron-client relations from other bilateral 
relationships. The relative military and financial capabilities of patrons and de facto 
states are inherently asymmetric, which means that all patron states are more 
powerful than their de facto state clients, and patron-de facto state relations are 
arguably even more asymmetric compared to patron-client relations of the Cold War 
period. Most de facto states are among the weakest quasi-state entities across the 
globe in terms of political, economic and military capabilities as well as their limited 
international connectedness. De facto states as a subgroup of client states therefore 
arguably push the limits of hierarchies and asymmetry even further in terms of their 
relative power vis-à-vis the patron state.  
The asymmetry of patron-client relations manifests itself in form of some 
degree of patron control over the client in order to achieve an objective and the non-
mutually beneficial nature of the relationship. This control taking measure results in 
some autonomy handover from the client to the patron (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 
14, 17). However, the asymmetric nature of patron-client and patron-de facto state 
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relations can only be a characteristic rather than a unique identifier of patron-de 
facto state relations, because of similar power variation patterns in recognised 
entities and development aid relationships. Indeed, measuring the relative power 
capabilities of two entities may reveal the potential of two actors to be in a patron-
client state relationship, but not the dependencies, control dynamics and client 
agency involved in such relations. 
 
3.1.4 Fluid Dependencies and Bounded De Facto State Agency 
This section outlines the ways in which dependency dynamics in patron-de facto 
state relations shape the domestic realities and agency of de facto states. These 
dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations represent a unique identifier 
of these bilateral relations if the patron is the sole or at least predominant provider 
of support that contributes to the sustainability of the de facto regime.  
Dependencies tend to arise in asymmetric playing fields where one party 
requires a tangible or intangible service or good, which a second party is in a position 
to supply. Dependency theorists assume that this exchange facilitates an 
environment in which economic developments of an entity are conditioned by the 
developments in another entity on which the former is dependent (Dos Santos 1970: 
231). Dependence can transcend the economic sphere and cover a variety of sectors 
such as security and politics. It is important to note that subordination to the 
authority of dominant states is not itself an uncommon phenomenon even among 
internationally recognised states (Krasner 1999; 2004). While some subordinate 
entities only grant or acknowledge external authority in specific areas of their state, 
such as financial, foreign or military affairs, other entities accept more widespread 
external authority, whereas yet again others hand over full authority to another state 
or group of states (Lake 2011: 2-3). For some clients, patron support even manifests 
itself as the source of their national survival (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 21), which 
enables patron states to considerably influence their clients. Still, international 
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hierarchy28 rarely manifests itself in form of all-encompassing or complete external 
authority and control (Lake 2011: 8).  
While subordination and dependencies are not uncommon phenomena 
among internationally recognised states, dependencies in patron-de facto state 
relations involve dynamics that single out these relations compared to other bilateral 
asymmetric relations. Internationally recognised client states possess at least the 
theoretical opportunity of obtaining support from alternative sources. Even if this 
alternative support is only hypothetical in nature, it creates an important distinction 
from contexts where client states are reliant on the predominant support of a single 
actor. This does not mean, however, that de facto states are not in a position to 
access alternative support sources. Even though the choices of de facto states are 
severely limited due to their limited international recognition, de facto regimes can 
raise money from diaspora groups or through taxation on informal trade (Caspersen 
2012: 63). Furthermore, Berg and Pegg (2018) as well as Dembińska and Mérand 
(2019) find that de facto regimes and other domestic actors in these entities have 
attempted to identify alternative great power involvement to outweigh the reliance 
on the patron state. Still, despite the presence of potential alternative sources for de 
facto states, such as diaspora groups or great powers, the military, financial and 
political support of patron states tends to contribute disproportionately to an 
unrecognised entity’s ability to sustain its regime. While alternatives to patron 
support outlined by Caspersen (2012), Berg and Pegg (2018) and Dembińska and 
Mérand (2019) may encourage economic exchanges with the de facto state, they are 
unlikely to contribute to the military capabilities and sustainability of the entity due 
to the contentious status of de facto states and the diplomatic costs associated with 
further engagement.  
Dependencies are more likely to occur in contexts where a de facto state’s 
economy and potentially even its security and political environment are closely 
interwoven with an external source (Dos Santos 1970) and where the client is 
predominantly reliant on one source. If the client regime has the ability to navigate 
 
28 Lake (2011: 9) defines hierarchy as “the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over 
the ruled. The greater the number of possible actions by the ruled that the rule can legitimacy 
regulate, the more hierarchical is the relationship.” 
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between various support sources or if a variety of actors supply significant 
contributions to the client to enable its sustainability, this reduces the dependency 
on the patron source which ultimately restricts the inherent dependency and control 
dynamics of patron-de facto state relations. This does not mean, however, that a de 
facto state client cannot receive alternative support or approach alternative sources, 
as long as the patron provides the dominant share of financial, military or political 
support for a given period of time. In other words, one can only talk of patron-de 
facto state relations if the patron is the sole or at least predominant provider of 
support that contributes to the sustainability of the de facto regime, as this develops 
dependencies between the two actors that make up the inherent characteristics of 
patron-de facto state relations.  
In practice, dependence on patron support has significant implications for the 
domestic realities of de facto states, which start to reflect the political, economic and 
military environment of the patron state. From a diffusion standpoint, this means 
that dependence may encourage legislative and institutional isomorphism. 
Dependency theory assumes that the dominant economy can grow and sustain itself, 
whereas the dependent economy can only develop in accordance with the dominant 
one (Dos Santos 1970: 231). Economic crises, growth, sanctions and military 
expenditures in Russia, for instance, are likely to affect the economic, political and 
security realities of Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia. In 2014, Russian 
authorities promised financial contributions to the Abkhaz state budget, however, 
these promises did not fully materialise due to Russia’s restricted economic room for 
manoeuvre following the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent sanctions. Thus, 
the predominant reliance on patron support in addition to the limited international 
recognition of de facto states facilitates dependencies between de facto regimes and 
their patrons that have significant implications on the domestic realities of de facto 
states.  
Despite the centrality of dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state 
relations, it is important to stress that dependencies are neither stagnant nor 
necessarily unidirectional. First, the demand and supply for certain goods and 
services is unlikely to remain constant over time. This variability encourages dynamic 
and fluctuating dependencies, which in turn explain varying degrees of patron 
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engagement, control mechanisms and client agency (Berg & Toomla 2009: 27). Due 
to the contentious nature of de facto states in international politics and their 
challenges in ensuring territorial control, demands of de facto state regimes are likely 
to focus on security matters. The more acute and imminent the threat, the more 
readily the client side will accept the terms of the patrons (Shoemaker & Spanier 
1984: 21-22). In less threatening circumstances, other client goals become more 
important, that do not necessitate the direct involvement of the patron (Shoemaker 
& Spanier 1984: 21-22). This dynamic would suggest that both the Transnistrian and 
Abkhaz de facto regimes find themselves in less threatening environments, which 
facilitates the search for alternative economic and diplomatic support sources as 
identified by Berg and Pegg (2018) and Dembińska and Mérand (2019).  
Second, political entities may willingly subordinate themselves to a dominant 
state if they receive something in return, such as security guarantees or financial aid. 
Also dominant states are only willing to bear the costs of services and goods 
provisions if they receive something in return, such as compliance and legitimacy 
(Lake 2011: 8). In that sense, the arrangement between patron and de facto state 
can even take the form of “a symbiotic relationship that is rooted in mutual 
dependencies and converging interests” (Sahin 2015: 40). Veenendaal (2017) 
therefore argues that patron-client relations do not represent a form of simple 
dependence, but a complex structure based on reciprocity, asymmetry, compliance 
and loyalty. Indeed, Comai (2018b: 189, 193) identifies a pragmatic approach of post-
Soviet de facto states toward sustained dependence on their patron by striving for 
“sustainability rather than self-sustainability.” Importantly, de facto state clients are 
not solely dependent on their patrons, as patrons themselves can be dependent on 
their client. While patrons are unlikely to be reliant on financial or military support 
from the client, patrons can achieve political or economic returns for their 
engagement (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984: 13-14). Particularly in the case of patrons 
that also function as the de facto state’s kin state, the client can utilise its ethnic 
kinship to influence the patron’s domestic policy agenda (Kopeček 2020), because 
the client’s political support contributes to the political viability of a patron state’s 
government. This is in line with Caspersen’s (2010: 52) observation that patronage is 
a “two-way street”, as the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Serbia’s relationships with 
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the de facto states on Bosnian and Croatian territory suggest (Broers 2005; Kopeček 
2020; Biermann 2014). In these instances, the role of patron and client could be 
considered “almost reversed” (Caspersen 2010: 53). Despite the possible fluctuating 
and multidirectional nature of dependencies, the underlying military and financial 
dependencies of de facto states on their patron do not shift significantly and 
therefore serve as the best guiding principle for identifying patron-client relations. 
Understanding dependencies as fluctuating and potentially multidirectional 
processes also clarifies the role of de facto state agency and accommodates varying 
degrees of patron support ranging from strong to limited involvement. Still, there 
appears to be a hesitation in the de facto state literature to view patron-client 
relations through the lens of dependency and vulnerability and instead authors call 
for greater emphasis on de facto state agency (see e.g. Caspersen 2012; Veenendaal 
2017). Examining patron-de facto state relations through a dependency framework 
does not automatically negate client agency. Instead, this framework contextualises 
client behaviour and agency under dependency pressures and the ways in which de 
facto regimes navigate external pressures, which falls into the category of bounded 
agency discussed in the theoretical framework of this thesis. Berg and Vits (2018: 
391) similarly suggest that de facto state agency should be viewed as an ability that  
 
 
is conditioned by: (1) the capacity/capability to act; (2) 
the asymmetric relations moulded into 
interdependence with their patrons; and finally (3) the 
external environment which privileges traditional 
diplomatic connections and the rules of the game 
against illegal challengers.  
 
Using the example of Transnistria, Dembińska and Mérand (2019) demonstrate a de 
facto regime’s ability to manoeuvre under dependency pressures, which can be 
understood as a form of bounded agency of the client state. The Transnistrian de 
facto regime and other local actors accommodate the fluctuating dependence on 
Russian support by laying the groundwork for alternative support channels with 
Europe despite their dependence on Russian economic, military and political aid. 
Dembińska and Mérand refer to this simultaneous manoeuvring between Russian 
and European interests as a policy of dual alignment, which marginally reduces 
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Transnistria’s dependence on Russian economic support (2019: 15). These findings 
are in line with Dos Santos’ (1970: 231) argument that “the dependence […] on other 
countries cannot be overcome without a qualitative change in their internal 
structures and external relations.” Thus, analysing patron-de facto state relations 
through the lens of dependency reveals valuable insights into bounded client agency 
in the context of dependency pressures and offers potential explanations for 
institutional and legislative isomorphism in client states.   
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3.2 Conceptualisation of Patron-De Facto States Relationships 
On the basis of the above analysis, this section conceptualises patron-de facto state 
relations and compares this conceptualisation to Florea’s (2014) classification of 
patron states in his data set. This thesis proposes that  
 
• Patron-de facto state relations are dyadic exchanges between a de 
facto state and an entity that supports the unrecognised polity. 
The relation may even exist without the conflict between the de 
facto state and its parent state.  
• The military and economic capabilities of both entities are sizeably 
different and the relationship is asymmetric and not necessarily 
mutually beneficial.  
• Patron state are the sole or at least predominant provider of 
unidirectional military and financial support, in return for some 
level of compliance of the de facto state and in some instances 
also geopolitical, political and economic benefits. Patron 
engagement can vary across time but contributes to the 
sustainability of the de facto regime. 
• De facto states are dependent on the patron state, which means 
that the de facto state’s economy and security is closely 
interwoven and reflective of the patron even if the client can 
access alternative support that does not outweigh patron financial 
and military involvement. This dependency can fluctuate and be 
multidirectional, as long as the underlying military and financial 
dependencies on the patron do not shift significantly.  
• De facto states can present a degree of (bounded) agency despite 
this dependence, which varies across time. In less threatening 
environments, de facto regimes may manoeuvre between 
alternative support sources. 
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Unlike previous definitions of patron states and patron-client relations (Shoemaker 
& Spanier 1984; Carney 1989; Veenendaal 2017), the conceptualisation of this thesis 
offers a basis for identifying patron-client relations. Furthermore, this proposed 
definition of patron-de facto state relations challenges Florea’s (2014) classification 
of patron states, who defines patrons as “regularised patterns of military assistance 
from a third (state) party.”29 The table below (table 3) compares both Florea’s and 
my classification of patron states. The green cells signify an overlap in our 
classification, the yellow cells propose a different time period, the orange cells 
suggest an alternative patron, whereas the red cells indicate that the de facto state 
does not have a patron according to my definition.  
 
Table 3 Florea and Spanke’s Classifications of Patron States 
De Facto State Patron State (Florea) Patron State (Spanke) 
Abkhazia Russia Russia 
Ajaria Russia Russia 
Anjouan France France 
Biafra France France 
Bougainville Solomon Islands  
Casamance Guinea-Bissau  
Eastern Slavonia Serbia Serbia 
Gaza Iran Iran 
Katanga Belgium Belgium 
Kosovo Albania United States 
Krajina Serbia Serbia 
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenia Armenia 
Northern Cyprus Turkey Turkey 
Palestine Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc.  
Republika Srpska Serbia Serbia 
South Ossetia Russia Russia; North Ossetia-Alania 
South Sudan Ethiopia  
Taiwan United States United States 
Tamil Eelam India India 
Transnistria Russia Russia 
Western Sahara Algeria Algeria 
 
Agreement 
Different Years 
Different Patron 
No Patron 
 
 
29 This was communicated to the author by email with Adrian Florea on 21st August 2018.  
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The majority of cases in the above table represent agreements of Florea’s and my 
classification of patron states including French support for Anjouan (Beary 2011: 22), 
Iranian engagement in Gaza (Florea 2018), political, financial and military aid from 
Serbia and Yugoslavia to Krajina, Republika Srpska and Eastern Slavonia (Zahar 2004: 
36; Florea 2018), Armenian financial, political and military support for Nagorno-
Karabakh (Caspersen 2012; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008), Turkish financial, political and 
military aid to Northern Cyprus (Florea 2018), US support for Taiwan (Florea 2018), 
Indian financial and military support for Tamil Eelam (Mampilly 2011: 104-105) as 
well as Russian financial, military and political engagement in Transnistria (Kolstø & 
Blakkisrud 2017). In other cases, the classification of patron states was less clear-cut 
due to three central challenges: the relative importance of patron support, the extent 
of patron support and the regional fragmentation of patron support. In some 
instances, these concerns resulted in direct challenges to Florea’s classification of 
patron states.  
First, my conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations highlights that 
predominant patron state support to de facto states is necessary to facilitate the 
inherent dependency characteristics of these relations. Some de facto states 
acquired support from a variety of external sources, but one state provided the 
dominant share of aid to the unrecognised entity and was therefore identified as the 
patron state. Katanga, for instance, received support from a variety of countries 
including France, South Africa, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Yet, Belgium was Katanga’s key supporter throughout its 
existence (Heraclides 1990: 347) making Belgium Katanga’s patron. Similarly, Biafra 
was supported by a wide range of countries including Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Zambia, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Benin, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Portugal and China. France’s substantial financial and military support (Heraclides 
1990: 348) makes France Biafra’s patron. Likewise, Western Sahara not only received 
sustained support from its patron Algeria, but also sporadic aid from Libya (Zunes & 
Mundy 2010: 9).  
In other instances, it is not possible to identify a clear patron, because de 
facto states receive similar levels of support from a variety of sources. Palestine, for 
example, has received support from a wide range of countries at different stages of 
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its existence including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria without 
a dominant supporter that created dependencies in the sense of the patron-de facto 
state relation conceptualisation. Similarly, Casamance, has been supported by 
various actors including Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, Gambia and Iraq, but no 
dominant supporter stood out. South Sudan received arms supplies from Israel and 
occasional and indirect support from Zaire, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya (Heraclides 
1990: 348-349), which cannot be considered sufficient to speak of patron-de facto 
state relations. A borderline case in this regard is Kosovo, which received substantial 
support from Albania and the US and arguably even the EU. In this case, the extent 
of external support ultimately matters. US military, financial and political 
involvement, including its support for Kosovo’s independence and military 
campaigns against Kosovo’s parent state Serbia presents the US as Kosovo’s patron, 
because relative to Albanian support the US contributed significantly more to 
Kosovo’s sustainability. Kosovo would not have been able to outweigh the extent of 
US involvement with alternative external sources.  
The case of Kosovo identifies an arguably controversial argument in the 
conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations of this thesis. Due to the focus 
on dependencies, this thesis proposes that de facto states can only have one patron 
state. This distinction is certainly not always clear-cut, as some de facto states, such 
as Kosovo and Palestine, receive significant support from a variety of sources. 
However, even though one could refer to these external supporters as patrons, such 
support systems develop different agency and dependency dynamics in de facto 
states where their regimes can navigate between various patron sources. Instead, 
numerous significant external support sources may be referred to as patron or 
support networks with varying dependency dynamics. It is important to note in this 
context, that the patron-de facto state conceptualisation has a clear limitation in the 
sense that it only considers state or regional actors as patrons. International 
governmental organisations, (Heraclides 1992; Bookman 1992), diaspora groups 
(Relitz & Biermann 2018), relief organisations or private arms suppliers can arguably 
also take on patron roles (Heraclides 1991). The US, for instance, used international 
organisations such as NATO and the UN to provide support to Kosovo.  
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The second challenge to Florea’s classification relates to the extent of 
external support. Some countries, that were identified as patrons in Florea’s data set, 
only provided limited support to the de facto state, which according to the definition 
of this thesis, does not make them patron states, because it does not contribute to 
the survival or sustainability of the unrecognised entity. The Solomon Islands, for 
instance, provided limited arms supplies to Bougainville (Florea 2018), which is 
insufficient to be considered patron support as it does not facilitate a dependency 
relationship between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville. The cases of Casamance 
and South Sudan combine the first and second challenges to Flores’s definition, as 
the unrecognised regions received limited support from a variety of sources 
(Heraclides 1990: 348-349; Florea 2018). These relations are unlikely to create 
dependencies and are therefore not considered patron-de facto state relations 
according to the conceptualisation of this thesis.  
 Third, regional fragmentation of patron states challenges the classification of 
Russia as Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s patron. Florea (2018) argues that Russia has 
been Abkhazia’s patron continuously since 1991 and that South Ossetia has received 
military and political support from Russia and Russian regions (Florea 2018). 
However, Russia initiated a trade embargo and sanctions against Abkhazia between 
1994 and 1999 and even though some Russian regions supported Abkhazia in that 
period, Abkhazia did not develop dependencies on these regions, because limited 
trade with the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey presented a viable alternative for some 
time. From 1999 onwards, the Abkhaz de facto regime became increasingly 
dependent on Russia and started to function as Abkhazia’s patron. This is not to say 
that central government support is necessary to create dependencies and to speak 
of patron-client relations. Regional actors can become patrons as well as the case of 
South Ossetia in the 1990s suggests. In these instances, it is necessary to clearly state 
that the central government does not represent the patron, but specific regions, such 
as the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania in Russia.  
Overall, the table identifies 17 de facto states that are in patron-de facto state 
relationships as opposed to Florea’s (2014) classification that suggests that 21 out of 
34 de facto states between 1945 and 2011 have had a patron state at one point 
during their existence. If we consider Caspersen & Stansfield’s (2011) definition of de 
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facto states, which lists 21 de facto states since World War II, 14 of them have been 
in a patron-de facto state relation according to Florea’s (2014) definition and 13 de 
facto states according to the definition of this thesis. At the least, these results show 
the prevalence of patron states for de facto states and the importance of 
understanding patron influences on these unrecognised entities. The proposed 
classification of patron-de facto states relations also slightly modifies the original 
tables of patron instruments and interests (see updated tables 4 and 5).  
 
Table 4 Spanke’s Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Interest30 
Patron Interest Sum of Patron-De Facto State Relations 
Geopolitical 15 (88%) 
Shared History 13 (76%) 
Security 10 (59%) 
Shared Ethnicity 10 (59%) 
Shared Ideology 7 (41%) 
Integration 6 (35%) 
Economic 2 (12%) 
Democratisation 0 (0%) 
 
Table 5 Spanke’s Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Instruments31 
Patron Instrument Sum of Patron-De Facto State Relationships 
Military 17 (100%) 
Political 15 (88%) 
Financial 14 (82%) 
Soft power 9 (53%) 
State building 6 (35%) 
Gatekeeping  5 (29%) 
  
 
30 See appendix C for detailed table breakdown. 
31 See appendix D for detailed table breakdown. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
Patron states tend to be depicted as great, economic and military powers that engage 
in client states to pursue their geopolitical or economic interests. However, this 
chapter demonstrated that domestic characteristics of patron states such as GDP, 
military capabilities, landmass or population size cannot account for common factors 
of patron state identification, which means that a patron state cannot be a patron 
state in and of itself. Instead, this thesis proposes a relational view of patron states 
by considering the dependency dynamics of patron-de facto state relations. Even 
though all patron-de facto state relations are asymmetric and involve varying relative 
power capabilities, this chapter suggests that hierarchies and asymmetries of patron-
de facto state relations need to be redefined beyond the framework of relative 
power capabilities and the unidirectional provision of benefits, by highlighting that 
patron support arrives predominantly from one source. This redirects the focus on 
dependency dynamics between de facto states and their patrons that shapes the 
agency of de facto regimes and encourages institutional and legislative isomorphism. 
Analyses of patron-client state relations from the Cold War period assumed 
that patrons do not usually concern themselves with economic, social and political 
developments within client states. Yet, in the case of de facto states, patron 
engagement centres not exclusively around security transfers for the de facto state, 
but in some instances also encompasses political and economic support to sustain de 
facto states and thereby keep the patron competition with the parent state or 
another patron alive. The real or perceived threat going out from the parent state 
may require the support of a patron that has more economic and military capabilities 
than the de facto state to match or come close to matching the parent state 
capabilities. In that case, political and economic support by the patron is needed to 
ensure the fulfilment of strategic advantage objectives of the patron. Yet, patron 
competition can no longer be considered the single driving force behind patron 
engagement in de facto states and therefore does not represent a unique identifier 
of patron-de facto state relations. Indeed, patron-de facto state relations may exist 
outside of conflictual relations, especially when ethnic or historic ties motivate 
patron engagement.  
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Conceptualising patron states in the context of patron-de facto state relations 
not only benefits the clarity of arguments surrounding the influence of external 
actors on de facto states, but it also contributes to bigger questions relating to 
geopolitics, state survival, dependencies, agency and legitimacy. Understanding the 
dependency dynamics of patron-de facto state relations, for instance, uncovers the 
ways in which these relations shape the domestic realities and agency of de facto 
states, which is necessary to analyse state building developments in de facto states. 
Furthermore, dependencies capture the formal and informal rules underlying 
interactions between patrons and de facto states and how they reinforce power 
relations. A more precise patron state concept also enables a nuanced engagement 
with the ways in which powers such as Russia, Algeria or the United States project 
influence and to what extent it is possible to separate a country’s foreign policy from 
a country’s role as a patron. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
The mixed methods research design of this thesis aims to tease out patterns of 
patron state influences on the state and institution building processes of de facto 
states. The research strategy follows a combination of a large-N statistical analysis of 
all de facto states in the period between 1945 and 2011 with an in-depth single case 
study analysis. The quantitative methods test a set of hypotheses surrounding the 
influence of patron states and parent-patron state competition on state and 
institution building in de facto states. The proposed statistical approaches thereby 
test parts of the main argument and the theoretical framework of this thesis relating 
to the general impact of patron states as well as of parent-patron state competition 
as an indirect diffusion source on the state and institution building processes of de 
facto states.  
While the quantitative research methods identify associations between the 
independent and dependent variables, they do not conclusively infer causality. 
Instead, this thesis will demonstrate the causal effects of patrons through its 
qualitative methods in form of process tracing. The case study of Russian 
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involvement in Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes tests whether the 
presence of Russia as a patron state has a causal effect on state and institution 
building in Abkhazia and whether the direct and indirect diffusion channels set out in 
the theoretical framework serve as causal pathways. This form of result triangulation 
where a variety of methods are employed to make causal arguments represents a 
common empirical mixed-methods research strategy but comes with its own 
limitations that will be touched upon in this chapter (see Olsen 2004; Seawright 
2016). 
This chapter specifies and justifies the research design, methods as well as 
variable and case selections of this research project. The quantitative methods 
comprise linear regression, logistic regression and survival models across a time 
series cross-sectional panel data set. The qualitative methods encompass three 
research methods covering a single case study analysis, semi-structured interviews 
and process tracing. As certain methods and cases may inform particular research 
outcomes, it is necessary to consider the appropriateness of each applied research 
method and case study for answering the previously defined research questions. 
Furthermore, both statistical analyses of de facto states and fieldwork in these 
contested regions present a range of limitations and challenges to the validity of the 
research outcomes, which will be considered in this research design chapter as well.  
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4.1 Quantitative Methods 
The quantitative methods applied in this thesis test a set of hypotheses concerning 
the influence of patron states and parent-patron state competition on state and 
institution building in de facto states. The proposed statistical approaches thereby 
test parts of the main argument and the theoretical framework of this thesis that 
relate to the general impact of patron states as well as of parent-patron state 
competition as an indirect diffusion source on the state and institution building 
processes of de facto states. This section introduces the data set, justifies the 
modifications made to the data set and presents the variable choices and their 
operationalisation. Subsequently, the section introduces the statistical methods in 
form of linear regression, logistic regression and survival models across a time series 
cross-sectional panel data set. Finally, the section specifies which hypotheses and 
theoretical arguments will be tested through the proposed quantitative methods.  
It is worth noting in this context, that quantitative studies on de facto states 
remain the exception to this date among the de facto state literature (refer to Bakke 
et al. 2009; 2013; 2018; O’Loughlin et al. 2015; Florea 2014; 2017 for notable 
exceptions). Recent work by Florea (2014; 2017) and Griffiths (2015) intends to break 
with this limitation by assembling comprehensive data sets on de facto states, 
secessionist regions and proto-states. Florea’s (2017) survival model of de facto 
states, for example, offers a noteworthy contribution to the de facto state literature 
by identifying external military assistance, rebel fragmentation and state building as 
significant factors shaping a de facto state’s transition to statehood. Still, a common 
reservation towards quantitative approaches in the field of de facto states is that the 
number of individual cases remains too small to run sophisticated regressions or that 
these polities are too dissimilar to offer a meaningful comparison. Florea’s (2014) 
data set, for instance, may be criticised for its inclusion of cases that do not fall into 
the common definitions of de facto states put forward by Pegg (1998), Caspersen 
(2012) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) in order to guarantee sufficient cases in 
the data set. To circumvent these limitations of large-N studies on de facto states, 
Ishiyama and Batta (2012) use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. 
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4.1.1 Modifications to the Original Data Set 
Despite the above-mentioned criticism of Adrian Florea’s data set, the data set of this 
thesis is based predominantly on his original data set from the 2014 article ‘De Facto 
States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set’. Florea’s data set offers 
a suitable basis for the statistical analyses of state and institution building in de facto 
states, because it includes both a state and institution building variable and measures 
de facto state developments across time. The data set regards each year that a de 
facto state survives in the international system as an individual observation. The 
nature of the data set therefore not only offers useful insights into the number of 
years a de facto survives, but also provides more general information about when 
patrons support these entities as well as the point in time when a de facto state 
achieves state and institution building. The observed cases include both successful 
and unsuccessful cases and are not restricted to violent, illegal, or non-colonial 
instances. I tailored Florea’s data set for the purposes of this thesis by modifying and 
complementing the data set with a variety of newly generated dependent, 
independent and control variables, such as indicators for patron and parent state 
capabilities, a variable measuring the relative strength of patron and parent states, a 
clearer distinction between stages of state building, a state building experience 
variable and finally an alternative patron state conceptualisation. 
 
4.1.1.1 Operationalising De Facto States 
This thesis uses the term ‘de facto state’ put forward by Pegg (1998) to define regions 
with state-like structures, that declared their independence and whose 
independence is widely unrecognised by the international community. To this date, 
the term de facto state is somewhat theoretically fragmented and contested in 
academic literature and other scholars may have preferred to use the terms 
unrecognised state (King 2001; Caspersen 2012), quasi-state (Baev 1998; Kolstø 
2006) or pseudo-state (Kolossov & O’Loughlin 1999) at some stage. However, in 
recent years most de facto state scholars have referred to these entities as either de 
facto states or unrecognised states following Pegg’s (1998) and Caspersen’s (2012) 
influential definitions. Even Caspersen (2017: 13) stated that she bows to the 
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predominant usage of de facto states instead of unrecognised states and argues that 
the term de facto state is more appropriate to consider the context in the period 
after Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Caspersen’s (2012: 11) 
original definition of unrecognised states foresees that 
 
• An unrecognized state has achieved de facto 
independence, covering at least two-thirds of the 
territory to which it lays claim and including its main 
city and key regions.  
• Its leadership is seeking to build further state 
institutions and demonstrate its own legitimacy.  
• The entity has declared formal independence or 
demonstrated clear aspirations for independence, for 
example through an independence referendum, 
adoption of a separate currency or similar act that 
clear signals separate statehood.32  
• The entity has not gained international recognition or 
has, at the most, been recognized by its patron state 
and a few other states of no great importance.  
• It has existed for at least two years.  
 
Building on Caspersen’s (2012) definition of de facto states, but also on Coggin’s 
criteria for secessionist movements, Florea (2014: 791) defines de facto states as 
“separatist entities that exercise a monopoly over the use of violence in a given 
territory but lack universal recognition.” More specifically, Florea (2014: 791-792) 
defines a de facto state as an entity that  
  
 
32 Ó’Beacháin, Comai, and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili (2016: 442) instead propose a minimalist 
definition that considers de facto states as “entities that have achieved and maintained 
internal sovereignty over an area for an extended period, with a degree of internal legitimacy 
but only limited formal recognition at the international level, or none at all.” Thereby, the 
authors remove the requirement of territorial control and declaration of or aspiration for 
formal independence from the definition (see also Comai 2018a: 24-25). 
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belongs to (or is administered by) a recognized country, 
but is not a colonial possession; seeks some degree of 
separation from that country and has declared 
independence (or has demonstrated aspirations for 
independence, for example, through a referendum or a 
“sovereignty declaration”); exerts military control over 
a territory or portions of territory inhabited by a 
permanent population; is not sanctioned by the 
government; performs at least basic governance 
functions (provision of social and political order); lacks 
international legal sovereignty, and exists for at least 24 
months. 
 
The choice of definition can have significant consequences on the number of entities 
included in the set of de facto states. While around six entities could be called de 
facto states according to Pegg’s (1998) definition, Caspersen (2012) counts 16 
unrecognised states since 1991. Meanwhile, a survey by Caspersen and Stansfield 
(2011: 4) identifies 21 unrecognised states since 1945, whereas Relitz (2016; 2019) 
identifies 25 de facto states since 1945 and Florea’s dataset comprises 34 de facto 
states between 1945 and 2011 (2014: 793). These numbers tellingly represent the 
potential criticism of Florea’s data set in the sense that a certain stretching of the 
definition enabled the creation of a large-N study. This, in turn, presents a caveat for 
the results of this thesis, which will be applicable to Florea’s definition of de facto 
states and the specific state-like entities included in his data set, but not necessarily 
to Pegg’s (1998) or Caspersen’s (2012) definition. Despite the variations in the de 
facto state definitions and the resulting variations in de facto state identification, all 
34 cases between 1945 and 2011 that were identified by Florea (2014) will be 
analysed in this statistical analysis. The table on the next page (table 6) lists all de 
facto states in Florea’s data set. The de facto states were sorted by first considering 
those entities with a patron state and then those without a patron state. In addition, 
the table was complemented with a column that indicates the time period of patron 
state support. The previous chapter specified an alternative conceptualisation of 
patron-de facto state relations, which challenges some of Florea’s classifications. 
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Table 6 De Facto States and their Patrons According to Florea (2014) 
De Facto State Parent State Emergence Disappearance Patron State Period of Patron Support 
Abkhazia Georgia 1991 Still present Russia 1991-present 
Ajaria Georgia 1991 2004 Russia 1991-2004 
Anjouan Comoros 1997 2008 France 1997-2008 
Biafra Nigeria 1967 1970 France 1967-1970 
Bougainville Papua New Guinea 1975 1997 Solomon Islands 1975-1997 
Casamance Senegal 1982 Still present Guinea-Bissau 1982-present 
Eastern Slavonia Croatia 1995 1997 Serbia/Yugoslavia 1995-1997 
Gaza Palestine 2007 Still present Iran 2007-present 
Katanga DR Congo 1960 1963 Belgium 1960-1963 
Kosovo Serbia 1998 2008 Albania 1998-2008 
Krajina Croatia 1991 1995 Serbia/Yugoslavia 1991-1995 
Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan 1991 Still present Armenia 1991-present 
Northern Cyprus Cyprus 1974 Still present Turkey 1974-present 
Palestine Israel 1995 Still present Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. 1995-present 
Republika Srpska Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 Still present Serbia/Yugoslavia 1992-present 
South Ossetia Georgia 1991 Still present Russia 1992-present 
South Sudan Sudan 1956 2011 Ethiopia 1983-1990 
Taiwan China 1971 Still present United States 1971-present 
Tamil Eelam Sri Lanka 1984 2009 India 1984-1987 
Transnistria Moldova 1991 Still present Russia 1991-present 
Western Sahara Morocco 1975 Still present Algeria 1975-present 
Aceh Indonesia 2001 2005 - - 
Cabinda Angola 1975 Still present - - 
Chechnya Russia 1991 1999 - - 
East Timor Indonesia 1975 2002 - - 
Eritrea Ethiopia 1964 1993 - - 
Gagauzia Moldova 1991 1994 - - 
Kachin State Burma 1961 Still present - - 
Karen State Burma 1949 Still present - - 
Kurdistan Iraq 1991 Still present - - 
Mindanao Philippines 1973 Still present - - 
Puntland Somalia 1991 Still present - - 
Rwenzururu Kingdom Uganda 1963 1982 - - 
Somaliland Somalia 1991 Still present - - 
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4.1.1.2 Variables 
The dependent variables of the quantitative chapter (chapter 5) are the degree of 
state building and the number of governance institutions in a de facto state in a given 
year. The dependent variables are summarised in the table below (table 7). All 
variable descriptions are sourced from Florea’s 2016 and 2018 code books apart from 
the newly generated variables.33  
 
Table 7 Dependent Variables 
dfsbuild Ordinal variable measuring degree of state building from 1 (low) to 4 
(very high) 
dfsbuildmod Binary variable comparing low degrees of state building (0) with 
moderate, high and very high degrees of state building (1) 
dfsbuildstrong Binary variable comparing low and moderate degrees of state building 
(0) with high and very high degrees of state building (1) 
dfsinst Number of governance institutions in a de facto state in a given year 
 
The first dependent variable (dfsbuild) is an ordinal variable that represents the 
degree of state building in a given year in a de facto state. Florea (2016: 14) codes 
the degree of state building by applying 4 categories: 
 
1  low degree of state building: de facto state 
separatists control the means of violence in the territory 
and provide minimal public goods (such as physical 
security)  
2  moderate degree of state building; in addition to 1, 
separatists allocate resources for civilian governance 
(such as minimal public administration, social security, 
education, health)  
3  high degree of state building: in addition to 2, 
separatists develop coherent governmental structures 
(institutions for extraction and redistribution; internal 
security and border management; courts; ministries)  
4  very high degree of state building; the polity has 
most characteristics of a state (including external 
relations, representative offices abroad, commercial 
relations with international partners).  
 
33 The variable definitions in tables 7, 8 and 9 are taken from Adrian Florea’s De Facto States 
Dataset Codebook (Versions 1.1 February 2016 and 2.0 September 2018). I do not place the 
variable descriptions in quotation marks, but with the exception of some newly generated 
variables in tables 7, 8 and 10, all descriptions are Florea’s work. 
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As the variable dfsbuild is an ordered categorical variable, I decided to generate two 
binary variables from the original state building variable: dfsbuildmod and 
dfsbuildstrong. The former focuses on the step from category 1 (low degrees of state 
building) to category 2 (moderate degrees of state building) and the latter focuses 
on the step from moderate degrees of state building to high degrees of state 
building. Generating these two new dependent variables has two advantages in both 
a practical and an analytical sense. First, dividing the ordinal variable into two stages 
allows me to run binary logistic regressions across the time series cross-sectional 
data set, which would not be possible for an ordered logistic regression. The time 
series cross-sectional panel data literature offers more sophisticated statistical 
functions on binary variables than for ordered categorical variables (see e.g. Beck et 
al. 1998; Tucker 1999; Beck 2001; 2008). Second, as this thesis is interested in 
individual state and institution building developments, recoding the dependent 
variable allows me to analyse the steps from separatist control to basic forms of 
civilian governance and from basic forms of civilian governance to coherent 
governmental structures more thoroughly and precisely. This enables the regression 
models to measure the effect of independent variables on the change from low to 
moderate degrees of state building and from moderate to high degrees of state 
building.  
The second dependent variable (dfsinst) is a discrete variable that counts the 
number of governance institutions in a de facto state in a given year. The variable 
encompasses ten categories (Florea 2016: 14-15) and does not distinguish between 
the origin of these institutions, which means that institutions can be inherited from 
previous autonomy rights or built by local separatist authorities. Florea weighs each 
governance institution equally, which presents a possible analytical limitation as 
foreign affairs institutions and militarily supported executives are coded as 
equivalent despite the latter’s relatively higher relevance for state building. Yet, for 
this research, not the equal weighting presents a caveat, but that the coded 
institutional presence does not represent institutional capacity. In more practical 
terms, the presence of an independent central bank in a given de facto state does 
not signify the entity’s capacity to perform central banking responsibilities. 
Abkhazia’s central bank, for example, is physically present and coded as existent in 
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Florea’s data set, but it does not perform all monetary policies usually associated 
with central banks. Every governance institution that is captured by the variable 
dfsinst is listed below: 
 
1 an executive supported by a military (coded as 
present if there is a clear executive authority that makes 
decisions in the de facto state)  
2  a legislature and/or regional councils (coded as 
present if there is a legislative body in the de facto state 
capital and/or regional councils)  
3  a court or semi-formalized legal system (coded as 
present if there is a formal or semiformal juridical 
authority that adjudicates disputes between individuals 
or institutions in the de facto state)  
4  a civilian tax system (coded as present if there are 
institutions for regularized extraction of taxes from the 
local population/businesses and/or from the diaspora)  
5  an educational system (coded as present if the 
authorities in the de facto state establish a system of 
education that functions in parallel with or in lieu of the 
one provided by the parent state)  
6  a welfare system (coded as present if the authorities 
in the de facto state establish a system of welfare – 
healthcare and/or pensions – that functions in parallel 
with or in lieu of the one provided by the parent state)  
7  institutions for foreign affairs (coded as present if the 
authorities in the de facto state engage in diplomacy – 
establishing missions abroad; engaging in contacts with 
IGOs and/or foreign governments)  
8  media or propaganda system (coded as present if the 
authorities in the de facto state establish media or 
propaganda outlets)  
9  police and/or gendarmerie system (coded as present 
if he authorities in the de facto state establish a system 
of internal control – police and/or gendarmerie – that 
operates separately from the army)  
10  an independent central banking system (coded as 
present if the authorities in the de facto state establish 
an independent central banking system that functions 
separately from the parent state’s banking  
 
The outcome of interest in this thesis is the state building development of de facto 
states. The state building and governance institution variables of the data set relate 
relatively well with the qualitative operationalisation of state building of this thesis, 
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which refers to state building as the development of state capacity in form of 
institutional and governance structures as well as the provision of public services and 
goods (see chapter 2 for the detailed operationalisation of state building). The state 
building variable dfsbuild, for instance, uncovers the development of a given de facto 
state’s state structures and its ability to provide public services and goods such as 
security, health and education. The state building models of this thesis distinguish 
between two state building stages. The step from low to moderate degrees of state 
building engages with a development to a stage of basic public services and goods, 
such as education and health, while simultaneously covering state capacity aspects 
such as minimal public administration. The step from moderate to high degrees of 
state building meanwhile captures a further extension of both the provision of public 
services and goods (e.g. internal security and border management) and state capacity 
in form of courts and ministries.  
The governance institution variable dfsinst accounts at least theoretically for 
a de facto state’s institutional capacity by listing the physical presence of a set of 
governance institutions such as a legislature, tax authorities and a central banking 
system. The institution variable simultaneously indicates the level of public service 
and goods provision in a given entity by considering for example education, welfare 
and legal service provisions. It is important to reiterate that the physical presence of 
such institutions does not automatically represent the practical capacity to provide 
services and goods associated with these institutions. Thus, the dependent variables 
dfsinst and dfsbuild of the large-N study appropriately capture the state building 
outcome of interest in this thesis and enable an estimation of how variations of direct 
and indirect involvement of patron states influence the provision of public services 
and state capacity in de facto states. 
The independent variables in the statistical models of this thesis (table 8) 
centre primarily around patrons and parent-patron state competition. The variable 
patronspanke classifies patron states according to the definition of patron states laid 
out in chapter 3 of this thesis. The relparentstrength and relparentgdppc variables 
refer to the relative military and economic power of parent and patron states. The 
operationalisation of the independent variables ties in with the theoretical 
framework and argument of this thesis in a number of ways. The patron variable 
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patronspanke enables the measurement of the effect of the presence of a patron 
state on the two dependent variables and thereby captures both the direct and 
indirect diffusion influences of patrons on state building in de facto states. The 
independent variables relparentstrength and relparentgdppc meanwhile 
quantitatively capture the indirect diffusion influences of patrons through 
competitive diffusion channels. 
 
Table 8 Independent Variables 
patronspanke Patron classification of this thesis (see chapter 3) 
relparentstrength Relative parent military and economic strength  
relparentgdppc Relative parent GDP per capita compared to patron state 
 
I also included a set of control variables (table 9) to ensure the robustness of the 
explanations derived from the independent variables, such as prior independence of 
the de facto state (dfspriorind), the type of de facto state emergence (typeonset), de 
jure autonomy from the parent state (dfsaut), the war intensity on the territory of 
the de facto state (dfswarint), the presence of a large diaspora (dias) and the duration 
of de facto state survival (duration). In addition, I control for domestic de facto state 
capabilities including the relative rebel capability (relcap) and the fragmentation of 
the secessionist movement (frag2). See chapter 5 for a detailed theoretical 
justification for the inclusion of these control variables.  
The proposed state and institution building models use the variable 
patronspanke as a key independent variable, whereas Florea’s (2014) patron variable 
serves as a control variable in the robustness checks of the quantitative chapter. As 
Florea does not specify the definition of patron states in the data set codebooks, I 
contacted him by email and he revealed to me in 2018 that he determines the 
presence of a patron state by identifying “regularised patterns of military assistance 
from a third (state) party.” 
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Table 9 Control Variables 
dfspriorind Previous independence or autonomy after 1812 
typeonset Variable categorises type of de facto state emergence: 
(1) de facto state emerges as post-conflict outcome 
(2) de facto state emerges out of the contentious interaction between 
the parent state and separatists (non-conflictual emergence) 
(3) de facto state emerges in the wake of state/federal collapse 
(4) de facto state emerges during the decolonization process (colonial 
divestment) 
dfswarint War intensity in de facto state coded as:  
(0) no battle-related deaths 
(1) minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year 
(2) war: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year between the 
de facto and parent state 
dias Presence of large diaspora originating from de facto state 
dfsaut De facto state benefits from de jure autonomy within parent state 
duration Number of months entity has survived as de facto state 
relcap Relative rebel capability coded as 
(1) weaker than the government  
(2) at parity with the government 
(3) stronger than the government 
(4) much stronger than the government 
frag2 Fragmentation on unified–fragmented scale (cf. Bakke, Cunningham & 
Seymour 2012): 
(1)  no fragmentation 
[…] 
(9)  extreme fragmentation 
patron De facto state has a patron. Florea (2018) defines patrons as regularised 
patterns of military assistance from a third (state) party 
 
In addition to the already existing variables in the data set, I generated a set of 
variables that perform as either independent or control variables and unpack the 
influence of patrons and state building processes in de facto states further, situate 
patron-de facto state relations in a geopolitical setting and ensure more time-varying 
variables (see table 10). Thereby, the large-N study captures both the effect of patron 
states on state and institution building in de facto states as well as the impact of 
indirect competitive diffusion channels of patron states in form of patron-parent 
state competition. The supplementary variables, for instance, measure the relative 
patron and parent state capabilities, specify an alternative patron definition and 
account for previous state and institution building experiences in de facto states.  
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This thesis utilises the Composite indicator of National Capability (CINC) from 
the Correlates of War Project (Singer et al. 1972)34 and World Bank GDP data to 
classify the military (patronstrength and parentstrength) and economic strength 
(patrongdppc and parentgdppc) of patron and parent states. Subsequently, the 
military or economic strength of the patron state was deducted from the parent state 
strength to capture the relative power of parent and patron states (relparentstrength 
and relparentgdppc).35 The data set also includes variables that measure the state 
and institution building experience (dfsbuildexp and dfsinstexp) and the number of 
months since the last state or institution building experience (tsincedfsbuildchg and 
tsincedfsinstchg).  
 
Table 10 Newly Generated Independent and Control Variables 
patronspanke Patron classification of this thesis (see chapter 3) 
patronname Name of patron state 
patrongdp GDP of the patron state 
patrongdppc GDP per capita of the patron state 
parentgdp GDP of the parent state 
parentgdppc GDP per capita of the parent state 
relparentgdp Relative parent GDP compared to patron state 
relparentgdppc Relative parent GDP per capita compared to patron state 
relpatrongdp Relative patron GDP compared to parent state 
relpatrongdppc Relative patron GDP per capita compared to parent state 
patronstrength Military and economic strength of patron state using CINC 
parentstrength Military and economic strength of parent state using CINC 
relparentstrength Relative parent military and economic strength  
relpatronstrength Relative patron military and economic strength 
dfsbuildexp Number of times de facto state has experienced state building 
changes 
dfsinstexp Number of times de facto state has experienced institution 
changes 
tsincedfsbuildchg Number of months since last state building change 
tsincesdfsinstchg Number of months since last institution change 
 
34 The CINC indicator uses six material capacity indicators of material capacity: total 
population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditure, steel and iron 
production as well as energy consumption (Singer et al. 1972). 
35 I referred to Israel as Gaza’s parent state (rather than Palestine as Florea suggests in his 
data set) to offer a more realistic representation of relative patron and parent state strength. 
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4.1.2 Statistical Modelling 
This section introduces two statistical approaches to test three hypotheses, which 
shed light on the role of patron states, patron-parent state competition and temporal 
patterns of state building in de facto states. First, this thesis develops linear and 
logistic state and institution building models that measure the impact of patron 
states on state and institution building in de facto states, while controlling for 
temporal dependence and a set of domestic, structural and international variables. 
Even though the dependent variable dfsinst represents a discrete count variable, I 
decided to run linear regressions rather than a Poisson regression model, as the 
variable shares more characteristics with a continuous variable than with a 
traditional count variable (see appendix E for the justification). The recoded 
dependent variables dfsbuildmod and dfsbuildstrong will be included in logistic 
regression models and survival models. Second, survival model techniques uncover 
temporal patterns of state and institution building in de facto states and the extent 
to which patrons shape these developments. I used the statistics package Stata 
(Version 15.0) for the statistical modelling and analysis of the data set. 
 
4.1.2.1 Statistical Models for Time Series Cross-Sectional Panel Data  
Unlike panel data that tends to consist of many units (𝑖) across few time observations 
(𝑡), time series cross-sectional (TSCS) panel data usually comprises large 𝑡 and small 
or medium 𝑖. In a basic ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for TSCS panel data, 
the covariates are therefore indexed both by time and unit (see equation below).  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Statistical models for time series cross-sectional panel data enable researchers to 
approach questions that have both spatial and temporal dimensions by covering 
multiple cross-sectional units across various time periods. Particularly for the 
research goals set out in this thesis, TSCS panel data presents an appropriate 
resource, as the proposed research questions and state building theories cover 
temporal variations across a fixed set of units. Yet, statistical models for TSCS panel 
data require additional statistical considerations related to temporal and spatial 
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dependence, various forms of heterogeneity and panel heteroscedasticity. The 
standard OLS assumption that the error terms are independent, for instance, is 
violated in the case of TSCS panel data for a variety of reasons including likely time 
dependence and potential spatial dependence. These considerations ultimately 
inform the suitability of the model choice and the appropriate means to account for 
temporal dependence. 
The above OLS equation assumes constant intercepts and covariate effects 
across all observations. As this homogeneity assumption is unlikely to hold true 
across a diverse set of entities as de facto states, it is necessary to account for 
potential intercept and effect heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity informs 
the choice of fixed or random effect models for the state and institution building 
models of this thesis. Therefore, I consulted a set of descriptive statistics to uncover 
possible intercept and slope heterogeneity across units or time for the dependent, 
independent and control variables of the statistical models (see appendix F). The 
results indicate some heterogeneity across the unit level. For the number of 
governance institutions, for instance, several de facto states have low mean values 
and no change in the number of state institutions, whereas others show more 
institutional development. At the same time, the standard deviations are relatively 
similar, which indicate slightly less heterogeneity. As there are no regions with 
specifically high or low state institution counts, it appears at least unnecessary to 
create regional dummy variables.  
Beyond the dependent variables, I also tested for heterogeneity across the 
independent and control variables of the study and found variations of variables 
across space, time as well as both space and time. The variables typeonset, dias and 
dfspriorind do not vary over time and would ultimately be dropped in a fixed effects 
model. A set of other variables (i.e. patronspanke) indicate little time variation. Due 
to the theoretical significance of these variables for state building and the research 
questions of this thesis, I decided to keep these variables in the model despite their 
limited variation across time. This is in line with Beck (2008), who stresses the 
importance of time-varying independent variables for most studies that work with 
binary time series cross-sectional (BTSCS) panel data. The heterogeneity of variables 
and intercepts as well as the limited variability of some independent variables, in 
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turn, informed the model choice and the inclusion of a set of variables that vary more 
across time, such as relparentstrength and tsincedfsinstchg. 
Fixed effects models, on the one hand, consider unit-specific effects, where 
the unit effects are fixed and time effects are constrained to zero (see Stimson 1985 
who refers to this as the least-squares dummy variables method). Fixed effects 
assume uniqueness of the fixed unit over time that covariates are unable to capture. 
Fixed effects models are suitable for data sets with unit heterogeneity, because they 
account for within-unit variation and correlations between the sources of the 
heterogeneity with the independent variables. However, fixed effects do not 
estimate the effects of covariates that do not change over a period of time within 
cases (Beck & Katz 2001). Random effects, on the other hand, assume that unit-
specific effects are not correlated with the independent variables. Importantly for 
the variables in the state and institution building models, random effects models 
have the advantage of taking time-invariant regressors into consideration, which 
captures the effects of time-invariant regressors. 
In light of the descriptive statistics results, a fixed effects model would not be 
the most appropriate model for this study, as it does not suitably take the 
independent variables into account that do not vary over time. Additionally, the fixed 
effects model would overemphasise those cases in the data set with limited 
independent variations (patronspanke, typeonset, dfspriorind). Thus, even though 
the Hausman test suggests that the fixed effects model may be preferred, I decided 
to pursue random effects models, based on the descriptive statistics and because the 
Hausman test cannot address covariates that are non-time-varying (the results of the 
Hausman test results can be found in appendix G).  
The choice of the random effects model also addresses potential endogeneity 
in the regression models of this thesis. Endogeneity refers to the correlation of the 
independent variable with the error term in the regression analysis, which would 
result in biased coefficients. In that sense, endogenous variables are those that are 
determined by variables outside the model. TSCS panel data reduces the endogeneity 
problem somewhat, because unlike non-time-varying data sets, TSCS panel data 
captures correlated individual effects across time. If the assumption of random 
effects models that the unit-specific effects are not correlated with the independent 
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variable holds true, this significantly reduces the endogeneity concerns in the model. 
Still, it is not possible to argue that no variables were omitted, because in random 
effect models, omitted variable bias may affect time-varying effects. Therefore, 
process tracing in the case studies of this thesis may identify further omitted 
variables. 
 
4.1.2.2 Survival Modelling 
Survival models are also known as event history, duration or hazard models and 
estimate the time until a given event occurs. The event in question is conditional on 
the time until the event takes place (Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford 2004; Cleves et 
al. 2016; Mills 2011). For this thesis, survival models enable a deeper engagement 
with potential temporal patterns of state building in de facto states and the extent 
to which patron states shift these dynamics across time.  
From the outset, survival models necessitate the modification of the original 
data set in such a way, that the events of attaining moderate degrees of state building 
or high degrees of state building represent the final observation for each unit. In 
other words, all observations that take place after the state building event 
(dfsbuildmod or dfsbuildstrong) will be dropped. Unfortunately, the discarded 
observations reduce the number of observations to an extent that makes parametric 
and Cox models statistically infeasible. Furthermore, it is necessary to declare data 
as survival data and choose the appropriate temporal variable. Rather than 
comparing de facto states across years, I decided to pursue an ahistoric approach 
that measures state building using the number of months an entity survived 
(duration). While this approach does not consider the potential influence of historical 
contexts on state building, it enables a better comparison across de facto states 
based on the number of months that these entities survived.  
The modified data sets produce insightful results about temporal patterns of 
state building by utilising a useful feature of survival analysis in form of the Kaplan-
Meier estimator, that estimates the likelihood of an event not taking place at a given 
point in time. In other words, it estimates the survival function for a non-parametric 
method and estimates survival at time 𝑡. This estimator can be used to understand 
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the likelihood (or risk) of moderate or high state building taking place in de facto 
states and at what point in time this step is likely to happen.  
 
4.1.3 Hypotheses Testing 
The aim of this thesis is to identify the causal effects of patrons on state and 
institution building in de facto states. The theoretical framework of this thesis 
suggests that these effects can take the form of direct and indirect diffusion 
influences and may be shaped by the legitimisation of patron involvement and the 
bounded agency of de facto states. The data set of this thesis enables the isolation 
of the association between the independent variable (patronspanke) and the 
dependent variables (dfsbuildmod, dfsbuildstrong and dfsinst), by holding a set of 
control variables and confounders constant. However, the quantitative methods are 
insufficient for causal identification, because the data set offers limited room for 
manoeuvre to capture counterfactuals. Thus, the quantitative research methods 
identify associations between the independent and dependent variables through 
hypotheses testing, but do not identify causality. Instead, causality will be 
demonstrated through the method of process tracing in the case studies of this 
thesis.  
The proposed state and institution building models of this thesis test a set of 
hypotheses that link the statistical findings to the argument and the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. On the basis of the existing literature on state and 
institution building in de facto states and the role of patron states, chapter 5 
establishes three hypotheses: 
 
𝐇𝟏: Patron states increase a de facto state’s degrees of state building and number 
of governance institutions. 
 
𝐇𝟐: The stronger the parent state compared to the patron state, the likelier de 
facto states pursue state and institution building. 
 
𝐇𝟑: Patrons decrease the time it takes for de facto states to achieve state and 
institution building. 
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Hypothesis one directly relates to the argument of the thesis that patrons limit the 
extent to which they support state and institution building in de facto states by 
guaranteeing minimal civilian governance, but not coherent government structures. 
The central argument of this thesis also states that patrons reduce the number of 
governance institutions through institution sharing. Thus, testing hypothesis one 
captures both the direct and indirect impact of patrons on the degrees of state 
building and the number of governance institutions in de facto states. Hypothesis 
two explores the presence and impact of competitive diffusion influences on state 
and institution building in de facto states, as suggested by the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. Thereby, the proposed model tests whether competition between 
parent and patron states as an indirect diffusion source encourages state and 
institution building in de facto states. The third hypothesis accounts for the effect of 
patrons on the temporal state and institution building processes of de facto states 
and thereby demonstrates both the direct and indirect effect of patron states on the 
pace of state and institution building processes.  
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4.2 Qualitative Methods 
This section introduces the qualitative methods of this thesis that cover a single in-
depth case study, process tracing as well as the analysis of interview data and a 
variety of other primary sources. The aim of the qualitative methods employed in this 
thesis is to tease out causal mechanisms through process tracing and thereby 
complement, specify or dispute some of the quantitative findings in a case study 
setting. More specifically, the case study explores whether patron states shape the 
state and institution building processes of de facto states through direct and indirect 
diffusion influences, in what settings these diffusion influences take place and what 
the impact on the state and institution building is. Thereby, the qualitative findings 
add robustness to the quantitative findings of this thesis, by addressing potential 
measurement and endogeneity concerns in the quantitative methods. The case 
studies, for instance, may uncover variables that were not accounted for in the 
statistical models and offer insights into alternative causal paths that result in a given 
outcome.  
 
4.2.1 Single Case Study Analysis and Selection 
A case study analysis represents “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident” (Yin 2009: 14). 
In the context of this thesis, case studies can descriptively illustrate the state and 
institution building processes of de facto states in a thick historical narrative by 
carefully considering the developments and fluctuating dependence on patron 
involvement. This, in turn, sheds more light on direct and indirect patron 
involvement, which enables a closer engagement with the causal mechanisms that 
facilitate state and institution building in de facto states.  
The selection of an appropriate case study to identify and illustrate causal 
mechanisms can follow a variety of methodological strategies ranging from 
randomisation (Fearon & Laitin 2008) to the choice of extreme or deviant cases on 
the independent variable (Seawright & Gerring 2008). I selected the single case study 
of this thesis at least partially to ensure result triangulation where the case study 
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offers insights into causal pathways that explain the findings of the quantitative 
study. This form of result triangulation where a variety of methods are employed to 
make causal arguments (Olsen 2004) represents a common empirical mixed-
methods research strategy, but comes with its own limitations (Seawright 2016). 
Particularly when the qualitative and quantitative research outcomes are either very 
similar or different, the combination of the respective findings may be problematic 
on the basis of the epistemological differences of the methods (Seawright 2016). 
While Seawright (2016) suggests an integrative mixed methods approach, the 
triangulation of research outcomes can still be considered appropriate for this thesis 
as neither approach makes arguments about the final inference supported by the 
other method, but instead the qualitative methods offer causal pathways that help 
explain the quantitative findings.  
Beyond the goal of result triangulation, Russian patron engagement in 
Abkhazia’s state and institution building development was purposively selected as 
the case study of this thesis, because it contains a set of essential attributes 
associated with the research matter of this thesis. More specifically, the chosen case 
study covers a set of practical and thematic characteristics that make the study 
suitable for the research of this thesis, including a degree of state building progress 
in the de facto state, the presence of a patron state, the availability of primary and 
secondary sources as well as its location in the post-Soviet space.36 Applying these 
standards to the de facto states of the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe presents 
Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh as the most appropriate case study 
choices. These regions have a patron, operated as de facto states since the early 
1990s, which provided these entities with enough time to develop their state and 
governance institutions (unlike the Luhansk and Donetsk People Republics) and were 
accessible for fieldwork (unlike South Ossetia). In terms of state and institution 
building development, figures 3 and 437 demonstrate that Abkhazia is not an outlier 
among the de facto states of the post-Soviet space, as it shares similar state and 
 
36 The final point can only be justified in so far that the post-Soviet space is a region of particular 
interest to me personally as a researcher and that I wanted to conduct interviews in Russian. 
37 Both graphs draw from the data of Florea’s (2014) data set, with a restricted focus on the post-
Soviet de facto states. 
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institution building developments with South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistria.  
In addition to the above-mentioned requirements, the theoretical framework 
and the patron conceptualisation of this thesis need to be applicable to the case 
study in question. Russia’s engagement in Abkhazia’s state and institution building 
endeavour is an appropriate case study in this regard, because it represents varying 
degrees of patron involvement as well as changes in the de facto state’s dependence 
on the patron state. According to the conceptualisation of patron states of this thesis, 
Russia cannot officially be considered Abkhazia’s patron until 1999 (see chapter 3). 
Thus, the case of Russo-Abkhaz relations has the analytical advantage of capturing 
how direct and indirect diffusion sources operate with and without the presence of 
a patron. The case study shows that even when Russia did not act as a patron, there 
are signs of indirect mimetic, competitive and normative diffusion influences from 
Russia. Furthermore, the case study highlights the ways in which Russia helped 
sustain the state and institution building achievements both directly and indirectly 
from 1999 onwards.  
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Figure 3 State Building in Post-Soviet De Facto States 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Number of Governance Institutions in Post-Soviet De Facto States 
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For the sake of transparency, it has to be noted that the selection of the case study 
was also informed by changes in the research focus of this thesis. In the early stages 
of the PhD project, I intended to compare Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s state building 
process and the extent to which the same patron state shapes the developments in 
two de facto states with arguably different independence intentions. Due to the 
difficulties of (legally) reaching South Ossetia and acquiring data on the ground, I 
soon later considered a case comparison of a smaller number of cases that were 
selected based on state building differences and similarities, while ensuring variation 
across the independent patron state variable. However, inspired by the in-depth case 
studies of Transnistria (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2011) and Somaliland (Richards 2014), I 
decided that a pathway case (Gerring 2007) encourages closer engagement with the 
causal mechanisms behind patron involvement in the state building processes of de 
facto states. The general relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables tends to be known in pathway case studies and the case study is used to 
capture the causal process behind this relationship and to test hypotheses (Collier 
1993: 108). Thus, Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia from the early 1990s until today 
serves as the pathway case to identify the causal mechanisms between dependent 
and independent variables and tease out the direct and indirect patron influences of 
a patron state on the state and institution building processes in a de facto state.  
Even though this thesis engages with a single case, the qualitative research 
enables the pursuit of comparative analyses throughout the study in form of within-
case analyses (see Collier & Mahoney 1996; Gerring 2007).38 Building on Prelz 
Oltramonti’s (2015) classification of Russo-Abkhaz economic relations, I compare 
Abkhazia’s state building processes across periods of varying degrees of patron 
involvement. This form of within-case analysis offers insights into the role of patron 
states and levels of dependency on particular state building developments at given 
time periods.  
In addition, chapter 8 represents a case-within-a-case that is dedicated to the 
analysis of Russian direct and indirect engagement in Abkhazia’s education sector. 
 
38 Even in single case studies one pursues implicit descriptive comparisons by judging 
developments as either strong or weak and present or absent. 
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This supplementary case examination offers a set of additional analytical 
perspectives on the variations of patron involvement in the state and institution 
building processes of de facto states and contributes to the theoretical framework of 
this thesis. First, chapters 6 and 7 offer an overview of Abkhazia’s state and 
institution building development in its entirety. By examining Abkhazia’s education 
sector in particular, the case-within-a-case exemplifies direct and indirect patron 
involvement and bounded agency at hand of one specific state sector. Education 
represents a basic service in most internationally recognised countries and can serve 
as an instrument to ensure a level of control and power over a group of people by 
establishing a degree of legitimacy between the population and the ruling class. In 
that regard, an analysis of Abkhazia’s education sector can be considered insightful 
in its own right. At the same time, an exploration of Russian direct and indirect 
involvement in Abkhazia’s education sector sheds light on the extent of patron 
engagement in de facto states, because unlike the defence and financial sector of de 
facto states, education represents a sector where patron involvement is not 
necessarily expected. Second, the analysis of Abkhazia’s education sector represents 
an insightful illustrative case study of competitive diffusion playing out in a specific 
state sector of a de facto state and the extent to which international actors might be 
prepared to go in supporting de facto authorities with the provision of public services 
and goods. These insights contribute to the theoretical framework of this thesis by 
fleshing out the origins, patterns and consequences of competing diffusion sources 
in de facto states. The chapter, for instance, contributes to the theoretical framework 
by highlighting that Russian and other diffusion sources do not necessarily directly 
compete outside of the Gali district but can complement each other. 
A limitation of the outlined case study selection relates to its predominant 
focus on the central de facto government and its governance institutions to capture 
state and institution building developments in Abkhazia. The inclusion of regional and 
civil society developments in the analysis would have likely contributed to a more 
comprehensive picture of state building processes in de facto states and the extent 
of patron engagement. This criticism has been put forward by Milli Lake (2014: 516), 
who differentiates between “three distinct levels of governance – the central, local 
and community levels,” and argues that central governments are not the only 
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settings for state building. Indeed, in the case of Abkhazia, one can observe 
significant differences in state building trajectories across regions such as Gali and 
Upper Kodori, that matter particularly in regard to territorial control (see chapter 6) 
and parent state engagement (see chapter 8). This thesis touches upon some 
community and local developments in the education chapter (see chapter 8), but 
further research needs to be conducted to capture the full extent of state building 
developments in Abkhazia beyond the central government.  
 
4.2.2 Qualitative Data: Interviews and Primary Sources 
The field research for this thesis was conducted for four months in the summer of 
2017 and autumn of 2018 covering Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia. The rationale of 
the fieldwork in the three regions was twofold. First, fieldwork in the parent, patron 
and de facto state enables a closer engagement with primary sources and facilitates 
the identification of central actors and processes in the regions of interest. In that 
sense, fieldwork encourages researchers to get a feeling for the studied regions and 
to observe aspects that would otherwise get lost in desktop research, such as the 
experience of crossing the de facto border between Georgia and Abkhazia and the 
lack of international companies in the de facto state. Second, the fieldwork enabled 
the collection of data, secondary sources and primary sources in form of interviews, 
agreements, written accounts and photographs. Indeed, I collected the predominant 
share of qualitative data points for this study during my field research in Abkhazia, 
Georgia and Russia. These rich data points shed light on the ways in which the Abkhaz 
de facto government pursued state and institution building and offer insights into 
the extent and ways in which Russia has shaped Abkhazia’s state and institution 
building processes.  
However, data collection in fieldwork settings comes with a set of limitations 
and ethical considerations that can shape the research outcomes (see e.g. Cronin-
Furman & Lake (2018) for an overview of ethical and practical implications of 
fieldwork activities in areas of state weakness and conflict). Yemelianova’s (2015) 
analysis of the prevalent theoretical and methodological approaches of Western 
English-language scholarship on de facto states, for instance, uncovers a set of 
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distinctive challenges that may affect the quality of conducted research. According 
to her, many researchers not only approached the post-Soviet de facto state conflicts 
from a Russia-centric perspective, but also “often lacked the in-depth knowledge and 
necessary linguistic skills to deal with ethno-political conflicts and processes in non-
Russian parts of the former Soviet Union” (Yemelianova 2015: 65). Furthermore, she 
finds that  
 
[t]horough field work on de facto states has been 
relatively limited, with the bulk of it based on short-
term visits there and interviews with capital based 
English or Russian-speaking policy-makers and 
academics as well as journalistic reports. As a result, 
data have sometimes been less than comprehensive, 
which has inevitably affected the validity of at least 
some of the conclusions reached (Yemelianova 2015: 
65).  
 
Even though I was aware of these limitations while planning my fieldwork, it was 
difficult to avoid falling into similar methodological traps during the fieldwork in 
Abkhazia and Georgia. Not only did I conduct my research interviews predominantly 
in English and Russian rather than Georgian or Abkhaz, I also conducted most of my 
field research in the capital cities of Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia. It is therefore 
necessary to account for the limitations of the interview data in terms of 
generalisability and coverage. Moreover, there are a variety of limitations to 
interview research in general and in conflict or post-conflict contexts in particular. 
Especially in geographically small regions or regions with small populations, where 
only a limited number of people are willing to be interviewed, it is likely that the 
findings of the interviews drive the research of a number of researchers 
simultaneously. I noticed, for instance, that I had previously read some of the 
interview results of my interviews in other research studies. Therefore, it is important 
to approach potential interviewees beyond those interview subjects that were 
referred to you by other researchers. Furthermore, field researchers should attempt 
to come up with questions that differ from previous studies in order to produce new 
research insights.  
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Interview data constitutes a significant portion of the qualitative data points 
of the cases studies. Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of flexibility in 
terms of what interviewees want to say in their own way (Carruthers 1990) and they 
allow the researcher to adapt the interview to the situation (Kajornboon 2005). The 
interview data of this thesis is the result of in-country field research in the de facto 
Republic of Abkhazia, Georgia and the Russian Federation, specifically in Sukhumi, 
the de facto capital of Abkhazia, Tbilisi, Saint Petersburg and Moscow. I interviewed 
a variety of stakeholders of the Abkhaz government including ministers and 
politicians. In addition, I interviewed previous members of the Abkhaz government 
and bureaucracy that experienced the state and institution building process of 
Abkhazia in the post-Soviet period of the 1990s first-hand, but moved on to work for 
international donors or NGOs in Sukhumi. Moreover, I interviewed international 
donors, NGOs, political analysts and researchers secondary to the state building 
process that regularly interacted with Abkhaz officials in some form. Thus, the 
interviews in Abkhazia were primarily selected to represent both an external and 
internal perspective on state building in Abkhazia and to offer insights into the 
interviewees’ experiences on the ground during the state building developments. 
These interviews uncover how and why the Abkhaz de facto government took certain 
decisions, what state and institution building measures it prioritised and how the 
authorities were influences by Russia.  
Despite attempts to interview representatives from the Russian government, 
it was only possible to interview scholars that had expertise in Russo-Abkhaz 
relations, that previously visited Abkhazia or worked directly with Russian officials. 
Therefore, Russian motivations behind their engagement in Abkhazia can only be 
assessed through second-hand information, which certainly presents a limitation of 
the interview results. Still, the interviews with Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian officials 
offered insights into the actions of Russian representatives on the ground and their 
policy prioritisations in Abkhazia. This information does not provide conclusive 
evidence on patron motivations, but uncovers the practical implications of patron 
engagement. The interviews with Abkhaz government officials, for instance, revealed 
that Russian engagement discourages Abkhaz self-sufficiency. 
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I developed an interview guide for the semi-structured interviews that 
focused on a set of core questions (Bogner et al. 2009) covering five topics: domestic 
state building developments, the role of limited international recognition, the 
involvement of external actors, Russian engagement in Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s 
education sector. The interviews lasted between 30 to 120 minutes. Four of the 18 
interviews were conducted in Russian without a translator and transcribed by a 
Russian transcription service. The remaining interviews were conducted in English 
and transcribed by a transcription service in London. With the exception of five 
interviews, all interviews were audio recorded. In one instance, I was not allowed to 
bring electronic equipment with me and in the other four cases the interview setting 
did not lend itself to recording the interview.  
The interviews are numbered consecutively to preserve the anonymity of the 
interviewees, but three interviewees agreed to having their names and/or 
professional titles used. For the sake of transparency, I indicate which findings derive 
from which interviewee. The interview data was cross-referenced with secondary or 
alternative primary findings. If it was not possible to cross-reference the interview 
data, the thesis clearly states that a specific finding was ‘alleged’ or ‘argued’ by one 
of the interviewees. The complete list of interviews is summarised in the table below 
(table 11). 
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Table 11 Interview Information 
Interview Description Location Year 
1 Georgian scholar Tbilisi, Georgia 2017 
2 Two representatives of an international donor Tbilisi, Georgia 2017 
3 Former Georgian diplomat Tbilisi, Georgia 2017 
4 Chairman of the Supreme Council of the 
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
Tbilisi, Georgia 2017 
5 Representative of an international 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
6 Representative of an international 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
7 Viacheslav Chirikba: former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
8 Adgur Kakoba: current Minister of Education 
of the Republic of Abkhazia 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
9 Government representative of the Republic of 
Abkhazia 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
10 Representative of an international 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
11 Representative of a non-governmental 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
12 Representative of an international 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
13 Representative of a non-governmental 
organisation 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia 2017 
14 Russian scholar Saint Petersburg, 
Russia 
2018 
15 Abkhaz scholar Saint Petersburg, 
Russia 
2018 
16 Russian scholar Moscow, Russia 2018 
17 American scholar Moscow, Russia 2018 
18 Russian scholar Moscow, Russia 2018 
   
In addition to the interviews, the data analysed in this thesis includes legal 
documents, such as treaties and agreements between the Russian Federation and 
the de facto Republic of Abkhazia from 2008 onwards. Especially the 2014 agreement 
offered detailed insights into Russian state building support for Abkhazia (see chapter 
7). Furthermore, I obtained primary sources on Abkhazia’s state building 
development in the Russian National Library in Moscow. These sources include 
exchanges between the Abkhaz, Russian and Georgian governments in the 1990s, 
statements and legal acts of the Abkhaz de facto authorities, photos of Abkhazia in 
the Soviet and post-Soviet period, as well as UN status reports assessing the situation 
in Abkhazia in the 1990s. The visual data of this thesis was either sourced from photo 
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albums from the Russian National Library or was produced by myself during my field 
research. The interviews, primary sources and photographs create a rich set of data 
points that enable a vivid representation of state building developments in Abkhazia. 
The photographic evidence in the thesis serves two dominant purposes for 
the analysis of the case studies. First, the photographs visually demonstrate the 
presence of state, governance and education infrastructure and institutions in 
Abkhazia’s Soviet and post-Soviet period. The photographic evidence thereby 
illustrates the potential for institutional path dependence in the post-Soviet period 
and the ability of Abkhaz rebel groups to utilise the foundations of the pre-existing 
institutional structure for their state and institution building endeavours (see figures 
11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 26, 27 and 28). Relatedly, some pictures depict cultural 
norms surrounding teaching settings and school uniforms in Abkhazia during the 
Soviet period. Some of these norms outlived the Soviet period and reflect a 
continuation of cultural norms in Abkhazia’s post-Soviet period outlined in the 
qualitative findings of chapter 8 (see figures 19, 21, 24 and 29). Second, some 
photographs vividly capture the war and post-war devastation in Abkhazia that 
exemplify the domestic state and institution building hurdles of the de facto regime. 
The pictures thereby also serve as an explanation why Russian state building support 
to Abkhazia focused predominantly on infrastructural assistance (see figures 22 and 
23). 
 
4.2.3 Process Tracing 
The previously introduced case study of Russian involvement in the state and 
institution building processes of Abkhazia will be analysed with the help of process 
tracing. Process tracing enables the identification of causal chains between an 
independent and a dependent variable (Checkel & Moravcsik 2001). Identifying and 
subsequently understanding the causal chain is necessary to establish causality 
between the variables in question and to recognise the causal mechanism at play 
(Collier 2011). More specifically, process tracing captures the actors and processes 
involved in the causal chain, which enables researchers to make claims about the 
presence of individual variables in the causal chain, their individual or combined 
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impact and whether there is a causal or temporal link between independent and 
dependent variables (George & Bennett 2005: 6). Thereby, process tracing also 
permits the categorical exclusion of independent variables from the equation and 
disconfirming hypotheses if variables are found not to have a causal or temporal 
effect. Furthermore, process tracing enables an assessment whether there is 
sufficient evidence in favour of a causal mechanism as opposed to an alternative 
direct or indirect pathway (George & Bennett 2005: 6). Due to the large and detailed 
data points necessary to uncover the process leading to an outcome, not all potential 
events and paths can be explored in process tracing (Checkel 2008).  
Hence, exploring the case study through process tracing tests whether the 
presence of a Russia as a patron state has a causal effect on state and institution 
building in Abkhazia and whether the direct and indirect diffusion channels set out in 
the theoretical framework serve as a causal pathway. In other words, the case study 
chapters outline the individual steps from patron state (independent variable) to 
state and institution building in Abkhazia (dependent variable). In addition, the case 
study chapters test the applicability of the causal chains set out in the theoretical 
framework in form of direct (coercive diffusion) and indirect (normative, mimetic and 
competitive diffusion) influences as potential causal mechanisms. In the following 
paragraphs, I will present three sections of the argument and theoretical framework 
that will be tested in the case studies through the application of process tracing. 
First, the central argument of this thesis poses that “patrons can nurture the 
dependence of de facto states on patron support by pursuing a multi-layered policy 
of granting de facto state agency in an international setting of limited alternatives 
while providing support that discourages self-sufficiency.” The case study tests 
whether the nurturing of dependence is truly at the heart of Russo-Abkhaz relations, 
by exploring the ways in which Russia grants agency to Abkhazia while discouraging 
self-sufficiency. This will be done by exploring agreements between the two parties 
and analysing the interviews for signs of such behaviour. The interviews do not 
uncover the motivation of Russia as a patron state, however they offer insights into 
Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s state building development. These 
actions and developments can be assessed for their impact on the de facto state’s 
agency and limited self-sufficiency. The case study, for instance, uncovers that 
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Russian support focuses predominantly on infrastructural reconstruction rather than 
capacity building, which hints at the limited self-sufficiency of Abkhazia. Similarly, the 
interviews and agreements direct the focus on a degree of institution sharing 
between Russia and Abkhazia, which demonstrates restricted self-sufficiency 
without knowing the motivations of the patron state.  
Second, the theoretical framework suggests that patron states can not only 
have a direct effect on the institutional outcome of a de facto state, but also an 
indirect influence through indirect diffusion channels. The case study tests whether 
there is evidence of causal mechanisms between the presence of a patron and the 
state and institution building outcome in a de facto state in form of competitive, 
normative, mimetic and coercive diffusion and what these causal mechanisms 
involve (i.e. actors and processes). These causal mechanisms can subsequently be 
linked to observable implications relating to the state and institution building 
development of Abkhazia, such as similarities across Abkhaz and Russian state and 
institution structures, institution sharing or developments in public service 
provisions. The interviews with former and present Abkhaz government 
representatives, for example, uncover that even during Abkhazia’s period of partial 
isolation, Abkhaz elites adjusted their actions and plans according to Russian 
interests and activities which hints at the role of indirect diffusion sources. 
Third, process tracing can also test the role of transition variables identified 
in the theoretical framework, such as bounded agency and legitimacy that shape the 
ways in which diffusion influences affect the state and institution building processes 
of de facto states. The thesis argues, for instance, that bounded agency increases the 
likelihood for legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de facto state 
and its patron due to the limited availability of alternative choices. The case study 
therefore explores the extent to which direct or indirect diffusion influences become 
more important, the more dependent the de facto state is on the patron. This may, 
for instance, take place in areas and during periods where competition with the 
parent state is more pronounced. Particularly the interviews used in chapters 6 and 
8 explore the ways in which competition serves as an indirect diffusion source that 
accelerates a state and institution building response from the Abkhaz government.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
Patron States and Triadic Competition in the State and 
Institution Building Developments of De Facto States  
Statistical Analyses  
 
 
 
 
 
Following a visit of Russian parliamentarians in Tbilisi in late June 2019, thousands of 
Georgians took to the streets of their capital to protest Russia’s ‘occupation’ of 
Georgian territories and the allegedly close ties between the Georgian and Russian 
governments. When the protests turned violent, Georgian musicians, footballers and 
other celebrities also started sharing their disdain over Russia’s presence in the 
Georgian de facto states on social media platforms. These protests exemplify that 
Russian engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continues to be at the heart of 
Georgian-Russian relations. While Russian involvement in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia is undisputed, the analytical focus tends to be restricted to Russia’s financial 
and military support in the two breakaway regions. This view omits a set of possible 
measures that patron states may pursue in de facto states to encourage the viability 
and sustainability of de facto states, such as state and institution building support.  
De facto states do not represent the likeliest candidates for state and 
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institution building due to their prevalent lack of widespread international 
recognition, on average less developed economies (Kolstø 2006), the common 
presence of war lords and crime in these regions as well as their unfavourable 
international settings involving ethnic tensions or parent state threats (Caspersen 
2012). Yet, a visual representation of state building levels in the first and last 
observed years of all de facto states between 1945 and 2011 (see figure 5) highlights 
a substantial shift from de facto state governments merely controlling the means of 
violence and providing basic public goods to establishing coherent governance 
structures (see appendix H for frequency table details). 
 
Figure 5 Degree of State Building in First and Final Observed Year 
 
 
An even more pronounced shift is observable across the number of governance 
institutions in de facto states between the first and final observed year (see figure 6). 
While some de facto states have five or fewer governance institutions in the final 
observed year, there appears to be a trend to high numbers of governance 
institutions among de facto states as time passes (see appendix I for detailed 
frequency tables). These state and institution building shifts ultimately signify the 
general state and institution building potential of de facto states. 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Low Moderate High Very High
First Year Final Year
131 
 
Figure 6 Number of Governance Institutions in First and Final Observed Year 
 
 
Yet, given the disadvantageous domestic and international context of many de facto 
states, how are these unrecognised entities able to achieve the observed state 
building growth and increase in governance institutions? This chapter is particularly 
interested in uncovering whether patrons and their competition with parent states 
predominantly shape the state building potential of de facto states as Kolstø and 
Blakkisrud (2008) suggest39 and whether the statistical results uncover indicators of 
variations in patron involvement in de facto states. Moreover, this chapter explores 
the temporal state and institution building patterns of de facto states and in how far 
the presence of a patron impacts the state and institution building rate of de facto 
states. This chapter attempts to offer answers to these posed questions by testing 
three hypotheses surrounding the impact of patron states and patron-parent state 
competition on state and institution building in de facto states.  
The first section of this chapter develops three hypotheses on the basis of 
theories and literature that offer explanations for the state and institution building 
development of de facto states. Second, the research design of this chapter 
introduces the empirical state and institution building models that emphasise the 
role of patron states, competition and temporal dependence. The third section 
discusses the findings of the state and institution building models relating to the 
impact of patron states, the relative power dynamics between parent and the 
temporal patters of state and institution building in de facto states. 
 
39 As opposed to Broers (2015) and Caspersen (2012), who highlight the centrality of domestic 
factors in the state and institution building developments of de facto states.  
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This chapter highlights that patrons appear to matter most when de facto 
states go from a stage of separatist control over the means of violence to a stage of 
basic civilian governance including minimal public administration, health and 
education services. Meanwhile, patrons do not seem to significantly impact the 
change from basic civilian governance to coherent governmental structures and 
patrons decrease the number of governance institutions in a given de facto state. 
This chapter thereby highlights the potential variations in the extent of patron 
involvement, which can have consequences for the state capacity and service 
provision of a de facto state.  
The results of the models also demonstrate that a militarily stronger parent 
state increases the likelihood of attaining coherent governance structures such as 
internal security and border management, while not affecting the step to basic 
civilian governance and even decreasing the number of governance institutions. 
These findings indicate that a patron not only has a direct effect on state and 
institution building in de facto states, but also serves as an indirect diffusion source 
for de facto states through the geopolitical competition with the parent state. The 
statistical results also suggest that patron involvement appears to increase the more 
pronounced the competition with the parent state is.  
Moreover, this chapter identifies the impact of patrons on the temporal 
patterns of the state and institution building processes of de facto states. De facto 
states that do not achieve basic civilian governance within the first eight years and 
coherent government structures within 13 years, are unlikely to get to this stage at 
all or it will take them considerably longer to do so. Patrons accelerate the state 
building processes of de facto states, particularly for high degrees of state building 
and to a lesser extent for moderate degrees of state building. Furthermore, the 
chapter finds that each month that a de facto state survives increases the likelihood 
of achieving basic civilian governance and coherent governance structures and raises 
the number of governance institutions. However, the longer de facto state 
governments do not develop new governance institutions, the less likely it is for 
regimes to develop new institutions. Similarly, it is less likely for de facto 
governments to attain coherent governance structures, the more time has passed 
since the last state building development.  
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5.1 The Impact of Patron States, Triadic Competition and Time 
A variety of qualitative studies have found that external assistance can, despite a 
number of limitations and potential negative side effects, benefit the state building 
development of de facto states (see e.g. Zartman 1995; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; 
Caspersen 2015). Abkhazia, for example, would have been unable “to fulfil its 
obligations towards the population without relying heavily on external support and 
infrastructure” (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008: 495). Particularly great power patrons 
appear to play a significant role in shaping the domestic and international realities of 
de facto states by facilitating wider international recognition and arguably even 
encouraging a level of state building (Sterio 2010; Coggins 2011; Caspersen 2015: 6).  
 
Table 12 State Building if Patron State is Present (1) or Not (0) 
 Patron (Florea) Patron (Spanke)  
Degrees of State Building 0 1 0 1 Total 
Low 227 66 275 18 293 
Moderate 97 72 108 61 169 
High 92 166 111 147 258 
Very High 3 57 3 57 60 
Total 419 361 497 283 780 
 
The descriptive statistics of table 12 suggest that de facto states with a patron tend 
to have higher degrees of state building than de facto states without patron state 
relationships across both conceptualisations of patron states. De facto states that 
have most characteristics of the state and relations with external actors (very high 
degrees of state building) are rare when a de facto state lacks a patron. The caveat 
of these descriptive statistics is that the results are likely to be driven by a few units 
that survive for a long period of time. On the basis of the qualitative literature on 
patron states, this chapter will test the following hypothesis to capture the direct 
effect of patron states on de facto states:  
 
𝐇𝟏: Patron states increase a de facto state’s degrees of state building and number 
of governance institutions. 
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5.1.1 Triadic Competition: Relative Power of Patron and Parent States 
The state and institution building processes of de facto states do not take place in a 
geopolitical vacuum. The involvement of patron states in de facto states or 
secessionist regions transforms dyadic relationships between the de facto or 
secessionist state with its parent state into a triadic relationship. Thereby, patron 
states have a consequential effect on the equilibrium of the involved parties, their 
power relations and bargaining positions (Siroky 2009: 38). The relative capabilities 
of patron states can, for instance, outweigh the economic and military capabilities of 
the parent state, which may discourage de facto states to pursue further state 
building in light of the relative security under patron protection. Hence, it is 
insufficient to account for the presence of patron states, but instead the competitive 
position and strength of both the parent and patron state need to be considered 
(Kolstø & Blakkisrud’s 2008: 507). Therefore, this chapter situates the provision of 
public services and the development of state capacity in the wider geopolitical 
environment of de facto states including parent and patron state competition and 
their relative power capabilities to account for the potential indirect diffusion 
influence of patron states via patron-parent state competition on state and 
institution building in de facto states.  
Most de facto states with a patron state are situated in a geopolitical context 
where their patrons are militarily stronger (16 out of 17 de facto states), whereas the 
relative economic capabilities are more evenly divided across parent and patron 
states (11 out of 17 patrons have a higher GDP per capita). The economic capability 
results are likely to be informed by the on average higher population counts in patron 
states compared to parent states, which naturally influences the GDP per capita 
numbers. Table 13 outlines this division across relative military and economic 
capabilities (see appendix J for exact breakdown). The above cited literature informs 
the following hypothesis that captures indirect competitive diffusion influences of 
patron states on de facto states: 
 
𝐇𝟐: The stronger the parent state compared to the patron state, the likelier de 
facto states pursue state and institution building. 
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Table 13 Relative Military and Economic Power between Patron and Parent State40 
 Military Economy 
  De Facto State More Powerful Patron More Powerful Parent More Powerful Patron More Powerful Parent 
Abkhazia √  √  
Ajaria √  √  
Anjouan √  √  
Biafra √  √  
Eastern Slavonia √   √ 
Gaza √   √ 
Katanga √  √  
Kosovo √  √  
Krajina √   √ 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
 √  √ 
Northern Cyprus √   √ 
Republika Srpska √  √  
South Ossetia √  √  
Taiwan √  √  
Tamil Eelam √   √ 
Transnistria √  √  
Western Sahara √  √  
 
 
5.1.2 Patrons and Temporal State Building Patterns of De Facto States  
De facto states represent entities that encapsulate a wide spectrum of state building 
paces and experiences. On the one extreme, cases such as Karen State survive for 
decades without experiencing any significant state or institution building 
development. On the other extreme, Taiwan shared most characteristics of a state 
as early as the first year of its existence. Most de facto states depict at least some 
state building progress that takes place within either of these extremes, such as 
Abkhazia, which attained coherent governance structures within a period of seven 
years.  
Yet, the role of time is rarely featured as a central component in the analyses 
of state and institution building processes in de facto states. Still, temporal 
considerations occasionally emerge in some de facto state studies. Zabarah (2012), 
for instance, highlights the relevance of the initial state building phase for the overall 
success of both Transnistria and Gagauzia. Caspersen (2012: 90) agrees with the 
relevance of the initial state building process in particular for establishing domestic 
 
40 I compared the Composite indicator of National Capability and GDP per capita variables of 
both the parent and patron state. If the difference is negative (parent strength minus patron 
strength), this indicates that over the measured period, the patron was on average militarily 
more powerful or had a higher GDP per capita. 
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control. The beginning stages of Somaliland’s independence campaign focused 
predominantly on ensuring security and obtaining revenue, which encouraged state 
building by uniting the nation (Johnson & Smaker 2014: 6). Yemelianova (2015: 60-
61) touches on the role of time as a variable in the state building processes of de 
facto states by determining the year by which Abkhazia had formed all central 
governance institutions. Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011: 178) not only argue that “the 
time factor will eventually transform secessionists into state-builders,” but also offer 
arguably the most extensive overview of state building from a quasi-temporal 
perspective by disentangling the state building process into three (overlapping) 
phases. The first phase involves the securing of physical control over the de facto 
territory. The second phase establishes the monopoly of legitimate use of force and 
basic public service provision. The third step focuses on creating state capacity.  
This chapter contributes to these findings by testing whether similar temporal 
patterns as those identified by Zabarah (2012), Caspersen (2012), Johnson and 
Smaker (2014) and Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) can be identified across the 34 de 
facto states in the data set and in what ways these temporal patterns can be shaped 
by the patron:  
 
𝐇𝟑: Patrons decrease the time it takes for de facto states to achieve state and 
institution building.   
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5.2 Research Design  
A set of case studies have captured the state building processes across a number of 
de facto states and offered varying interpretations on the causes of state building 
developments ranging from domestic, international to structural reasons (see e.g. 
Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; 2017; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2011; Caspersen 2012; Broers 
2015; Richards 2014; Richards & Smith 2015; Johnson and Smaker 2014; von 
Steinsdorff 2012). Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008: 506-507) study on ‘hard state 
building’41 in the three contemporary de facto states of the South Caucasus, for 
instance, argues that exogenous political influences and the positions and 
capabilities of parent and patron states are the deciding factors in the state building 
development of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Broers (2015) and 
Caspersen (2012), instead, propose that more emphasis should be placed on 
domestic developments and the agency of de facto regimes when analysing the state 
building processes of de facto states.  
On the basis of these qualitative case study analyses, this section justifies the 
choice and operationalisation of variables for the state and institution building 
models of this thesis. Subsequently, this section introduces the empirical models that 
capture the impact of patron states and parent-patron state competition on state 
and institution building in de facto states. Finally, a set of robustness checks will be 
conducted to test the appropriateness of the modelling and variable choices. 
 
5.2.1 Description, Justification and Operationalisation of Variables 
The theoretical foundations for the variable choices of the empirical models of this 
thesis are predominantly sourced from Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008), Broers (2015) 
and Caspersen’s (2012) qualitative studies on state and institution building in de facto 
states. The variables identified by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) as either significant 
or insignificant were matched with an appropriate independent variable in Florea’s 
(2014) modified data set. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008: 506-507) argue that the size 
 
41 Hard state building, according to Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008), includes the ability of de 
facto states to defend themselves, protect their borders and territory, economic 
development and the building of state institutions. 
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of the de facto state in terms of territory and population, their previous autonomy 
status in the Soviet Union (which will be measured with the variable dfspriorind) as 
well as war destruction (dfswarint) are not determining factors for state building in 
de facto states in the South Caucasus. Instead, it matters what stance the parent 
state takes. The more uncompromising and stronger a parent state is 
(parentgdppc42), the higher the independent state building of a de facto entity. The 
more accommodating the parent state, the less inclined a de facto state might be to 
work on independent state building (dfsaut). In addition, a consistent patron state 
(patronspanke) and an active and generous diaspora abroad (dias) facilitate state 
building in the de facto states of the South Caucasus. Note that not all of the variables 
that were highlighted by Kolstø and Blakkisrud were included in the final models of 
this thesis (see appendix K for Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s adapted state and institution 
building model). 
While Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s model offers insights into the role that 
structural and international factors play in the state building development of de facto 
states, it largely omits potential domestic influences. Similarly, Broers (2015: 138) 
argues that Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s “focus on external actors and particularly patron 
states […] leaves out the local ownership of actors within the de facto government 
such as elites [and] […] does not answer how they secured resources and how the 
resources and opportunities available influenced the way of government.” Broers’ 
criticism is in line with an increasing body of literature that attempts to capture the 
role of agency and domestic developments and internal legitimacy in de facto states 
(King 2001; Caspersen 2012, Berg & Mölder 2012; Richards 2014; Bakke et al. 2013; 
Broers et al. 2015; Kopeček 2020).  
Thus, the state and institution building models of this thesis complement 
Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008) international and structural variables with three 
additional variables that shed more light on domestic factors shaping state building: 
the type of state emergence (typeonset), the degree of rebel fragmentation (frag2) 
and the relative rebel capability compared to the parent state government (relcap). 
It has proven difficult to capture reliable and comparable quantitative data of de 
 
42 This variable refers to the economic strength of the parent state. 
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facto states that could capture domestic capabilities more effectively. While the 
three variables are in no way exhaustive, they represent some of the domestic 
developments and capabilities that can be linked to state building in de facto states.  
Furthermore, the state and institution building models of this thesis dissect 
the relationships between the de facto states, patron states and parent states by 
complementing the empirical model with a relative parent state strength variable 
(relparentstrength) that measures the impact of the relative military capabilities of 
the parent and patron states on state building in de facto states.43 The military 
strength of the parent and patron states will be measured utilising the Composite 
indicator of National Capability, which captures, among others, military expenditures 
and personnel, whereas the economic strength will be measured with the GDP per 
capita of the countries in a given year (relparentgdppc). Thereby, the model tests 
whether a militarily or economically more powerful patron state compared to the 
parent state incentivises or disincentivises the state and institution building progress 
of de facto states. Concurrently, the variables account for the role of competition as 
a potential indirect diffusion mechanism that encourages or discourages state and 
institution building in de facto states.  
The final variable in the state and institution building models measures 
potential time dependence. Rebel groups in secessionist regions or de facto 
governments in de facto states are likely to be constrained by a degree of time 
dependence throughout their pursuit of state and institution building. De facto 
governments are unlikely to develop extraction and redistribution systems, border 
management and basic public services such as education and health from the outset 
of their de facto independence. In order to account for potential time dependence, 
the state and institution building models of this thesis were complemented with a 
variable that measures time (duration).  
 
  
 
43 The state and institution building models use the relative parent strength variable 
(relparentstrength) instead of the parent GDP per capita variable (parentgdppc) used in 
Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008) adapted state building model.  
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5.2.2 Empirical Models 
The state and institution building models of this thesis translated the arguments put 
forward by Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s (2008) study on state building in the de facto 
states of the South Caucasus onto a wider data set of all 34 de facto states between 
1945 and 2011 to test their applicability beyond the specified geographical context. 
The models of this thesis adopt a set of variables from Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s model 
including the presence of a patron (patronspanke), war intensity (dfswarint), the 
presence of a sizeable diaspora (dias) and previous independence (dfspriorind). 
Three domestic variables complement the variables from Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s 
adapted state and institution building models in order to shed more light on domestic 
factors shaping state building: the type of state emergence (typeonset), the degree 
of rebel fragmentation (frag2) and the relative rebel capability compared to the 
parent state government (relcap). These variables were informed by the wider de 
facto state literature on state building (i.e. Johnson & Smaker 2014; Zabarah 2012; 
Caspersen 2012; Richards & Smith 2015; Broers 2015). Finally, variables that account 
for competition (relparentstrength) and time dependence (duration) complete the 
state and institution building models. 
Thus, the two empirical models capture the impact of patron states and 
patron-parent state competition on state and institution building in de facto states. 
First, a binary logistic regression model for the degrees of state building distinguishes 
between moderate degrees of state building (model (1) in table 14), on the one hand, 
and high degrees of state building of de facto states (model (2) in table 14), on the 
other hand. The findings for the logistic regression models are reported as log odds. 
Second, a linear regression model was created for the number of governance 
institutions in de facto states (model (3) in table 15). 
The R-squared and pseudo R-squared of the models suggest that the models 
fit the step to moderate degrees of state building better than to high degrees of state 
building (refer to appendices L and M for a comparison of the models of this thesis 
to models without temporal dependence and without parent state competition). The 
pseudo R-squared used for the TSCS logistic regression models in chapter 5 was 
calculated using McKelvey and Zavoina’s R-squared calculation (1975), which focuses 
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on the variance decomposition and is an appropriate calculation to compare the 
goodness of fit for binary and ordinal logit models.  
 
Table 14 State Building in De Facto States Model (Logistic Regression) 
Degrees of State Building 
(1) (2) 
Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 57.65*** 5.516 
 (7.377) (2.93) 
Diaspora 52.52*** 7.412 
 (10.07) (5.02) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -2.123 -2.713 
 (1.95) (2.386) 
   War -5.19 -5.546 
 (10.77) (3.042) 
Prev. Autonomy -53.06*** -11.91** 
 (12.21) (4.096) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -57.38*** -10.56 
 (10.55) (5.776) 
   State Collapse -73.82*** 2.715 
 (6.992) (3.162) 
   Decolonisation -114.2*** -46.77*** 
 (13.97) (4.746) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 18.51*** 9.294* 
 (3.531) (4.634) 
   Stronger 81.55*** 17.77** 
 (20.19) (6.746) 
   Much Stronger 72.38*** 11.09* 
 (9.697) (5.056) 
Rebel Fragmentation 4.041** 
(1.305) 
0.336 
(0.586) 
Relative Parent Strength -71.62 
(68.62) 
203.8** 
(62.42) 
Months Survived 0.164*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0085) 
Constant -7.823 -35.4*** 
 (7.677) (5.88) 
Pseudo R² 0.9306 0.3742 
N 776 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 15 Governance Institution Building in De Facto States Model (Linear Regression) 
Number of Governance Institutions (3) 
Patron (Spanke) -0.584** 
 (0.222) 
Diaspora 3.651*** 
 (0.914) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.703*** 
 (0.0985) 
   War -0.441** 
 (0.138) 
Prev. Autonomy -0.687 
 (0.77) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.0436 
 (1.407) 
   State Collapse 1.846* 
 (0.919) 
   Decolonisation -1.789 
 (1.144) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.964*** 
 (0.204) 
   Stronger 2.8*** 
 (0.617) 
   Much Stronger 1.627*** 
 (0.369) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.0813** 
 (0.0301) 
Relative Parent Strength -7.896* 
 (3.66) 
Months Survived 0.00369*** 
 (0.000326) 
Constant 2.291 
 (1.194) 
R² 0.5835 
N 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
  
143 
 
5.2.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to test the robustness of the state and institution building models of this 
thesis, I conducted a set of robustness checks spanning alternative model 
specifications, regional dummies and alternative variable measurements. First, as 
many variables from the state and institution building models of this thesis were 
derived from case studies of de facto states in the post-Soviet space, it is necessary 
to account for the extent to which the observations from the post-Soviet space 
inform the statistical significance of the overall findings. Therefore, I tested the 
applicability and robustness of the findings beyond the post-Soviet space by 
removing post-Soviet de facto state observations from the data set and rerunning 
the state and institution building models (see appendices N, O and P). A simple 
logistic regression excluding the post-Soviet cases (appendix N) supports the findings 
of the state building model of this thesis that patron states influence the likelihood 
of achieving moderate degrees of state building but not high degrees of state 
building. However, when control variables are included (see appendix O), patrons no 
longer statistically significantly increase the likelihood of moderate degrees of state 
building. This might hint at the importance of the post-Soviet cases for the 
statistically significant effect of patrons on moderate degrees of state building in de 
facto states. The general trends of the institution building model remain mostly 
constant even when the post-Soviet cases are excluded (appendix P). Yet, the 
detrimental effect of patrons on the number of governance institutions appears to 
be even larger when the post-Soviet observations are removed from the data set. 
Second, Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) are critical of ordinary logit and probit 
models across BTSCS data that assume temporal independence of repeated unit 
observations. To account for temporal dependence in logit and probit models across 
BTSCS data, the authors suggest the inclusion of temporal dummy variables. 
Therefore, I tested and compared alternative measurements to appropriately 
capture time dependence and the temporal impact on state and institution building 
in de facto states in the models of this thesis. Measures of time dependence covered, 
among others, temporal dummy variables, the natural logarithm of time and cubic 
splines, which were compared using the Akaike’s information criterion and Bayesian 
information criterion (see appendix Q). Each model incorporated a different time 
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measure to estimate time dependence, which was subsequently compared to a 
model without a temporal variable to identify the most appropriate temporal 
measure. The results of the likelihood-ratio and AIC tests suggest that a linear time 
model models time dependence appropriately for moderate and high degrees of 
state building. This thesis therefore uses a linear time variable (duration) to account 
for time dependence in its state and institution building models. A model that 
includes the natural logarithm of duration, squared time or cubic splines also 
presented potential alternatives to account for time dependence.  
Third, this thesis produced a novel conceptualisation of patron states in 
chapter 3, which was translated into the data set in form of the independent variable 
patronspanke. I tested the robustness of the results from the state and institution 
building models that rely on the patron definition of this thesis by taking into account 
Adrian Florea’s alternative specification of patron states (patron) that defines patron 
support as “regularised patterns of military assistance from a third (state) party.”44 I 
reran the state building model (appendix R) and governance institution building 
model (appendix S) with Florea’s patron variable instead of the patron variable of 
this thesis to uncover potential differences between the conceptualisations. The 
results of the state and institution building models of this thesis identify a distinction 
between a patron’s impact on moderate and high degrees of state building. This 
separation holds true even when Florea’s conceptualisation of patron states is used 
instead. However, when temporal dependence is accounted for in the model, 
patrons also increase the likelihood of achieving high degrees of state building even 
if it is to a lesser extent than moderate degrees of state building (see appendix R). 
Similarly to the governance institution model of this thesis, the number of 
governance institutions decreases under Florea’s conceptualisation of patron states 
and appears to have an even larger detrimental effect on the dependent variable 
(see appendix S).  
Finally, this thesis proposes to capture the number of governance institutions 
in a de facto state in a linear model even though the dependent variable strictly 
speaking constitutes a discrete variable instead of a continuous variable. The 
 
44 This was communicated to the author by email with Adrian Florea on 21st August 2018.  
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selection of a linear regression model instead of a Poisson regression model is based 
on the characteristics that the dependent variable dfsinst shares with a continuous 
rather than a discrete variable (see appendix E). A linear model is more appropriate 
to capture the impact of patrons on the number of governance institutions, for 
instance, because the variable dfsinst contains numerous observations across the 
values from 1 to 10. Furthermore, one can observe a tendency of the number of 
governance institutions to remain steady or increase in a de facto state from year to 
year. Traditional count variables tend to undergo repeated up- and downward 
fluctuations instead. Nonetheless, I reran the governance institution model as a 
Poisson regression model to compare the results to the original linear regression 
model of this thesis (see appendix T). The estimates in the Poisson regression model 
do indeed highlight some differences compared to the linear regression model of this 
thesis. The estimates for the patron variables, for instance, are not statistically 
significant in a Poisson regression specification and therefore neither in- nor 
decrease the logs of expected counts of governance institutions.  
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5.3 Discussion of Results  
This section discusses the findings of the state and institution building models and 
tests the previously formulated hypotheses. The central findings of this chapter are 
reported in regression tables 14 and 15. Some supplementary findings capturing 
patron influences on the temporal state building developments of de facto states will 
be presented in regression tables 16 and 17 as well as graphs 7 to 10 below.  
 
5.3.1 Impact of Patrons on State and Institution Building in De Facto States 
The results of the state building model (table 14) reveal that patrons increase the 
likelihood of de facto states achieving a state building change from low to moderate 
degrees of state building, which is statistically significant at a 99.9 per cent 
confidence interval. Patrons do not, however, significantly impact the step from 
moderate to high degrees of state building. In more practical terms, patrons appear 
to matter most when de facto states go from a stage of separatist control over the 
means of violence to a stage of basic civilian governance, such as minimal public 
administration, health and education services. However, patrons do not significantly 
impact the change from basic civilian governance to coherent governmental 
structures, such as extraction and redistribution structures.  
A conversion of these findings to predictive margins enables an assessment 
of the probability, rather than the log odds or the odds ratios, of a de facto state 
achieving moderate or high degrees of state building when a patron is present. The 
results show that the presence of a patron state (according to the definition of this 
thesis) is associated with a 28.2 per cent increase in the probability of de facto states 
having moderate degrees of state building. For high degrees of state building, the 
presence of a patron state is associated with a 4.8 per cent increase in the probability 
of de facto states having high degrees of state building. The results for high degrees 
of state building, however, do not pass the chi-square test (see appendix U).  
The control variables of the state building model offer a variety of 
supplementary insights into the state building endeavours of de facto states. Large 
diaspora groups, for instance, increase the likelihood of moderate but not high 
degrees of state building all other variables held equal at a 99.9 per cent confidence 
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interval.45 Both minor and severe war intensity on the territory of the de facto state 
neither decreases not increase the likelihood of reaching either moderate or high 
degrees of state building all other variables held equal.46 Previous independence or 
autonomy decreases both the likelihood of achieving moderate and high degrees of 
state building at a 99.9 and 99 per cent confidence interval all other variables held 
equal. The type of de facto state emergence also appears to be a strong indicator for 
achieving moderate degrees of state building and to a lesser extent for strong 
degrees of state building. De facto states that emerge out of state collapse, through 
decolonisation or a non-conflictual emergence are less likely to achieve moderate 
degrees of state building, whereas de facto states that emerge out of a 
decolonisation process are also less likely to achieve coherent governance structures 
(high degrees of state building).47 If rebels in a de facto state have the same, stronger 
or much stronger capabilities than the government of the parent state, this increases 
particularly the likelihood of de facto states achieving moderate degrees of state 
building at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval, but also to a slightly lesser extent the 
likelihood of attaining high degrees of state building all other variables held constant 
at a 95 and 99 per cent confidence interval depending on the relative strength. The 
more fragmented the rebel movement is, the likelier it is to achieve moderate 
degrees of state building at a 99 per cent confidence interval all other variables held 
constant.  
An analysis of the same independent variables on the number of governance 
institutions in de facto states (table 15) reveals that patrons decrease the number of 
governance institutions in de facto states by about half a governance institution at a 
99 per cent confidence interval all other variables held equal. A sizeable diaspora 
 
45 The relevance of sizeable diaspora groups for state building in de facto states may underscore the 
significance of financial and economic support for these entities rather than military support.  
46 The statistically insignificant effect of military conflict identified in the statistical models supports 
the claim by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) that the continued negative impact of war legacies in form 
of casualties, infrastructure destruction and economic downturns does not impede the ability of de 
facto states to pursue state building. 
47 The decreasing likelihood of achieving civilian governance and to a certain extent coherent 
governance structures in de facto states that emerge out of state collapse is in line with Krasner and 
Risse’s (2014: 547) finding that state building and service provision “are more difficult to provide, 
especially in failed states, where indigenous state capacity hardly exists, as opposed to polities with 
areas of limited statehood.” 
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increases, and minor and severe war intensity decreases the number of governance 
institutions all other variables held equal at a 99.9 and 99 per cent confidence 
interval. Previous independence does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
number of governance institutions. In addition, the type of emergence of a de facto 
state does not statistically significantly influence the number of state institutions 
with the exception of de facto states that emerge out of state collapse, which observe 
an increase in the number of governance institutions all other variables held constant 
at a 95 per confidence interval. De facto governments that are as strong, stronger or 
much stronger than their parent state see an increase in the number of governance 
institutions at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval all other variables held equal. The 
more fragmented a rebel movement, the higher the number of governance 
institutions tend to be at a 99 per cent confidence interval.  
The findings from the state and institution building models allow us to make 
a couple of preliminary conclusions about the role of patron states in the state and 
institution building endeavours of de facto states. First, the state building model 
makes a meaningful distinction between achieving basic civilian governance and 
coherent state structures. While some variables, such as a sizeable diaspora, rebel 
fragmentation and war intensity, shape the state building potential of de facto states 
regardless of their development stage, other variables matter more or less 
depending on the state building step the entity attempts to attain. Most notably for 
this thesis, the presence of a patron state influences the likelihood of de facto states 
reaching basic civilian governance, but not coherent state structures. The results of 
the state building model of this thesis suggests that patrons significantly increase the 
likelihood of achieving basic civilian governance in de facto states (moderate degrees 
of state building) all other variables held equal at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval. 
However, patrons do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on de facto 
states attaining coherent governance structures including an economic extraction 
and redistribution system, border management and internal security (high degrees 
of state building). 
Second, the decrease in the number of governance institutions among de 
facto states with a patron initially may appear counterintuitive, as one would expect 
higher number of governance institutions in entities that benefit from the military or 
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financial support and related relative stability of patron states. However, the lower 
number of governance institutions may hint at the presence of a degree of institution 
sharing where the patron takes on governance functions from the de facto state, 
which makes the presence of certain governance institutions obsolete (see chapter 
7 for further details on institution sharing).  
Thus, the results of the state building models can only partially confirm the 
first hypothesis, because they identify a crucial distinction between moderate and 
high degrees of state building and demonstrate that patrons only influence the 
former. In other words, these research findings illustrate the nuances of patron 
support, where the presence of a patron positively enhances the likelihood of de 
facto states achieving basic civilian governance, but not coherent governance 
structures. Meanwhile, de facto states with a patron have on average fewer 
governance institutions over time. These findings speak to the theoretical framework 
of this thesis in so far that they highlight the variations in the extent of patron 
involvement as patrons may limit or expand their support to sustain a level of 
dependence of the de facto state on the patron. The theoretical framework also 
offers a potential explanation for the simultaneous support for basic civilian 
governance and a reduction in the number of governance institutions. Indeed, these 
findings may not be a contradiction but a representation of a patron’s intent to 
ensure a level of dependence of the de facto state on patron support while 
guaranteeing a degree of self-sufficiency and bounded agency of the de facto 
authorities. 
 
5.3.2 Competition as an Indirect Diffusion Source for State and Institution Building  
The inclusion of the relative military parent strength variable (relparentstrength) in 
the state and institution building models measures the influence of patron-parent 
state competition on the state and institution building potential of de facto states. 
The models thereby capture competition as one of the potential indirect diffusion 
influences of patrons on the state and institution building processes of de facto 
states. Overall, the results highlight that the stronger the parent state in terms of 
military capabilities, the likelier it is for de facto states to attain coherent governance 
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structures (high degrees of state building) all other variable held equal at a 99 per 
cent confidence interval. The likelihood of attaining basic civilian governance 
(moderate degrees of state building) is not influenced significantly by a relatively 
stronger parent state. The number of governance institutions, meanwhile, 
significantly decreases the stronger the parent is compared to the patron state all 
other variables held equal at a 95 per cent confidence interval. These results are also 
applicable to de facto states that do not have a patron state as it captures the military 
strength of parent states in general. 
The impact of the parent state’s relative economic strength in form of GDP 
per capita (relparentgdppc) on state and institution building in de facto states is also 
mixed (see appendix V). Economically stronger parent states increase the number of 
governance institutions and the likelihood of high degrees of state building, but 
decrease the likelihood of moderate degrees of state building. While a relatively 
stronger parent state in terms of GDP per capita performance increases the 
likelihood of achieving coherent governance structures (high degrees of state 
building) and the number of governance institutions all other variables held equal at 
a 95 and 99 per cent confidence interval, the variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of a de facto state achieving basic civilian 
governance (moderate degrees of state building).  
The results highlight that stronger parent states in terms of military 
capabilities compared to patron states increase the likelihood of de facto states 
attaining coherent government structures (high degrees of state building), but not 
basic civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) and the number of 
governance institutions all other variables held equal. In other words, competition as 
an indirect diffusion source appears to encourage particularly the development of 
coherent governance structures such as internal security and border management. 
Yet, competition appears to matter less in the early state building developments 
when de facto regimes go from rebel governance to basic civilian governance. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis of this chapter can only be partially confirmed 
depending on the degree of state building development.  
Even though the relative parent strength variable overemphasises the role of 
parent states when a de facto state does not have a patron, the results, nonetheless, 
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support the argument put forward by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) that a strong 
parent state incentivises state building in de facto states at least for high degrees of 
state building. The regression results also reiterate the results of chapter 2 that the 
absolute capabilities of a patron state matter less than the patron’s relative 
capabilities vis-à-vis the parent state. In practical terms, the results of both relative 
military and economic capabilities may be explained with a tendency among de facto 
states with a patron to use the patron’s economic and military capabilities to 
outweigh or match the real or perceived threat and capabilities from the parent 
state. Specifically great or regional powers can shift the power balance of the dyadic 
relation between de facto states and their parents significantly. Therefore, the 
regression results can be interpreted in a way that if the patron’s military capabilities 
are high and outweigh the parent’s military capabilities, this may disincentivise 
domestic state and institution building in de facto states due to a reliance or even 
dependence on patron support to protect the de facto states from potential parent 
state threats. The opportunity structures of de facto states with a patron that enable 
these entities to rely on their patron’s military protection may disincentive domestic 
state and institution building despite a wider range of financial resources. De facto 
states without a patron meanwhile are likelier to be incentivised to increase their 
public service provision and state capacity including border security and domestic 
security in light of a real or perceived parent state threat. This form of dependence 
on military support from the patron state can be identified in a number of de facto 
states. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for instance, would have been unlikely to 
withstand the Georgian offensives without Russia’s military support (Caspersen 
2015: 6). 
These findings speak to the theoretical framework in so far that they highlight 
the presence of indirect diffusion sources such as competition on the state building 
development of de facto states. Indeed, the diffusion literature would explain the 
higher likelihood of state building and the lower number of governance institutions 
with the role of indirect diffusion channels such as geopolitical competition in 
facilitating institution or policy diffusion. Thereby, this chapter has not only shown 
that patrons have both a direct and indirect diffusion impact on the degrees of state 
building and the number of governance institution, but also that patron involvement 
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appears to increase if competition with the parent state is higher. Geopolitical 
competition with the parent state may incentivise de facto governments to pursue 
institutional or policy transformations, whereas the presence of patron states may 
reduce the competitive diffusion influences of the parent state on de facto states. 
The reduction in the number of governance institutions when a parent state is 
stronger, for instance, may indicate that patrons take over governance institutions 
from de facto states when pressures from the parent state are higher and that it can 
be more difficult to establish governance institutions under heightened external 
pressures (see section 6.3.3 for further details on the role of competitive diffusion in 
Abkhazia’s state building development). 
 
5.3.3 Patrons and the Temporal Patterns of State and Institution Building  
The final discussion section of this chapter captures temporal patterns of state and 
institution building in de facto states and the extent to which the presence of a 
patron accelerates or decelerates these developments. Rebel groups in de facto 
governments are unlikely to develop extraction and redistribution systems, border 
management and basic public services from the outset of their de facto 
independence. In other words, state and institution building is expected to be 
constrained by a degree of time dependence. The presence of a patron state may 
however accelerate the state and institution building processes, because the patron 
may present a potential income source and offer military support.  
The state and institution building models of this thesis expectedly indicate a 
degree of time dependence in the state and institution building processes of de facto 
states. Each month that a de facto state survives increases the likelihood of achieving 
basic civilian governance and coherent governance structures (moderate and high 
degrees of state building) at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval all other variables 
held constant. Time dependence is also prevalent in the case of institution building 
in de facto states. Each additional month that a de facto state survives increases the 
number of governance institutions at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval all other 
variables held constant. Yet, the Kaplan-Meier estimators indicate that this might 
mean that de facto states do not achieve moderate or high degrees of state building 
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for an extensive period of time. 
However, these findings present two limitations. First, while both state and 
institution building examples reveal some level of time dependence, they do not 
uncover the precise developments within de facto states that increase the number 
of governance institutions and the likelihood of state building for each additional 
month. A qualitative analysis of state and institution building processes may be 
necessary to identify the root cause for the presence of time dependence. Second, 
the findings do not uncover the influence of patron states on the temporal patterns 
of state and institution building in de facto states. Therefore, the next section 
captures the differences between the state and institution building paths of de facto 
states with and without a patron state, which enables the testing of the third 
hypothesis.  
 
5.3.3.1 Patrons as State Building Accelerators 
The Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator approximates the likelihood of an event not taking 
place at a given point in time. This means that in the context of state building in de 
facto states, the KM estimator measures the average time period of de facto states 
achieving basic civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) or coherent 
governance structures (high degrees of state building). A look at the KM estimates 
for high degrees of state building (appendix W) reveals that within the first four and 
a half years (53 months), only one out of 26 de facto states (96 per cent) achieved 
coherent governance structures (high degrees of state building) from a level of 
separatist control (low degrees of state building) or civilian governance (moderate 
degrees of state building). In the period between four and a half and 13 years, a 
significant portion of de facto states achieve coherent governance structures. From 
13 years onwards, only three de facto states achieve high degrees of state building, 
whereas seven de facto states either attain statehood, disintegrate or are reabsorbed 
into the parent state. After 21 years (256 months) nearly half of the de facto states, 
who did not have high degrees of state building at the start, achieved this degree of 
state building.  
The graph (figure 7) and the Kaplan-Meier estimator (appendix W) suggest 
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that de facto states that do not achieve coherent governance structures (high 
degrees of state building) within the first 13 years are likely to not achieve this level 
of state development at all or it will take them considerably longer to do so. The other 
graph below (figure 8) offers insights into the temporal state building patterns of de 
facto states with and without a patron by distinguishing between the Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimates of de facto states with a patron (red) and without a patron (blue). 
The graph signifies that de facto states with a patron are likelier to attain coherent 
governance structures (high degrees of state building) more rapidly than de facto 
states without a patron. The graph also suggests that de facto states with a patron 
appear to achieve coherent governance structures within the first 13 years and 
subsequently their state building development flatlines. These findings support the 
findings by Zabarah (2012), Caspersen (2012) and Johnson & Smaker (2014) that the 
initial state building phase is important for the overall state building development of 
de facto states. Particularly de facto states with a patron tend to achieve coherent 
governance structures earlier on or otherwise fail to do so in the end.  
 
Figure 7 Kaplan-Meier and Greenwood Estimator Graph High State Building48 
 
 
 
48 The Greenwood variance estimator estimates the uncertainty surrounding the Kaplan-
Meier estimator. 
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Figure 8 Kaplan-Meier Estimator Graph High State Building with and without Patron 
 
 
A look at the temporal patterns of de facto states in terms of their likelihood to attain 
moderate degrees of state building reveals similar trends about the state building 
processes of de facto states (see appendix X for the KM estimates for moderate 
degrees of state building). Within the first eight years, three de facto states that 
started with separatist control (low degrees of state building) attained basic civilian 
governance (moderate degrees of state building), while three de facto states failed 
in the same time period. The results also suggest that de facto states that do not 
reach a stage of basic civilian governance within the first eight years, require 
significantly more time to achieve this state building step from separatist control to 
civilian governance. However, between year 11 (157 months) and year 26 (312 
months), one can observe another sharp decline in the survivor function (from 77 to 
38 per cent), which signifies that many de facto states achieve moderate degrees of 
state building in this period. Beyond the 26th year only one de facto state achieved 
civilian governance while three entities failed.  
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Figure 9 Kaplan-Meier and Greenwood Estimator Graph Moderate State Building 
 
 
Figure 10 Kaplan-Meier Estimator Graph Moderate State Building with and without Patron 
 
 
 
Overall, the graph (figure 9) and estimates (appendix X) suggest that achieving basic 
civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) appears to be a slightly 
more gradual process compared to coherent governance structures (high degrees of 
state building). In the latter case, de facto states experience coherent governance 
structures (high degrees of state building) particularly in the first 13 years. Following 
the first 13 years, the process of state building slows down. Achieving moderate 
degrees of state building takes place particularly in the first eight years and 
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subsequently slows down. Both state building stages therefore highlight the 
importance of the first years for state building in de facto states with and without a 
patron. De facto states with a patron tend to drop out of the data set relatively 
quickly which suggests that de facto states already achieved moderate degrees of 
state building from the onset or ceased to exist (see figure 10). Still, the graphs 
support the conclusion that de facto states with a patron tend to be considerably 
faster in achieving high degrees of state building than de facto states without a 
patron.  
It is important to remember, that if all de facto states were included in this 
model and not only those that entities that have not yet achieved moderate or high 
degrees of state building, the tables and graph would render different results. In that 
case, one would observe a much sharper and rapid decline in the survival function in 
the first five years and a subsequent flattening of the survival function. This suggests 
that if de facto states do not make the step to moderate degrees of state building 
within the first five years, it will probably take them longer to achieve this step. 
This section confirms the third hypothesis, that patrons accelerate the state 
building processes of de facto states, particularly for high degrees of state building 
and to a lesser extent for moderate degrees of state building. Furthermore, the 
section demonstrates that de facto states that do not reach a stage of basic civilian 
governance within the first eight years require significantly more time to achieve this 
state building step from separatist control to civilian governance. Similarly, de facto 
states that do not achieve coherent governance structures including border 
management, internal security, ministries, courts and an economic extraction and 
redistribution system within the first 13 years are unlikely to achieve this level of 
state building at all or it will take them considerably longer to do so.  
 
5.3.3.2 Time Since Last State or Institution Building Experience  
The final section explores whether or not the duration since the last state or 
institution building event affects the state and institution building potential of de 
facto states. The previous analyses highlighted that prior independence, somehow 
counterintuitively, reduces the likelihood of state building and has no significant 
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effect on the number of governance institutions. An alternative way to account for 
state building experience is to refer to previous state and institution building 
developments as state building experience. By including a newly generated variable 
that captures the months since the last change in the degrees of state building 
(tsincedfsbuildchg) and the number of governance institutions (tsincedfsinstchg), this 
section estimates the effect of previous state and institution building experience (see 
tables 16 and 17). The regression table below (table 16) indicates that each additional 
month since achieving a degree of civilian governance (moderate degrees of state 
building) decreases the likelihood of attaining coherent governance structures (high 
degrees of state building) all other variables held constant at a 99.9 per confidence 
interval. The next regression table highlights that each additional month that a de 
facto state does not build new governance institutions decreases the number of 
governance institutions all other variables held equal at a 99.9 per cent confidence 
interval (see table 17). In other words, the longer de facto state rebels do not develop 
new governance institutions, the more unlikely it is that they end up developing new 
institutions.  
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Table 16 State Building Model Including Experience Variable (Logistic Regression) 
 (4) 
Degrees of State Building High 
Patron (Spanke) 8.445*** 
 (2.062) 
Diaspora 3.914 
 (3.061) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.272 
 (1.376) 
   War -3.144 
 (1.766) 
Prev. Autonomy -4.815* 
 (2.291) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -9.685* 
 (4.475) 
   State Collapse -0.68 
 (2.098) 
   Decolonisation -10.82*** 
 (2.298) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 3.106 
 (2.346) 
   Stronger 4.629 
 (3.44) 
   Much Stronger 2.733 
 (2.877) 
Rebel Fragmentation 1.062*** 
(0.3) 
Relative Parent Strength 45.79 
(45.68) 
Months Survived 0.0632*** 
 (0.00564) 
Time Since Last State Building Change -0.697*** 
 (0.111) 
Constant -14.99 
 (3.909) 
Pseudo R² 0.6089 
N 724 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 17 Institution Building Model Including Experience Variable (Linear Regression) 
Number of Governance Institutions (5) 
Patron (Spanke) 0.315 
 (0.252) 
Diaspora 2.257* 
 (1.003) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.299*** 
 (0.0826) 
   War 0.101 
 (0.115) 
Prev. Autonomy -0.74 
 (0.812) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual 
 
-2.495 
 (1.714) 
   State Collapse 1.214 
 (0.95) 
   Decolonisation -2.24 
 (1.182) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity -0.0378 
 (0.176) 
   Stronger 1.155* 
 (0.575) 
   Much Stronger 0.631 
 (0.36) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.0285 
 (0.0276) 
Relative Parent Strength 11.93* 
 (5.398) 
Months Survived 0.00861*** 
 (0.000351) 
Time Since Last Institution Change -0.0985*** 
 (0.00433) 
Constant 4.342*** 
 (1.293) 
R² 0.5212 
N 602 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the wider debates surrounding patron states and state 
and institution building in de facto states by applying research findings of individual 
de facto state case studies to a data set of all de facto states between 1945 and 2011. 
The research findings captured the effect of patron states on state and institution 
building across 34 de facto states. Furthermore, the chapter uncovered the impact 
of patron-parent state competition as an indirect diffusion source and offered 
insights into temporal patterns of state and institution building in de facto states. 
While the results of this chapter do not necessarily support the argument of some 
Georgian protestors that Russia occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this chapter 
revealed that Russia, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s patron, is likely to contribute 
to and accelerate the state building developments of both de facto states and 
thereby enhances their chances of survival.  
At the same time, the results of this chapter uncovered variations in the 
extent to which patrons influence both state and institution building in de facto 
states. The statistical models of this chapter proposed an important distinction 
between civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) and coherent 
governance structures (high degrees of state building). Domestic factors appear to 
matter more in the earlier state building stages and become less impactful in the step 
to coherent governance institutions. At the same time, external factors such as 
patron states and a sizeable diaspora are more significant for the step from separatist 
control to basic civilian governance than they are for more advanced forms of state 
building. Some variables, such as a previous independence and rebel capabilities 
shape the state building potential of de facto states regardless of their development 
stage. Other variables matter more or less depending on the state building step the 
entity attempts to attain. The presence of a patron state, for instance, influences the 
likelihood of de facto states reaching basic civilian governance, but not coherent 
state structures. In terms of public service and goods provision, these findings reflect 
that patrons encourage minimal public administration and the provision of social 
security, education and health, but patrons do not necessarily support the 
development of an economic extraction and redistribution system. Patrons may limit 
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or expand their support for a de facto state to sustain a level of dependence of the 
de facto regime on the patron while guaranteeing a degree of self-sufficiency and 
bounded agency of the de facto authorities. 
This chapter also indicated that patrons not only have a direct impact on the 
state and institution building endeavours of de facto states, but also present an 
indirect diffusion source in form of competition with the parent state. The stronger 
the parent state in terms of military capabilities, the higher the likelihood of achieving 
coherent governance structures, whereas the likelihood of attaining basic civilian 
governance is not affected and the number of governance institutions decreases with 
a relatively stronger parent state. Also the effect of economically stronger parent 
states is mixed. These findings not only capture both a patron’s direct and indirect 
diffusion impact on the degrees of state building and the number of governance 
institution, but also suggest that patron involvement appears to increase the more 
pronounced the competition with the parent state is. 
In terms of institution building, this chapter highlighted that the presence of 
a patron decreases the number of governance institutions in a de facto state. The 
lower number of governance institutions may hint at the presence of a degree of 
institution sharing where the patron takes on governance functions from the de facto 
state, which makes the presence of certain governance institutions obsolete. These 
findings may also indicate that patrons decrease a de facto state’s institutional 
capacity by lowering the number of governance institutions such as a legislature, tax 
authorities and a central banking system. It is important to reiterate however that 
the physical presence of such institutions does not automatically represent the 
practical capacity to provide services and goods associated with these institutions. 
Institution sharing will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Furthermore, state and institution building in de facto states follow temporal 
patterns and a degree of time dependence. De facto states that do not achieve basic 
civilian governance within the first eight years and coherent government structures 
within 13 years, are unlikely to get to this stage at all or it will take them considerably 
longer to do so. Each month that a de facto state survives increases the likelihood of 
achieving basic civilian governance and coherent governance structures and raises 
the number of governance institutions. However, the longer de facto state 
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governments do not develop new governance institutions, the more unlikely it is that 
they end up developing new institutions. Also achieving coherent governance 
structures is less likely, the more time has passed since the last state building 
development. Patrons appear to accelerate the state building process particularly for 
high degrees of state building and to a limited degree for moderate degrees of state 
building. 
Reflecting on these findings raises two central questions: First, why do 
patrons enhance the development of basic civilian governance in de facto states, but 
not of more coherent government structures? And second, do patron support for 
basic governance in de facto states and the concurrent negative impact of patrons 
on the number of governance institutions contradict each other? These questions 
pose uncertainty about the precise causal mechanisms behind patron state 
engagement in de facto states. The available quantitative data, for instance, does not 
capture whether it is indeed the patron that facilitates state building or whether 
patrons tend to support de facto states with better state building potential. 
Furthermore, even if the patron leadership is uninterested in state building support, 
the mere presence of a patron state may encourage or discourage state and 
institution building in de facto states. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish between 
direct and indirect patron states influences when analysing patron involvement in 
the state building processes of de facto states.  
Despite these causality concerns, this thesis argues that patron states support 
de facto states in guaranteeing minimal civilian governance to ensure a degree of 
sustainability of the unrecognised entity and to reduce the likelihood of public 
discontent. It is important for armed groups or rebels to achieve internal legitimacy 
in the initial phases through public service provision, security, economy and control 
(Bakke et al. 2013: 3). Patrons may support these armed groups in this early phase of 
legitimacy building. Moreover, the quantitative results highlighted that de facto state 
governments are more susceptible to the influence of external actors in the early 
phases of the state building process, whereas with proceeding time and more 
domestic accountability, de facto state governments are slightly less reliant on 
external support. In addition, patrons may not be interested in creating coherent 
government structures in de facto states, as this would reduce the level of de facto 
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state dependence on the patron state. Striving for a status quo of dependence may 
also explain why the number of governance institutions in de facto states tends to be 
lower when a patron state is present, as patrons and their clients pursue a policy of 
institution sharing. In other words, patron states nurture dependence through their 
financial, military but also state building support to de facto states. These findings in 
combination with the theoretical framework of this thesis offer an explanation why 
we can see the observed variations in patron involvement in de facto states.  
The role of dependence to explain the distinction between patron support for 
moderate and high degrees of state building, as proposed in this conclusion, cannot 
be sufficiently proven with the available quantitative data. Therefore, more in-depth 
qualitative analyses are needed to offer potential causal explanations for some of the 
findings of this chapter and to test the argumentation in the previous paragraph. For 
example, this chapter highlighted that patron states increase the likelihood of state 
building in some cases, but not the exact ways in which patrons influence state and 
institution building. Similarly, the chapter revealed that the relative military strength 
and to a certain extent economic power of parent states can have a positive effect 
on state building, but not how the competition between parent, patron and de facto 
states affects the state building process of de facto states in practice. A qualitative 
analysis of state and institution building processes is therefore necessary to 
complement the quantitative findings and identify the causal mechanisms behind 
direct and indirect patron state diffusion influences on state building in de facto 
states. These open questions and concerns will be addressed in the next three 
chapters of this thesis when the case study of Russia’s direct and indirect involvement 
in Abkhazia’s state building process will be presented and analysed. The case studies 
also explore the extent to which direct and indirect diffusion influences become more 
important if competition with the parent state is more pronounced. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
Russia on their Mind  
Abkhazia’s Domestic State Building Trajectories and Russian Indirect 
Diffusion Influences 
 
 
 
 
 
As I stroll the tree-lined boulevards of Sukhumi, the capital city of the de facto 
Republic of Abkhazia, I pass schools, a courthouse and medical facilities while a 
garbage disposal truck occasionally halts on the street to collect garbage containers. 
In Sukhumi’s east, a police officer intermittently patrols two bulky Soviet-style 
government buildings at the crossroads of Lakoba and Zvanba street, which host 
most of the ministries of the de facto government of Abkhazia, ranging from the 
Abkhaz Ministry of Education, to the Ministry of Health over to the Abkhaz Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (see figure 11). This administrative district of Sukhumi conveys the 
impression of an ordinarily functioning site of political decision-making similar to 
internationally recognised states of comparable size. Yet, after a few days in the city, 
the absence of international companies and a postal service becomes increasingly 
apparent, which indicate that Sukhumi lacks some characteristics usually associated 
with capital cities of internationally recognised states.  
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Still, the presence of basic administrative infrastructure, schools and hospitals 
raises the question in what ways the Abkhaz de facto regime achieved and sustained 
these levels of state development despite the legacies of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, 
outmigration and limited economic room for manoeuvre due to restricted 
international recognition. Abkhazia’s relatively successful state building track record 
(Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008) appears even more surprising taking into consideration 
Russia’s trade embargo on Abkhazia for a significant period of time in the 1990s in 
addition to occasional periods of violence. Even if one was to argue that Abkhazia’s 
state capacity is low and its institutions represent hollow structures rather than 
settings for public service provision (Lynch 2004: 63), it is worth considering how de 
facto state authorities prioritise and finance their state building endeavour and the 
extent to which Russia shaped Abkhazia’s domestic state and institution building 
developments.  
 
Figure 11 Cabinet of Ministers in Central Sukhumi (Spanke 2017) 
 
 
The statistical findings of the previous chapter raised a set of questions about the 
causal mechanisms behind patron state engagement in de facto states that could not 
be adequately answered with the quantitative information available in the data set. 
The statistical findings uncovered that patrons enhance a de facto state’s likelihood 
of achieving basic civilian governance, but did not specify whether this impact can be 
associated with the direct coercive involvement of the patron state or indirect 
influences, such as competitive, mimetic and normative diffusion influences. 
Furthermore, the quantitative chapter found that the relative military strength and 
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to a certain extent economic power of parent states can have a positive effect on 
state building, but not how the competition between parent, patron and de facto 
states affects the state building process of de facto states in practice. By following 
the causal chains of indirect diffusion laid out in the theoretical framework and 
process tracing the source material, this case study chapter empirically establishes 
that indirect diffusion (mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion) has a causal 
effect on Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes (direct coercive diffusion 
influences will be covered in chapter 7). These causal mechanisms can subsequently 
be linked to observable implications relating to the state and institution building 
development of Abkhazia, such as similarities across Abkhaz and Russian state and 
institution structures, institution sharing or enhanced public service provisions. 
This chapter contributes to answering the central research question of this 
thesis by offering detailed accounts of domestic state building patterns and 
trajectories in a de facto state and capturing the indirect diffusion influences of a 
patron on this process, including mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion. 
Placing the analytical focus on indirect diffusion influences reveals how the perceived 
interests of patron states, trade links and even the relative power vis-à-vis the parent 
state may change the behaviour and actions of domestic elites without direct patron 
engagement.  
The first section of this chapter provides a descriptive chronological overview 
of central state building developments in Abkhazia that is guided by critical historical 
events. This section, for example, finds that the formal changes in the Russo-Abkhaz 
relationship in 1999 marked an increase in direct coercive diffusion channels, which 
also encouraged further normative, mimetic and competitive diffusion. The second 
section discusses state building trajectories that shaped Abkhazia’s state building 
process including the incorporation of Soviet institutions, the ethnic trends in hiring 
government personnel, competitive diffusion influences, the funding of public 
service provisions as well as the prioritisation of specific state sectors. Instead of 
focusing on rebel fragmentation and relative rebel strength to capture domestic 
capabilities as in the previous quantitative chapter, this chapter is able to address a 
wider array of qualitative variables to examine Abkhazia’s endogenous state building 
developments. Finally, in order to offer a comprehensive understanding of the 
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influence of patron states on state building in de facto states, it is necessary to not 
only examine how patrons directly exert coercive influences on state building, but 
also to account for the indirect influences of patrons in form of mimetic, normative 
and competitive diffusion. This chapter thereby tests the applicability of indirect 
diffusion channels to the case of patron-de facto state relations and fleshes out some 
of the causal mechanisms behind patron influences on the state building processes 
of de facto states. 
This chapter argues that Abkhazia achieved the most notable state building 
boost during a period of uncertainty and partial isolation in the 1990s where Russia 
did not officially function as Abkhazia’s patron, because Soviet legacies provided 
Abkhaz officials with the basic political institutional structure to develop its 
institutions further and sporadic trade with Russian regions and Turkish diaspora 
groups sustained the de facto regime at least partially. Abkhaz officials attained 
control over the existing set of state institutions by strategically regulating the hiring 
of ethnic groups to influential state positions and limiting the scope of the state to 
central state functions including the management of Abkhazia’s external relations, 
basic resource extraction and distribution as well as the provision of law and order. 
With increasing Russian involvement, the scope of the state as well as public service 
and goods provisions expanded along with the enhancement of Abkhazia’s security 
and economic situation. Concurrently, Russia started taking on governance and 
institutional responsibilities from the Abkhaz de facto authorities, which reduced 
their state capacity. 
Meanwhile, Russian mimetic and normative diffusion influences ensured that 
Russian perceived interests were considered by the Abkhaz authorities without direct 
Russian involvement. Due to the limited availability of alternative partners, domestic 
actors needed to navigate their actions according to Russian indirect diffusion was 
more likely to shape domestic affairs. The process tracing in this chapter shows that 
Abkhazia’s agency is bound by the perceived interests and activities of its patron, 
which represents one of the transition variables of the theoretical framework. This 
bounded agency explains the legislative and institutional isomorphism between the 
de facto state and its patron, because of the predominance of indirect diffusion 
influences in contexts where de facto states are dependent on patron support. Still, 
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in this arena of limited manoeuvre and course of action, the Abkhaz de facto 
authorities and civil society repeatedly exemplified agency and signalled autonomy 
especially in the symbolic fields of language and private property provisions.  
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6.1 A Brief Chronology of State Building in Abkhazia 
Abkhazia’s state building development has undergone significant challenges and 
changes since the early 1990s. In order to specify the analysis of Abkhazia’s domestic 
state building process and to enable a within-case comparison, this chapter builds on 
Prelz Oltramonti’s (2015: 171) classification of Russo-Abkhaz economic relations, 
which distinguishes between two distinct periods in Abkhazia’s relationship with its 
northern neighbour. First, a period of partial isolation between 1994 and 1999 that 
was marked by a Russia-led embargo and sanctions, where Russia, according to the 
definition of this thesis, did not act as Abkhazia’s patron. Second, from 1999 until 
2008, an easing period, in which the sanctions against Abkhazia were progressively 
lifted and borders between Russia and Abkhazia were opened. This chapter proposes 
to specify Prelz Oltramonti’s classification by contextualising Russo-Abkhaz relations 
beyond the economic sphere, indicating the exact years of the individual periods and 
introducing two additional periods (see table 18). This distinction not only forms the 
broader framework of analysis of this chapter, but also enables a within-case study 
comparison, by comparing Abkhaz state building developments in the four different 
periods and across varying degrees of patron dependence.  
 
Table 18 Four Phases of Russo-Abkhaz Relations 
1992 - 1994 Uncertainty 
1994 - 1999 Partial isolation 
1999 - 2008 Easing 
2008 - present Rapprochement 
 
On the basis of this extended classification, the graph below (figure 12) offers 
surprising insights into Abkhazia’s degrees of state building between 1991 and 2011. 
The graph highlights that Abkhazia achieved high degrees of state building within 
seven years in the period between 1991 and 1997. This state building phase covered 
the formation of ministries, public administration, basic provisions of social services, 
border management as well as the set-up of an extraction and redistribution system. 
When Russia recognised Abkhazia in 2008, Abkhazia achieved very high degrees of 
state building, which means that “the polity has most characteristics of a state 
171 
 
(including external relations, representative offices abroad, commercial relations 
with international partners)” (Florea 2016: 14). Nonetheless, the most remarkable 
development is certainly Abkhazia’s state building from low to high degrees of state 
building in the 1990s, because of Abkhazia’s partial isolation and uncertainty in this 
period. In other words, Abkhazia achieved the most state building progress during a 
period when it was largely isolated, focused predominantly on domestic resource 
extraction and Russia enacted a trade embargo. This not only challenges arguments 
that state and institution building in the 1990s was limited due to war legacies, the 
blockade, sanctions and limited international support, but it also justifies the 
chapter’s predominant focus on state building developments in the uncertainty and 
partial isolation periods. Still, even after 1997, when Abkhazia had achieved high 
degrees of state building characterised by coherent government structures including 
an economic extraction and redistribution system and border control, it was 
necessary for the Abkhaz regime to sustain these initial developments. This section 
therefore not only covers central state building developments in the period of 
uncertainty and partial isolation, but also examines the extent to which Abkhaz 
authorities prioritised and financed certain state building developments beyond 
1997.  
 
Figure 12 State Building in Abkhazia (1991-2011) 
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6.1.1 The Emergence of the (de facto) Republic of Abkhazia  
Years of dissatisfaction with political and economic stagnation, coup attempts as well 
as rising nationalism and independence declarations in the union republics of the 
Soviet Union contributed to its dissolution in December 1991. The Supreme Council 
of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, as one of the Soviet union republics in 
question, declared Georgian independence in April 1991 following an independence 
referendum in late March of the same year. In this limbo of uncertainty and volatility 
and following increasing tensions with Georgia over Abkhazia’s position within the 
Georgian Union Republic, the Abkhaz nationalist movement found itself with an 
opportunity to ensure some degree of sovereignty for its territory.  
Importantly, the Abkhaz independence movement of the 1980s and 1990s 
was not primarily concerned with building an Abkhaz state, but rather to distance 
itself from Georgia as much as possible.49 The majority of ethnic Abkhaz ultimately 
desired an Abkhaz republic within the political structure of the Soviet Union.50 
Indeed, on 17th March 1991, Abkhazia held a referendum where the majority (98 per 
cent) of the Abkhaz population voted, not in favour of leaving the Soviet Union and 
becoming independent, but in favour of remaining in a reformed Soviet Union (Duffy-
Toft 2003: 98).51 However, due to infightings in Moscow, the Abkhaz SSR could not 
pursue the wish of this referendum and eventually found itself, at least momentarily 
between 26th December 1991 and 23rd July 1992, united in the newly formed 
Georgian Republic. Despite or perhaps due to this volatile context, the Abkhaz regime 
pursued a certain degree of state and institution building already before the 
independence declaration of July 1992. A declaration of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist 
Republic leadership from 25th August 1990, for instance, announces Abkhazia’s 
control over its own economic affairs and natural resources. Moreover, the 
document declares the formation of an independent central bank, a monetary, 
 
49 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
50 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
51 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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financial, customs and tax system as well as a state budget and a currency fund.52 
The Supreme Council of Abkhazia also declared the abolition of the KGB of Abkhazia 
and instead the installation of the State Security Service of Abkhazia on 27th 
November 1991.53 These declarations have a symbolic importance for Abkhazia, 
however, the Abkhaz SSR was unlikely to have been permitted the official 
introduction of these institutions while being part of the Soviet Union. A few months 
later, on 8th May 1992, the Supreme Council reinstated ministries including the 
Ministries of Health, Industry, Energy, Finance, Trade and Interior and appointed 
their ministers and staff.54 These examples show at least the intent of the Abkhaz 
regime to expand its state institutions before its proclamation of independence of 
July 1992. Whether or not these institutions actually had the capacity to provide 
public services and goods or whether Abkhazia’s state building development was 
used as a bargaining tool in negotiations with Georgian and Russian officials remain 
open questions.  
Following increasing tensions over Abkhazia’s autonomy and Abkhaz militants 
taking over government buildings in Sukhumi, Abkhazia’s government proclaimed 
Abkhazia’s independence on 23 July 1992. On the same day, Abkhazia revived the old 
Abkhaz SSR constitution from 1925 (Marychuba 2008; Chirikba 2014: 5), which meant 
that between 23rd July 1992 and 14th August 1992, the Republic of Abkhazia found 
itself in a union with the Georgian Republic (Marychuba 2008). For nearly one and a 
half years after the independence declaration of Georgia and Abkhazia’s referendum 
to remain in the Soviet Union, Abkhazia functioned officially as part of Georgia.55 
During this period, the government structures that Abkhazia inherited from the 
Soviet Union as an autonomous republic continued to operate, however, officially 
under Georgian supervision. While the Georgian government installed Georgian 
 
52 Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД России. 
Центр Кавказских исследований (2008). Конфликты в Абхазии И Южной Осетии. 
Документы 1989-2006 гг. Москва: Русская Панорама. No. 56, pp. 110-112 
53 No. 69, p.129. 
54 No. 78, p. 136. 
55 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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supervisors in the Abkhaz government structures, its presence was otherwise limited 
in this period.56  
Eventually, the Abkhaz-Georgian war broke out in August 1992 and lasted 
approximately one year and two months. Since 1993, when Georgia somewhat 
surprisingly lost the war, Georgia has not held any control over the Abkhaz territory. 
The war created a humanitarian crisis that significantly impacted Abkhazia’s state 
building process. The Abkhaz-Georgian war destroyed a considerable part of the 
Abkhaz infrastructure including government and civilian buildings57 and ended 
almost all the operations of most ministries of Abkhazia.58 Moreover, the Abkhaz 
leadership struggled under limited financial means, the inability to guarantee a stable 
energy supply59 and significant outmigration (around two thirds of the original 
Abkhaz population fled the region, in particular ethnic Georgians).60 61  
During and immediately after the war, the Abkhaz state structure and some 
of the state infrastructure remained largely the same as before the conflict when 
Abkhazia acted as an autonomous republic.62 63 64 The photographic evidence of this 
chapter visually demonstrates the presence of state and governance infrastructure 
and institutions in Abkhazia’s Soviet and post-Soviet period. This infrastructure 
illustrates the potential for institutional path dependence in the post-Soviet period 
and the ability of Abkhaz rebel groups to utilise the foundations of the pre-existing 
institutional structure for their state and institution building endeavours (see figures 
11, 13, 14, 16). Experienced bureaucrats and leadership that were appointed before 
the Abkhaz-Georgian war mostly remained in their positions and continued working 
 
56 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
57 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
58 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
59 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
60 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
61 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
62 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
63 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
64 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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for the Abkhaz government during and after the war.65 66 Meanwhile, 
parliamentarians worked simultaneously in the executive branch, despite the 
envisioned separation of the three branches of government. Similarly to the choice 
of a centralised presidential system, this was justified with the extreme situation 
surrounding the war that made it difficult to form state institutions and train new 
cadres.67 Initially, the Abkhaz de facto government prioritised setting up local 
resource extraction and electricity infrastructure in order to minimise dependency 
on external sources and simultaneously sustain the basic state institutions. However, 
as Abkhazia had gotten used to relatively high levels of public spending during the 
Soviet Union and several institutions to be sustained, the domestically extracted 
resources were insufficient (Prelz Oltramonti 2015: 176). 
Despite the limited financial means and the regime’s preoccupation with 
domestic resource extraction, energy supply and warfare, the Abkhaz de facto 
government expanded its governance institutions by establishing the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence during the war.68 Until the end of the 
blockade, the responsibilities of the newly founded Foreign Ministry were restricted 
to managing the relationship with Moscow and the negotiations with Georgia.69 70  
In December 1993, following the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, a new 
Abkhaz de facto government was formed, which essentially utilised the previous 
structures from the Supreme Soviet as its basis and encompassed an additional set 
of new ministries, such as the Ministry of Ecology, the Ministry of Culture the Ministry 
of Information and Press, a Customs Committee and the Ministry for Taxes, which 
developed out of a tax committee (see table 19 for a representation of Abkhazia’s 
incorporation of Soviet institutional structures).71 72 In the meantime, the Abkhaz 
 
65 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
66 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
67 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
68 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
69 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
70 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
71 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
72 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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authorities were required to modify Abkhazia’s legal basis in order to reflect the new 
realities of de facto statehood, rather than the Georgia-based laws from the 
Autonomous Republic period.73  
The legislative changes also included the passing of a new constitution on 26th 
November 1994 (Marychuba 2008; Chirikba 2014). The constitution enacted several 
structural changes to Abkhazia’s state system ranging from a presidential system 
with vertical authority structures to partial decentralisation. The 1994 constitution, 
for instance, prescribed that heads of local administrations will be appointed by the 
president from a pool of deputies of local self-government bodies, such as local 
assemblies and parliaments. The system choices were largely justified with the post-
war devastations, which left Abkhazia with few resources and necessitated a 
centralised system with vertical power structures centred around strong presidential 
power and authority.74 However, the state structure outcomes in Abkhazia cannot 
solely be explained with its war legacies. Abkhazia’s centralised system with vertical 
power structures represented the default option for most post-Soviet states 
irrespective of their war experiences. In that sense, some of the state structure 
outcomes reflect institutional path dependencies.  
 
Figure 13 Administration Building of Gulripshskiy Region (Chachkhalia 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
74 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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From a territorial control point of view rather than an institutional perspective, the 
Abkhaz forces did not achieve full control over their de facto territory during the war 
and did not do so until the 2008 Russo-Georgian war (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 282). 
Particularly the south-eastern Gali region and Upper Kodori in north-eastern 
Abkhazia remained contentious regions after the Georgian-Abkhaz war. The latter 
region was even reintegrated into Georgia in 2006, before becoming a part of 
Abkhazia with Russian military support in 2008 (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012). A 
monitoring mission from the United Nations (UNOMIG) offered some supplementary 
security provision in the conflict zones and may have contributed somewhat to 
internal security levels, but was unable to get involved in recurring violence in 1998 
and 2008 (Comai 2018a: 68).  
This section highlighted the degrees of state building activity and the de facto 
regime’s intent to develop at least the institutional structures that formed the basis 
for subsequent state capacity even before the Georgian-Abkhaz war broke out in 
1992. The de facto regime was preoccupied with guaranteeing domestic resource 
extraction, energy supply and warfare in this period, but also started setting up the 
basis for engaging in foreign relations. In this context, Abkhazia’s institutional and 
infrastructural foundation and the interrelated path dependencies from its period as 
an Autonomous Republic benefited the regime’s ability to provide basic public 
services and goods, even though it did not guarantee full territorial integrity and 
internal security until after 2008.  
 
6.1.2 State Building During the Blockade and Sanctions 
With the end of the war in September 1993, negotiations between Abkhazia and 
Georgia with Russian and international organisation involvement were set up.75 
Initially, Russia, at least on an official level, pressured Abkhazia to reintegrate with 
Georgia.76 In order to emphasise this point, Russia as a member of the CIS established 
a so-called blockade against Abkhazia in form of a Russo-Abkhaz border closure for 
men of the age between 16 and 60, which resulted in the partial isolation of Abkhazia 
 
75 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
76 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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for approximately 6 years.77 78 In January 1996, the CIS countries adopted a resolution 
outlining the elements of the embargo and additional sanctions, which ultimately 
banned CIS “trade, financial, transportation, communications, and other ties with 
Abkhazia at the state level” (Prelz Oltramonti 2015: 171).79  
Despite some channels of support from Russia and Turkey, most Abkhaz 
interviewees refer to the time of the blockade as a period of survival, because 
Abkhazia not only had limited financial resources, but some areas even lacked 
electricity and clean drinking water.80 81 As many villages were close to being self-
sufficient, hunger was not one of the central issues in Abkhazia during the blockade.82 
The limited financial means of the Abkhaz regime meant that it was unable to pay 
the salaries of public servants. Ministry staff and teachers at schools and universities, 
for instance, were not paid until the end of 1994.83 But even after 1994, the salaries 
were low, irregular and rather symbolic in nature.84 85 Government staff and teachers 
were therefore reliant on help from relatives abroad, domestic agricultural products 
or international organisations that provided humanitarian aid.86  
Hence, the Abkhaz de facto state took on a specific position in people’s life 
that was not all-encompassing but was restricted to central functions such as security 
provision, including border management, policing and setting up a legal framework, 
external relations as well as an extraction and redistribution system. One interviewee 
described the role of the state in that period as follows:  
 
  
 
77 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
78 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
79 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
80 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
81 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
82 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
83 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
84 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
85 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
86 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
179 
 
[A]t that time, […] people depended on themselves 
more than on the state […]. The state was more 
responsible for our external situation, the negotiation 
process and […] for the provision of certain degree of 
law and order.87 
Representative of a Non-Governmental Organisation in Sukhumi 
 
Despite the blockade and the focus on survival, the central Abkhaz ministries started 
operating again and the Abkhaz regime rebuilt its infrastructure after the war.88 One 
interviewee argues that the Abkhaz leadership had no other choice but to pursue at 
least some limited degree of state building, due to its isolation, the blockade and 
limited cooperation possibilities with Russia and Georgia.89 In other words, 
Abkhazia’s partial isolation may have made Abkhazia more self-reliant and focused 
on local ownership which consequently benefited the state building process. Levitsky 
and Way (2006; 2010) would argue that the low degrees of linkages between 
Abkhazia and Russia in that period shifted the focus on endogenous factors and 
benefited state building in Abkhazia. Similarly, periods of predominant isolation and 
the absence of international involvement may present de facto states with the 
opportunity of stabilisation (Kolstø 2006) and state building can develop without a 
strict external blueprint, which enables more domestic input (Richards & Smith 2015: 
1718). At the same time, isolation may incentivise the maintenance of unity and shift 
the state building emphasis on military force (Ishiyama & Batta 2012: 124).  
The extensive focus on establishing state capacity and basic provision of 
services and goods in Abkhazia’s initial state building period is in line with studies 
that stress the relevance of the initial state building progress for establishing control 
(Caspersen 2012: 90) and the overall success of some de facto states (Zabarah 2012; 
Johnson & Smaker 2014: 6). There is, however, a crucial regional distinction in 
Abkhazia between Lower and Upper Gali in terms of state building during this period. 
In Upper Gali between 1994 and 1998, authorities built rudimentary state 
infrastructures in form of basic police control over the territory, a reward system and 
 
87 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
88 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
89 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
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a tax collection system with the support of the local government. In Lower Gali, on 
the other hand, there was essentially no state infrastructure, no local government 
and lack of manpower.90 Still, Abkhazia was able to provide basic public services and 
goods even though the regime had not attained statehood and full control over its 
territory. This supports the finding that strong statehood is not necessary for public 
service and goods provision (Lee et al. 2014: 636).  
 
6.1.3 State Building Motivation in the Easing Phase 
Following Abkhazia’s official declaration of independence in October 1999 after a 
referendum where 97 per cent voted in favour of adopting the constitution of 1994 
and with Putin’s first presidency, the blockade and most sanctions ended gradually 
(Chirikba 2014; Mihalkanin 2004).91 According to Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi (2010: 7-
8), this was in response to tensions over Chechnya between the Russian Federation 
and Georgia. The beginning of the economic easing period between Abkhazia and 
Russia did not result in immediate financial contributions from Russia, as their 
economic relationship focused predominantly on the easing of sanctions and fewer 
border controls (ICG 2006: 16).  
By 1999, Abkhazia had already formed all central governance institutions 
(Yemelianova 2015: 60-61), yet the motivations behind Abkhazia’s state building 
efforts are not always clear. Until 2004, Georgia and Abkhazia continued their 
negotiations under Russian mediation due to external pressures, even though some 
Abkhaz leaders already envisioned independent statehood at this point.92 93 
However, it is difficult to link Abkhazia’s state building efforts up to this point 
restrictively to its pursuit of independent statehood, as the creation of state 
institutions and the provision of limited public services and goods may have been 
also used as a bargaining tool in the negotiation process.94 In addition, the Abkhaz 
 
90 Interview 17: American scholar (Moscow) 
91 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
92 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
93 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
94 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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regime pursued state building to manage expectations among the public relating to 
the provision of security and other basic services, while pragmatically engaging with 
Russian and Georgian pressures.95 One interviewee argued that up until 2008 the 
driving force behind state building for the population and the government was to 
show the world that Abkhazia can be a functioning state, which simultaneously 
unified the population behind the goal of recognition. Since Russia’s recognition in 
2008, the motivation behind state building has changed and new unifying strategies 
have been lacking.96  
The formal changes in the Russo-Abkhaz relationship in 1999 shaped the 
relative importance of direct and indirect diffusion influences. The economic easing 
period permitted the expansion of direct coercive diffusion instruments ranging from 
financial contributions to agreements that specified trading regulations between the 
two parties. The prevalence of indirect diffusion channels observable during 
Abkhazia’s period of partial isolation did not fade, however, as the growing coercive 
diffusion influences encouraged the role of normative and mimetic diffusion 
channels. At the same time, the rise in coercive diffusion sources in form of military 
and financial support facilitated competitive diffusion influences, because Russia was 
willing to defend Georgian military campaigns against Abkhazia and presented a 
viable alternative source for healthcare and education services. 
In terms of internal legitimacy and perceptions of state building after twenty 
years of de facto statehood, a survey showed that the majority of ethnic Abkhaz 
support independence, that trust in the president is high, but that less than half of 
respondents trust the police and courts (Bakke et al. 2013: 5-6). Meanwhile, 
Abkhazia’s economic development worries citizens and while attitudes towards 
health case are slightly more optimistic, the Abkhaz population is sceptical of health 
care provision (7). This signifies that the Abkhaz regime has been more successful in 
ensuring state and regime legitimacy than institutional legitimacy. Still, concerns 
about security and economic provision may reduce the confidence of the public in 
the status quo and the ruling elite (Bakke et al. 2018: 165).  
 
95 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
96 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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6.3 Domestic State Building Trajectories in Abkhazia 
Guided by Blakkisrud and Kolstø’s (2011; 2012) analyses of state and nation building 
in Transnistria and the de facto states of the South Caucasus, as well as a set of 
studies on institution building in Abkhazia (Krylov 2002; Skakov 2005; Berg & Mölder 
2012; Ó’Beacháin 2012; von Steinsdorff 2012; Bakke et al. 2013; Kopeček 2017), this 
chapter examines the circumstances, actions and coincidences that facilitated state 
building in Abkhazia and the ways in which the Abkhaz regime financed and 
prioritised internal state and institution building to attain the capacity to provide 
public services and goods.97 Instead of approaching Abkhazia’s state building 
development from a chronological perspective, this section accentuates dominant 
trends in Abkhazia’s state institution development and the provision of public goods 
and services. Focusing on central domestic state building trajectories enables a closer 
engagement with the developments that facilitated Abkhazia’s state capacity and the 
provision of public goods and services. This section thereby addresses the ways in 
which de facto states may pursue state building without direct external patron 
engagement and covers how the presence of a patron indirectly shapes the decision-
making of domestic elites in terms of state building prioritisation. These domestic 
state building trajectories cover the inclusion of Soviet structures, state building 
prioritisation, war and trade as state building facilitators and public service 
appointments. 
 
6.3.1 Historical Legacies of the Soviet Union and Abkhazia’s State Structure 
Studies on Abkhazia’s state and institution building developments do not always 
consider the institutional legacies from the Soviet period when assessing the 
 
97 State capacity and the provision of public services and goods are only two aspects of the 
state building process of a nascent state. Richards (2015: 5), for instance, argues that state 
building goes beyond mere technocratic institution building, because it manifests itself as 
“socio-political change that creates, sustains and legitimizes a separate political entity, both 
to the international community and to the domestic audience.” It is therefore also worth 
considering other societal developments and nation building practices in Abkhazia. 
Dembińska (2019) and Clogg (2008), for example, offer a detailed insight into nation-building 
strategies in Abkhazia. While the predominant focus on governance institutions in this 
chapter does not reveal the whole story of state building in Abkhazia, it uncovers the 
institutional priorities of the (de facto) authorities in setting up the state. 
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institutional realities of the de facto state. In a comparative study of state building in 
post-Soviet de facto states of the South Caucasus, Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008: 506) 
even argue that, at least for South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, “former status in 
the hierarchy of Soviet national autonomous units does not seem to play a role […] 
[in] potential state-building.” Their definition of state building refers specifically to 
defence, border and territorial control, economic development and the consolidation 
of state institutions. However, this section argues that while the long-term impact on 
contemporary state structures is debated, the historical legacies of the Soviet Union 
accounted for the basic institutional structure of Abkhazia after the disintegration of 
the USSR.98 99 This section thereby positions itself more in line with Caspersen (2012: 
35), who argues that “the former autonomous institutions could be used as a basis 
for the creation of state-like structures.” Several interviews reflected this line of 
argument by understanding the Abkhaz state as a continuation of the old Soviet 
system, where a clear break or even a distinct transformation of Soviet institutions 
did not take place.100 101 Hence, this section highlights that the Soviet structures 
formed the basis of Abkhazia’s state capacity in the early 1990s, which did not 
necessitate external patron support. 
At the same time, this argumentation counters the findings of the statistical 
analyses of this thesis, which uncover that previous independence does either not 
affect the likelihood of achieving moderate or high degrees of state building or even 
decreases the likelihood (see chapter 5). Similarly, the number of governance 
institutions are not significantly impacted by previous independence of de facto 
states. While the findings of this Abkhaz case study do not invalidate the statistical 
findings of the thesis, it illustrates the ways in which de facto states may utilise their 
previous autonomy status in their state and institution building endeavour.  
The Soviet Union was a federal union comprising fifteen union republics that 
consisted of additional hierarchical, administrative layers, such as oblasts or krais. In 
addition to the union republics, the Soviet Union included twenty autonomous Soviet 
 
98 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
99 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
100 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
101 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
184 
 
socialist republics, which were associated with union republics, but had more 
autonomy rights than oblasts or krais (Carr 1950-1978; Motyl 2001; Noah 1966: 48-
50). Depending on their administrative title, entities were subsequently granted 
varying degrees of autonomous rights (Cornell 2002: 248).  
Since 1931, the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was one of 
twenty autonomous republics in the Soviet Union that enjoyed a set of autonomy 
privileges including the control over their own set of ministries (see photographic 
evidence in figures 13, 14 and 16 for example). One Georgian interviewee even 
argued that Abkhazia received disproportionately more political attention and health 
sector investments from the Georgian Union Republic and the Soviet central 
government due to its history, geography and appeal as a tourist destination. Soviet 
Georgia, for instance, allegedly invested more resources into the Abkhaz 
infrastructure than in any other Georgian region.102  
 
Figure 14 Frunze Street. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the 
Abkhazian ASSR (Shakaya 1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the state structure of the Soviet Union facilitated the presence of a more or 
less sophisticated network of institutions and political and managerial awareness 
within the union republics, autonomous republics and regions.103 Abkhazia inherited 
 
102 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
103 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
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a set of state institutions and structures from its previous status as an Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic, such as ministries, a parliament as well as education and 
health infrastructure.104 105 106 While ministries in autonomous republics at least 
nominally had the status of ministries, they had limited financial, material and 
political authority.107 Major policy decisions, for instance, were taken in either Tbilisi 
or Moscow.108 109 Nonetheless, the execution of governance tasks, which required an 
experienced bureaucracy, was taking place locally in Abkhaz ministries.110 The graph 
below (figure 15) confirms the relatively high number of (physically present) 
governance institutions in Abkhazia from the early 1990s onwards when the Soviet 
Union dissolved, according to Florea’s (2016) classification.  
 
Figure 15 Number of Governance Institutions in Abkhazia (1991- 2011) 
 
 
Both interview and primary source data confirm that most of the institutional 
structures of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic were transformed into Abkhaz 
 
104 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
105 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
106 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
107 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
108 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
109 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
110 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
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government structures.111 In the pre- and post-war period, Abkhaz ministries and 
political structures remained largely the same and may have only changed in name 
rather than in content.112 On 27th November 1991, for instance, the Abkhaz 
authorities abolished the KGB of Abkhazia and on its basis installed the State Security 
Service of Abkhazia.113 Similarly, the Abkhaz Health Ministry was opened on the 
structures of the Soviet Health Ministry in Sukhumi.114 Meanwhile, the Abkhaz 
authorities continued the use of Soviet institutions as wide-ranging as university and 
research institutions, criminal legislation and Soviet passports (see table 19 for a 
representation of Abkhazia’s incorporation of Soviet institutional structures).115 116 
117 An additional institution that was shaped by Abkhazia’s previous level of 
autonomy within the Soviet Union is the Abkhaz bureaucracy, including 
administrative personnel and standard operating procedures. The presence of formal 
state institutions that controlled the implementation of executive orders ensured 
that the Abkhaz regime was not entirely new to leadership and bureaucracy. This 
advantage was enhanced by several central leadership figures and bureaucrats 
remaining in their position during and after the war.118 119 120  
Still, the Abkhaz regime not only relied on existing infrastructure, but also 
developed new governance institutions that were not initially part of the institutional 
framework of Autonomous Republics in order to address the needs of the new 
realities of de facto independence. The Abkhaz government, for instance, established 
both a Ministry of Defence and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the war to 
 
111 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
112 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
113 Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД России. 
Центр Кавказских исследований (2008). Конфликты в Абхазии И Южной Осетии. 
Документы 1989-2006 гг. Москва: Русская Панорама. No. 69, p.129. 
114 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
115 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
116 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
117 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
118 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
119 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
120 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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organise the protection of the Abkhaz de facto territory.121 In December 1993, a new 
Abkhaz government was formed that included a number of new ministries, such as a 
Ministry of Ecology, Ministry of Culture and a Ministry of Information and Press (see 
table 19 for newly created institutions).122 123  
  
 
121 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
122 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
123 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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Table 19 Institutional Transition124 
 Soviet Period (1978 Constitution) Post-1994 Constitution 
Executive   
 Chairman of the Supreme Soviet / 
 / President 
 / Vice President 
 / Prime Minister 
 Council of Ministers Cabinet of Ministers 
 Ministry of Health Ministry of Health 
 Ministry of Education Ministry of Education 
 Tax Committee Ministry of Taxes and Fees 
 (Budgetary) Responsibilities Ministry of Finance 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Interior 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Justice 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Economy and Foreign 
Economic Relations 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Work and Social Development 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Agriculture 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Culture 
 Responsibilities  Ministry of Ecology 
 Responsibilities Ministry of Industry 
 / Ministry of Defence 
 / Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 / Ministry of Information and Press 
 / Ministry of Energy  
 / 6 Government Committees125 
 Local Councils of People’s Deputies Regional Governments and Ministries 
Legislative   
 Supreme Soviet People’s Assembly of Abkhazia 
Judiciary   
 Supreme Court Supreme Court 
 Arbitration Court Arbitration Court 
 Local Courts Local Courts 
 / Military Court 
Other   
 KGB Abkhaz State Security Service 
 / National Central Bank 
 
124 This table is based on publications by Chirikba (2014), Shanava et al. (2015) as well as 
research interviews. ‘/’ indicates that the institution was not present at that point in time. It 
was not always possible to identify sources that confirm the presence of official ministries in 
Abkhazia during the Soviet period. However, in some instances the 1978 constitution 
describes government responsibilities in a variety of government sectors that may indicate 
previous exposure to certain government sectors before the constitution of 1994 (these are 
simply referred to as responsibilities in the table). Furthermore, the number and names of 
ministries tended to change frequently, which means that this table does not account for 
institutional developments between the constitutions of 1978 and 1994. 
125 Government Committees included the Government Committee of Customs; Property 
Management and Privatisation; Resorts and Tourism; Repatriation; Youth and Sport; Ecology 
and Environmental Management (Chirikba 2014). 
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An additional Soviet legacy as well as a legacy of the post-war period is that family 
networks and clans play an important role in reducing the potential for poverty, 
limiting the effect of brain drain and ensuring legal protections of individuals (Trier 
et al. 2010). In terms of informal political institutions and practices, the Abkhaz 
political system is to this day oftentimes linked to clan structures and clientelism 
(Kopeček 2017: 123-124). Kopeček (2017: 124) identified two clans in different 
regional locations (the Gudauta or Bzyp and the Ochamchira or Abzhua). Kopeček 
(2017: 124) also stresses the role of “clientelist networks based on family, friendship 
and business interests” that are especially dominant in regional and local level.  
Overall, Abkhaz authorities had little incentive and limited financial political 
capital to break with and transform the, at least partially, predetermined Soviet state 
structures of Abkhazia. The institutional legacies of the Soviet period presented the 
authorities with a degree of state capacity and permitted the Abkhaz regime to 
develop a political Abkhaz elite that relatively rapidly took control over Abkhazia’s 
territory and administration (Cornell 2002: 265-266). This was of particular 
importance in relation to controlling Abkhazia’s opportunity structures, be they of a 
geographic, economic or resource nature, which could subsequently improve 
Abkhazia’s bargaining position (i.e. Zabarah 2012: 183). The existing institutional 
structures and a common history with other Soviet successor states also facilitated 
at least partial external support. Abkhaz elites were able to source support from 
former Soviet military personnel, for instance, due to existing Communist Party 
connections (Cornell 2002: 265-266).  
 
6.3.2 Prioritisation in Abkhazia’s State Building Development 
Caspersen (2012) and Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011) disentangle state building in de 
facto states by dividing these developments into different possibly overlapping 
phases and processes ranging from the establishment of physical control to internal 
legitimacy. Rather than referring to state building phases, this section approaches 
the state building developments in Abkhazia from a prioritisation perspective, as this 
reflects the decision-making approaches of domestic authorities towards state 
building. Framing Abkhazia’s state building development through the lens of 
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prioritisation uncovers patterns of state formation that are informed by the 
geopolitical and economic considerations of the young de facto state, explores the 
bounded agency of state builders and reveals areas of potential access to the Abkhaz 
state for external actors. In other words, areas of the state that are selectively 
neglected by the regime may result in sporadic state weakness, which in turn enables 
domestic and international actors to influence the policies, institutions and practices 
of the entity (Lake 2014: 524). Thus, this section highlights that Abkhazia’s domestic 
state building prioritisation impacts the structure and scope of the state, which in 
turn shapes the entity’s ability to provide public services and goods and affects the 
susceptibility to external influences (see chapter 8 for an analysis of how these 
dynamics play out in Abkhazia’s education sector).  
The blockade and sanctions of the 1990s as well as the restricted international 
support presented the de facto regime with limited economic and financial room for 
manoeuvre for its state and institution building development. While the Abkhaz state 
could at least partially rely on the existing institutional framework and bureaucratic 
experience from the Soviet Union, this institutional basis proved insufficient in 
guaranteeing security, the provision of public services and maintaining the salaries 
for public servants. Ultimately, these constraints required the Abkhaz regime to 
prioritise certain sectors in its state building endeavour. Particularly the periods of 
uncertainty and partial isolation were earmarked by survival efforts of both the 
Abkhaz state and its population.126 127 The population on Abkhaz territory, on the one 
hand, did not necessarily suffer from wide-spread hunger because of a high degree 
of agricultural self-sufficiency, however, many regions experienced high levels of 
crime and did not have electricity, running water and sufficient salaries.128 In these 
periods, people depended on themselves more than they did on the state, which had 
significant implications for the perception of what constituted the state and its 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the population. The Abkhaz state, on the other hand, was 
therefore not preoccupied with service provision per se, but was instead responsible 
 
126 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
127 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
128 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
191 
 
for a set of core tasks including the management of Abkhazia’s external relations (i.e. 
the negotiation process with Russia, Georgia and international organisations), setting 
up a basic resource extraction and distribution system including trade as well as the 
provision of law and order (i.e. border controls, military, security services and a legal 
framework). 129 Declarations by the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic and the Supreme 
Council of Abkhazia mirror this state building prioritisation in the period of 
uncertainty and partial isolation. A substantial portion of the de facto state’s written 
output represents exchanges between Sukhumi, Tbilisi and Moscow, which reflect 
the de facto state’s newly adopted role as manager of external relations on behalf of 
the Abkhaz public.130 By 1990, Abkhazia had already started to declare its intentions 
to set up the framework for basic resource extraction and its domestic and 
international distribution by setting up a central bank, a tax system and customs 
regulations.131 One year later, the Abkhaz authorities intended to install the State 
Security Service of Abkhazia, which was at least partially responsible for the 
assurance of law and order on Abkhaz territory.132 Despite the symbolic significance 
of these declarations of intent, it is unlikely that the Abkhaz SSR was permitted to 
introduce these institutions while being part of the Soviet Union.  
Until the early 2000s, Abkhazia’s security and defence was considered a clear 
priority for its regime, because of the real or perceived threat from Georgia and 
repeated violent attacks in the border area.133 134 Abkhazia also faced criminal 
violence and a struggle for power from a variety of civilian, former military and other 
criminal networks, particularly in the Gali region of Abkhazia (Khashig 2003; 2004). 
This showed that the Abkhaz central regime did not have complete control over its 
de facto territory (Lynch 2004), which allowed the parent state to develop alternative 
 
129 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
130 Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД России. 
Центр Кавказских исследований (2008). Конфликты в Абхазии И Южной Осетии. 
Документы 1989-2006 гг. Москва: Русская Панорама. 
131 Московский государственный институт международных отношений МИД России. 
Центр Кавказских исследований (2008). Конфликты в Абхазии И Южной Осетии. 
Документы 1989-2006 гг. Москва: Русская Панорама. No. 56, pp. 110-112 
132 No. 69, p.129. 
133 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
134 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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rivalling structures (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008). This is not in itself surprising as post-
war periods are oftentimes quite violent and not actually represent post-conflict 
societies in the strict sense (Bakke 2011: 90, 94). Particularly de facto states that 
emerge out of violent conflicts and had fragmented separatist groups have to deal 
with internal violence over political control (Cunningham et al. 2012). If the violence 
at the end of the official war continues, because the de facto regime is unable to 
ensure security and control, this may negatively influence public service and goods 
provision which in turn increases the likelihood of effecting internal legitimacy (Bakke 
2011: 91; 2013: 11). The Abkhaz authorities therefore spent significant financial and 
human resources on its army and border protection.135 
Meanwhile, the Abkhaz regime placed emphasis on the development of a 
compatible banking system136 and the energy supply to and within Abkhazia. 
According to a Georgian official, the energy infrastructure was even the first priority 
in the immediate post-war period, because the Abkhaz regime spent significant 
resources into the maintenance of energy facilities and infrastructure.137 Up to that 
point, Abkhazia’s energy supply had largely originated from the Inguri Dam 
hydropower station, the second largest energy source in terms of volume and output 
in the Soviet Union. According to an official that was involved in Georgian-Abkhaz 
post-war negotiations, Abkhazia and Georgia came to an agreement of joint 
exploitation of the hydropower plant on the first day after the conflict, because the 
reservoir is on the Georgian side and the technical facilities are situated on the 
Abkhaz side.  
In the easing phase from 1999 onwards, the Abkhaz authorities started to 
gradually rely on Russian support in terms of security provision, which facilitated 
reduced Abkhaz military spending and a slow-down of its military development.138 
Instead, the Abkhaz regime stated placing more emphasis on welfare provisions.139 
 
135 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
136 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
137 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
138 The importance of understanding not only the effects of physical security, but also 
ontological security has been highlighted by Jakša (2017). 
139 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
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Despite the increasing welfare focus, such as pension payments, Abkhazia’s 
education (discussed in chapter 8) and health sector received limited attention until 
the late 2000s.  
Hence, Abkhazia’s state building prioritisation as well as its geopolitical and 
economic circumstances shaped the structure and extent of the de facto state. Even 
if the declarations of the de facto officials represent intentions rather than actions, 
they unveil the ways in which the Abkhaz regime prioritised its state building efforts 
and how it perceived its responsibilities. This argument is at least partially in line with 
Lake and Fariss’ (2014: 570) view that national and international leaders do not see 
state capacity as their primary or even singular goal. Instead, national leaders focus 
on political survival and therefore attempt to identify support coalitions (Lake & 
Fariss 2014). Abkhazia’s prioritisation of economic and security structures as well as 
the management of its foreign affairs contributed at least partially to the political 
survival of the Abkhaz regime. It is therefore not surprising that public service and 
goods provision, including education, health and welfare policies, were not high on 
the list of priorities until the easing phase of the 2000s. However, the more the de 
facto regime evolved, the higher were the demands toward the state regarding 
public service and goods provision beyond security. 
 
6.3.3 Internal and External (Military) Competition as a State Building Mechanism  
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, but arguably already in 
1931 with Abkhazia’s integration into the Georgian Union Republic, Abkhazia found 
itself in the centre of geopolitical and ethnic tensions with Georgia. Thus, the Abkhaz 
regime not only had to curtail the privatised violence on its territory that had made 
secession possible in order to avoid losing internal legitimacy and cohesion (Bakke 
2011; Bakke et al. 2013), but the authorities also had to manage the perceived or 
actual external pressures from Georgia. The role of conflict in the state building 
developments of internationally recognised states has been discussed prominently 
by Tilly (1975; 1992) and has also been set in the context of de facto states (King 
2001; Caspersen 2011). Wars are considered state building facilitators for de facto 
states, because they stimulate the development of military institutions, a common 
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ideology, unity and a resource extraction system (King 2001; Ishiyama & Batta 2012). 
At the same time, the continued real or perceived threat of an external actor 
encourages the desire for a strong state and facilities institution and state building 
(Caspersen 2012: 77). The statistical results of this thesis, for instance, highlighted 
that stronger parent states in terms of military capabilities compared to patron states 
increase the likelihood of de facto states attaining coherent government structures 
(high degrees of state building), but not basic civilian governance (moderate degrees 
of state building) and the number of governance institutions all other variables held 
equal. In other words, competition as an indirect diffusion source appears to 
encourage particularly the development of coherent governance structures such as 
internal security and border management. Yet, competition appears to matter less 
in the early state building developments when de facto regimes go from rebel 
governance to basic civilian governance. However, also domestic competition can 
affect state building in a given entity. If criminal activities are widespread, especially 
in the economic sector following war, this might reduce the quantity and quality of 
public service and goods provision as elites focus more on getting local warlords or 
even external support on their side instead of providing public services and goods 
(Reno 2002).  
Rather than analysing Abkhazia’s state building development through Tilly’s 
(1975; 1992) and King’s (2001) perspective of conflict and war, this section examines 
policy and institutional choices in Abkhazia’s state building development through the 
lens of competitive diffusion instead. In the case of Abkhazia, competition diffusion 
takes place in the context of patron, parent and international community forces 
competing for control over particular sectors of the state, which in turn may motivate 
policy or institutional developments beyond the military sphere. The de facto regime 
essentially competes with the perceived or actual aggression from Georgia over the 
control of Abkhaz territory, resources and service provision. Henceforth, Kolstø and 
Blakkisrud’s (2008) argument that parent state opposition to extended autonomy 
rights for de facto states encourages state building efforts of these unrecognised 
entities in the post-Soviet context can be neatly situated in a competition diffusion 
context. Similarly, the competition diffusion framework is in line with Trier, Lohm and 
Szakonyi’s (2010: 10) claim that “[c]reating viable governmental institutions, 
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rehabilitating the economy and enforcing the rule of law are perceived as the best 
protection against ‘Georgian imperialism and aggression’, since such measures are 
seen as strengthening and legitimizing the de facto state in the eyes of the 
international community.” The causal mechanisms in these instances are legislative 
or service provision changes that are facilitated by the de facto state authorities’ 
perception of competing parent state involvement in the de facto state. By following 
the causal chains of competitive diffusion laid out in the theoretical framework and 
applying process tracing to the source material, this section empirically establishes 
that competitive diffusion is at work in Abkhazia’s state and institution building 
processes.  
In the case of Abkhazia, competition with the parent state encouraged 
diffusion channels that facilitated more defined hierarchical power structures, a 
shared ideology and arguably even a national identity (Iskandaryan 2015: 31). 
Meanwhile, competitive diffusion stimulated the development of a political system 
that ensured the dominance of ethnic Abkhaz by cooperating with ethnic Armenians 
and Russians on Abkhaz territory and nations from the north Caucasus in order to 
increase the distance with Georgia (Cornell 2002: 264). While, the quality and 
sustainability of these institutions is not necessarily ensured, they nonetheless build 
a basis to win wars and protect a stable population (Iskandaryan 2015: 31). It is not 
unusual for post-Soviet de facto state elites to also concede domestically on the 
dominant focus on the monopoly of force and coercion for tactical or pragmatic 
reasons for at least some time (Broers 2015: 141). Even though some “shadow state-
like networks were still evident within the formal bureaucratic structures” in the 
early 2000s, de facto elites did not share coercive control with non-governmental 
armed groups (Broers 2015: 141). This is also where the distinction between the 
patron classification of this thesis and Florea comes into play. Until 1999, Abkhazia 
was largely self-reliant with some support from Russian regions. This partial isolation 
pressured the Abkhaz regime to develop its security forces more. Since 1999, the 
strength of Abkhaz security and military forces has deteriorated with Russian forces 
taking over security and military responsibilities from Abkhazia. Thus, at least in the 
security and military sector, the presence of a patron appears to have resulted in less 
development. 
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By applying a competition diffusion framework to Abkhazia, this section goes 
beyond the mere influences of military conflict on military institutions and national 
cohesion, because it encompasses competitive diffusion sources brought forward by 
the conflict that penetrate sectors as diverse as energy, education and health care. 
The following three examples attempt to outline the ways in which competition 
diffusion sources exert influence on specific state institutions and policy decisions of 
the de facto regime. Interestingly, each example encouraged different responses 
from the Abkhaz authorities ranging from direct counteraction, patron involvement 
to compromise. The examples highlight the varied outcomes of competitive diffusion 
with observable implications such as institution sharing, developments in public 
service provisions and accelerated state building responses. The findings also 
demonstrate that competition with the parent state facilitates direct diffusion 
influences (as in Abkhazia’s healthcare example), while not reducing the importance 
of indirect diffusion sources.  
The first example of competitive diffusion occurs in the Lower Gali region in 
southern Abkhazia where the Georgian government supports some schools by 
providing free Georgian textbooks, rehabilitating school infrastructure and in some 
cases supplementing the salaries of teachers and other education staff (Trier et al. 
2010: 71-72). This involvement of the Georgian government represents competitive 
diffusion in the sense that it motivated the de facto authorities in Sukhumi to extend 
their control over and involvement in the schools of Lower Gali by providing Abkhaz 
and Russian textbooks and demanding the use of the Abkhaz curriculum in return 
(128). In other words, Lower Gali’s education sector exemplifies how the Abkhaz 
regime retaliated Georgia’s involvement with a set of education policies addressing 
the competition in this region of Abkhazia. Process tracing thereby demonstrates 
that the perceived competition by the Abkhaz authorities of Georgian involvement 
in Lower Gali facilitated an observable implication in form of an accelerated state 
building response from the Abkhaz government and an extension of the state 
building provisions in an area where the de facto authorities had limited territorial 
control.  
Second, Georgia enacted a health care programme targeting citizens on 
Abkhaz territory with free or highly subsidised health care treatments in Georgia, 
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which instigated cross-border movements for health care purposes especially in 
severe and costly cases.140 141 Even though few people in Abkhazia would admit to 
receiving Georgian health care treatment,142 the existence of the programme alone 
can be considered a challenge by the Georgian government against Abkhazia as the 
sole provider of public services and goods. Yet, unlike the first example, the Abkhaz 
regime has not focused on the provision of better domestic health care provisions, 
but instead relies partially on Russian support to match or outweigh Georgian 
diffusion influences. Russia has, for instance, started introducing quotas for 
treatments in Russia to patients on Abkhaz territory, which ensures that most 
patients are at least partially funded by the Russian budget. In addition, Russia has 
started providing financial and material resources to improve Abkhaz domestic 
health care provision especially since 2011.143 Based on the timeline of policy 
implementations, the policy of the Abkhaz authorities can be seen as a response to 
increasing Georgian offerings in the health care sector. In that sense, competitive 
diffusion encouraged observable outcomes involving institution and service 
provision sharing.  
Third, Abkhazia’s energy sector exemplifies how the Abkhaz elite may still 
pursue a strategy of cooperation with the Georgian government despite the 
competitive environment if it ensures Abkhaz viability. The Inguri Dam hydropower 
plant represents a central component in Abkhazia’s state building strategy in the 
immediate aftermath of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in order to ensure the energy 
supply on Abkhaz territory. Yet, due to the geographical division of the hydropower 
plant between the Abkhaz and Georgian territories and due to the insufficient know-
how and experience on the Abkhaz side in operating the plant, the Abkhaz authorities 
were required to cooperate with Georgia (energy supply was certainly also in 
Georgia’s interest). Both parties agreed that from the first day after the war, 
Georgian engineers were allowed to cross the de facto border to work on the Abkhaz 
 
140 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
141 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
142 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
143 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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side of the hydropower plant and support Abkhaz engineers.144 Thus, despite 
competition between the parent and de facto state, both parties can engage in joint 
public goods provision.  
 
6.3.4 Financing State Building  
Building and subsequently sustaining a state necessitates tremendous financial and 
human resource investments, ranging from maintaining health equipment, setting 
up new ministries to paying salaries for public service employees. This section 
therefore examines the ways in which Abkhazia managed to finance its state and 
institution building efforts and how this, in turn, shaped the Abkhaz state structure.  
In order to finance the Abkhaz regime’s state building efforts, the authorities 
relied predominantly on domestic resource extraction between 1993 and 2008 to 
pay for the provision of basic services to the public (Prelz Oltramonti 2015; Broers 
2015), which Broers (2015: 146) refers to as the subsistent model. This was largely 
due to the international context of the post-war years including the blockade and CIS 
sanctions until 1999, which significantly restricted alternative sources of income, 
such as external support and trade. It is, however, somewhat of a myth that Abkhazia 
was completely isolated in the period up to 1999. While the sanctions and blockade 
resulted in widespread international isolation, Abkhazia continued to rely on 
informal channels with Russian regions, because Russia did not comply with all the 
requirements from the CIS agreement.145 Russia, for instance, occasionally opened 
its border with Abkhazia allowing trade of Abkhaz agricultural produce.146 147 148 The 
continuation of sporadic trade was possible due to the inclusion of a clause in a CIS 
agreement under Chernomyrdin’s leadership that while prohibiting government 
interactions with Abkhazia, permitted private sector interactions.149 In other words, 
 
144 Also the United Nations and the European Union were involved in the infrastructural 
support for the Ingur/Enguri power plant project (Trier et al. 2010: 14-15). 
145 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
146 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
147 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
148 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
149 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
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CIS governments were not allowed to provide financial, material and economic 
assistance to Abkhazia, whereas private companies, organisations or individuals were 
allowed to do so.150 This not only had the implication that the railway connection 
between Sochi and Sukhumi was opened,151 but also that Russian businessmen 
travelled to Abkhazia to buy agricultural produce from farmers and ship the goods 
across the border.152 As the blockade did not permit Abkhaz men of working age to 
cross the Russo-Abkhaz border, women played an increasingly important role as 
traders.153 One interviewee describes how women worked as traders during the 
blockade: 
 
[W]omen […] on their shoulders […] were taking goods 
like citrus fruits, mandarins, cucumbers, whatever was 
growing in Abkhazia, including flowers, for instance, 
mimosa […] to Russia, selling it there, bringing back 
some other goods.154  
Representative of a non-governmental organisation in Sukhumi 
 
The trade connections with Russia took place particularly through the north Caucasus 
(Prelz Oltramonti 2015) as well as other Russian regions (see section 7.1.2 on Russian 
regional support), which enabled Abkhazia to develop relatively close connections 
with individual subjects of the Russian Federation despite the blockade and 
sanctions, that were orchestrated by the central Russian government. Especially in 
the first few post-war years, some Russian regions provided humanitarian aid to 
Abkhazia, including Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Krasnodar Krai and some republics of the 
North Caucasus.155 Specifically citizens of the republics of the North Caucasus 
occasionally visited Abkhazia for business, trade and tourism.156 157 158 
 
150 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
151 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
152 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
153 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
154 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
155 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
156 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
157 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
158 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
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Besides agricultural products, the Abkhaz authorities identified ways to earn 
an income through private companies and the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey thanks to 
an operating port in Abkhazia.159 Abkhaz companies as well as firms run by the 
Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey, for instance, began collecting and selling timber as well 
as scrap metal and raw materials, such as coal, from factories, that Abkhazia used to 
operate but that stopped working during the war, to Turkey, Russia and even 
Georgia. 160 161 162 The trade of scrap metal did not always take official government 
routes, but criminal activities involved the destruction of factories and stealing of 
metals in old factories that were then sold for little money to Turkey.163 Moreover, 
Abkhazia granted fishing licenses to Turkish ships in the Black Sea, which were 
subsequently used as an export product.164 In addition, a passenger ferry between 
Trabzon and Sukhumi was particularly used by Turkish business people and the 
Abkhaz diaspora (Gültekin-Punsmann et al. 2009: 10). After 1995, due to Georgian 
pressures, Turkey suspended the ferry and one year later installed an embargo that 
is still in place (Hewitt 2013). Despite the embargo, Turkish businesspeople continue 
trading with Abkhazia to this date (see Smolnik et al. (2017) for a detailed discussion 
on Turkish involvement in Abkhazia). Another source of income was the CIS 
peacekeeping mission, which employed locals and increased the demand for Abkhaz 
produce (Trier et al. 2010: 106). 
The beginning of the economic easing period between Abkhazia and Russia 
from 1999 onwards did not result in immediate financial contributions from Russia 
but focused mostly on the easing of sanctions and fewer border controls (ICG 2006: 
16). In the early 2000s, for instance, Russia started issuing passports and citizenship 
to Abkhaz citizens and removed the border restriction, which allowed the male 
population to engage in economic activity with new businesses and trade.165 This also 
 
159 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
160 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
161 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
162 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
163 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
164 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
165 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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opened up other financial channels, as Abkhaz citizens left Abkhazia to work in Russia 
or other countries and sent money to their relatives in Abkhazia.166 The CIS sanctions 
were only fully removed unilaterally in 2008 when relations between Russia and 
Georgia worsened (Kizilbuga 2006: 83-89). Still, in the easing period Russia provided 
some financial contributions in form of infrastructural aid and from 2002 onwards, 
pension payments (ICG 2006: 16).  
Abkhazia’s limited financial capabilities and its approach to financing the state 
building developments had implications on the structure and functioning of the state. 
Abkhazia’s weak economy following the Georgian-Abkhaz war and the phase of 
partial isolation encouraged a political climate of cooperation among politicians with 
the aim of making the Abkhaz economy viable (Mihalkanin 2004: 154). However, 
some de facto elites used the post-war and post-socialist economy to consolidate 
their power rather than to transform the economy (Prelz Oltramonti 2015). The 
implications of the Abkhaz economic context were manifold and included for 
instance the quasi-privatisation of Abkhazia’s health care sector.167  
Abkhazia’s limited financial room for manoeuvre meant that state employees 
such as government staff, ministers and teachers were not paid for months in a 
row.168 169 The current Minister of Education, for example, received no salary for his 
position as assistant professor at the University of Abkhazia for approximately two 
years after the end of the Abkhaz-Georgian war, but was instead reimbursed with 
bread.170 171 While some people remained in their government positions despite the 
lack or limited pay, others decided to change their professions due to the precarious 
financial situation and started working in trading professions, like shuttle trade or 
driving tangerines. Abkhazia’s education sector came up with a particular solution to 
ensure teacher salaries in form of parental contributions, which meant that parents 
contributed a monthly small amount of money to the schools, which paid for school 
 
166 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
167 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
168 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
169 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
170 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
171 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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renovations, new textbooks and in some instances teacher salaries.172 Many citizens 
were willing to work for less motivated by the prospect of independent statehood.173 
According to an international donor representative in Abkhazia, this was possible, 
because the people that worked as teachers, doctors or in government ministries in 
the 1990s were almost exclusively raised in the Soviet time where the idea and 
ideology arguably meant more compared to the younger generation of government 
representatives.174 Today, Comai (2018b: 182) argues that the economic structure of 
post-Soviet de facto states “fits at least in part the MIRAB model (migration, 
remittances, aid, and bureaucracy).” Other sources stress the role of clans, families 
or individual businesspeople that run much of the Abkhaz economy and facilitate 
investments, such as the Adleiba, Avidzba and Tsuba families and businessman 
Beslan Butba (Trier et al. 2010: 109). These families play an important role in 
manifesting economic links with Russia, because they oftentimes invest through 
Russo-Abkhaz joint ventures (Trier et al. 2010). 
 Abkhazia’s overall economic development theoretically enables the de facto 
regime to be self-sustainable from an economic standpoint. However, the continued 
and increasing levels of Russian support in form of financial contributions, tourist 
streams, pension provisions, public salary payments and infrastructure projects 
contributed to a significant increase in living standards in Abkhazia that would not be 
sustainable if the de facto authorities decided to limit Russian involvement (Comai 
2018a: 92). In other words, Russia’s significant financial, welfare and economic 
contributions nurture Abkhaz dependence on Russia, because even though economic 
self-sustainability presents a theoretical option, it would most likely result in a 
significant drop in living standards.  
 
6.3.5 (Ethnic) Public Service Appointments 
The ethnic makeup and post-war appointment process of de facto state 
bureaucracies can reveal the national character of a state especially in heterogenous 
de facto states and its effect on state capacity. Indeed, whether a country is 
 
172 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
173 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
174 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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monoethnic or heterogenous and whether it bases its legitimacy on ethnicity, 
previous independence or outside threats tends to be reflected in its appointments 
of public servants.175 At the same time, the appointment of bureaucrats can be 
considered a mechanism of the de facto authorities to achieve control over 
institutions and increase the state capacity. This section therefore examines 
Abkhazia’s ethnic public service appointment strategies and the extent to which this 
shapes Abkhazia’s state building process.  
The allocation of bureaucratic posts along ethnic lines in the pre- and post-
war period needs to be seen in the wider context of Abkhazia’s state and nation 
building process: 
 
In the decisive years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Abkhazia developed into an ethnically defined state 
entity. […] it is a fact that an ethno-nationalist discourse 
today dominates the state building project in Abkhazia. 
The main priorities as seen by most Abkhazians are to 
secure their language and culture, and thereby, it is 
perceived, their future survival as a nation. This, many 
believe, can be done only by keeping the demographic 
balance numerically in favour of the ethnic Abkhazians 
and the political power in their hands (Trier et al. 2010: 
9). 
 
The Soviet Union’s ethno-federalism granted ethnicities and nationalities the right 
for a so-called ‘homeland’ within the hierarchical structure of the Soviet Union. The 
principle not only included the right to language instruction in the local language, but 
also that bureaucracies, politicians and nomenklatura represent the nationality of 
the local people (Trier et al. 2010: 95-95). The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
hosted a number of sizeable ethnic groups beyond Abkhazians including Georgians, 
Russians and Armenians. The Soviet system allocated guaranteed government seats 
or positions to Georgians, Armenians, Abkhazians and Russians in the Abkhaz state 
institutions. Yet, ethnic Abkhaz represented higher shares in the institutional 
structure than the general population proportions would suggest (Trier et al. 2010: 
21-22). Before the Georgian-Abkhaz war, ethnic Abkhaz headed the majority of 
 
175 Interview 18: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
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government ministries and district governments,176 which was partially due to a 
minimum requirement of ethnic Abkhaz in institutions, such as the Supreme Council, 
ministries and universities,177 which ensured their “significant over-representation” 
(Anchbadze 1999: 138). Still, the considerable presence of ethnic Georgians in the 
state administration was perceived by several ethnic Abkhaz as a threat. These 
threats intensified with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Georgia’s 
independence, as it ended Abkhazians’ entitlement to control its state institutions 
(Trier et al. 2010: 94).  
 
Figure 16 The Abkhazian Regional Committee of the Communist Party in Shota Rustaveli Street 
(Shakaya 1979) 
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Abkhaz civil servants that were appointed before the war, continued working for the 
Abkhaz state apparatus during and after the war in most cases.178 If the existing 
Soviet staff were Abkhaz, Russian or Armenians and supported the Abkhaz side, they 
also remained in their offices.179 Yet, Abkhaz officials tended to be suspicious of the 
 
176 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
177 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
178 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
179 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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influence of minorities in light of potential hostilities and justified their ethnically 
motivated control over the state apparatus with their dedication to the Abkhaz 
nation and responsibility during the war (Trier et al. 2010: 95). Thereby, the Abkhaz 
regime developed a state system that is based on principles of sharp vertical ethnic 
hierarchies (Trier et al. 2010: 89). The sharp population decline in the post-war period 
strengthened the situation for the titular nations (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 288). 
Following the war, the new Abkhaz state was required to fill staff gaps that 
were caused by casualties in the war, outmigration and profession changes due to 
insufficient salaries in Abkhazia’s public administration.180 In addition, Abkhazia 
reinstated its constitution from 1925 in 1992, which commanded Abkhaz control over 
Abkhazia’s state apparatus (Cornell 2002: 264-265), while new ministries were 
founded in 1993 and 1994 that needed to be filled with civil servants.  
A number of people joined the Abkhaz state administration to fill these gaps 
even before the war that had not previously worked in governance positions, such as 
the first President of Abkhazia, and other intellectuals, historians, lawyers, poets and 
soldiers.181 182 183 Yet, the continuation of many civil servants throughout and beyond 
the war ensured at least some governance and bureaucracy experience in 
Abkhazia.184 185 186 In addition, many parliamentarians worked simultaneously in the 
executive branch during and after the war, due to the limited availability of potential 
staff and insufficient time to train cadres.187 It has to be noted, however, that the low 
salaries for state officials meant that predominantly members of the public with 
strong kinship ties and business relations could represent Abkhazia politically (Trier 
et al. 2010: 92) 
The appointments of state officials were also used as a strategic state building 
instruments by the authorities in Sukhumi. The Abkhaz government sent an ethnic 
 
180 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
181 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
182 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
183 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
184 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
185 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
186 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
187 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Abkhaz official, a so-called special presidential representative, to the Gali region to 
head the local administration (Trier et al. 2010: 89).188 When the Abkhaz authorities 
focused increasingly on domestic security from 1998 onwards, they soon realised 
that their strategy of sending ethnic Abkhaz representatives to head the local 
administration was insufficient to guarantee stable and relatively peaceful conditions 
in Gali and ensure the control over the territory. Therefore, the regime in Sukhumi 
started appointing local representatives from non-Abkhaz ethnicities to represent 
the de facto government in the southern region.189  
  
 
188 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
189 Interview 17: American scholar (Moscow) 
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6.4 Russian Influences without Direct Involvement 
In order to paint a picture of the full extent of patron state influences on the state 
building processes of de facto states, it is important to examine patron influences not 
only through the framework of direct coercive influences (as will be discussed in 
chapter 7) and competitive diffusion (as discussed in section 6.3.3), but also through 
the lens of indirect patron diffusion influences. Russia, for instance, has shaped 
Abkhazia’s state capacity and provision of public services and goods beyond direct 
financial contributions, military support and political involvement, in form of mimetic 
and normative diffusion influences. By applying process tracing and the causal chains 
of diffusion influences laid out in the theoretical framework, this section tests 
whether there is evidence of (1) normative, (2) mimetic and (3) overlapping 
normative and mimetic diffusion sources. Furthermore, the observable implications 
of these indirect diffusion influences in Abkhazia’s state building development since 
the early 1990s will be captured. When discussing the indirect impact of patron states 
on state and institution building in de facto states, it is necessary to distinguish 
between developments that can be attributed to a de facto state’s attempt to adapt 
to the patron, on the one hand, and institutional path dependencies, on the other 
hand. This section focuses primarily on the former, whereas institutional path 
dependencies were discussed in section 6.1.1.  
This section argues that Russia is not necessarily required to intervene directly 
in Abkhazia, because even during period of uncertainty and partial isolation, Abkhaz 
elites adjusted their actions and plans at least partially according to Russian interests, 
activities, institutions and legislation. These isomorphic tendencies hint at the role of 
indirect diffusion sources ranging from mimetic, normative to competition diffusion. 
In other words, the agency of dependent Abkhazia was bound by the (perceived) 
interests and activities of its patron. This bounded agency increases the likelihood for 
legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de facto state and its patron, 
because of the limited availability of viable alternative choices, which made Abkhazia 
more susceptible to indirect diffusion influences in form of mimetic, normative and 
competitive diffusion. Beyond the role of dependency and the competitive 
geopolitical context that de facto states find themselves in (discussed in section 
6.3.3), this section finds that normative and mimetic diffusion influences are more 
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prevalent in periods of uncertainty and when the patron pursues direct coercive 
diffusion in the de facto state. This is particularly the case for normative diffusion, as 
this diffusion type necessitates soft or material forces from the patron state that are 
oftentimes present in coercive diffusion sources and ultimately inform the 
institutional or policy choices of the de facto state. Thus, the more coercive 
involvement is legitimised and perceived reputable by the de facto authorities, the 
higher the likelihood for normative diffusion.  
First, Russia penetrates a variety of sectors in Abkhazia through soft power 
and material channels that increase the likelihood that Russian policies or institutions 
are considered appropriate and respected by political decision-makers and the 
public. This, in turn, may motivate the Abkhaz government to consider Russian 
institutional or policy choices for their own context. Even though there is an 
understanding on both sides that Abkhazia is a different country and culture from 
Russia190 and with few people identifying themselves with Russia directly,191 Russia 
and Abkhazia have a close relationship with strong social linkages, which is amplified 
by their common history in the Soviet Union.192 Social linkages between the two 
entities manifest themselves through “the presence of Russian minorities, the 
position of the Russian language and more generally the popularity of Russian culture 
and media” which offers Russia potential channels of influencing the region beyond 
high-level politics. In addition, Abkhazia continues to experience a high influx of 
Russian tourists,193 194 whereas some Abkhaz citizens travel to Russia for health care 
and education.195 In a different context, but arguably applicable to the case of Russo-
Abkhaz relations, Lankina and Libman (2019) find that trade and production chain 
dependencies in Ukraine from the Soviet period maintain institutional path 
dependencies and are likely to shape diffusion even in the post-Soviet space. Even 
though many Abkhaz citizens put forward a differentiated view of the relationship 
 
190 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
191 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
192 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
193 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
194 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
195 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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with Russia (Bakke et al. 2018), the strong social and economic linkages, Russian 
media penetration and continued financial and military support from Russia, makes 
Russian policies and institutions likely candidates for normative appreciation, 
because Russia remains on the people’s minds. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2017) refer to 
this as the “Russia factor” in their analysis of regime development in Transnistria.  
These examples represent evidence for the causal mechanisms of normative 
diffusion set out in the theoretical framework involving soft or material forces from 
the patron state that the de facto state actors consider “legitimate and reputable” 
(Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 153). In the case of Russian involvement in Abkhazia, these 
soft and material forces appear to predominantly cover social linkages, culture and 
media, as well as financial incentives. While it is difficult to identify definite proof of 
normative diffusion beyond statements from politicians about the appropriateness 
of Russian state building, the high levels of mimetic diffusion discussed below are 
indicators that Russian policy and institutional choices are at least perceived as 
appropriate bases for mimicry. At the same time, normative diffusion influences are 
more prevalent when the patron pursues direct coercive diffusion in the de facto 
state, because this diffusion type necessitates soft or material forces from the patron 
state that are oftentimes present in coercive diffusion sources and ultimately inform 
the institutional or policy choices of the de facto state.  
A potential negative side effect of normative diffusion is the possibility for 
issue displacement on the basis of perceived or actual patron or donor interests. In 
development contexts, client states may abandon programmes, policies or 
institutions on the basis of their perception that only certain policies receive 
continued funding (Lake 2014: 523). This form of issue displacement may also occur 
in the case of Abkhazia’s relationship with Russia, were Abkhaz elites need to 
navigate Russia’s perceived interests in order to ensure continued military and 
financial support. Unlike recognised states, however, de facto states do not have the 
opportunity to strategically manoeuvre the interests and potential support from 
alternative external sources, which means that the de facto elites experience higher 
pressures to consider Russian interests. Even if Russia does not directly communicate 
its preferences or prioritisation, their perceived role plays a role for Abkhaz actions.  
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Second, mimetic diffusion assumes a central role in the institutional and 
legislative development of Abkhazia’s larger state building development (Gerrits & 
Bader 2016: 305-306). Mimetic diffusion is not only likelier due to the previously 
discussed normative diffusion basis of Russo-Abkhaz relations, but also due to high 
levels of uncertainty among the Abkhaz leadership and public in the 1990s and 
simultaneous rapid institutional advances, which encourage the adoption of policies 
and institutions of regions in similar contexts (see Mooney 2001). There is strong 
evidence for the causal mechanism of mimetic diffusion set out in the theoretical 
framework in form of legislative and institutional similarities of the patron and de 
facto state following a given time lag. Indeed, the findings capture that decision-
makers in the de facto state deliberately copy and reproduce polices and institutions 
from the patron state.  
In practice, Abkhazia assumed and, in some instances, adapted Russian 
institutional designs and legislature. While institutional and legislative similarities 
across borders do not necessarily represent their respective diffusion, specific 
Abkhaz legislation and governance institutions are nearly identical to their Russian 
counterpart. This reliance on mimicry may also be explained with the limited 
experience of the law makers of the Abkhaz regime and the restricted international 
influences beyond the Soviet Union (Trier et al. 2010: 75).  
Institutional isomorphism between Russia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, 
covers the semi-presidential political system of both entities including the 
constitutional arrangements regarding power sharing between the branches of 
government (ICG 2010b). According to Bader, Grävingholt and Kästner (2010), 
authoritarian states benefit from similar authoritarian state structure in their 
neighbourhood. Legislative isomorphism, on the other hand, ranges from Abkhazia’s 
constitution from 1994, which is very similar to Russia’s constitution from 1993, to 
political party and electoral legislation (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 305-306).196  
The high degrees of legislative isomorphism in Abkhazia can be explained with 
the necessity of rapid legislative changes in the war and post-war period. As 
 
196 Kopeček (2020) identified a degree of agency among the de facto regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which does not copy each Armenian law and implements it in the de facto state, but is instead 
selective of which legislation to consider for mimicry. 
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Abkhazia’s legal basis in the post-war period stemmed from the Autonomous 
Republic period and was based on Georgian laws, the authorities needed to change 
these laws in order to reflect the new realities of de facto statehood in the 1990s. 
Additionally, in a context where de facto state lawmakers may lack the experience to 
independently transform the legislative framework of Abkhazia, mimetic diffusion 
appears to be a likely option for the de facto regime.197 With the support of the 
theoretical framework of the thesis, this section thereby identifies a potential causal 
mechanism behind legislative and institutional isomorphism in Abkhazia.  
Third, diffusion sources are not mutually exclusive. Trade and education in 
the Russo-Abkhaz relationship, for instance, represent equally mimetic and 
normative diffusion influences shaping Abkhazia’s state building development. The 
previously discussed high levels of social linkages play out particularly in the 
education of the Abkhaz public and public officials. Most Abkhaz state officials and 
students (particularly medical staff) have studied either in Russia or the Soviet 
Union.198 199 200 201 Meanwhile, ethnic Russians and Russian citizens are situated in 
key positions in Abkhaz ministries, departments and law enforcement agencies. 
More specifically, Russians can be found at ministerial level (for example the previous 
Minister of Health) and deputy ministerial level. Furthermore, two of the five 
deputies of the chairman of the Abkhaz Security Service are Russian citizens, who did 
not previously work in Abkhazia during the Soviet Union, but joined Abkhazia 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.202 Some of the above mentioned 
ministers and deputies had previous ties with Abkhazia and fought in the Abkhaz-
Georgian war.  
This should certainly not imply that these representatives of Abkhazia’s state 
apparatus are incapable of making independent judgements and taking decisions 
that are in the interest of Abkhazia. Indeed, the de facto regime may act out of 
 
197 According to Kopeček (2020), Nagorno-Karabakh is selective in terms of the laws it copies 
from Armenia.  
198 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
199 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
200 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
201 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
202 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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necessity or pragmatism that informs the extent of patron engagement (Comai 
2018a: 34), which represents a form of bounded agency. At the same time, there is 
no definitive proof that Russia directly controls the hiring of ethnic Russians and 
Russian citizens into the Abkhaz state apparatus. Yet, the partial socialisation of some 
Abkhaz state representatives in Russia may encourage mimetic and normative 
diffusion, because Russian policy and institution choices are likelier to be considered 
appropriate and reputable policy choices for Abkhazia.  
Russo-Abkhaz trade can also simultaneously encourage mimetic and 
normative diffusion. Recent post-conflict literature has shifted the focus increasingly 
on the impact of trade on post-conflict state building (Cheng 2018). Also in Abkhazia’s 
case, sporadic trade in the 1990s not only encouraged the reinstatement of the 
Abkhaz central bank and Ministry of Economy and Trade, but it also shaped 
Abkhazia’s institutions and legal framework, such as trade legislation and customs 
regulations, in line with the structures of its main trading partners. As Abkhaz trade 
with Turkey developed informally with diaspora groups rather than the central 
government, trade with Russian regions in the 1990s and later on with the Russian 
central government presented the likeliest candidate for mimetic diffusion sources. 
It is important to consider these forms of normative and mimetic diffusion, as they 
do not encourage the development of ownership on their own.203 
 
  
 
203 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Political elites in Abkhazia are required to subordinate their state building plans at 
least partially to the foreign policy interests of external powers (Broers 2013: 62). 
Yet, understanding Abkhazia’s state building projects as mere subordination in the 
geopolitical context of this entity disregards some of the local achievements in 
Abkhazia outlined in this chapter. Nonetheless, subordination is a phenomenon that 
can be observed repeatedly throughout the chapter in one form or the other. Even 
during Abkhazia’s significant state building progress during the period of uncertainty 
and partial isolation between 1992 and 1999, Abkhazia’s elites adjusted their 
legislations and institutions at least partially according to Russia’s structures and its 
perceived interests. This chapter highlighted how bounded agency, as one of the 
transition variables of the theoretical framework, encourages legislative and 
institutional isomorphism, because of the predominance of indirect diffusion 
influences in contexts where de facto states are dependent on patron support. This 
form of bounded agency shows that Russia does not necessarily need to coercively 
intervene in Abkhazia, because of Russian mimetic and normative diffusion 
influences that keep Russia on the minds of both the Abkhaz regime and its 
population. Indeed, the chapter empirically uncovered evidence for the causal 
mechanisms behind competitive, mimetic and normative diffusion influences on 
Abkhazia’s state and institution building processes. In this context, the chapter 
specified the varied outcomes of competitive diffusion with observable implications 
such as institution sharing, developments in public service provisions and accelerated 
state building responses. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that normative and 
mimetic diffusion influences are more prevalent in periods of uncertainty and when 
the patron pursues direct coercive diffusion in the de facto state. 
Henceforth, Abkhazia’s state building development needs to be framed in the 
wider context of its power relationship with Russia. Many de facto states find 
themselves at the very end of the power spectrum with weak governance 
institutions, economic and military capabilities as well as limited international 
recognition. These economic, political and security vulnerabilities draw Abkhazia into 
the Russian sphere of influence whether their de facto elites desire it or not 
(Kereselidze 2015). Russia’s (quasi) isolationist policy towards Abkhazia in the 1990s, 
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for instance, encouraged the Abkhaz de facto state to take on a specific position in 
people’s life that was not all-encompassing but was restricted to central functions 
such as security provision, the development of an economic system and the 
international representation of the Abkhaz state. Still, some endogenous state 
building developments can be considered mostly outside the context of Russian and 
Georgian diffusion influences, such as the incorporation of Soviet institutional 
structures, public servant hiring along ethnic lines and state building prioritisation. 
These trajectories exemplify the agency of the Abkhaz authorities to develop their 
state capacity and determine the direction of public service and goods provisions. 
Understanding the endogenous state building trajectories in de facto states also 
offers insights into the ways in which de facto regimes attempt to provide order and 
control, which may help the authorities to attain internal legitimacy and increase 
public confidence into the de facto state’s right of existence, its regime and 
institutions (Bakke et al 2013: 2-3). After all, de facto regimes not only need to win 
the war, but also become state builders (Bakke et al. 2018: 159, 161). 
While the findings of this chapter do not represent the realities of all de facto 
states beyond Abkhazia, the results may indicate how other de facto states operate 
in dependency relations with their patrons and the ways in which de facto authorities 
may prioritise their state building in the context of limited financial room for 
manoeuvre. The chapter, for instance, offered insights into the kind of institutions 
that de facto or other nascent states may prioritise, such as (border) security, energy 
infrastructure, economic extraction and redistribution systems and foreign affairs 
institutions. Due to the limited availability of viable alternative choices, de facto 
regimes are, for instance, likely to be more susceptible to indirect diffusion influences 
in form of mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion. The agency of dependent 
de facto states is likely bound by the perceived interests and activities of the patron, 
which in turn increases the likelihood for legislative and institutional isomorphism 
between the de facto state and its patron.  
Even though Russia does arguably not need to be directly involved in 
Abkhazia’s state building development, Russia decided on numerous occasions to 
intervene in Abkhazia. The extent of this direct Russian coercive involvement in 
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Abkhazia’s state building development will be discussed in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
Nurturing Dependence 
Direct Involvement and Legitimisation of Patron States in the State 
Building Processes of De Facto States 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the discovery of offshore natural gas reserves in the Aegean Sea and 
renewed tensions between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in October 2018, Turkish President Erdoğan emphasised Turkey’s 
predominance over Northern Cyprus by declaring that “no step can be taken in 
Cyprus […] at the expense of Turkey.”204 Two months earlier, Algeria renewed its 
pledge to provide the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement in the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), “with the necessary financial support to 
carry out administrative works.”205 Meanwhile, former US National Security Advisor 
John Bolton confirmed the United States’ commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act 
 
204 VOA News (2018). Erdogan Toughens Stance as Cyprus Faces Permanent Partition. 
Retrieved from: https://www.voanews.com/a/erdogan-toughens-stance-cyprus-faces-
permanent-partition/4601823.html 
205 Yabiladi (2018). Western Sahara: Algeria and South Africa reaffirm their support to the 
Polisario. Retrieved from: https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/68510/western-sahara-
algeria-south-africa.html 
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from 1979, that guarantees the necessary military support for Taiwanese self-
defence.206 These three examples reflect the dominant coverage of relationships 
between de facto states and their patrons, concentrating on military support, 
financial aid and direct interference in the domestic political affairs of the 
unrecognised entities. Similarly, Russian foreign policy towards its near abroad is 
frequently portrayed along military, economic and political dimensions and in terms 
of hard power instruments (Kramer 2008: 3-4).207  
The while, several de facto states have achieved and sustained relatively high 
levels of state building despite limited financial means, low international 
connectedness and in some instances even legacies of war (Caspersen 2012: 51; de 
Waal 2018). A range of studies examined the extent to which internationally 
recognised and unrecognised post-conflict states can benefit from the support of 
external actors to provide public services and goods (see e.g. Zartman 1995; 
Caspersen 2015; Fearon & Laitin 2004; Krasner & Risse, 2014). However, the concrete 
influence and contribution of patron states on the state building processes of de 
facto states remain insufficiently explored. While a number of articles and books 
(Caspersen 2008; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Gerrits & Bader 2016) have assessed the 
influence of patron states on de facto states in the military, financial and political 
spheres, few studies examine the effect of patron states on the capacity of authority 
structures and the provision of public services and goods in de facto states. 
Blakkisrud and Kolstø’s (2012) study on state and nation building in the de facto 
states of the South Caucasus and Comai’s (2018a) thesis on the post-Soviet de facto 
states touch upon the role of patron states and are notable exceptions in this regard.  
The previous chapter examined Russia’s indirect influence on Abkhazia’s state 
building process and concluded that there does not appear to be the need for 
continued direct coercive diffusion influences of the patron. Even during the phase 
of partial isolation, Abkhaz elites adjusted their actions and plans according to 
perceived Russian interests and activities, which signifies Russia’s mimetic and 
 
206 Taiwan News (2019). Bolton says US commitments to Taiwan Relations Act ‘are clear’ after 
Chinese jet incursion. Retrieved from: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3671232 
207 Some studies expanded this framework by including Russian soft power instruments as 
an additional foreign policy tool (see e.g. Lankina & Niemczyk 2015). 
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normative diffusion potential and the bounded agency of de facto states. This 
chapter uncovers that Russia has nonetheless intervened in Abkhazia on several 
occasions through direct coercive diffusion influences such as agreements and 
treaties, financial contributions, institution sharing and technocratic linkages. The 
central argument of this thesis poses that “patrons can nurture the dependence of 
de facto states on patron support by pursuing a multi-layered policy of granting de 
facto state agency in an international setting of limited alternatives while providing 
support that discourages self-sufficiency.” This chapter tests whether the nurturing 
of dependence is truly at the heart of Russo-Abkhaz relations, by exploring the ways 
in which Russia grants agency to Abkhazia while discouraging self-sufficiency through 
a range of direct coercive instruments. This chapter also applies process tracing to 
the case study to examine whether the direct diffusion mechanisms set out in the 
theoretical framework serve as a causal pathway. 
The research identifies dependence as one of the outcomes of Russian 
engagement in Abkhazia. Dependence can explain the statistical findings of this 
thesis that show that patron states generally do not encourage the development of 
coherent government structures, but predominantly guarantee minimal civilian 
governance in de facto states. Russian support for Abkhazia, for instance, is linked 
predominantly to infrastructural reconstruction rather than capacity building and 
training. Essentially, Russia finances an institutional infrastructure that enables basic 
public service provision and potential further state development.  
Furthermore, rather than contributing to the development of governance 
institutions, Russia takes on specific governing or service provision functions and 
responsibilities from the Abkhaz de facto authorities, despite Abkhazia’s relatively 
strong statehood and wide penetration of the state. Institution sharing in these 
instances reduces Abkhazia’s self-sustainability, because it disincentivises 
institutional development. This example may partly explain why, according to the 
findings of the statistical analysis, the number of governance institutions tends to 
drop with the presence of a patron state. As such, Russia’s role as a patron from 1999 
onwards did not change the number of governance institutions in Abkhazia, but 
reduced the de facto state’s ability to provide public services and goods 
independently. An additional instrument that ensures the status quo of dependence 
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is Russian control of relevant de facto politicians to ensure their loyalty through the 
provision of significant financial contributions and military support. While the 
Russian authorities are not necessarily interested in micromanaging politics and state 
building in Abkhazia, the patron is interested in having candidates in place that have 
a favourable view on Russia and can be manipulated more easily. This can be seen as 
a strategy by Russia to encourage mimetic and normative diffusion channels, rather 
than coercive diffusion.  
There are a few indicators that patron states provide state building assistance 
to de facto states beyond the stage of basic civilian governance. Treaties and 
agreements between Abkhazia and Russia, for instance, specify state building 
measures and institutionalise the relationship which increases the likelihood for both 
mimetic and normative diffusion. At the same time, the bilateral nature of the 
agreements and treaties safeguards Russia’s monopoly position over the external 
influences on Abkhazia’s state building processes.  
Russian engagement in Abkhazia is certainly not representative for all patron-
de facto state relations and does not cover an exhaustive list of potential forms of 
involvement. Still, the case study demonstrates the ways in which a set of patron 
instruments shape the state and institution building processes of de facto states and 
how this involvement may be legitimised by the de facto state. Understanding the 
direct coercive diffusion channels behind patron engagement in de facto states not 
only offers insights into how far patron states are prepared to go in terms of their 
support for de facto states, but also the extent to which this involvement is 
legitimised by the local elites and population. The lack of support for Abkhazia’s soft 
component appears to be the biggest threat to output legitimacy of Russian actions. 
Nonetheless, Russian support is largely legitimised and accepted, partly due to 
limited viable alternatives. Moreover, Russian involvement in Abkhazia represents an 
insightful case study of change in the nature of patron support. According to the 
conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations of this thesis, Russia only became 
Abkhazia’s patron from 1999 onwards when the dependency criteria of this thesis 
was met. The case study therefore outlines how the formal changes in the Russo-
Abkhaz relationship in 1999 marked the beginning of a range of direct coercive 
diffusion instruments, which also encouraged the role of normative, mimetic and 
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competitive diffusion channels.  
In order to assess the direct diffusion influences of the Russian Federation on 
state building in Abkhazia, this chapter is structured as follows: The first section 
examines Russia’s role as a patron state, how it communicates its interests and policy 
preferences, the presence of change agents on the ground, as well as its centralised 
and decentralised penetration of Abkhazia. The second section analyses specific 
Russian coercive diffusion instruments that influence the state and institution 
building process of Abkhazia. The third section discusses the extent to which Russian 
involvement in Abkhazia is legitimised by the Abkhaz elite, civil society and the wider 
population. 
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7.1 Russian Involvement in Abkhazia 
The economic, governmental and societal linkages between Russia and Abkhazia are 
among the deepest in the post-Soviet space (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 297). Still, the 
scope of Russo-Abkhaz relations and the extent to which Russia provides support to 
the de facto state has changed significantly over time and under different Abkhaz 
and Russian presidencies.208 Therefore, this section attempts to offer a nuanced view 
on Russia as a patron state ranging from the ways in which Russia set up 
communication channels with Abkhazia to the decentralised nature of Russian 
support for much of the 1990s. This section essentially highlights how Russia adapted 
its communication channels to the political context of its relationship with Abkhazia, 
which set the foundation for coercive, mimetic and normative diffusion influences. 
The analysis of Russo-Abkhaz communication exchanges also identifies Russian 
change agents on the ground that are an essential component of the causal 
mechanisms of coercive diffusion channels laid out in the theoretical framework. 
Moreover, this section challenges the dominant understanding of centralised Russian 
patron support and Russia as a unitary actor by outlining the decentralised support 
networks that aided Abkhazia particularly in the 1990s. This perspective frames 
Russian regional support as an additional diffusion source that shaped Abkhazia’s 
state building development. 
 
7.1.1 Russo-Abkhaz Communication Channels 
The theoretical framework of this thesis established that strong communication 
linkages between two or more entities can build the basis of diffusion channels 
without geographic contiguity. Russo-Abkhaz relations exemplify spatial 
connectedness beyond mere geographic proximity remarkably well in form of layers 
of connections between the two entities that range from the governmental to the 
societal level. Understanding Russo-Abkhaz connections and communication 
channels not only uncovers how both parties communicate their interests, but also 
the ways in which Russia guarantees the spread of its preferences in almost all areas 
of Abkhaz public life. This section therefore reveals the extent of Russia’s web of 
 
208 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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connections across ministries and departments, how regular ministerial meetings 
signify the centrality of Russia in Abkhaz domestic policy making and that Abkhaz 
domestic politics is partially made abroad.  
Since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia in 2008, the two entities have 
communicated their interests and preferences predominantly through official 
diplomatic channels.209 Abkhazia installed special envoys that are responsible for its 
relationship with Russia210 and formal agreements and treaties institutionalised the 
relationship, which further facilitated closer connections between both parties. One 
interviewee explains the collective adherence to formal diplomatic channels and 
agreements with Russia’s attempt to signal its respect towards Abkhazia’s 
independence.211 In practice, this implies that Russia respects the diplomatic 
protocol in most official meetings between Abkhaz and Russian officials.212 According 
to former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia Viacheslav Chirikba, 
“all levels, from [the lowest] level […] to the [highest], [follow a] very delicate 
etiquette. All the questions […] are discussed very frankly.”213 Despite Russia’s 
signalling of respect through the use of diplomatic channels, some interviewees 
argue that Abkhazia is viewed by Russia as a Russian region.214 The financial 
coordination of infrastructure development in Abkhazia, for instance, is organised by 
the Russian Ministry of Regional Development, which is responsible for domestic 
regions rather than external entities (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 302-303). 
The Russian embassy officially opened in Sukhumi in 2008215 and is 
responsible for sending out statements that may indicate Russian policy 
preferences.216 The residence of the Russian Ambassador to Abkhazia is symbolically 
located in the former residence of Soviet Security and Secret Police Apparatus Chief 
Lavrentiy Beria. The dacha is situated on top of the hills overseeing Sukhumi, which 
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an interviewee rather bluntly interprets as the subjugation of Abkhaz politicians to 
the Russian ambassador.217 The centrality of the Russian embassy in terms of 
coordinating ministerial visits and indicating Russian policy preferences places this 
institution as a potential change agent on the ground, because the embassy may 
shape the institutional and legislative preferences of Abkhaz decision-makers. The 
role of the Russian embassy and its ambassador in Sukhumi as a crossroad of 
communication channels is similar to the model in the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus where the Turkish ambassador delivers and pursues Turkish interests.218  
It is important to note in this context, that Russia’s expression of interests and 
policy preferences goes beyond the official diplomatic level and the Russian embassy 
in Sukhumi. Russia and Abkhazia have developed an extensive framework of 
communication channels within the political structure of the Abkhaz Republic 
outside the diplomatic sphere. Most Russian and Abkhaz departments established 
interdepartmental agreements that set out joint information exchanges and training, 
for example, between the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Abkhazia and Russia, 
the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Department of Custom Officers. The Ministry 
of Emergency Situations in Russia, for instance, offers support to Abkhazia in form of 
training, joint exercises and equipment, sending experts to Abkhazia or alternatively 
inviting Abkhaz specialists to Russia. Similarly, Abkhaz custom officers are trained by 
the Russian Custom Officers Department through training sessions and seminars in 
Russia.219 
Moreover, regular exchanges on the ministerial level220 221 build the basis of 
normative, mimetic and coercive diffusion between Russia and Abkhazia. The two 
parties established a joint information coordination centre at the Ministry of 
Interior222 and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia and Russia installed 
coordination mechanisms.223 According to an interviewee with links to the Abkhaz 
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government, some Abkhaz ministers tend to spend only one to two days per week in 
their office in Sukhumi, whereas the remaining three to four days of the week are 
spent in Moscow.224 While these numbers might be slightly exaggerated, the 
regularity of meetings and opinion exchanges was also confirmed by a representative 
from the Abkhaz government.225 During these visits in Russia, Abkhaz ministers focus 
primarily on meeting their Russian counterparts and representatives from the 
Russian central bank in order to identify financial support opportunities and settle 
state concerns.226 One can observe similar behavioural patterns across ministers or 
heads of government from the Donetsk Republic, Luhansk Republic and Transnistria, 
who spend several days each month in Moscow and have regular meetings with 
Russian officials.227 In addition to monthly meetings in Moscow or Sukhumi, Russia 
and Abkhazia engage in discussions in Geneva every three months, which necessitate 
further meetings between Abkhazia and Russia before and after the negotiations in 
Geneva.228  
These regular ministerial and departmental exchanges can ultimately sway 
policy directions and the desirability of a specific outcome and therefore represent 
change agents that pave the way for coercive diffusion influences. Due to the strong 
ties with Abkhaz legislatures, ministries and even presidents, Russia is able to exert 
coercive pressures on Abkhazia that encourage institutional and legislative 
isomorphism. At the same time, various different Russian ministries and 
departments engage with individual aspects of Russia’s relationship with Abkhazia 
ranging from military, social to financial matters. This wide range of actors produces 
potentially competing influences depending on the ministry or department in 
question.229 It is therefore difficult to identify which Russian ministries or 
departments influence which Abkhaz policies. In a number of cases, Russia has 
expressed its policy preferences in Abkhazia during ministerial meetings between the 
two entities. During a meeting with Abkhaz officials in 2017, for instance, a Russian 
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official stressed that the restrictions on selling private property to foreigners should 
be lifted by the Abkhaz government.230 This specific example of private property 
legislation however represents a case where Abkhazia has remained firm and did not 
bow to Russia’s insistence despite Abkhazia’s dependence on Russian support.  
Beyond the formal diplomatic and governmental channels, Russia has also set 
up a framework of extensive links with Abkhazia in the security, business and media 
sector, that allows Russia to express its interests and political preferences beyond 
the official governmental and diplomatic channels.231 These linkages are part of a 
greater network of non-state level channels that may also influence public opinion in 
Abkhazia. These communication channels have the advantage of reducing the 
potential of an accountability dilemma. If patrons outline their state building 
intentions in official documents, they may be held to account for their actions both 
by the international community and actors within the patron and the client state.  
 
7.1.2 Russian Regional Support 
A historical perspective on the origin of Russian support for Abkhazia challenges the 
predominant narrative that Russian involvement in Abkhazia derives exclusively from 
central authorities in Moscow. Even though Russia’s central authorities have 
orchestrated most of Russia’s engagement in Abkhazia since 1999 and especially 
since 2008, Russian regions had already established close ties with the Abkhaz regime 
in the early 1990s and represented a source of external support for Abkhazia during 
a phase of partial isolation. To this day, individual Russian regions occasionally offer 
their support for Abkhazia. This perspective shifts the focus of patron state diffusion 
away from a restrictively central diffusion source to a more inclusive approach that 
encompasses decentralised diffusion influences. At the same time, the pronounced 
role of Russian regions challenges the common perception of Russia as a unitary 
patron actor.  
In the 1990s and particularly during the so-called CIS blockade and embargo 
against Abkhazia, Russian central government support was restricted to 
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humanitarian aid after floods, medical treatments in Russia for sick and injured 
Abkhaz citizens as well as occasional trading opportunities for Abkhaz produce.232 
Various CIS documents highlight that during Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia, at least 
officially, stressed the special position and sovereignty of Georgia.233 234 While the 
central Russian government restricted its involvement in Abkhazia, individual 
subjects of the Russian Federation offered support to the war-torn region at the Black 
Sea.235  
In the period of uncertainty and partial isolation from 1992 to approximately 
1999, Abkhaz ties with regions of the Russian Federation were considerably stronger 
than with Russian central authorities.236 In 1994, shortly after the end of the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war, Abkhaz authorities initiated relations and even signed treaties 
and agreements with Republics of the Russian Federation. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry officially condemned these regional connections and agreements,237 
however the Russian constitution and the political climate at that time granted 
republics more sovereign rights and enabled these relations.238 Following the first 
agreement, more and more Russian republics started engaging with Abkhazia, which 
allowed the de facto authorities to develop a network of business, cultural and 
education ties.239 Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Krasnodar and the republics of the North 
Caucasus were among the Russian regions that provided humanitarian aid to 
Abkhazia240 and signed official agreements with the de facto state in 1994.241 These 
Russian regions, for instance, allocated quotas to Abkhaz students, which meant that 
by 1994 and 1995 Abkhaz students started studying in cities such as Kazan, Ufa, 
Nalchik and Maykop.242 In some instances, these Russian regions also sent teachers 
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to Abkhazia or encouraged trade with Abkhazia.243 Particularly regions from the 
North Caucasus supported Abkhazia economically and militarily during and after the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war. During the blockade, people from the North Caucasus that had 
supported Abkhazia during the war came to Abkhazia for business or tourism (see 
Derluguian (2005) for further information on Abkhaz military links with the North 
Caucasus).244 These relationships with Russian regions not only represented a 
significant breakthrough for the Abkhaz regime in form of developing connections 
with outside entities, but it also meant that Abkhazia received some limited local 
state building assistance from these Russian Republics early on in form of economic 
support and that hundreds of students could study for free in these regions.245  
The phase of restricted support from the Russian central authorities drew to 
a close in 1999 and 2000 when Putin assumed office and initiated a gradual process 
of sanction reductions, aid increases and preparations to lift the blockade.246 247 
Russia eventually cancelled the travel restrictions for Abkhaz men and official trading 
between Abkhazia and Russia resumed.248 Putin also pursued, with varying success, 
various recentralisation policies in an attempt to achieve institutional uniformity 
across the regions (Reddaway & Orttung 2004-2005; Chebankova 2007). These 
developments may explain why central Russian support, rather than Russian regional 
support, became increasingly important from 1999 onwards. Still, Russian regions 
that had previously supported Abkhazia continue to shape Russian policies towards 
the de facto state. In April 2008, for instance, the Russian government developed a 
policy package (the so-called ‘Decree on the Main Directions of the Development of 
Relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia’) to develop direct economic, political and 
legal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this process, “the territorial 
authorities (Krasnodarsky Kray and Republic Alania in North Ossetia) of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation were assigned to provide effective 
 
243 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
244 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
245 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
246 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
247 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
248 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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consultative assistance to the citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (Pelnens et al. 
2010: 112-113).  
This section touched upon Russian involvement in Abkhaz affairs long before 
Russia’s official recognition of the breakaway region in 2008. Nonetheless, the official 
recognition marks an important point in time for Russo-Abkhaz relations as it 
intensified and from a Russian perspective legitimised engagement in the de facto 
region. The next section therefore explores the specific state building instruments 
that Russia has employed in Abkhazia since 2008 and that represent direct coercive 
diffusion sources.  
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7.2 Russian Coercive Diffusion Influences in Abkhazia 
Studies on Russian involvement in its near abroad tend to focus predominantly on 
three foreign policy areas: security, political and financial channels of influence. A 
smaller contingent of research is dedicated to Russia’s influence on the social sphere 
in the countries of its near abroad. A closer examination of Russia’s influence on the 
post-Soviet space and particularly de facto states reveals the need for a broader view 
on Russia’s sphere of influence beyond the common analytical channels and foreign 
policy instruments Russia employs in its neighbourhood. Russian security, political 
and financial involvement indeed represent an important building block for 
Abkhazia’s state building development. Russia’s direct involvement in the state 
building process of Abkhazia therefore needs to be understood in the context of 
these three foreign policy channels. Thus, the simplified graph below (figure 17) 
signifies the three foreign policy channels in addition to a separate state building 
channel. Moreover, the graph highlights that the state building channel is sourced 
from the other three channels of Russian influence. 
 
Figure 17 Channels of Russian Influence on Abkhazia 
 
 
The previous chapter illustrated that the formal changes in the Russo-Abkhaz 
relationship in 1999 reformed the relative importance of direct and indirect diffusion 
influences. The economic easing period, for instance, permitted the expansion of 
coercive diffusion instruments that have had an imminent impact on the state 
building process of the de facto state. Russia’s growing coercive involvement in 
Abkhazia from 1999 onwards also set the basis for further normative and mimetic 
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diffusion influences in form of agreements, close ties with politicians, security 
guarantees and financial contributions. Thus, some foreign policy instruments of 
patrons function as coercive diffusion instruments that have simultaneous indirect 
diffusion influences on the capacity and public service provision of de facto states.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis presumes that patrons are interested 
in sustaining de facto states to uphold their geopolitical advantage, while limiting 
financial and military costs associated with direct involvement in the de facto state. 
This thesis argues that patron states therefore encourage a degree of dependence of 
the de facto state on patron support by providing limited financial, military and 
political involvement that discourages self-sufficiency.249 Hence, this section 
attempts to isolate the causal mechanisms behind coercive diffusion influences and 
to support the claim that Russia nurtures the dependence of Abkhazia on Russian 
support. 
An analysis of Russian coercive diffusion influences on Abkhazia reveals four 
central trends: First, Russian support is linked predominantly to infrastructural 
reconstruction and not systematic change or the development of people’s 
capacity.250 Essentially, this means that Russia finances Abkhazia’s institutional 
infrastructure that enables basic public service provisions and ensures an 
institutional basis for further domestic state developments.251 Second, Russia and 
Abkhazia pursue institution sharing, which reduces Abkhazia’s self-sustainability 
opportunities, because it disincentivises institutional development in Abkhazia. This 
is particularly visible in Abkhazia’s security services and the economy.252 Third, Russia 
controls relevant de facto politicians or ensures that politicians have close ties with 
Russia. This dependence of politicians on Russia is achieved among other things 
through Russia’s continued financial contribution to the Abkhaz state budget and 
military assistance. Russia appears to support candidates that have a favourable view 
of Russia, which encourages mimetic and normative diffusion influences. Fourth, 
 
249 Based on the interview results, it is difficult to source conclusive evidence about the 
motivations behind Russian direct coercive engagement in Abkhazia as a patron. Instead, this 
chapter uncovers the observable implications of direct patron involvement. 
250 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
251 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
252 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Russia has passed treaties and agreements with Abkhazia that specify state building 
measures in form of health care reforms, legislative changes, education sector 
advancements and social sector payments. This institutionalisation of the Russo-
Abkhaz relationship increases the likelihood for both mimetic and normative 
isomorphism, because the treaties and agreements contain specific institutional and 
public service provision examples from the Russian context. 
 
7.2.1 Financial Contributions Related to State Building 
Since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia in 2008, the Russian Federation has provided 
substantial direct financial support to the Abkhaz budget (ICG 2010a). This makes the 
breakaway region one of a few places in the near abroad to receive direct 
development support from Russia (Wierzbowska-Miazga & Kaczmarski 2011). 
Revealingly, the financial coordination of infrastructure development is organised by 
the Russian Ministry of Regional Development, which focuses on domestic regions 
and not external countries (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 302-303). Russia’s financial 
contributions exemplify the asymmetric relationship between the Russian 
Federation and Abkhazia. In 2009, direct aid from Russia accounted for 60 per cent 
of the Abkhaz state budget (ICG 2010a). Between 2012 and 2015, Russia accounted 
for more than 50 per cent of the Abkhaz budget contributions excluding pension 
payments and infrastructure subsidies (Comai 2018b: 188). However, when 
infrastructural subsidies are included, the overall financial contributions amount to 
approximately 70 per cent of Abkhazia’s budget (ICG 2013: 6). For instance, Russia 
contributed $465 million to Abkhaz military infrastructure until 2015 (Freedom 
House 2015). To put this into context, Russia provides considerably less than $1 
billion to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a given year, which represents about 0.3 per 
cent of the Russian budget. This is a significant decrease since 2013, when Russia 
spent about $1 billion on Abkhazia and South Ossetia excluding military expenditures 
(Comai 2018a). This downward trend may be explained with falling exchange rates 
and a shift in Russian foreign policy priorities (Comai 2018a). 
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Russia and Abkhazia jointly decide on the direction and extent of Russian 
funding to Abkhazia.253 254 Russian investment programmes for Abkhazia, for 
instance, “are developed by ‘joint inter-governmental commissions for social-
economic cooperation’ that include representatives of both Russia and Abkhazia” 
(Comai 2018a: 109). Importantly in this context, the Abkhaz authorities have a degree 
of agency in the decision-making processes with Russia. According to Ambrosio and 
Lange (2016), Abkhaz opinions and contributions have had an effect on the decision-
making outcome despite Abkhazia’s weaker negotiation position and its dependence 
on Russia. 
Russian financial assistance tends to be based on investment packages, that 
arrive in Abkhazia via two channels.255 First, Russian budget contributions within the 
framework of the Complex Development Plan or Investment Programme allocate 
funds to Abkhaz infrastructure projects and the provision of public services.256 This 
programme targets reconstructions and repairs covering areas such as health, 
education, transport and other basic needs.257 258 Abkhazia’s investment programme 
for the period between 2015 and 2017, for instance, covers large-scale infrastructure 
projects including road and sanitation infrastructure,259 but also the construction and 
renovation of governance institution buildings, as well as health, education260 and 
 
253 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
254 This chapter claims that the official recognition presents a crucial point in time for 
Abkhazia’s state building development as it facilitated further international recognition, 
military and economic integration as well as detailed plans for state building and public 
service provisions between Russia and Abkhazia. However, beyond Russia’s recognition and 
subsequent involvement, international recognition has had little effect on state building in 
Abkhazia. 
255 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
256 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
257 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
258 Russia has helped to renovate transport links, such as the railway running from Sochi to 
Sukhumi. There was likely some self-interest involved, as this also benefited Russia in terms 
of the tourist infrastructure and military purposes. In 2008, for example, Russia used the 
railway link to introduce weaponry into Abkhazia. Russia also helps to keep the airport in 
Sukhumi operational, but only for flights to Russia, as it is not internationally recognised 
(Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi)). Furthermore, Abkhazia is reliant on mobile, 
internet, banking and power connections from Russia (Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi)).  
259 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
260 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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tourism infrastructure (Comai 2018a: 109). Notably, the investment programme 
even encompasses state capacity funding in form of the development of a land 
registry and blueprints of water sanitation systems (Comai 2018a). A number of 
interviewees raised their concerns over the predominant focus on infrastructural 
projects in form of equipment provision, infrastructure redevelopment and 
renovations, or what one interviewee refers to as ‘the hard component’ of Russian 
support.261 Insufficient financial support for soft components and capacity building, 
such as training courses for teachers or guidelines on how to use medical 
equipment,262 appears to be the biggest threat to the legitimacy of Russian state 
building engagement in Abkhazia according to the interviews of this thesis.  
Second, the Social and Economic Support Programme pays millions of roubles 
in lump sums for welfare and social transfers of the state.263 264 265 This programme 
finances, for instance, top-up salaries for public sector employees such as law 
enforcement266 and allowances of pensioners who hold Russian passports.267 268 
Russian financial support for Abkhazia in form of welfare and social transfers exhibits 
notable similarities with Russian social policies towards its regions.269 These financial 
contributions fit in neatly with the causal mechanisms laid out in the theoretical 
framework, as they incentivise and pressure the de facto authorities to pursue state 
and institution building developments laid out in these packages.  
The significant Russian financial contributions are, however, not guaranteed 
to reach the de facto state due to corruption, embezzlement and funds being 
channelled back to Russia in some instances. This appears to be especially the case 
in South Ossetia but is also a concern in Abkhazia.270 Therefore, talks between 
Russian and Abkhaz authorities were repeatedly clouded by disagreements on the 
 
261 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
262 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
263 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
264 Interview 14: Russian scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
265 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
266 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
267 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
268 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
269 Interview 14: Russian scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
270 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
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appropriate spending of the Abkhaz budget (Gogoryan 2011; Krivitsky 2013). Some 
Abkhaz representatives have been critical of the low implementation rates of Russian 
financial support,271 the inadequate planning, which may result in money not being 
spent, as well as the dissonance between needs on the ground and actual money 
spent.272 Concerns surrounding the spending of Russian financial contributions has 
considerably restricted the freedom of Abkhaz authorities to distribute funding since 
2014, as Russia not only reduced its financial support somewhat, but also enforced a 
stricter oversight over the allocation of funds.273 Once Russia has sent its 
contributions to the Abkhaz budget, Russian ministries still need to approve specific 
actions before the implementation process can begin. This continued involvement of 
ministries is only applicable for the Investment Programme, but not the Social and 
Economic Support Programme (Comai 2018: 109-110). While a breach in trust 
between the two parties related to corruption charges can partly explain this change 
in control mechanisms, the decreasing financial support may also be due to Russian 
economic struggles since 2014.274 Overall, the current system of Russian financial 
contributions mirrors Abkhazia’s exposure to and limited control over Russia’s 
allocation of funds. This can be observed in Russian continued support to 
infrastructural projects rather than capacity building and increased oversight 
regarding Abkhazia’s budget spending.  
Russian financial support goes beyond state budget contributions as Russia 
also provides funds for humanitarian aid projects as well as civil infrastructure 
projects. Russian investment and reconstruction support started in 2002 and was 
largely driven by interests of Abkhaz businessmen in Russia focusing particularly on 
tourism, infrastructure and construction ventures (Trier et al. 2010: 8, 107). It is 
therefore not surprising that Russia is Abkhazia’s biggest source of foreign direct 
investment (Relitz 2016: 11). Concurrently, Russia positioned itself as the main 
trading partner for Abkhazia. Russia is Abkhazia’s biggest trading partner with nearly 
80% of consumer goods in Abkhazia being imported from Russia (ICG 2010a). The 
 
271 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
272 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
273 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
274 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support and the Alliance and 
Strategic Partnership Treaty facilitate further economic integration between Russia 
and Abkhazia. However, the development of Abkhazia’s economy appears to be 
stagnant, with both Russia and Abkhazia contributing little to the growth of the 
economic sector. According to an interviewee, the Russian government was recently 
willing to change the nature of its investment by initiating economic projects in 
Abkhazia, but the Abkhaz government was allegedly not prepared for this step.275 
Studies in development contexts and areas of limited statehood have shown 
that NGOs and government agencies may redirect their prioritisation and own 
interests in order to receive funding from an external actor (Lake 2014: 523). There 
are signs that this form of issue displacement takes place in Abkhazia on the basis of 
Russia’s prioritisation as well. Russia’s funding focuses primarily on infrastructure 
and social support, rather than economic development or capacity development. It 
is possible, that Abkhaz elites have also prioritised certain aspects of their state 
building project based on perceived Russian interest or potential funding from 
Russia. 
Ultimately, Russia’s substantial state budget contributions as well as its 
trading position have lasting effects on the state building efforts of the de facto state. 
In terms of capital accumulation, for instance, Abkhazia pursued a political economy 
pathway that relies predominantly on patron contributions and a subsidised 
economy.276 In return for external financial patron support, Abkhaz elites are more 
 
275 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
276 Broers’ (2015) classification of political economies in post-Soviet de facto states is a 
beneficial tool to understand where and how specific countries and regions extract their 
resources and the ways in which this affects the relationship between elites and the general 
public. Broers identifies three political economy models in the post-Soviet space: The 
subsistent, the rentier and the monopoly mediator model. The subsistent model covers 
entities that focus predominantly on domestic resource extraction and the provision of basic 
services to the public. The rentier model includes entities that focus more on external rather 
than domestic source extraction, which results in limited autonomy for the entity and 
increasing reliance on external actors. The monopoly mediator model is a mixture of the first 
two models where elites try to develop local capacity building, but believe that external 
source extraction from one particular sponsor remains an important factor to sustain the 
provision of services to the public (145). Broers argues that concerning capital accumulation, 
de facto states could follow two possible pathways (142). While the first pathway includes a 
high level of self-reliance, the second pathway “could turn outwards towards dependence 
on a patron-state, building heavily subsidized economies in return for specified kinds of 
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likely to remain loyal to Russia and prioritise political developments in line with 
Russia’s ideals (Broers 2015: 142). While external state builders might be interested 
in capable states, as they offer more opportunities for extraction, they tend to prefer 
loyalty over capacity and even accept take legitimacy concerns (Lake & Fariss 2014: 
570). In other words, Abkhazia’s financial dependence on Russia severely limits the 
ability of politicians to independently and impartially set and implement policies 
(Freedom House 2015). It is important to note, that dependence on an external actor 
does not necessarily chip away at internal sovereignty (Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2008: 
373). Similarly, Abkhaz dependence on external support is likely to fluctuate and vary 
depending on alternative resource access, the willingness of the patron to provide 
support, the involvement of the parent state and the general position of the de facto 
state in the international community (Caspersen 2012: 109). 
At least theoretically, Abkhazia could be self-sustainable in terms of its 
economy. However, the welfare and public service payments make a break from 
Russian support unlikely (Comai 2018b: 188). The extensive financial aid from Russia 
for the Abkhazian budget also affects the structure and functioning of the de facto 
authorities, because the wages of the public sector, government institutions and the 
provision of the public services are financed directly by the budget (Gerrits & Bader 
2016: 307). The Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty of 2014, for example, 
promised specific budgetary contributions that raise the average salaries of public 
servants to similar levels as in Southern Russia (301-302). Overall, Russian financial 
support in form of trade, financial aid, pension and public salary payments as well as 
infrastructure projects nurtures Abkhaz dependence on Russia, because it decreases 
the likelihood of the Abkhaz regime to limit Russian influence, as this would, in turn, 
significantly reduce the standard of living in Abkhazia (Comai 2018a: 92). These 
findings show that financial aid, pension payments, and public salary payments 
nurture Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia. While the interviews with Russian and 
Abkhaz representatives hint at this being a strategic choice of the Russian 
 
loyalty and particular model of political development” (142). An endogenous resource model 
in de facto states results in legitimacy of de facto elites through elite-society negotiations. 
An exogenous model, on the other hand, does not ensure this form of loyalty between 
society and elites (143). 
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government, there is no conclusive evidence that unveils Russian motivations and 
suggests that the Russian government strategically enacts these support packages to 
nurture dependence. Nonetheless, the outcomes of these support measures 
demonstrate that Russian coercive diffusion sources nurture Abkhaz dependence on 
Russian support.  
 
7.2.2 Agreements and Treaties 
A significant dimension of Russian coercive diffusion influence on state building in 
Abkhazia spans the formulation of agreements and treaties between the patron and 
de facto state (see table 20). The quote below by former Deputy Foreign Minister of 
Abkhazia Irakli Khintba stresses the relevance of Russian involvement in Abkhazia. In 
addition, Khintba makes insightful references to a contractual framework that 
regulates the relations between Abkhazia and Russia, which is likely to denote the 
agreements and treaties signed between the two parties. 
 
Russian influence in Abkhazia certainly does exist. It is 
natural, since Russia is currently the only country in the 
world, which provides enormous assistance to 
Abkhazia, not only in socio-economic development, but 
also in strengthening and improving the efficiency of the 
Abkhaz state as a whole. It is some kind of "Marshall 
Plan" for Europe, as Russia is helping us to cope with the 
consequences of the war to strengthen the Abkhaz 
statehood as much as possible. All aspects of the 
Russian-Abkhaz cooperation are regulated by a solid 
contractual framework that exists between our two 
countries.277  
Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia Irakli Khintba 
 
The institutionalised nature of the Russo-Abkhaz relationship can denote a path for 
civil society to be involved in the decision-making process surrounding external 
engagement in Abkhazia’s domestic affairs. Depending on the quality of civil society 
involvement, this may increase the input legitimacy of the external actor (Scharpf 
 
277 Abkhaz World (2013). Russian Influence in Abkhazia Certainly Does Exist: Interview with 
Irakli Khintba. Retrieved from: http://abkhazworld.com/aw/interview/83-interview-with-
the-deputy-foreign-minister-ir-khintba-for-the-magazine-kommersant-vlast  
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1999; Krasner & Risse 2014: 552). Furthermore, studies of contracting either in the 
form of delegation (Matanock 2014) or interstate agreements (Boerzel & van Huellen 
2014) have shown that institutionalising a relationship can result in more successful 
state building interventions if the responsibilities and tasks are clearly set up, the 
process is observed and examined by an authority and local conditions are taken into 
account when the institutional design is developed (Krasner & Risse 2014: 559). 
Whether or not Russia and Abkhazia decided to institutionalise their relationship for 
the purpose of enhancing legitimacy or better oversight is difficult to trace back. It is 
telling, however, that the treaties and agreements were all signed bilaterally rather 
than multilateral, which signifies Russia’s unwillingness or inability to include further 
international actors into Abkhazia’s support network (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 299; 
Stewart 2010: 7). The bilateral nature of the agreements and treaties can be 
considered coercive diffusion in so far that it ensures that Russia attains the 
monopoly over the external influences on Abkhaz state building processes. At the 
same time, this institutionalisation also increases the likelihood for both mimetic and 
normative diffusion, because the treaties and agreements contain specific 
institutional and public service provision examples ranging from the average pay of 
public service employees to the harmonisation of laws. 
Shortly after the recognition of Abkhazia, Russia signed the Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty on 17th September 2008 with Abkhazia. 
The treaty covered the pledge for economic integration and military support to 
defend Abkhazia’s sovereignty (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 301-302). Since Russia’s 
recognition of Abkhazia in 2008, the Abkhaz economy has indeed become more 
integrated with the Russian economy. The economic integration of Abkhazia and 
Russia was operationalised by transferring economic and infrastructural assets (i.e. 
electricity grids, rail network, oil reserves), adopting technical and commercial 
standards, lifting trade barriers and installing the rouble as a common currency 
(Gerrits & Bader 2016: 301). State building itself does not appear to be the priority, 
but economic, military, economic and administrative integration is high on the list 
(Kereselidze 2015: 205).  
On 24th November 2014, Abkhazia and Russia signed the Alliance and 
239 
 
Strategic Partnership Treaty,278 however the first draft of the agreement had to 
undergo redrafting as it raised concerns among the Abkhaz population and politicians 
regarding a possible threat to Abkhazia’s independence.279 Among other changes, 
the word ‘integration’ was dropped and the term ‘strategic partnership’ was used 
instead, Abkhaz and Russian military forces worked jointly under Russian command 
and Russia was obliged to facilitate further international recognition for the 
sovereign state of Abkhazia.280 Moreover, Abkhazia managed to ensure that “the 
foreign policy of both countries will not be ‘coordinated’ but instead ‘agreed’ 
upon.281 Thereby, Abkhazians hoped that the self-proclaimed independence of 
Abkhazia is not endangered and that it reduced the threat of a possible 
annexation.282 While these changes can certainly be considered an achievement from 
the Abkhaz negotiation side, it would be too early and too optimistic to argue that 
“Abkhazia has achieved to keep its military, political and economic independence, 
while at the same time securing stronger cooperation in foreign, defence, economic 
and social policy with Russia.”283  
The association agreement between Abkhazia and Russia in 2014 indicates 
that Russia will spend up to 12 billion roubles to Abkhazia by 2017. The agreement 
foresees that Abkhazia passes on the management and modernisation of central 
infrastructure over to Russia for ten years such as the Abkhaz railway and airports in 
return for investments and loans (Hewitt 2012). The treaty includes provisions to 
make Russian citizenship easier and the levelling of public service wages similar to 
 
278 ДОГОВОР между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Абхазия о союзничестве и 
стратегическом партнерстве. Retrieved from: 
http://m.government.ru/media/files/wNsItFsYzes.pdf  
279 Nationalia (2016). Will South Ossetia be the next Crimea? Retrieved from: 
http://www.nationalia.info/noticia/10770/ossetia-del-sud-sera-la-propera-
crimea?llengua_ant=en 
280 Nationalia (2016). Will South Ossetia be the next Crimea? Retrieved from: 
http://www.nationalia.info/noticia/10770/ossetia-del-sud-sera-la-propera-
crimea?llengua_ant=en 
281 UNPO (2014). New Russian-Abkhaz Treaty on ‘Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ Not a 
Threat to Abkhazia’s De Facto Independence. Retrieved from: http://unpo.org/article/17796 
282 Nationalia (2016). Will South Ossetia be the next Crimea? Retrieved from: 
http://www.nationalia.info/noticia/10770/ossetia-del-sud-sera-la-propera-
crimea?llengua_ant=en 
283 UNPO (2014). New Russian-Abkhaz Treaty on ‘Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ Not a 
Threat to Abkhazia’s De Facto Independence. Retrieved from: http://unpo.org/article/17796 
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Southern Federal District of Russia wages (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 301-302).  
A closer look at the agreement reveals some aspects that can be considered 
significant in terms of their effect on state building in Abkhazia. Article 10 of the 
agreement lays out the internal affairs coordination. Article 11 sets out the 
harmonisation of laws, including budget (4) and customs (1) legislation. Article 18 
focuses on similar measures for individuals and organisations in the field of 
pharmaceutical or medical activities. Article 14 of the Alliance and Strategic 
Partnership Treaty outlines that “the Republic of Abkhazia shall gradually increase 
the average wage in main areas of public employees such as health care, education, 
science, culture, sports and social services to a level comparable with the level of 
wage payments of appropriate categories of workers in the southern federal districts 
of Russia.”284 
Article 20 of the agreement states that:  
 
in order to improve the quality of education in the 
Republic of Abkhazia with the assistance of the Russian 
Federation, the Republic of Abkhazia within 3 years 
from the date of entry into force of this Treaty: Develop 
the education system of the Republic of Abkhazia and 
the support of the organisations, carrying out 
educational activities in the Republic of Abkhazia, 
normative legal acts correspond to the legislation of the 
Russian Federation in education; organise the 
development of educational programs, training and 
professional development of teachers organisations 
carrying out educational activities; implementing 
agreed measures aimed at training professionals in 
priority areas of science and technology, as well as the 
mutual recognition of studies and qualifications.285 
 
284 This is a translation of the following original quote in Russian: “Республика Абхазия 
поэтапно осуществляет повышение средней заработной платы основных категорий 
работников государственных учреждений в сфере здравоохранения, образования, 
науки, культуры, спорта и социального обслуживания граждан до уровня, 
сопоставимого с уровнем оплаты труда соответствующих категорий работников в 
Южном федеральном округе Российской Федерации.” Retrieved from 
http://m.government.ru/media/files/wNsItFsYzes.pdf. 
285 This is a translation of the following original quote in Russian: “В целях повышения 
качества образования в Республике Абхазия при содействии Российской Федерации 
Республика Абхазия не позднее 3 лет со дня вступления в силу настоящего Договора: 
принимает направленные на развитие системы образования Республики Абхазия и 
обеспечение деятельности организаций, осуществляющих образовательную 
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Article 20 is a good example of the treaty between Russia and Abkhazia that involves 
specific criteria and plans for the provision of public services in Abkhazia. While the 
focus of the treaties and agreements is primarily on economic development and 
integration as well as military relations, the provision of security, institutional and 
technocratic state building takes place as well. 
 
Table 20 Inexhaustive List of Agreements and Treaties Signed between Russia and Abkhazia 
Year Treaty/Agreement 
2008 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty 
2009 Cooperation Agreement on State Border Protection 
2009 Agreement on Socio-Economic Development Assistance 
2010 Agreement on Joint Military Base in Abkhazia 
2011 Agreement on the Establishment of and Conditions for Information-Culture 
Centres 
2012 Agreement on Cooperation in Disaster Prevention and Management 
2012 Agreement on Procedures for Pension Provisions for Employees of Domestic 
Affairs 
2012 Agreement on the Trade of Goods 
2014 Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty 
2016 Agreement on Joint Group of Armed Forces 
 
Russia and Abkhazia signed several dozen additional agreements (table 20) that 
demonstrate clear links to Abkhazia’s state capacity and its ability to provide public 
services and goods. The agreements, for instance, touch upon border management, 
military bases and joint forces that provide security guarantees as well as trade 
legislation. Agreements in the form of coercive diffusion channels therefore also 
encourage institutional and legislative isomorphism.  
 
 
деятельность в Республике Абхазия, нормативные правовые акты, 
корреспондирующие с законодательством Российской Федерации об образовании; 
организует разработку образовательных программ, подготовку и повышение 
квалификации педагогических работников организаций, осуществляющих 
образовательную деятельность; осуществляет согласованные меры, направленные на 
подготовку специалистов по приоритетным направлениям науки и техники, а также на 
обеспечение взаимного признания образования и квалификаций.” Retrieved from 
http://m.government.ru/media/files/wNsItFsYzes.pdf. 
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7.2.3 Institution Sharing 
State building is not necessarily limited to the building of new government 
institutions and the provision of services, but also includes the maintenance, funding 
and reorganisation of governance institutions and public services. This section shows 
that some de facto states might even be inclined to pass over some of their 
governance responsibilities and institutional requirements to other actors through 
institution sharing in order to sustain public service and goods provision. Popescu 
(2006) and Comai (2018a: 93) refer to this phenomenon as ‘outsourcing (de facto) 
statehood’, however this thesis uses the term institution sharing to signify the degree 
of agency from a de facto state perspective and to emphasise the role of cooperation 
and joint actions, even if only in name, throughout the agreements and treaties 
signed between Russia and Abkhazia.  
The results of the statistical analysis highlight the decreasing number of 
governance institutions among de facto states with a patron by around half a 
governance institution. Initially, these findings appear to be counter intuitive, as 
patron support should ensure a more stable security situation and financial 
contributions for de facto states that benefit the building of new governance 
institutions. The lower number of governance institutions in de facto states with a 
patron may be explained with patrons taking over some of the responsibilities and 
tasks of governance institutions in a de facto state. In other words, the statistical 
findings of this thesis uncover a degree of institution sharing in the relationships 
between de facto states and patron states. These findings speak to the theoretical 
framework of this thesis in so far that they highlight the variations in patron 
involvement where patrons may limit or expand their support to sustain a level of 
dependence of the de facto state on the patron. The theoretical framework also 
offers a potential explanation for the simultaneous support for basic civilian 
governance and a reduction in the number of governance institutions. Indeed, these 
findings may not be a contradiction but a representation of a patron’s intent to 
ensure a level of dependence of the de facto state on patron support while 
guaranteeing a degree of self-sufficiency and bounded agency of the de facto 
authorities. It has to be reiterated in this context, that the lower number of 
governance institutions does not necessarily equate to hampered state capacity and 
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public services and goods provision. At the same time, the physical presence of a 
governance institution does not present a de facto state’s ability to provide public 
services and goods. 
It is not uncommon in regions without central government penetration, so-
called weak, failed and fragile states or areas with limited statehood, that 
organisations on the ground ranging from NGOs to civil society organisations take on 
basic governance functions from the central government (Lake 2014: 519). These 
organisations can even “function as the de facto legitimate authorities” (Lake 2014: 
519) in a region, by engaging in policy making and institutional oversight (Büscher & 
Vlassenroot 2010; Trefon 2011).286 This section argues that in the case of de facto 
states such as Abkhazia, one can observe similar developments of institution sharing 
both with patron states and international organisations on the ground, particularly 
in the security, monetary and education sectors. Importantly, this form of institution 
sharing takes place despite Abkhazia’s relatively strong statehood and wide 
penetration of the state. Instead, institution sharing in Abkhazia is partly due to years 
of neglect of specific state sectors, alternative prioritisation of the de facto 
authorities as well as Abkhazia’s reliance on patron state protection. These dynamics 
have created opportunities for non-state actors and external entities to assume 
power by entering and influencing responsibilities that would usually be considered 
a state’s responsibility (see chapter 8 for a discussion on institution sharing in 
Abkhazia’s education sector). This reliance on non-state actors or external states to 
take on responsibilities that are usually reserved for sovereign states can develop 
dependencies on these external resources and may ultimately reduce the state 
capacity, because it disincentivises investments from the state itself (Lake 2014: 524).  
A look at the descriptive of statistics of Abkhazia (figure 15) reveals that 
according to Florea’s classification, Abkhazia already possessed all ten governance 
institutions by 1994. This means that Russia’s role as a patron from 1999 onwards 
did not change the number of governance institutions as such, but reduced 
 
286 In Eastern DR Congo, for example, “[d]omestic and international NGOs have assumed 
responsibility for maintaining public order, paying fees to public officials in lieu of salaries 
from the state, and coordinating and administering trials, in addition to providing health and 
education services” (Lake 2014: 519). 
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Abkhazia’s ability to provide public services and goods independently. In that sense, 
this section is able to trace back the reduction in independent service and goods 
provision in Abkhazia and its reliance on institution sharing to Russian patronage. 
These findings may explain Abkhazia’s underdevelopment in state sectors ranging 
from its military to central banking responsibilities.  
One interviewed Russian foreign policy expert compares the Russo-Abkhaz 
patron-client relationship to parasites and symbiosis. According to him, de facto 
states are not required to possess all state institutions in order to function as a state 
and de facto state elites are oftentimes unable to develop an extensive institutional 
framework themselves,287 due to insufficient capacity, know-how or financial 
opportunities.288 Therefore, as in most cases of natural symbiosis, de facto states rely 
on patrons for some governance responsibilities and public service provision tasks, 
whereas patrons receive the de facto state’s loyalty in return.289 For instance, 
Abkhazia relies almost exclusively on Russia for telephone, internet and postal 
connections with the outside world.290 Also Biermann and Harsch (2017) highlight 
that patrons may take over state responsibilities from de facto states, such as border 
control and the payment of public employee salaries. However, the ability of external 
actors to take on governance responsibilities from the de facto state depends on the 
legitimacy of the external actor and the perceived appropriateness of the envisioned 
governance structure or service provision (see e.g. Krasner & Risse 2014: 555). At the 
same time, institution sharing may influence the internal legitimacy of the affected 
institutions and possibly even the domestic regime.  
Russo-Abkhaz institution sharing is particularly visible in Abkhazia’s military 
and security sectors. Throughout the 1990s, the Abkhaz military and security 
capabilities expanded considerably, because of dedicated budgetary contributions by 
the de facto authorities to Abkhazia’s security infrastructure and regional military 
support from individual Russian republics of the North Caucasus. However, from 
1999 onwards, Abkhazia’s regime has relied almost exclusively on Russia for the 
 
287 Interview 16: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
288 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
289 Interview 16: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
290 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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provision of security services and military protection. In addition to limited financial 
capabilities, this may explain why Abkhazia did not commit to the development of its 
own security and military institutions.291 The treaties between Abkhazia and Russia 
from 2008 and 2014 facilitated further military integration and established joint 
troops between the two parties. Particular the focus on a “coordinated foreign 
policy” and a “single space of defence and security” signifies the military involvement 
of Russia in Abkhazia (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 301-302). In practice, this means that 
Abkhazia and Russia have a joint military force and that Abkhazia does not control its 
de facto border independently as Russia also controls the border at the Inguri bridge. 
While the Abkhaz side checks the documents of incoming people, the Russian FSB 
checkpoint at the same border also validates passports.292 Abkhazia’s security and 
military sector therefore tellingly represents the extent to which institution sharing 
and dependence on Russia decreases the state capacity and provision of public 
services and goods in Abkhazia. At the same time, Abkhaz dependence on Russian 
military and security support as well as its reliance on telephone, internet and postal 
connections highlights the limited alternatives for Abkhaz authorities, which 
encourages institution sharing.  
Beyond the military and security sectors, there are signs of institution sharing 
in certain Abkhaz ministries and departments as well. In the Ministry of Interior, for 
instance, Russia and Abkhazia have a joint information coordination centre,293 
whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia employs a coordination 
mechanism with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.294 Gerrits and Bader (2016: 
298) even argue that Russia “carries out part of public administration” in Abkhazia. 
In the education sector, on the other hand, Abkhazia relies a lot on international 
organisations such as the UN and UNICEF (see Chapter 8 for further insight into the 
Abkhaz education sector).295 
 
 
291 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
292 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
293 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
294 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
295 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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Figure 18 Abkhaz National Bank (Shakaya 1979) 
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Even though Abkhazia was in possession of all ten governance institutions by 1994 
according to Florea’s data set (2014), the physical presence of these governance 
institutions does not necessarily reflect the capacity and ability to perform the tasks 
and responsibilities usually associated with these institutions. Institution sharing, in 
this context, does not imply the closure or removal of the existing physical structures, 
but that the responsibilities are taken over by an external body. Rather than a 
reduction in physical governance institutions as shown in the quantitative chapter of 
this thesis, this section observes a reduction in independent service and goods 
provision from 1999 onwards, that can be traced back to Russian patronhood. These 
institution sharing dynamics are particularly noticeable in the Abkhaz monetary 
sector. Abkhazia’s central bank, while physically present (see figure 18) and counted 
as one of ten governance institutions in Florea’s data set, does not perform 
traditional central bank responsibilities. In other words, Abkhazia may have a building 
that officially hosts the Abkhaz Central Bank and some employees may be assigned 
to work in this Central Bank, but the actual monetary policy usually performed by a 
Central Bank takes place not in Sukhumi but in the Russian Central Bank in Moscow. 
Abkhazia uses Russian roubles as its currency296 with the Abkhaz Apsar currency 
 
296 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
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essentially not in use.297 This is one of the reasons why Abkhaz citizens cannot make 
international transactions without a Russian bank as a mediator.298 The Central Bank 
in Abkhazia focuses primarily on the clearance of bank and social transfers instead.299 
Similar to Abkhazia’s military and security sector, Abkhazia’s Central Bank represents 
an instance where Abkhaz authorities had little room for manoeuvre and few 
alternative viable operation options, due to the inability to stem monetary policies 
independently and Abkhaz dependence on Russian financial support, tourism and 
trade.  
Hence, institution sharing has significant implications for the state capacity of 
de facto states and their ability to provide public services and goods. On the one 
hand, institution sharing can arguably facilitate state building by ensuring a broader 
variety of public services and goods for the citizens that otherwise would not have 
been available. On the other hand, institution sharing may restrict state building by 
reducing the capacity of domestic institutions and disincentivising institutional 
developments. Institution sharing appears to affect particularly governance 
institutions of the state, but can also shape governance institutions of non-state 
actors. Indeed, this section presented evidence supporting the argument that Russia 
takes on some public service and goods provisions from the Abkhaz authorities. 
While there are few signs of governance institutions in Abkhazia outright missing due 
to Russian patronage, the underdevelopment of some sectors of the Abkhaz de facto 
state that discourage independent public service and goods provision can be traced 
back to Russian patronhood. This section also argued that de facto states oftentimes 
cannot oppose institution sharing due to their dependence on patron support for 
public service and goods provision and their inability to stem public service and goods 
provisions without patron support. This is particular the case in terms of telephone, 
internet and postal connections with the outside world, but also covers Abkhazia’s 
military, security and monetary sector.  
 
 
297 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
298 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
299 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
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7.2.4 Technocratic Influences  
Scholars such as Skalov (2011) and Sukhov (2009) argue that Russia does not need to 
interfere directly in the everyday political decision-making of Abkhazia, because it 
holds a monopoly position as Abkhazia’s sole patron. From their perspective, all 
major parties and candidates in Abkhazia are aware of their reliance on Russian 
support. Thus, the election outcome is to large extents irrelevant, as the stance 
towards Russia will remain largely positive. The fact that Russia interfered in previous 
presidential elections in Abkhazia weakens Skalov’s (2011) and Sukhov’s (2009) 
argument somewhat, as it shows that it is in Russia’s interest to establish susceptible 
decision-makers in Abkhazia. Essentially, this section argues that Russian 
technocratic influences in Abkhazia highlight that Russia is not necessarily interested 
in micromanaging politics and state building in Abkhazia, but in having candidates in 
place that have a favourable view on Russia and can be manipulated more easily. 
This, in turn, highlights that Russia encourages mimetic and normative diffusion, 
rather than sustained coercive diffusion, which results in institutional and legislative 
isomorphism. This is in line with Lake and Fariss’ (2014) argument that external state 
builders are more interested in loyalty and adherence to policy preferences rather 
than the state capacity of the client state.  
Russia has a track record of intervening in elections and high-level 
appointments of de facto states in its near abroad (e.g. Abkhazia in 2004 and 2014 as 
well as in South Ossetia in 2017).300 In the first round of the 2004 presidential election 
in Abkhazia, Moscow and outgoing President Vladislav Ardzinba backed candidate 
Raul Khajimba who lost to Sergei Bagapsh, a candidate that was supported by “civil 
society organisations, the veteran’s association, businessmen and disgruntled former 
government ministers” (Caspersen 2011: 343).301 302 Russia went as far as to block 
railway traffic and Abkhaz produce and threatened the end of pension payments and 
the distribution of Russian passports if people voted for Bagapsh in the second round 
of the presidential election. This is an indication of what Gel’man and Lankina (2013) 
 
300 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
301 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
302 Interview 16: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
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refer to as authoritarian diffusion across Russia’s regions. In the end, both candidates 
pursued a power sharing agreement with a combined ticket (Trier et al. 2010: 10-11). 
This was a first striking sign of the growing role of Abkhazia’s civil society and that 
Russian influence was not absolute. At the same time, Russian support for a specific 
candidate in the presidential election indicates Russia’s readiness to directly interfere 
in Abkhaz domestic politics and high-level appointments.303 Also the resignation of 
Abkhaz de facto President Aleksandr Ankvab in 2014 was arguably motivated by 
Russian interference (Kereselidze 2015: 206).  
These examples highlight Russia’s support for candidates that have a 
favourable view of Russia. Russia is therefore willing to directly engage in the 
appointment or demotion of high-level candidates. Lake (2016: 1-2) warns that 
external actors, that are willing to fund state building, “are likely to have interests in 
the future of that country, and will therefore seek to promote leaders who share or 
are at least sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred 
policies.” Especially in cases where the policy ideas of citizens and external state 
builders diverge, the latter is more likely to support political actors with similar 
preferences to the external state building (Lake & Fariss 2014: 570). This, in turn, can 
reduce the legitimacy of the leader domestically, which Lake (2016: 2) refers to as 
the statebuilder’s dilemma, but also of the external state builder. 
Some interviewees suggested that Russia has utilised these connections with 
high-ranking politicians to shape Abkhazia’s government agenda.304 Russia, for 
instance, has attempted to push private property legislation through parliament.305 
However, Russia's success in influencing specific legislation appears to be limited 
even under changing Abkhaz presidencies.306 This is an example where a de facto 
state challenges coercive diffusion despite its bounded agency and political pressures 
from the patron to amend legislations through persistent lobbying of decision-
makers.  
The control of relevant political actors reaches groups and individuals beyond 
 
303 Interview 2: Representatives of an international donor (Sukhumi) 
304 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
305 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
306 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
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top-level decision-makers. Russia not only targets Abkhaz government officials and 
political decision-makers, but also non-governmental organisations (Gerrits & Bader 
2016: 299-300). In these cases, Russia lures these groups with financial contributions 
and increased political and intergovernmental access and involvement. Also 
industrial and business ties between Abkhazia and Russia can present legacies from 
the Soviet period that shape the state building processes of the de facto state. 
Lankina and Libman (2019), for instance, highlight trade and production chain 
dependencies in Ukraine from the Soviet period that facilitate diffusion through 
institutional path dependencies even in the post-Soviet era. One could argue that 
Abkhazia’s institutional path dependence on Russian tourists falls into a similar form 
of Soviet legacy.  
As previously mentioned, coordination mechanisms between certain Abkhaz 
and Russian ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Prosecutor General’s Office, tie Russian and Abkhaz officials closer together.307 
These coordination mechanisms mirror Sahin’s (2015: 27) rather telling description 
of external interventions in relation to recruitment within government bodies and 
co-staffed departments, as blurring the differences between internal and external. 
Moreover, many Abkhaz officials, such as custom officers, have been trained in 
Russia.308 Russia forms these close ties between Russian and Abkhaz decision-
makers, bureaucrats and non-state actors through financial and military support, 
direct intervention, coordination mechanisms and education. In other instances, the 
close connections can be shaped by legacies from the Soviet period. The resulting 
blurring of internal and external differences encourages mimetic and normative 
diffusion and increases the likelihood for institutional and legislative isomorphism.  
  
7.2.5 Duopoly of Legitimate Violence 
Domestic security provision tends to be a state building priority across de facto 
states, because it represents a central component of ensuring internal legitimacy 
(Bakke et al. 2013: 3). This section argues that Abkhazia’s monopoly on legitimate 
 
307 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
308 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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violence and its ability to exercise control domestically is largely due to Russian 
military and security support. Indeed, the de facto regime has relied to varying 
degrees on Russian military support to ensure security on the de facto territory. 
Henceforth, rather than referring to Abkhazia’s monopoly of legitimate violence, this 
phenomenon should be described as a duopoly of legitimate violence.  
Russia supported Abkhazia militarily long before its official recognition in 
2008. Since the early 1990s, Russia has engaged in a variety of military practices 
including security alliances, the stationing of military and peacekeeping troops, 
covert military operations, building of military bases, active involvement in defence 
during the wars in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2008, protection of borders, organisation of 
joint troops and the supply of logistical and military aid (German 2012; Hedeskog & 
Larsson 2007; Gerrits & Bader 2016). It is important to note in this context, that 
Russian military support in the early 1990s did not originate from the Russian central 
government, but individual Russian republics. Particularly from 1999 onwards, the 
Russian government started to be more openly involved in military operations. The 
Russian military support during the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, for instance, 
enabled the Abkhaz army to reclaim Upper Kodori and establish territorial control 
(Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 283). Abkhazia enjoys significant military support beyond 
direct military involvement by Russian troops. Some key positions in the law 
enforcement agencies and in ministries are staffed with Russian citizens. Two of the 
five deputies of the Chairman of the Abkhaz Security Service, for instance, are former 
Russians military generals.309 Moreover, Abkhazia and Russia exchange relevant 
security intelligence through the joint information coordination centre at the 
Ministry of Interior.310  
Russia’s official recognition of Abkhazia marked a point of further 
intensification of military relations. Russia, for the first time, did not recognise 
Georgia’s territorial integrity and the so-called CIS peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia 
turned into official military support. The 2008 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance Treaty grants Russia to establish Russian military bases and station 
 
309 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
310 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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soldiers on Abkhaz territory and promises the protection of Abkhazia’s de facto 
border and sovereignty (ICG 2010a; Gerrits & Bader: 2016: 298). A 2010 agreement 
covers the lease of a military base for 49 years and Russia is also interested in setting 
up naval capabilities in Ochamchira (Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 290). In 2014, Russia 
signed the Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty with Abkhazia, which facilitates 
further military integration and establishes joint troops between the de facto state 
and Russia. Particular the focus on a “coordinated foreign policy” and a “single space 
of defence and security” signifies the military involvement of Russia in Abkhazia 
(Gerrits & Bader 2016: 301-302). Generally, survey results show that Abkhaz citizens 
(with the exception of the Gali district) support Russia’s military presence on their 
territory and even argue that Russia should stay in Abkhazia permanently (O’Loughlin 
et al. 2015: 437). 
Russia’s involvement in the military and security sector of Abkhazia is 
significant for Abkhazia’s state building development for two reasons. First, by 
providing Abkhazia with security guarantees, Russia matches the Georgian military 
capabilities and ensures the status quo of relative stability in the de facto state 
(Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012: 290). Due to Abkhazia’s reliance on Russia in security 
matters, Abkhazia has not developed its own military institutions as extensively.311 
This is an example where institution sharing and dependence decreases state and 
institution building of a de facto state. These findings also complement the statistical 
results of this thesis, that found that a militarily stronger parent state compared to 
the patron can increase the likelihood for high degrees of state building in de facto 
states, whereas a stronger patron may discourage or disincentivise further state 
building. Second, Abkhazia’s military integration with Russia and its reliance on 
Russian military protection has significant effects on a traditional understanding of 
sovereignty and Abkhaz control over its de facto territory. The above-mentioned 
extent of Russian military involvement indicates that Abkhazia does not hold the 
monopoly of violence on its territory, but rather shares some of the responsibilities 
with Russia. The Abkhaz border, for instance, is controlled to this day both by Abkhaz 
 
311 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
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and Russian forces at separate checkpoints.312 In this sense, it is more applicable to 
speak of a duopoly rather than a monopoly of violence in Abkhazia. However, Krasner 
(1999; 2004) finds that similar external involvement in domestic authority structures 
is commonplace across history. Instead of highlighting the potential threat of such a 
duopoly of violence to Abkhazia’s sovereignty, it is more insightful to examine how 
the dependence on external support shapes domestic legitimacy dynamics. 
Therefore, the next section explores the ways in which Abkhazia’s reliance on Russian 
support has affected the legitimacy of Russian involvement in Abkhazia. 
  
 
312 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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7.3 Legitimisation of Russian Involvement 
 
If Russia could build Abkhazia as it imagines an ideal 
state, then there would not be what [there is] now.313 
Abkhaz Scholar Residing in Saint Petersburg, Russia 
 
External involvement in the state and institution building processes of de facto states 
raises concerns around the legitimacy of this external involvement and whether local 
ownership can sustain in the context of likely dependence on the external state 
builder (see Caspersen 2015). Thus, in order to assess the extent to which Russian 
involvement is legitimised and has lasting effects on Abkhazia’s state building 
process, it is necessary to reconsider the role of input and output legitimacy in 
patron-client relations. As discussed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, a 
variety of legitimacy dynamics play a role in the effectiveness and success of state 
building processes in de facto states. Both direct (coercive) and indirect (normative, 
mimetic and competitive) diffusion influences have to be legitimised in order to 
shape the state and institutional structure of an entity. Lake (2016), for instance, 
points out that the development of institutional structures is only meaningful if 
domestic authorities legitimise the external state builder. Therefore, the task of 
external state builders is not restricted to facilitating the provision of public services 
and goods as well as ensuring the monopoly of violence, but also to enable social 
transformations that increase the likelihood for legitimisation (Lake 2016: 4). 
Based on findings from areas of limited statehood, external actors can 
increase state capacity and provide public services if domestic communities and 
elites perceive the external actor as legitimate (Krasner & Risse 2014: 555). 
Legitimised external state builders facilitate an external state building process that 
necessitates fewer interventions even if the institutionalisation and funding is low 
(547).314 This section argues that Russia’s partial support in Abkhazia’s early state 
building campaign, the institutionalisation of Russian involvement since 2008 as well 
 
313 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
314 While the quoted literature refers predominantly to failed states, areas of limited 
statehood and weak states, some of the assumptions and results also show surprising 
applicability in de facto states.  
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as the ability of domestic elites to challenge certain Russian policy proposals ensures 
a degree of input legitimacy of Russian actions. However, the relative freedom of 
Abkhaz domestic elites has decreased since 2014. Output legitimacy, on the other 
hand, is driven predominantly by Russia’s initial military support in the early 1990s, 
financial support from 1999 onwards and particularly Russia’s recognition of 
Abkhazia in 2008. At the same time, some Abkhaz elites question the 
appropriateness of state building efforts by Russia, which may challenge Russia’s 
output legitimacy. Nonetheless, both input and output legitimacy are safeguarded to 
a certain extent, because Russia is Abkhazia’s only viable partner and both parties 
have internalised this situation.  
Scharpf (1999) refers to two forms of empirical legitimacy in form of input 
and output legitimacy (refer back to chapter 2 for a more detailed overview of 
legitimacy dynamics in external state building). Input legitimacy denotes how the 
quality of public involvement in the decision-making process can increase the 
likelihood of external actor legitimisation. Output legitimacy refers to the target 
population’s perception of the appropriateness and performance quality of state 
building efforts by external actors. Krasner and Risse (2014: 557) identify two ways 
in which actors can attain output legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. First, 
international actors may be considered legitimate if the domestic population or elite 
awaits a certain outcome or trusts the “knowledge and moral authority” of the 
international actor. Second, the legitimacy of an external actor increases if the initial 
actions meet the expectations of the domestic actors (see also Beisheim & Liese 
2014; Matanock 2014). External actors, for instance, may achieve output legitimacy 
if the external actor removed an unfavourable ruler or regime. 
The agreements and treaties signed between Russia and Abkhazia represent 
an institutionalised form of a certain degree of input legitimacy. The institutional 
structure of the relationship between external and domestic actors can ensure at 
least some involvement of domestic actors in the decision-making process. The 
quality of this process increases the input legitimacy vis-à-vis external actors (Scharpf 
1999; Krasner & Risse 2014: 552). Contracting, either in the form of delegation 
(Matanock 2014) or interstate agreements (Boerzel & van Huellen 2014), is an 
example of such an institutional framework. Also the departmental and ministerial 
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coordination mechanisms between Abkhazia and Russia can be considered a form of 
institutionalised input legitimacy. Yet, there are few signs that the public is 
significantly involved in the decision-making behind agreements and treaties.  
In terms of domestic elite and society involvement in the state building 
process, the interviewees suggest that despite the direct contributions to the Abkhaz 
budget and deep social linkages, the Abkhaz authorities take important decisions 
regarding the development of their state institutions and public service provision.315 
316 The standard procedure in determining Russian financial contributions, for 
instance, commences with a request from the Abkhaz government outlining the 
quantity and purpose of the desired funding.317 Subsequently, the Russian budgetary 
mechanisms allocate the funds to Abkhazia. According to a representative from an 
international organisation in Sukhumi, the quantity and purpose of the allocated 
funds can be renegotiated.318 Following the transfer of funds, Russian inspection 
teams travel to Abkhazia to monitor the spending of funds and may identify potential 
discrepancies.319 This standard procedure highlights at least some level of domestic 
elite involvement, even though it is not clear to what extent domestic actors can 
renegotiate the funding allocation in practice. At least according to Ambrosio and 
Lange (2016), Abkhaz opinions and contributions have had an effect on the decision-
making outcome despite Abkhazia’s weaker negotiation position and its dependence 
on Russia. At the same time, the monitoring teams from Russia represent a relatively 
tight external control over domestic affairs and expenditures. Russia has tightened 
its grip on Abkhazia in the last years with stricter guidelines and control mechanisms 
on how and when these funds are spent, due to alleged corruption schemes 
significantly limiting the amount of money arriving in Abkhazia.320 321 
In some instances, Russian involvement in domestic affairs has caused 
frictions within Abkhazia’s ruling elite and the general public (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 
 
315 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
316 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
317 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
318 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
319 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
320 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
321 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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298). In cases of diverging opinions or viewpoints, Abkhaz authorities have 
challenged certain Russian involvement and were able to stand their ground in some 
instances.322 323 While Russia takes over responsibilities from Abkhazia in certain 
areas, because Abkhazia does not have the necessary international access, 
Abkhazians would not offer Russia full responsibility to negotiate on their behalf. One 
interviewee goes as far as to argue that Abkhazia would have lost all control to Russia 
after 2008 if they had not made a firm and formative approach.324 The most 
prominent example in this respect is Russia’s continued challenge of the Abkhaz 
private property law that only permits ethnic Abkhaz to acquire private property on 
Abkhaz soil.325 326 On the one hand, Russia respects Abkhaz domestic affairs to the 
extent that Russian representatives consult and attempt to persuade Abkhaz elites, 
while the Abkhaz side is able to stand its ground under mounting pressure and 
despite its dependence on Russian support.327 On the other hand, it is questionable 
whether Abkhazia would be willing to give up its ties with Russia over the private 
property question. At the same time, Russia does not appear to risk such a scenario 
to begin with. The private property question signifies an area of potential input 
legitimacy erosion, but the commitment of domestic elites to challenge Russian 
interests in this regard should ultimately strengthen input legitimacy. Concurrently, 
the mounting Russian pressure may negative influence the legitimacy perception of 
Abkhaz elites and citizens vis-à-vis Russia’s position as an external support source.  
In addition, a variety of developments since Abkhazia’s recognition in 2008 
decreased the relative freedom of domestic elites in directing their own policies and 
state building process. While some interviewees appreciated Russia for respecting 
Abkhaz independence, others highlighted that Russia appears to impose conditions 
on Abkhazia or ask Abkhaz officials to mimic Russian policies or institutions, which 
 
322 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
323 Interview 15: Abkhaz scholar (Saint Petersburg) 
324 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
325 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
326 Other areas of contention, that are also corner stones of the negotiations with Russia are 
church and internal affairs. 
327 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
258 
 
would eventually deprive the de facto state of its sovereignty and ownership.328 329 
Russian interference in high-level appointments and elections, such as in the 2004 
presidential election in Abkhazia, may also reduce input legitimacy as it signifies to 
the Abkhaz population the extent of Russian involvement in domestic affairs with 
little regard for Abkhaz’ self-conception of sovereignty. Nonetheless, Abkhazia does 
not have any realistic alternatives to Russian support and therefore political actors in 
the two regions rarely disagree on the Russian role in Abkhazia, but rather on how 
Abkhazia should utilise Russian support. As all major candidates and parties in 
Abkhazia depend on financial support from Russia, there are no parliamentary or 
opposition fractions that are per se opposed to Russian support.330 Essentially, the 
Abkhaz government and opposition attempt to differentiate themselves by 
promoting varying degrees of relationship intensities with Russia.331  
The output legitimacy of the Russo-Abkhaz relationship appears to be largely 
driven by Russia’s initial military support in the early 1990s, financial support from 
1999 onwards and particularly Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia in 2008. To this date, 
the Abkhaz elite and population appreciates Russian (regional) support during the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war, Russia’s eventual recognition and subsequent financial and 
humanitarian aid.332 333 While it was not necessarily Russia’s involvement that 
ensured the regime change in 1992 and 1993 that removed an unfavourable regime, 
some troops from the North Caucasus supported Abkhazia in its endeavour. 
Furthermore, regional ties with Russian regions benefitted Abkhazia’s state building 
development throughout the 1990s. Thus, Russia’s partial support for Abkhazia in the 
early state building campaign can be considered a contributing factor to a certain 
degree of output legitimacy of Russian involvement in Abkhazia. Most Abkhaz 
 
328 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
329 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
330 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
331 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
332 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
333 Interview 4: Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia 
(Tbilisi) 
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citizens have a favourable view of Russia (O’Loughlin et al. 2015; Bakke et al. 2018). 
A survey conducted in Abkhazia and other post-Soviet de facto states, for instance, 
shows that Abkhaz respondents (with significant differences in the Gali region) trust 
the Russian government more than their leadership (O’Loughlin et al. 2015: 435) and 
support Russia’s military presence (436-437). The Abkhaz respondents also value 
economic ties with Russia, “but dispute its use, modalities, instruments, and its 
“price.”” (O’Loughlin et al. 2015: 436).  
Several Abkhaz interviewees questioned whether Russia’s agenda is 
compatible with Abkhaz interests and instead highlighted a number of aspects that 
Russia and Abkhazia disagree on.334 335 The interviews revealed, for instance, a 
reoccurring challenge to output legitimacy in Russo-Abkhaz relationship relating to 
the appropriateness of state building efforts by Russia. Russia appears to be 
preoccupied with infrastructural development, equipment provision and welfare 
support in Abkhazia, rather than the development of the Abkhaz society, 
opportunities for economic revenue and human capacity.336 The focus on 
infrastructural development and equipment, however, does not necessarily result in 
better quality service provision.337 The Abkhaz health care sector is an insightful case 
in this context as it exemplifies Russia’s focus on infrastructure and equipment rather 
than soft components. Before 2010, Russian financial assistance for the Abkhaz 
health care sector was minimal and once financial assistance poured in, it was limited 
to physical infrastructure and equipment investments. The allocation of funds to the 
Abkhaz health care sector did not necessarily result in better quality of the health 
services, due to insufficient investments in soft components such as staff capacities, 
maintenance, management and methodologies.338 Unsurprisingly, Russia remains 
the central reference for technical and practical support (Comai 2018a: 34) and does 
not encourage the endogenous development of technical and practical know-how. 
This might be due to limited resources, insufficient capacities and expertise or not 
 
334 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
335 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
336 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
337 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
338 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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enough interest to enforce a change in the existing approach and perform the 
required investment in capacity development.339 
Some officials on the Abkhaz and Russian sides have started to realise the 
significance of the soft component for Abkhazia’s state building development in the 
last couple of years and first minor steps have been taken to address this 
limitation.340 In the meantime, the preoccupation with infrastructure support over 
capacity building remains the main challenge to output legitimacy in Russo-Abkhaz 
relations.  
These findings relating to the extent of Russian support in Abkhazia’s state 
and institution building process are reflected in the statistical analysis of this thesis. 
Patron states generally support de facto states in guaranteeing minimal civilian 
governance, but do not encourage the development of coherent government 
structures in de facto states. Thus, Abkhaz officials are reliant on coming up with own 
initiatives to develop the capacities of health and teaching staff unless they accept 
the continued reliance on Russian expertise or training sessions from local 
international donors and NGOs.  
A second challenge to output legitimacy in Russo-Abkhaz relations relate to 
failures by Russia to meet expectations of the Abkhaz partners and in some instances 
even contractual agreements. Russia, for example, significantly revised a promised 
amount of funding for Abkhazia in 2016 that Russia had previously agreed to in an 
agreement in 2014.341 Moreover, a variety of interviewees stated that since the 
recognition in 2008, both Abkhazia and Russia have not had a concrete goal to work 
towards, which is reflected in diverging expectations on both sides.  
Krasner and Risse (2014) identify a variety of ways for external state builders 
to achieve input and output legitimacy in areas of limited statehood ranging from 
trust in the moral authority of the external actor to delivered results meeting the 
expectations of the local elite and population. A closer look at relationships between 
patrons and de facto states reveals an additional way to achieve both input and 
output legitimacy in entities that have limited viable alternatives. If the external actor 
 
339 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
340 Interview 10: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
341 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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is the only potential actor available to offer support, this reduces the requirements 
and expectations in terms of output. While the absence of viable alternative support 
systems may not legitimise the actions of external actors independently, it, 
nonetheless, significantly reduces the requirements and expectations set by the 
domestic elite and civil society on the external actor. If the external actor is the only 
available resource for support, the demands and expectations for the external actor 
are significantly lower for output legitimacy and elites may demand less direct 
involvement in the state building process than they would if more viable alternatives 
were present. In other words, the higher the dependence on an external actor, the 
lower the expectations set out by the local population. However, this form of 
legitimacy making exercise may not be considered legitimacy in the strict sense, but 
rather legitimacy out of necessity.  
Unsurprisingly, Abkhazia’s limited international recognition results in large-
scale international isolation for the de facto states. This has reduced Abkhazia’s 
perspectives in terms of potential international partnerships and pushed the region 
further into the Russian sphere of influence.342 343 Several Abkhaz interviewees 
admitted Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia in a variety of areas ranging from 
financial to military support.344 In some areas, Abkhazia is exclusively reliant on 
Russian support, such as banking and internet provision.345 Therefore, elites in 
Abkhazia tend to modify their behaviour accordingly when they are reliant on patron 
support and have no viable alternatives. The acceptance of Russian involvement 
appears to depend on the specific area it influences and the extent to which it affects 
their understanding of sovereignty. A government representative, for instance, 
revealed that Abkhazia is dependent economically on Russia, however, Abkhazia 
remains fully sovereign according to him.346 Interestingly, Abkhaz representatives 
appear to be more protective of legislations surrounding private property, land and 
language rights. In these sectors, the Abkhaz elite is able to withstand substantial 
coercive diffusion pressures from Russian change agents. Yet, Abkhaz decision-
 
342 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
343 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
344 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
345 Interview 1: Georgian scholar (Tbilisi) 
346 Interview 9: Government representative of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
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makers are more susceptible to external engagement in sectors such as Abkhazia’s 
security institutions, the economy and border control.347  
In sum, both input and output legitimacy are considerably affected by an 
understanding by the Abkhaz elites, civil society and public of the limited viable 
alternatives to Russian support. On the one hand, Abkhazia welcomes Russian 
support and the political discussions centre predominantly on how the financial 
contributions originating in Russia should be utilised. On the other hand, Abkhazia’s 
limited viable alternatives reduce the likelihood that Russo-Abkhaz relations will 
suffer under a lack of input or output legitimacy. The institutionalisation of the Russo-
Abkhaz relationship since 2008 has also benefitted input legitimacy to a certain 
extent. Input legitimacy may, however, suffer under impositions to mimic 
institutional practices and increased Russian control over the allocation of funds in 
Abkhazia. Output legitimacy is predominantly sourced through what Russia 
symbolises and what Russia has previously delivered in form of military support and 
international recognition in 2008. At least since 2014, Russia has been criticised for 
its focus on the hard component of state building in form of infrastructural support. 
Nonetheless, output legitimacy is ensured to a certain extent as Russia is Abkhazia’s 
only viable partner at this stage.  
Overall, analysing the legitimisation of external support offers valuable 
insights into the distinction between areas where Abkhaz elites challenge Russian 
involvement and areas where they are more open to a quasi-takeover of Russia. 
Abkhazia flexibly deals with the issue of legitimacy, by holding certain criticisms back 
and restricting Russian influence in certain areas in order to ensure sustained 
support. This flexibility is in line with Castel-Branco’s (2008) understanding of 
ownership. According to him (Castel-Branco 2008: 3),  
 
  
 
347 I would encourage further research into the reasoning behind Abkhazia’s sovereignty 
concerns when it comes to private property rights, but not its border control or military 
institutions. 
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what matters in social and economic development is not 
ownership per se, but the dynamics of the contest for, 
and the social and political basis of, ownership. In other 
words, whether the aid recipient government has 
ownership or not of development policy is a lesser issue 
than that of the social and political interactions and 
direction of the development policy followed by such a 
government, because the latter reflects the dynamics of 
the contest for, and the social and political basis of, 
ownership. 
 
At the same time, de facto regimes need to consider that if respondents distrust the 
patron, this reduces the trust in the de facto state leadership and the status quo 
(Bakke et al. 2018: 159). Vice versa, trust in the patron leadership increases the 
credibility of the de facto ruler (165). In other words, the Abkhaz regime would be 
wise to encourage both input and output legitimacy of Russia’s engagement in the 
de facto state.  
  
264 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia’s state building development and the interwoven 
legitimacy dynamics are certainly not representative for all forms of patron-de facto 
state relations. Still, this chapter outlines the potential extent of patron involvement 
in de facto states, foreign policy instruments available to patron states and the 
necessary legitimisation processes behind external interventions. Whether or not 
Russia is indeed required to intervene directly in Abkhazia to achieve a desired goal 
and sustain a level of dependence, this chapter has shown that Russia does actively 
engage with this entity in areas that surpass mere military support, financial 
assistance and direct involvement in elections. A close examination of the ways in 
which Russia influences Abkhazia highlights the necessity to complement common 
perspectives on Russian foreign policy with an additional foreign policy channel in 
form of state building. At the same time, this chapter stressed that it is imperative to 
go beyond centralised views of foreign policy and Russia as a unitary actor when 
analysing Russian influences on Abkhazia, as Russian regions offered humanitarian 
support, education exchanges and trading opportunities as well.  
 The statistical analysis of this thesis underscored that patron states are 
unlikely to support the creation of coherent government structures, but encourage 
the development of minimal civilian governance. This is in line with the qualitative 
analysis of key Russian state building instruments in Abkhazia, which revealed that 
Russian support is linked predominantly to infrastructural reconstruction rather than 
capacity building and training. Russia prioritises loyalty and the creation of a basic 
sustainable institutional framework over the capacity and capabilities of the Abkhaz 
de facto state institutions. In other words, Russia pursues a policy of nurturing 
Abkhazia’s dependence on external support by providing aid that discourages self-
sufficiency. Russian prioritisation of state building in Abkhazia therefore shapes 
Abkhazia’s state capability and the provision of public services and goods. Another 
significant effect on Abkhazia’s state capacity and service provision is Abkhazia’s 
reliance on institution sharing with patrons and non-state actors, which take on 
specific governance or service provision tasks from the unrecognised entity. If these 
developments are commonplace across other patron-de facto state relations, this 
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may explain why some de facto states struggle to develop more coherent 
government structures despite the presence of financial support from a patron state.  
By following the causal chains of coercive diffusion laid out in the theoretical 
framework and applying process tracing to the source material, this chapter 
empirically established that coercive diffusion shapes Abkhazia’s state and institution 
building processes. Yet, this chapter also highlighted that Russian involvement in 
Abkhazia goes beyond direct coercive diffusion channels, by setting the basis for 
normative and mimetic diffusion. Russia, for instance, controls relevant de facto 
politicians or ensures that politicians have close ties with Russia through the 
provision of significant financial contributions and military support. Russia and 
Abkhazia also signed treaties and agreements that specify state building measures. 
These developments encourage mimetic and normative diffusion through which de 
facto elites take on policy ideas, legislature and institutional practices from Russia 
without the necessity of direct Russian involvement.  
Decisive nuances can also be identified in Abkhazia’s behaviour vis-à-vis 
Russia. Abkhazia appears to be more open to external influences in certain areas of 
its de facto state including education, health, finance and security. This openness to 
external involvement has resulted in institution sharing and outsourcing of 
governance tasks in some instances. At the same time, the Abkhaz government and 
civil society appear to be protective of some aspects of their state including private 
property and language legislations, which tend to be associated with Abkhaz 
nationhood. In these sectors, the Abkhaz elite is able to withstand extensive coercive 
diffusion pressures of Russian change agents. Abkhaz resistance in these sectors is 
not due to the involvement of alternative support sources, but arguably because they 
represent symbolic battles over Russian influence and Abkhazia’s national identity 
that the Abkhaz regime is much keener to fight.  
Finally, Abkhazia flexibly deals with the issue of legitimacy, by holding certain 
criticisms back and restricting Russian influence in certain areas in order to ensure 
sustained support. This is largely due to some level of sustained input and output 
legitimacy, because Russia is Abkhazia’s only viable partner and both parties have 
internalised this situation. The following and final empirical chapter applies the 
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theoretical model of this thesis to Abkhazia’s education sector in order to capture 
the developments and state building dynamics in one specific state sector. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 
The ABC of De Facto State Education Reform 
How Selective State Building and Restricted Patron Support Encouraged 
Competitive Diffusion in Abkhazia’s Education Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian foreign policies towards countries and regions of its near abroad tend to be 
viewed with suspicion by many politicians and analysts, particularly when these 
policies involve direct military, political or economic action. Russian involvement in 
Abkhazia is certainly not an exception in this regard. While considerable attention 
has been paid to Russia’s hard power endeavours in the post-Soviet space, Russia’s 
pursuit of soft power interests including its involvement in education activities 
abroad is oftentimes overlooked. The goal of this chapter is to go beyond the 
common Russian hard power narrative by examining the extent to which Russian 
direct and indirect diffusion influences penetrate one specific public sector in 
Abkhazia’s state building quest and the ways in which domestic and external policy 
prioritisations have shaped Abkhazia’s education sector since 1992. Abkhazia’s 
education sector development should not necessarily be seen as a unique or outlier 
case, as other countries and de facto states experienced similar challenges and 
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trajectories during the post-Soviet transition period. The findings thereby also 
contribute to an increasingly rich literature on domestic concerns surrounding ethno-
linguistic developments in de facto states of the post-Soviet space that touch upon 
education reforms (Clogg 2008; Trier et al. 2010; Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2011; 
Ó’Beacháin 2012; Dembińska & Danero Iglesias 2013; Comai & Venturi 2015; 
Pashentseva 2018; Dembińska 2019).  
The previous chapters of this thesis provided insights into the striking state 
building development of the de facto Republic of Abkhazia since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Abkhazia’s education sector during the same period however 
appears to have undergone merely minor modifications from the outgoing Soviet 
education system. Abkhazia’s susceptibility to external actors as an internationally 
largely unrecognised entity offers insights into the extent to which patron states 
support de facto authorities with the provision of public services and goods. Unlike 
the defence and financial sectors of de facto states, for instance, education 
represents a segment of the state where patron involvement is not necessarily 
expected. Furthermore, this chapter offers additional analytical perspectives on the 
variations of direct and indirect patron involvement by shedding light on how 
competing domestic and international diffusion sources (NGOs, international donors, 
kin states, patron states, de facto authorities and parent states) have shaped 
Abkhazia’s education sector. By following the causal chains of the diffusion channels 
laid out in the theoretical framework and applying process tracing to the source 
material, this section empirically establishes that particularly competitive diffusion 
informs Abkhazia’s education sector transformations. These insights contribute to 
the theoretical framework of this thesis by fleshing out the origins, patterns and 
consequences of competing diffusion sources in de facto states. The chapter, for 
instance, highlights that Russian and other diffusion sources do not necessarily 
directly compete outside of the Gali district but can complement each other. 
Furthermore, competing parent state involvement in Gali facilitates direct patron 
involvement and de facto state responses.  
In addition to applying diffusion models as a theoretical tool to distinguish 
between direct and indirect influences of external actors on the domestic affairs of a 
given entity, this chapter utilises the concept of education change to complement 
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the domestic education developments in Abkhazia with an additional analytical layer. 
Karpov and Lisovskaya (2005: 23) differentiate between two forms of education 
change. On the one hand, reforms, which involve “intended changes of educational 
institutions in a desirable direction” and on the other hand, mutations, which refer 
to “spontaneous, micro-level adaptive reactions of educational institutions to their 
unstable environment.” Mutations occur in every education sector in one way or the 
other, primarily because the implementation process of an original reform plan rarely 
results in the exact planned outcome. Furthermore, the unstable societal 
environment of education and the schooling system increases the likelihood for 
education mutations. Indeed, the more unstable a societal environment, the more 
likely are mutations to occur, as the implementation of the original plan is less likely 
to succeed (Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005: 23). This additional theoretical layer helps to 
capture the extent to which selective domestic state building prioritisation can 
facilitate state building mutations, which may shape the state building trajectories of 
de facto states and the ability of competing actors to take on responsibilities from 
the central de facto government. 
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Figure 19 Abkhaz School Class (Shakaya 1979)348 
 
 
348 All the pictures in this chapter depict education institutions and scenes that provide a 
glimpse into the education sector of Soviet and post-Soviet Abkhazia. I uncovered the 
pictures that are used in this chapter in the Russian State Library in Moscow in 2018. The 
picture for figure 25 was taken during my fieldwork in Sukhumi in 2017.  
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This chapter draws four central conclusions from the analysis of domestic and 
international influences on Abkhazia’s provision of education services. First, Soviet 
legacies in form of institutional and cultural standards are a key contributing factor 
to the ability of the de facto regime to provide education services to its citizens in the 
period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Due to the common Soviet past, 
education reforms in other post-Soviet regions are likely sources of mimetic and 
normative diffusion. Second, with the exception of minor modifications in relation to 
textbooks, language laws and syllabi, the general education infrastructure in 
Abkhazia has not changed significantly in the last quarter of a century. Instead, 
mutations appear to be the norm, because the Abkhaz regime has not consistently 
prioritised education reforms. Nonetheless, education was regarded as a tool to 
achieve one of the de facto state’s central interests namely nation building and the 
revival of the Abkhaz language.  
Third, Russia’s involvement in Abkhazia’s education sector illustrates the 
albeit limited education dimension of Russian foreign policy under the umbrella of 
Russian humanitarian foreign policy. While extensive content reform of Abkhazia’s 
schooling system does not appear to be a primary concern of Russia in its 
engagement with Abkhazia, Russia provides significant financial contributions to 
Abkhazia’s de facto state budget, which ultimately if indirectly pays for structural 
aspects of Abkhazia’s education system. In terms of education content, despite more 
aspirational goals in a set of Russo-Abkhaz agreements, Russia’s influence is 
restricted to education exchange programmes for Abkhaz students with set quotas 
and the approval and distribution of some textbooks.  
  Fourth, the combination of Abkhazia’s selective neglect of its education 
sector (including a restricted geographic coverage) and Russia’s primary focus on 
infrastructural support created opportunities for other international and domestic 
actors to emerge as diffusion sources and assume responsibilities of the state. These 
factors encouraged some degree of institution sharing with international donors and 
NGOs despite Abkhazia’s relatively strong statehood and wide penetration of the 
state. Some kin states, international donors and NGOs, for instance, were able to 
significantly reshape teaching methodologies and teacher training in schools on the 
Abkhaz de facto territory. Still, the approval and incorporation of the de facto 
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authorities was necessary to increase the spread of these reform programmes.  
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8.2 Domestic Developments of Education Provision in Abkhazia 
A well-functioning education sector349 can be considered the backbone of a society, 
nation and state. Not only does education represent investments into the future of a 
country’s economy, it simultaneously serves as an instrument to legitimise the rule 
of the political class over the population and increase the visibility and durability of 
the state. Moreover, Abkhazia’s education sector embodies an instrument that may 
contribute to the survival and wider use of the Abkhaz language in the context of 
Abkhazia’s nation building development. Already Eugene Weber (1976) highlighted 
the indoctrinatory power of the French school system that taught the French 
peasantry the language skills and values of the dominant culture including patriotism.  
Unlike many other education sector reforms, but similarly to most Soviet 
successor states, the transformation of Abkhazia’s education system had as its basis 
“a fully modern education system which, during half a century of its existence, had 
formed its own traditions and (for better or for worse) a strong institutional inertia” 
(Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005: 48). Despite the presence of an institutional framework 
and extensive experience in the provision of education services, sustaining an 
education sector requires considerable and continuous financial and human 
investment. This raises the question to what extent Abkhaz authorities prioritised 
education provision and accumulated the necessary resources during a period of 
partial isolation and post-war legacies in the 1990s and much of the 2000s. This 
section thereby captures what the statistical classification of degrees of state building 
(Florea 2014) means in practice when it refers to de facto states achieving moderate 
degree of state building in form of budgetary allocations for education services.  
Essentially, the institutional and cultural legacies of the Soviet education 
sector shaped Abkhazia’s capacity to provide education service in the post-war 
period. The limited financial and human resources in addition to a demolished 
education infrastructure placed education reform towards the bottom of the list of 
priorities for the Abkhaz regime. Instead, the first decade of Abkhazia’s de facto 
 
349 The focus of this chapter lies on formal rather than non-formal education within the de 
facto Republic of Abkhazia. Formal education refers to “those institutions in which teaching 
is regularly provided for students who are working toward the completion of a specific course 
of study.” (Noah 1966: 2). 
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independence was spent on renovating and rebuilding the education infrastructure 
and ensuring the provision of basic education services. Unsurprisingly, one can 
identify more mutations than reforms in Abkhazia’s education sector in this period, 
which reflects an environment in which teachers, students, parents and authorities 
had to spontaneously come up with solutions to deal with Abkhazia’s scarce 
resources and unstable environment. Nonetheless, the de facto authorities passed 
minor content reforms of its education sector including the provision of Abkhaz 
textbooks for newly introduced subjects and language training. Still, the authorities 
resisted reforms concerning teaching methodologies and teacher training until the 
late 2000s. At the same time, the struggle with Georgia and for some time Russia 
helped to limit the societal critique against the lack of appropriate education reform. 
Throughout the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, Abkhazia’s education sector was 
only exposed to limited external diffusion influences with the exception of 
competitive diffusion, which encouraged some domestic reforms relating to 
language legislation and textbook provisions. Yet, the incorporation of Soviet legacies 
in addition to selectively neglecting the education sector opened up channels for 
other international and domestic actors to influence Abkhazia’s state building sector.  
 
8.2.1 Soviet Legacies in Abkhazia’s Education System  
The state structure of the Soviet Union facilitated a more or less sophisticated 
network of institutions as well as some degree of political and managerial experience 
within its union republics, autonomous republics and regions. Despite the federal 
nature of the Soviet Union, the education system of the Soviet Union represented a 
highly centralised and integrated system (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 303). Wages of 
teachers and school directors, for example, were set by central authorities and 
subsequently standardised across the Soviet Union (Sutherland 1999: 117).350 The 
standardisation of the Soviet education sector also covered school and university 
curricula and syllabi with only limited leeway for minor alterations (Noah 1966: 2).351 
 
350 In certain areas of the Union, such as more remote or ‘difficult’ areas, wages of teachers 
and other school staff could be higher (Sutherland 1999: 117). 
351 While union republics were formally responsible for the provision and content 
development of textbooks, school regulations and school programmes, the central 
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The common Soviet past and the standardisation of the education systems, presents 
education reforms in other post-Soviet regions as likely sources of mimetic and 
normative diffusion, because of the similarities between the transition periods and 
the inherent troubles. Abkhaz decision-makers are therefore inclined to look for 
Russia or other post-Soviet cases for legislative and institutional inspiration in such 
unstable and uncertain periods. 
The Soviet Union essentially formed historical legacies that shape Abkhazia’s 
education sector to this date. Adgur Kakoba, Abkhazia’s Minister of Education, 
describes the situation of the Abkhaz education system and Soviet legacies in the 
following way: 
 
Our education system has not changed for many years. 
This is the same Soviet education system, which existed 
in all the republics under the USSR. And now these, too, 
the most basic principles, basic directions and basic 
educational standards have remained since the Soviet 
period.352 
Adgur Kakoba, Education Minister of the Republic of Abkhazia 
 
The Soviet legacies can broadly be categorised into institutional and cultural legacies. 
First, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was one of twenty 
autonomous republics in the Soviet Union that possessed a specific set of state 
institutions, including a Ministry of Education, schooling infrastructure as well as a 
limited degree of autonomy regarding education provision (see figures 20, 25, 26, 27 
and 28).353 Thus, the Soviet Union produced a basic structural framework in form of 
schools, a pedagogical institute, a ministry and from 1976 onwards a university, that 
 
authorities in Moscow highly influenced these aspects of the education sector and had the 
final say of approval (Noah 1966: 19). Grant (1979: 33) summarises this by stating that “[a]ll 
aspects of Soviet education are […] planned in detail, from the finance of universities to the 
curriculum and teaching methods for the elementary classes, from building programmes to 
admission figures for the colleges.” 
352 Interview 8 : Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
353 Education Ministries were responsible for schools but not higher education (Grant 1979: 
36-37). 
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serves as the basis for Abkhazia’s current education sector.354 The photographic 
evidence of this chapter captures the presence of education infrastructure and 
institutions in Abkhazia’s Soviet and post-Soviet period. The photographs thereby 
demonstrate the potential for institutional path dependence in the post-Soviet 
period and the ability of Abkhaz rebel groups to utilise the foundations of the pre-
existing institutional structure for their state and institution building endeavours (see 
figures 20, 25, 26, 27 and 28). Moreover, Abkhaz authorities had acquired experience 
overseeing the bureaucratic and governing side of its education sector. 
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Figure 20 School in the mountain village of Achandara (Shakaya 1979) 
 
While the literature on failed and weak states as well as areas of limited statehood 
highlights that statehood is not a necessary condition for the provision of education 
services in these entities (Lee et al. 2014: 647), the provision of education services 
can certainly benefit from state capacity and an existing infrastructure in form of 
ministries, schools and universities. This means that Abkhazia had a substantial 
advantage following the war in terms of guaranteeing the provision of basic 
education services, despite the destruction of much of the education infrastructure.  
 
354 Unlike Union Republics, Abkhazia had no Academy of Science and official university 
(Broers et al. 2015: 29). However, in 1979, the Abkhazian State University (figure 26) was 
founded on the basis of the Sukhumi Pedagogical Institute (see figure 28).  
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Second, the Soviet Union had a lasting effect on the cultural standards 
surrounding education in its successor (de facto) states (Broers et al. 2015: 29). Some 
photographic evidence in this chapter depicts cultural norms surrounding teaching 
settings and school uniforms in Abkhazia during the Soviet period. Some of these 
norms outlived the Soviet period and reflect a continuation of cultural norms in 
Abkhazia’s post-Soviet period (see figures 19, 21, 24 and 29). Beyond a general 
understanding that general education schools should be free of charge, secular and 
mass-entry based (Noah 1966: 19), the teaching methodologies and curricula in 
Abkhazia are to this date largely based on Soviet versions and have only changed 
minimally.355 356 357 Also cultural characteristics such as school uniforms have largely 
stayed the same to this day (see figures 19 and 21).  
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Figure 21 In Sukhum Kindergarten No 11 (Chashba 1960) 
 
8.2.2 Post-Soviet Challenges to the Provision of Education Services  
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia faced serious challenges 
regarding its future status in the international system and a phase of uncertainty 
 
355 Sutherland found similar developments in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, where 
“nominally, ‘Soviet’ education ceased to exist, although in reality the same system of 
teaching was to continue for many years, until the new independent states or republics had 
fully formulated their own systems” (1999: xiv). 
356 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
357 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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(what some interviewees referred to as a period of survival).358 359 360 361 Most 
prominently, the Abkhaz de facto regime had to navigate the legacies of the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war, an inauspicious economic environment in light of economic 
transition and large-scale international isolation, as well as high levels of 
outmigration (Trier et al. 2010: 34).362 In addition, the Abkhaz de facto government 
faced a variety of specific challenges and uncertainties ranging from the CIS embargo 
to war legacies and the economic costs associated with them. Unsurprisingly, 
education reforms did not place highly on the priority list in this period after the war 
(Comai & Venturi 2015: 897). Still, the de facto regime in Sukhumi needed to address 
a set of obstacles that hindered the provision of education services across its 
territory.  
 First, most schools and other education institutions were destroyed during 
the Georgian-Abkhaz war and it was not possible to immediately rebuild and 
renovate all of them.363 Some photographs vividly capture the war and post-war 
devastation in Abkhazia that exemplify the domestic state and institution building 
hurdles of the de facto regime. The pictures thereby also serve as an explanation why 
Russian state building support to Abkhazia focused predominantly on infrastructural 
assistance (see figures 22 and 23). In the Gali district, for example, nearly all 
education facilities were demolished. According to the Minister of Education of 
Abkhazia Adgur Kakoba, the situation was most dire in the secondary specialised 
education institutions, such as colleges and technical schools, because almost all of 
buildings needed to be repaired.364 Even the schools that were not destroyed lacked 
 
358 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
359 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
360 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
361 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
362 Abkhazia’s educational challenges and transformational needs following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union were certainly not unique. The transition to a market economy, for 
instance, resulted in inflation and consequently rising wages for many post-Soviet countries. 
Meanwhile, education staff wages were rarely raised and did not keep up with the high 
inflation rates and industry wages (Sutherland 1999: 91). 
363 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
364 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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the necessary material or technical infrastructure,365 “which were [partly] the result 
of decades of neglect” (Webber 2000: 13). Overall, war destruction, limited financial 
opportunities and outmigration are also reflected in the number of schools on 
Abkhaz territory, which decreased from 447 schools in 1945 (Orynyanskiy & Fadeev 
1935: 36) to 165 in the academic year 2013-2014 (Comai & Venturi 2015: 897). 
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Figure 22 Burnt and looted building of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History 
(Gaguliy 1995) 
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Figure 23 Destroyed School (Gaguliy 1995) 
 
Second, Abkhazia faced a shortage of qualified teachers, as many of them either died 
during the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict or left Abkhazia due to the adverse economic 
 
365 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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situation after the war.366 At the same time, the continuation of a large contingent 
of the teaching body represents a degree of institutional path dependence. Those 
teachers that stayed behind tended to be underpaid if they were paid at all. During 
the war and in the first months of the post-war period, teachers and university staff 
worked practically without a salary and received bread instead.367 This changed 
slowly in 1993 to 1994, when a few people started receiving a minimal salary.368 369 
Still, some teachers were not paid during holidays or months in arrears, which made 
the teaching profession an undesirable position resulting in further shortages of 
teaching staff.370 371 To this day, even the Ministry of Education admits that the 
salaries for teachers in Abkhazia are insufficient and barely guarantee a basic living 
wage.372 The salaries are allegedly approximately a maximum of $100 a month.373 
Other sources argue that the salaries for teachers range from between 200 – 1300 
Russian roubles, which translates to $8-50 a month (Trier et al. 2010: 65-66). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
366 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
367 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
368 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
369 To this day, the Gali district in Southern Abkhazia experiences a shortage of qualified 
teachers and teachers are not regularly paid (Trier et al. 2010: 66). 
370 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
371 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
372 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
373 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Figure 24 Students [and Teacher] of the Institute of Subtropical Farming in Production Practice 
(Chashba 1960) 
 
Third, teachers that previously taught in Russian had to become proficient in an 
additional language (Sutherland 1999: 88-89). This remains an issue in Abkhazia’s 
education sector as many teachers do not speak Abkhaz proficiently (Dembińska 
2019; Clogg 2008). Thus, teacher training projects needed to be introduced in order 
to develop a workforce of qualified teachers that is able to teach in the local 
language. Relatedly, Abkhazia’s education system required an overhaul of its 
textbooks and curricula in order to reflect the de facto authority’s wish to teach in 
the local language with appropriate teaching material (see Sutherland 1999: 153 for 
similar developments in Russia). Fourth, Soviet teaching methods and education 
materials did not meet the latest pedagogical standards. Teachers in Abkhazia 
continued utilising textbooks, curricula and teaching methods from the Soviet period 
up to the mid-2000s and beyond.374 
 
8.2.3 Education Reforms and Mutations of Abkhazia’s Education System 
The aforementioned challenges considerably impeded the de facto authorities’ self-
proclaimed goal of sustaining the de facto Republic of Abkhazia, let alone reform its 
 
374 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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education sector.375 376 In addition, limited financial resources and expertise reduced 
the room for manoeuvre for the authorities to consider more complex reforms of the 
education system.377 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Abkhaz education system 
has not changed considerably since the Soviet Union.378 379 380 381 As education did 
not play a dominant role for the Abkhaz regime during the post-war phase, mutations 
rather than reforms appear to have been the norm to ensure the provision of basic 
education services. This is in line with comparable unstable societal environments 
where the importance of mutations is likely to grow (Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005).  
Instead of wide-reaching education reform, the Abkhaz government reduced 
their attention to infrastructure rehabilitation and minor curricula reforms as a tool 
to broaden the scope of Abkhaz language usage.382 Some interviewees attempted to 
explain the limited reforms with a hesitation on the side of the authorities, because 
the education system was seen as more or less functioning and abrupt changes may 
have resulted in its collapse.383 The limited changes in Abkhazia’s education sector 
may be explained with norms having been “perhaps too deeply and firmly 
established in both the school and society to be fundamentally changed in a decade 
of even the most radical reforms” (Karpov & Lisovskaya 2005: 48). 
Particularly in the post-war period, Russia and other post-Soviet countries 
may have represented normative and mimetic diffusion sources, due to the similarity 
of their transition challenges and common institutional and cultural education 
framework. Mimetic diffusion occurs particularly in areas of high uncertainty and the 
institutional or policy choices of entities in similar contexts are likely to have been 
considered legitimate and an inspiration for the Abkhaz authorities. The next section 
 
375 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
376 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
377 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
378 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
379 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
380 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
381 Interview 8 : Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
382 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
383 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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outlines the central reforms and mutations in Abkhazia’s education sector, by 
distinguishing between content and structural transformations as two distinct forms 
of educational change.  
 
8.2.3.1 Content Reforms and Mutations 
Since the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, Abkhazia’s education sector has 
experienced only minimal content reforms of its teaching methodologies, syllabi and 
textbooks. Still, the de facto authorities placed heavy emphasis on establishing 
Abkhaz as a language of instruction in schools within the wider context of their nation 
building efforts. The Abkhaz education system also experienced a set of mutations 
that are predominantly situated around the provision of textbooks and language 
teaching.  
Up to the late 2000s and arguably even the early 2010s, the Abkhaz de facto 
authorities did not adequately address the issue of teaching methods. During several 
interviews with civil society organisations in Abkhazia, the Ministry of Education was 
singled out and criticised for its lack of inspiration and willingness for reform in the 
area of teaching methods.384 385 Hence, the Soviet school type including the inherent 
teaching methods and pedagogy remained largely the same in Abkhazia until the late 
2000s.386 This phenomenon can also partially be traced back to the predominance of 
elderly and often even retired teachers in the Abkhaz teacher work force. 
Furthermore, the de facto authorities remained resistant to any kind of 
methodological and pedagogical reform for a long period of time. When some NGOs 
and international donors pushed for more contemporary teaching methodologies 
and training opportunities for student teachers in 2005, for instance, the de facto 
government blocked any education reform and instead welcomed mere 
infrastructural support.387  
However, the de facto authorities slowly changed their perspective and 
introduced initiatives to improve the teaching methodologies in schools on Abkhaz 
 
384 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
385 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
386 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
387 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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territory. Particularly from 2014 onwards, with a change in government, the 
authorities became more accessible to suggestions, which enabled NGOs and 
international donors to become more engaged (see section 8.3 for further details on 
domestic and international influences).388 It is telling, that the involvement of 
authorities was necessary to increase the widespread influence of NGOs and 
international donors on Abkhazia’s education sector. Due to the wide penetration of 
the de facto authorities and relatively strong statehood, NGOs and international 
donors do not hold sufficient leverage to make policy decisions and manage 
institutions on behalf or instead of the authorities despite the limited role of 
Abkhazia’s Ministry of Education.  
In the late 2000s, the de facto authorities passed legislation that permitted 
teachers from certain ethnic backgrounds such as Armenians or Russians to receive 
teachers’ training in their respective kin states. This was part of an attempt to 
increase the number of teachers in the de facto states (Comai & Venturi 2015: 897). 
While this programme does not enjoy a high degree of support from the kin states 
and improvements in teaching quality have not yet been confirmed (Trier et al. 2010: 
65-66), this reform signifies the governments awareness of teaching methodology 
limitations in their education system and willingness to address these challenges. 
However, in 2014 there were still insufficient available qualified teachers across 
Abkhazia and even in the de facto capital city (Kvitsinia 2014; Comai & Venturi 2015: 
897).  
In terms of textbooks, the Abkhaz de facto authorities relied predominantly 
on Soviet and Russian textbooks or textbooks from other kin states for periods of 
time.389 In some instances, Russia provides these textbooks to schools in Abkhazia 
free of charge, however, oftentimes families would need to pay for the textbooks 
themselves. Henceforth, many schools in Abkhazia, including Abkhaz language 
schools, still rely on Soviet educational material or operate without textbooks, 
because they cannot afford new textbooks (Trier et al. 2010: 65-67).  
 
 
388 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
389 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Figure 25 School in Central Sukhumi (Spanke 2017) 
 
These difficulties surrounding textbook provision were heightened, because Abkhaz 
authorities reformed certain subjects, syllabi and curricula in order to reflect their 
new found understanding of history, geography, literature and social studies.390 The 
Abkhaz Ministry of Education, for instance, introduced a new curriculum in 1995, that 
not only introduced new subjects but also facilitated replacing Georgian language 
education with its Russian equivalent (Dembińska 2019: 309). In addition, the de 
facto government foresees textbooks to be available in the Abkhaz language, which 
ultimately necessitated the production of new school textbooks.391 As an example, 
Abkhaz grammar textbooks for native and non-native speakers do not exist beyond 
the first four grades (Trier et al. 2010: 62-63). Thus, the Abkhaz Ministry of Education 
produces textbooks both in Abkhaz and Russian (Clogg 2008: 316).  
The de facto government has started addressing these issues and placed 
more emphases on wider dissemination of education materials (Comai & Venturi 
2015: 897). History and literature textbooks as well as Abkhaz grammar textbooks 
for the first four years in addition to some Russian textbooks were written in the late 
2000s under the supervision of the de facto authorities when funds were made 
available specifically for the purpose of establishing these subjects in Abkhaz at all 
schools (Trier et al. 2010: 62). Despite the recent provision of history and literature 
 
390 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
391 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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textbooks, the de facto authorities and civil society organisations are aware of the 
need of further Abkhaz textbooks. Meanwhile, schools have experienced delays in 
acquiring the newly written textbooks, because of publication delays and deficiencies 
in the distribution of books (68). Some schools that do not teach in Abkhaz contacted 
kin states (specifically Russia, Armenia and Georgia) for textbooks and additional 
education material. Despite these kin state contacts, the costs of educational 
material from kin states are too high for many families, making it difficult for some 
to send their children to non-Abkhaz language school classes (65-67). 
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Figure 26 The Abkhazian State University named after Maxim Gorky (Shakaya 1979) 
 
The textbooks and syllabi concerns neatly link to the role of Abkhaz as a language of 
instruction in Abkhazia. Abkhaz primary schools teach children in Abkhaz up to the 
fourth grade and from the fifth grade onwards, all classes except Abkhaz literature 
are in Russian.392 At Russian schools, on the other hand, classes are conducted in 
Russian, whereas Abkhaz is taught as a subject.393 Meanwhile, most kindergartens394 
as well as colleges and universities operate predominantly in Russian,395 which is 
primarily due to capacity issues such as a lack of Abkhaz textbooks, limited language 
development, which makes it difficult to teach physics and chemistry in Abkhaz, as 
 
392 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
393 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
394 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
395 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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well as insufficient teachers that are able to teach in Abkhaz.396 While the 
department of Abkhaz language and literature operates in Abkhaz, all other 
university departments work in Russian.397  
In order to address what the de facto authorities perceive as the insufficient 
dissemination of Abkhaz language teaching, the Abkhaz government has passed a 
variety of language legislation to preserve the Abkhaz language. The Education 
Ministry, for instance, has been pursuing a slow change of one subject per grade from 
Russian to Abkhaz in all grades. At the time of the field work, the ministry has 
achieved this up to the seventh grade.398 An additional provision by the Education 
Ministry established Abkhaz as a mandatory second language at minority schools in 
Abkhazia at primary school level. In other words, grades one to four not only teach 
Armenian or Russian for example, but also Abkhaz as a second language.399  
However, several Abkhaz cities and towns lack the infrastructure for school 
and pre-school facilities where children could learn Abkhaz. Particularly the lack of 
textbooks and Abkhaz-speaking teachers severely complicates appropriate teaching 
of the Abkhaz language and the implementation of these provisions (Hewitt 1999: 
173; Trier et al. 2010: 65). The lack of teachers that speak Abkhaz in these non-Abkhaz 
schools is particularly visible in the Gali district (see Trier et al. (2010): 70-73 and 
Clogg (2008) for further details on the Gali district and the differences between 
Upper and Lower Gali). To tackle these deficiencies in the field of teaching resources, 
the Abkhaz government formed a Fund for the Development of the Abkhaz Language 
in 2001, which has created education material for children and teachers (Trier et al. 
2010: 60). Despite these language reforms, Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi (2010: 59) argue 
that “there has been a lack of direction in language policies” by the de facto 
authorities since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A detailed analysis of language 
laws and reforms is also presented by Clogg (2008) and Comai and Venturi (2015). 
 
 
396 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
397 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
398 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
399 The Abkhaz constitution guarantees that Abkhaz or any other minority language can be 
taught in schools on Abkhaz territory as long as the Abkhaz language as well as the Abkhaz 
curriculum is taught as well (Trier et al. 2010: 63).  
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8.2.3.2 Structural Reforms and Mutations 
Structural reforms in Abkhazia’s education sector centred predominantly around the 
decentralisation of the education system and the restoration of education 
infrastructure, but also included the provision of private school opportunities. In the 
meantime, a set of mutations surrounding teachers’ salaries adjusted the education 
system in order to ensure the sustained provision of basic education services to its 
citizens.  
In the early 1990s, many post-Soviet transition countries decentralised their 
education systems considerably (Webber 2000: 70). In 1992, the Abkhaz education 
system, for instance, consisted of one single subordination. Following the Abkhaz-
Georgian war, the Abkhaz de facto authorities divided the state system including its 
education sector into administrative districts.400 Essentially, each administrative 
entity of the federalised education system (Sukhumi, Gali, Tkvarcheli, Ochamchira, 
Gulripshi, Sukhumi raion, Gudauta and Gagra) possesses its own education 
department, that is structurally subordinate to district governments and holds 
specific rights and oversight responsibilities in terms of their education policies. 
Teachers, for instance, receive their salary from the district government.401 The 
general structure of the school system shows clear similarities to the Soviet school 
system. As in Soviet times, schools in Abkhazia offer eleven grades of elementary 
education in which the first four years are taught in Abkhaz at Abkhaz schools (Trier 
et al. 2010: 62). However, the Gali administrative raion is not yet fully integrated into 
Abkhazia’s central education system in terms of language of instruction and 
curriculum policies (Trier et al. 2010: 48). One of the measures by the de facto 
authorities to integrate the schools of the Gali district into the central education 
system involved the payment of regular salaries to teachers in the Lower Gali region 
in 2006 (Trier et al. 2010: 72). 
 
 
 
 
400 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi)  
401 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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Figure 27 In the Georgian Institute of Subtropical Crops (Shakaya 1979) 
 
During the civil war in 1992-93, many schools and education facilities in Abkhazia 
were destroyed. In the Gali district nearly all school buildings were demolished. 
Therefore, the de facto authorities prioritised the restoration of its Soviet education 
infrastructure in order to sustain the provision of education services. The limited 
budget of Abkhazia and the even smaller percentage allocated for education was, 
thus, ultimately spent on the rehabilitation of some of the schools rather than on 
content reform. After the war, as a preliminary measure by the de facto authorities, 
all more or less intact universities and secondary school started operating again.402 
Even though international organisations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, the International 
Red Cross and the Swedish International Development Agency started rebuilding and 
renovating some of Abkhazia’s basic education infrastructure,403 many schools 
remain in desolate situations (Trier et al. 2010: 66, 71). Still, the general rehabilitation 
of basic school infrastructure can be considered somewhat successful.  
By 2006, Abkhazia also had three private schools teaching in Abkhaz, Russian 
and Turkish (Trier et al. 2010: 62). The presence of private schools in Abkhazia 
 
402 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
403 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
289 
 
signifies that the Abkhaz de facto authorities opened up its education system for 
private schools. Moreover, the Ministry of Education introduced an experimental 
school that reports directly to the Ministry and where the Abkhaz government tests 
newly published textbooks for one year to gather feedback before distributing it to 
other schools.404  
Abkhazia’s federal education structure is mostly financed by the central 
federal budget. In the current education and budget system, however, there is “no 
functioning redistribution of funds to schools from the de facto state budget” (66). 
The de facto authorities are still not in a position to guarantee adequate teacher 
salaries throughout Abkhazia (66). The salaries for teachers are considered low 
ranging from 200 to 1,300 Russian roubles, which accounts for $8-50 per month (65-
66). In order to address the salary situation of teachers and education staff, parents 
introduced parental contributions to teachers in schools. This mutation of the 
education sector stems from a need of school material, school renovations and 
teachers to be paid adequately. These payments were in themselves illegal and 
officially outlawed in the early 2010s. Nonetheless, they ensured the payment of 
teachers and some renovations and school material by parents contributing a small 
amount each month to the school.405 406 However, the smaller the school and the 
lower the number of pupils, the more expensive it is for parents to contribute to the 
fixed costs of sustaining a school including the salaries of teachers, heating and 
renovation works (Trier et al. 2010: 66). This affects smaller ethnic groups that want 
to send their children to non-Russian or non-Abkhaz schools and rural schools 
disproportionately more. Some support for teachers was also provided in form of 
humanitarian aid by international donors or NGOs on the ground.407 Also the Abkhaz 
regime started addressing qualified teaching shortcoming by increasing teacher 
salaries, which was agreed upon in the 2014 treaty between Russia and Abkhazia 
(Comai 2018a: 156). 
 
 
404 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi)  
405 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
406 Interview 6: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
407 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
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8.3 External Diffusion Influences on Abkhazia’s Education Sector 
The institutional and cultural legacies of the Soviet Union as well as some limited 
domestic education reforms and mutations contributed to the provision of education 
services in the de facto Republic of Abkhazia. Still, these factors do not satisfactorily 
explain how the de facto authorities were able to sustain the education sector 
financially and accumulate the expertise to implement content reforms. Therefore, 
this section examines the role of external actors as potential diffusion influences on 
Abkhazia’s education sector ranging from international donors, NGOs, kin states to 
patron states.  
This section highlights that external diffusion far surpasses mere direct 
coercive diffusion channels such as financial support. While Russia’s involvement in 
Abkhazia’s education sector is limited primarily to infrastructural support and 
education exchanges, Russian budget contributions and the institutionalisation of 
the Russo-Abkhaz relationship also set the basis for mimetic and normative diffusion. 
Meanwhile, extensive content reform of Abkhazia’s schooling system does not 
appear to be a primary concern of Russia in its engagement with Abkhazia. The 
combination of Abkhazia’s selective neglect of its education sector (including a 
restricted geographic coverage) and Russia’s predominant focus on infrastructural 
support created opportunities for other external actors to emerge as additional 
diffusion influences and assume state responsibilities in the education sector. Some 
kin state, international donor and NGO involvement significantly shaped teaching 
methodologies and teacher training in Abkhazia. However, the approval and 
incorporation of the de facto authorities was necessary to increase the spread of 
these reform programmes. This section also finds that Russian and other diffusion 
sources do not directly compete with each other outside of the Gali district but take 
on complementary positions instead. 
 
8.3.1 Russian Diffusion Influences on Abkhazia’s Education Sector 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has attempted to increase its 
leverage within the states of the former Soviet Union through a wide array of foreign 
policy instruments ranging from hard power military operations, economic and 
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political integration to soft power (Lankina & Niemczyk 2015). Both Russia’s language 
and education policies abroad are defined under the umbrella term of the 
“humanitarian trend” of Russian foreign policy in the Russian Federation’s Foreign 
Policy Review of 27 March 2007,408 which includes “traditional elements of Russia’s 
actions in its near abroad (human rights, compatriots, campaigns of aspersion and 
propaganda, political consolidation of Russian speaking minorities), the 
technical/practical means to enforce these actions (consular issues, informational 
superiority), and new approaches of soft power (culture, education, science, public 
diplomacy)” (Pelnens et al. 2010: 13). Russian education involvement in Abkhazia 
appears to go beyond the scope of soft power, as Russia not only uses instruments 
of attraction, but also coerces and pays for certain policies surrounding the provision 
of education services. Thus, the education dimension of Russian foreign policy 
bridges the gap between soft and hard power instruments. 
Rossotrudnichestvo, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation, is predominantly responsible for the execution of 
Russia’s education policy in its neighbourhood. The agency, for instance, 
“implements projects and programs aimed at the export of Russian education, the 
promotion of international scientific cooperation, the attraction of foreign citizens to 
study in Russia, as well as interaction with graduates of Russian (Soviet) universities” 
(Rossotrudnichestvo 2016). Rossotrudnichestvo’s scope is at least officially restricted 
to Russian schools and covers the promotion of schooling in the Russian language, 
ensuring general education for Russian citizens and establishing the appropriate 
informational and logistical infrastructure (Rossotrudnichestvo 2016). Governments 
can utilise this infrastructural basis to pursue their soft power interests by directly 
and indirectly supporting governments to promote their culture and values (Nye 
2004). In the case of Abkhazia, Russia tends to pursue its soft power objectives 
through government structures, such as embassies and diplomatic services. In 
addition to governmental structures and consular activities, Russia also built cultural 
 
408 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007). Obzor vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federazii, 
431. March 27, 2007. Retrieved from: 
www.kremln.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml  
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and science centres to develop Russia’s attraction as a cultural, educational and 
language power in Abkhazia.  
Interviews with de facto authorities, civil society representatives and 
international donors suggest that Russia is primarily involved in structural aspects of 
Abkhazia’s education sector, rather than the specific content of education 
services.409 Along with the gradual lifting of CIS sanctions in 1999, Abkhazia started 
receiving some direct financial contributions to its budget from Russia in the early 
2000s. These financial budget injections are likely to have contributed to sustaining 
Abkhazia’s education sector for much of the 2000s. Unsurprisingly, Russia’s 
involvement in Abkhazia’s education sector intensified in 2008 when Russia 
recognised Abkhazia as an independent state both in terms of direct budget 
contributions and specific agreements relating to education service provisions. Since 
2008, Russia provides direct financial contributions to the Abkhaz state budget under 
an investment programme which contributes among other things to the 
rehabilitation of schools. The 2015-2017 investment programme agreed upon by 
Russia and Abkhazia foresees, for instance, infrastructure project investments into 
education facilities covering kindergartens, schools and universities (Comai 2018a: 
109). 
This means that Russia supports the (re)construction and renovation of 
schools on Abkhaz territory by providing the necessary funds to the Abkhaz budget. 
While Russia does not offer direct support to schools on Abkhaz territory, it 
contributes significant amounts to Abkhazia’s budget in order to rehabilitate 
Abkhazia’s education infrastructure. Overall, the reconstruction and renovation of 
education facilities appears to be a success with increases in the number of 
kindergartens and schools, which are estimated to meet Abkhaz education 
infrastructure demands by the end of 2020 (156). Thus, Russian support for the 
reconstruction and renovation of Abkhazia’s education system represents a clear 
contribution to the de facto government’s infrastructural capacity to sustain the 
provision of public services.  
 
 
 
409 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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Figure 28 New Study Complex of the Sukhum Pedagogic Institute (Chashba 1960) 
 
Beyond financial contributions, Russia and Abkhazia have signed agreements and 
policy proposals since 2008 that indicate specific provisions for Abkhazia’s education 
sector. In April 2008, for instance, the Russian government developed a policy 
package to develop direct economic, political and legal relations with Abkhazia. This 
‘Decree on the Main Directions of the Development of Relations with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia’ outlines some of the intents and goals of Russia’s future relationships 
with Abkhazia in a number of fields such as trade, the economy, legal assistance, but 
also covering “social, scientific-technical, informational, educational, and cultural 
spheres” (Pelnens et al. 2010: 112-113). Furthermore, the Alliance and Strategic 
Partnership Agreement from 2014 includes clear references to the Abkhaz education 
sector and hints at Russia’s potential involvement in the education infrastructure and 
the provision of education services in Abkhazia. Beyond the financial promises made 
by Russia in the 2014 agreement,410 Article 14 outlines that  
 
the Republic of Abkhazia shall gradually increase the 
average wage in main areas of public employees such as 
health care, education, science, culture, sports and 
social services to a level comparable with the level of 
wage payments of appropriate categories of workers in 
the southern federal districts of Russia.411  
 
410 The association agreement between Abkhazia and Russia in 2014 indicates that Russia 
will spend up to 12 billion roubles on Abkhazia by 2017.  
411 This is a translation of the following original quote in Russian: “Республика Абхазия 
поэтапно осуществляет повышение средней заработной платы основных категорий 
работников государственных учреждений в сфере здравоохранения, образования, 
науки, культуры, спорта и социального обслуживания граждан до уровня, 
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This article promises the Abkhaz regime to significantly increase teacher salaries. Still, 
Russia’s influence on Abkhaz domestic policies goes beyond wage provisions of 
teachers and other education related professions. Article 20 of the agreement states 
that 
in order to improve the quality of education in the Republic 
of Abkhazia with the assistance of the Russian Federation, 
the Republic of Abkhazia, within 3 years from the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement, [shall] develop the 
education system of the Republic of Abkhazia and support 
its institutions; carry out educational activities in the 
Republic of Abkhazia; [pass] normative legal acts 
corresponding to the legislation of the Russian Federation 
in education; organise the development of educational, 
training and professional development programmes for 
teachers and institutions carrying out educational 
activities; implement agreed measures aimed at training 
professionals in priority areas of science and technology; 
as well as mutually recognise studies and qualifications.412 
 
Article 20 lists specific criteria and plans for the provision of education services in 
Abkhazia that go beyond infrastructural and financial support and thereby represents 
clear coercive diffusion influences on Abkhazia’s education system. Article 20 
references, among other provisions, the training of teachers and the development of 
education activities, which shows the extent to which Russia’s support addresses 
education content. Most notably, the agreement incentivises legislative copying in 
 
сопоставимого с уровнем оплаты труда соответствующих категорий работников в 
Южном федеральном округе Российской Федерации.” Retrieved from 
http://m.government.ru/media/files/wNsItFsYzes.pdf. 
412 This is a translation of the following original quote in Russian: “В целях повышения 
качества образования в Республике Абхазия при содействии Российской Федерации 
Республика Абхазия не позднее 3 лет со дня вступления в силу настоящего Договора: 
принимает направленные на развитие системы образования Республики Абхазия и 
обеспечение деятельности организаций, осуществляющих образовательную 
деятельность в Республике Абхазия, нормативные правовые акты, 
корреспондирующие с законодательством Российской Федерации об образовании; 
организует разработку образовательных программ, подготовку и повышение 
квалификации педагогических работников организаций, осуществляющих 
образовательную деятельность; осуществляет согласованные меры, направленные на 
подготовку специалистов по приоритетным направлениям науки и техники, а также на 
обеспечение взаимного признания образования и квалификаций.” Retrieved from 
http://m.government.ru/media/files/wNsItFsYzes.pdf. 
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the education sphere. This signifies that the agreement should not only be regarded 
as a source of coercive diffusion, because it also sets the basis for mimetic and 
normative diffusion, which increases the likelihood for legislative and institutional 
isomorphism in Abkhazia’s education sector.  
The facilitation of mimetic practices not only takes the form of agreement and 
treaties, but arguably also originates in the special dependency relationship between 
Russia and Abkhazia and a path dependence of legislative and institutional mimicry. 
The Soviet Union encapsulates a long history of mimetic diffusion. In many cases, 
standardisation was achieved by smaller Union Republics copying the legislation of 
the Russian Union Republic and “by adopting suggestions emanating from the 
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the [Russian Union Republic].” (Noah 1966: 19-
20). Therefore, the role of the Russian Union Republic cannot be understated, 
because it “set the pattern for the other Union Republics, especially in educational 
and financial matters” (Noah 1966: 48). This tendency by the Abkhaz authorities to 
mimic Russian legislations and institutions takes place without a clear understanding 
of the implications for the Abkhaz context, according to an Abkhaz source.413 
Despite the clear reference to education content standards in the 2014 
agreement, interviewed civil society and international donor representatives are 
sceptical as to whether Russia delivers on this front.414 415 416 According to them, 
Russia does not appear to hold specific interests in teaching methodologies, teacher 
training and the content of classes with the exception of some interests in the 
language of instruction and education exchange between Abkhazia and Russia. This 
may be due to existing provision of services being in line with Russian interests. 
Russia’s failure, inability or lack of interest to offer training opportunities for teachers 
and other education staff created opportunities for other external actors to emerge 
as additional diffusion influences and assume state responsibilities in the education 
sector. Still, Russia has some influence on the content of school classes in Abkhazia, 
because the textbooks and curricula used in Abkhazia are approved by the Russian 
 
413 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
414 Interview 12: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
415 Interview 11: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
416 Interview 1: Representative of an international donor (Tbilisi) 
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Ministry of Education (Pelnens et al. 2010: 129). In addition, an agreement between 
Abkhazia and Russia ensures that most textbooks besides Abkhaz grammar, history 
and literature books are predominantly from Russia.417  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 In the Laboratory of the Abkhaz Department of the Scientific Research Institute of 
Balneology and Physiotherapy of the Georgian SSR (Chashba 1960) 
 
As mentioned above, the education dimension of Russian foreign policy not only 
covers tangible direct influences in form of financial and infrastructural contributions 
as well as agreements, but also includes soft power instruments, such as education 
exchanges and quotas for Abkhaz high school graduates to study in Russia (see also 
Kirova 2012: 19; Gerrits & Bader 2016; Trier et al. 2010: 67; Comai 2018a). 
Educational exchanges are one way of building soft power by socialising other groups 
to the ideas, practices and norms of the hosting country. Already during the Cold 
War, leaders utilised student exchange programmes to wield political power and gain 
influence (Atkinson 2010: 2). Atkinson’s (2010: 1) study on education exchange 
programmes between the US and non-democratic states demonstrates that the 
experience for the visiting students “may impact the political institutions and 
influence political behavior in their home countries.”418 Similarly, Nye (2004: 13) 
 
417 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
418 This influence takes place if at least the following three conditions are fulfilled “(i) the 
depth and extent of social interactions that occur while abroad, (ii) the sharing of a sense of 
community or common identity between participants and their hosts, and (iii) the 
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emphasises the relevance of education exchanges as an instrument of soft power if 
countries share experiences with the citizens of other countries that they wish to 
convince of their ways of governing or acting.  
In the Russo-Abkhaz context, education exchange quotas guarantee 
scholarships and free studies for some Abkhaz students.419 The number of 
scholarships range from 100,420 150-200421 to 250 places422 depending on the year 
and the interviewee. In 2016, for example, Rossotrudnichestvo provided 200 
scholarships to residents of Abkhazia on the basis of local demands and needs and in 
accordance with Abkhaz government representatives (Comai 2018a: 156-157). 
According Abkhazia’s de facto Education Minister, Adgur Kakoba, more than two to 
three thousand Abkhaz students have studied at Russian universities within this 
framework.423 Such scholarships are particularly demanded in subjects where Abkhaz 
universities are unable to cater for certain specialties. This is predominantly the case 
in the medical field, because Abkhazia does not have a medical faculty.424 Russian 
regions introduced education quotas even earlier than the central government 
following the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Krasnodar and the 
republics of the North Caucasus invited Abkhaz students to study in their regions,425 
which meant that by 1994 to 1995, some Abkhaz residents went to Kazan, Ufa, 
Nalchik and Maykop to study.426 In the post-Soviet period and for the elites in the 
post-Soviet space a degree from a Russia institute remains a prestigious asset and 
appears to be common among the Abkhaz elite (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 303). 
 
attainment of a politically influential position by the exchange participant after returning 
home” (Atkinson 2010: 2). 
419 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
420 Interview 3: Former Georgian diplomat (Tbilisi) 
421 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi)  
422 Interview 7: Viacheslav Chirikba – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Abkhazia (Sukhumi) 
423 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi)  
424 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi)  
425 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
426 Interview 13: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
298 
 
Despite the official recognition of Abkhazia by Russia in 2008, education 
exchanges tend to take place regionally to this date, perhaps to signify that these 
projects are organic activities, rather than centrally organised soft power 
instruments.427 The City of Moscow regional government, for instance, financially 
supports small programmes for Abkhaz education bodies through subsidiary offices 
in Abkhazia (Comai 2018a: 156). Similar trends can be observed in the two de facto 
Donbas Republics and Transnistria where education exchanges take place 
predominantly with Russian regions.428 These exchange programmes can facilitate 
further normative and mimetic diffusion in Abkhazia’s education sector, because it 
encourages students to engage more closely with the Russian education context, 
which may sway the perceptions vis-à-vis Abkhaz and Russian legislature and 
institutions once these students return from Russia.  
 
8.3.2 Competitive Diffusion of NGOs, International Donors, Parent and Kin States? 
Patron states are certainly not the only external actors involved in the internal affairs 
of de facto states. During and following the Georgian-Abkhaz in the early 1990s, a 
number of international donors and NGOs arrived in Abkhazia to address the ensuing 
humanitarian crisis in the de facto state. While some organisations left Abkhazia after 
a period of time, others remained in the de facto Republic and in some instances 
redirected their focus on education provision. Also kin states of Abkhazia’s ethnic 
minorities occasionally engaged in Abkhazia’s domestic matters relating to 
education.  
This section argues that Abkhazia’s selective neglect of its education sector in 
addition to Russia’s prioritisation of infrastructure support opened up opportunities 
for other external and domestic actors, such as international donors, NGOs, kin states 
and parent states to assume power in Abkhazia by entering Abkhazia’s education 
sector and taking on responsibilities from the de facto state. These additional 
diffusion influences predominantly shaped teaching methodologies and teacher 
training in Abkhazia, but also covered school renovations and textbook provision. The 
 
427 Interview 18: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
428 Interview 18: Russian scholar (Moscow) 
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teaching methodology and teacher training reforms of the late 2000s would not have 
been possible without the sustained efforts of domestic NGOs and international 
donors in addition to more receptive de facto authorities, because of Abkhazia’s 
relatively strong statehood and wide penetration of the state (with the exception of 
the Gali region). Abkhazia’s and Russia’s restricted geographic coverage in the Gali 
district encouraged additional competing diffusion influences in this region, which, 
in turn, facilitated increased central government engagement in Lower Gali.  
A wide variety of NGOs and international donors have operated in Abkhazia 
at some stage during its de facto existence.429 Given the domestic and international 
circumstances, most of these organisations shifted their focus from humanitarian aid 
in the 1990s to development aid in the 2000s (Trier et al. 2010). Development aid in 
the context of Abkhazia’s education sector encompasses among other aspects the 
introduction and adoption of new teaching methods, such as teacher-student 
interactions and skills training. In 2004, for example, the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities introduced an initiative called ‘Teachers for Understanding’ in 
three administrative districts of Abkhazia (the Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli 
districts), which envisioned Georgian and Abkhaz language training for teachers and 
the creation of a teacher network (Trier et al. 2010: 66). Development aid also covers 
the renovation of education infrastructure430 431 and the provision of equipment for 
education facilities.432 Overall, NGOs and international donors have focused 
predominantly on training programmes and supporting education facility 
renovations. 
 
429 This includes the “UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), World Vision (WV), Save the Children (SC), Premiere 
Urgence (PU), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Accion 
Contra el Hambre (ACF) and Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation-along with conflict prevention and 
peace-building actors such as Conciliation Resources, International Alert, Berghof 
Foundation for Peace Support, and academicians from University of California, Irvine (UCI) 
and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)” (Trier et al. 2010: 15). 
430 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
431 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
432 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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International organisations, such as the UNDP, World Vision, the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and UNICEF, have been particularly active in 
schools in the Gali district,433 434 due to the restricted involvement of the de facto 
authorities in Sukhumi. UNICEF and World Vision, for instance, developed youth 
clubs and created teacher training programmes (Comai 2018a: 155). Nonetheless, 
NGO and international donor support surpasses the borders of Gali and covers 
schools in districts such as Tkvarcheli, Ochamchira, as well as the Sukhumi and Gagra 
regions. While these international organisations have improved the education 
situation on Abkhazia’s countryside, their programmes tend to be on a smaller scale 
and are unable to address all the limitations of Abkhazia’s education system (Comai 
2018a: 155).  
The relationship between the Abkhaz authorities and international 
organisations has undergone significant changes that shaped the ways in which these 
organisations were able to influence the provision of education services in Abkhazia. 
Up to the mid to late 2000s, the Abkhaz authorities resisted sustained attempts by 
NGOs and international donors to shape teaching methodologies and training for 
student teachers.435 Instead, the Ministry of Education was predominantly 
concerned with accumulating financial and practical support for Abkhazia’s 
education infrastructure.436 This preoccupation with the education infrastructure 
might also explain Russia’s limited involvement in Abkhaz content reforms, as the de 
facto authorities may not have deemed it necessary or too invasive for Russia to 
influence Abkhaz education content. With a change in government in 2014, the 
Abkhaz authorities and particularly the Ministry of Education became more 
accessible to external influences, which allowed NGOs and international donors, such 
as UNICEF, to become more engaged in teacher training and establish new teaching 
methodologies.437 This change in receptivity to external influences from 2014 
onwards may be due to sustained efforts by domestic actors for methodological 
 
433 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
434 Interview 11: Representative of a non-governmental organisation (Sukhumi) 
435 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
436 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
437 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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change and the simultaneous insistence of NGOs and international actors. In that 
sense, the NGOs and international donors on the ground represent change agents 
for coercive influence, because they directly influenced the policy direction of the 
Abkhaz Ministry of Education. The developments may, however, also be explained 
with a realisation from the authorities that education content reform was necessary 
and that Russia was not going to deliver on its promises of teacher training set out in 
the 2014 agreement.  
The change in governmental receptivity in 2014 encouraged a set of 
education reforms in Abkhazia that pursue student-oriented methodologies and 
teacher training.438 UNICEF, with the approval of the Ministry of Education, for 
instance, holds annual or even more regular training courses for teachers in 
Abkhazia, which are conducted by Abkhaz teachers, scientists and experts from 
Russia. Moreover, the Ministry of Education organises refresher courses for teachers, 
managers, directors and head teachers.439 According to Adgur Kakoba, almost all 
teachers in Abkhazia have been trained with this new methodology.440 The Ministry 
of Education even intends to make these refresher courses mandatory for 
employment at a state institution.441 Furthermore, some international organisations 
support the Ministry of Education in publishing and buying textbooks for 
underprivileged families. In these cases, international organisations purchase 
textbooks for struggling families, that had been identified by the Ministry of 
Education.442 Hence, domestic NGOs and international donors have assumed 
positions of de facto legitimate authorities in certain areas of the Abkhaz education 
sector, such as teacher training and teaching methodologies.  
While the selective neglect of central authorities up to the late 2000s has 
created opportunities to enter the education sector, it was necessary to receive the 
consent of local authorities for a wider penetration and adoption of the policy 
 
438 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
439 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
440 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
441 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
442 Interview 8: Adgur Kakoba – current Minister of Education of the Republic of Abkhazia 
(Sukhumi) 
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suggestions of NGOs and international donors. Indeed, the Abkhaz regime continues 
to have “a significant say on the kind of activity that international organisations 
conduct in their territory” (Comai 2018a: 35). In that sense, these domestic and 
international organisations do not hold the monopoly of power to take policy 
decisions and manage institutions as is the case of some fragile, weak or failed states 
(cf. Lake 2014). This is predominantly due to the wide penetration of the de facto 
state and relative strong statehood (with the exception of Gali). Still, the central role 
in education service provision in Abkhazia, gives these organisations the ability to 
significantly influence public life and education services. While the Abkhaz 
authorities appear to be open to external and domestic coercive influences from 
Russia, NGOs, international donors and kin states, the Abkhaz elites challenge some 
influences relating to the language of instruction in order to ensure the use of Abkhaz 
in Abkhaz schools and Abkhaz language classes in other ethnic schools. This 
represents a clear prioritisation of the Abkhaz authorities in terms of education 
policies.  
Some kin states have also contributed to the provision of education services 
in Abkhazia with infrastructural support, methodological and teacher training as well 
as textbook provisions. However, the support tends to be restricted to those minority 
schools of their nationality rather than the Abkhaz education sector as a whole. 
Armenian schools, for instance, study according to the Armenian curriculum443 and 
receive free education materials from Armenia about once a year (Trier et al. 2010: 
67-68). Moreover, since the early 2000s, the de facto authorities permit Armenian 
teachers to receive teachers’ training in Armenia (65-66). Still, teachers at Armenian 
schools are paid by the Abkhaz government.444 Abkhaz diaspora groups in Turkey, 
the while, facilitate places for Abkhaz students at Turkish universities (Comai 2018a: 
157).  
The Georgian government, as Abkhazia’s parent state and kin state to the 
Georgian population in Abkhazia, supports Georgian language schools in the Lower 
Gali region with free Georgian textbooks, rehabilitating school infrastructure and in 
 
443 Even Armenian schools need to teach courses on Abkhaz history written in Russian (Trier 
et al. 2010: 67-68). 
444 Interview 5: Representative of an international organisation (Sukhumi) 
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some cases supplementing the salaries of teachers and other education staff (Trier 
et al. 2010: 71-72). The Georgian government also offers scholarships for 
undergraduate studies at Georgian universities. Predominantly Gali residents pick up 
this offer (Comai 2018a: 157). Despite the degree of Georgian government support, 
the situation for Georgian language schools remains bleak, as Georgian textbooks are 
not accepted (Clogg 2008: 316) and most schools in the Gali region have to teach in 
Russian with some exceptions in Lower Gali (Dembińska 2019: 309; Comai & Venturi 
2015: 897). Despite this problematic context and school closures, some Georgian 
language schools continue to operate (Comai & Venturi 2015: 887). This extent of 
Georgian engagement in the Gali region shows that Georgia as a parent state is more 
directly and openly involved in the education sector of Abkhazia, at least in a region 
of specific interest to Georgia, than Russia as a patron state. While Russia provides 
direct contributions to the Abkhaz budget, which pays for the upkeep of schools, 
Russian involvement does not go as far as paying teacher wages directly. 
 The number of fully subsidised study opportunities in Russia, Georgia and to 
a lesser extent in Turkey exemplifies the range of study opportunities abroad for 
residents from Abkhazia (Comai 2018a: 157). The opportunities offered by 
international organisations, such as training courses or brief exchange programmes, 
cannot compete with this offering at least in the scholarship sector. The 
predominance of Russian scholarships is therefore unsurprising (157-158) and 
international donors appear unable and unwilling to compete with this diffusion 
source. In other areas of Abkhazia’s education system, such as teacher and 
methodology training, NGOs and international donors provide services to schools in 
Abkhazia. However, rather than competing with Abkhaz or Russian provisions, the 
services appear to complement the existing supply, because Russia and the de facto 
government provide only limited support in these specific sectors. Even the support 
for education infrastructure reconstruction and renovation, a sector where the de 
facto government, patron and international donors are involved, appears to be 
complementary rather than competitive.  
However, Georgian engagement in Lower Gali represents a competitive 
diffusion source that facilitated a reaction from the de facto central government in 
Sukhumi. Georgian support for Georgian schools in the region motivated the de facto 
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authorities in Sukhumi to extend their control over and involvement in the schools 
of Lower Gali by providing Abkhaz and Russian textbooks and demanding the use of 
the Abkhaz curriculum in return (Trier et al. 2010: 128). In some instances, Georgian 
schools were even closed by the authorities (Dembińska 2019). Furthermore, due to 
an outflux of Georgian youth to study in Georgia, the Abkhaz authorities invited 
students from Gali to study at the Abkhaz State University, which increased the 
number of Gali residents studying at Abkhaz institutions (Conciliation Resources 
2015: 11). In a nutshell, Lower Gali’s education sector exemplifies the ways in which 
the Abkhaz regime retaliated Georgia’s involvement with a set of education policies 
to address the competition in this region of Abkhazia.  
In cases of “poly-nuclear” influences from a variety of (competing) diffusion 
sources, (Savage 1985: 14) the institutional outcomes may be uneven depending on 
the strength of each propagation model (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 58). In the case of 
de facto states, external diffusion influences from actors besides the patron that may 
advocate for specific institutional frameworks are limited. The involvement of NGOs, 
international donors, kin and parent states in Abkhazia’s education sector has shown 
that there are indeed competing sources of diffusion. Still, it is difficult to identify 
areas outside the Gali district where patron influences and the diffusion sources from 
other actors directly compete with each other. In other words, it appears that 
external diffusion sources do not compete, but rather complement each other and 
the institutional outcomes are therefore not necessarily uneven. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter not only outlined the development of Abkhazia’s education sector since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also illustrated diffusion dynamics between 
patron states, domestic de facto regimes, international donors and parent states 
surrounding the provision of education services. Abkhazia was able to provide 
education services to the population, if to a limited degree, throughout the 1990s 
despite the embargo and widespread international isolation, because of the cultural 
and institutional legacies of the Soviet Union and a set of minor reforms and 
mutations. Even when the sanctions were lifted and Abkhazia received financial 
support, the Abkhaz de facto authorities did not prioritise education reform beyond 
Abkhaz language concerns and syllabi modifications. The additional theoretical layer 
of mutations and reforms captured the extent to which selective domestic state 
building prioritisation can facilitate state building mutations, which contributed to 
the de facto state’s ability to provide education services in the post-war period.  
The chapter also examined the potential extent of patron state involvement 
in the education sector of de facto states. Russian involvement, for instance, is 
primarily restricted to budget contributions and infrastructure rehabilitation. 
However, some agreements between Russia and Abkhazia specify provisions for 
education reforms and encourage legislative and institutional isomorphism. It 
appears that the Russia authorities have the aspiration to sustain the basic level of 
public education provisions in Abkhazia and simultaneously establish closer 
educational ties between the two parties. Even if Russian involvement in Abkhazia’s 
education sector is limited, this chapter has highlighted that its restricted 
involvement has serious consequences on state building in Abkhazia and the 
availability of alternative diffusion sources.  
The combination of Abkhazia’s selective neglect of its education sector 
(including a restricted geographic coverage) and Russia’s primary focus on 
infrastructural support created surprising openings for other external and domestic 
actors, such as NGOs, international donors, as well as kin and parent states, to 
emerge as diffusion sources and influence Abkhazia’s education sector. This chapter 
thereby shows the potential consequences of limited state building development and 
restricted patron state involvement. Some of these alternative diffusion sources 
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significantly transformed the availability of teaching methodologies and teacher 
training in Abkhazia. The wide adoption of these programmes was made possible 
because of a continued push from NGOs and international donors for reform in 
addition to a change in governmental receptivity in 2014 towards content changes. 
Whether or not the involvement of external actors developed capacities of the 
Abkhaz state authorities remains to be seen. While it did not relieve the Education 
Ministry from its responsibilities to provide basic education services, the de facto 
authorities have little incentive to invest time and resources into developing the 
education sector beyond its current provision. 
The chapter also contributed to the theoretical framework of this thesis by 
fleshing out the origins, patterns and consequences of competing diffusion sources 
in de facto states. The chapter highlighted that Russian and other diffusion sources 
do not necessarily directly compete outside of the Gali district but can complement 
each other. The analysis of Georgian engagement in the Gali region presented an 
illustrative case study of how external actors can establish rivalling support even in 
the education sector of a de facto state, because of the de facto government’s limited 
physical control over the territory (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011: 184). In that instance, 
the Abkhaz regime responded to Georgia’s involvement with a set of education 
policies that addressed the competitive engagement in Lower Gali, which 
simultaneously facilitated greater central government engagement in the contested 
region of Abkhazia. 
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Chapter 9 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
De facto states returned on the agenda of policy makers, diplomats and academics 
worldwide, because these state-like political entities have repeatedly generated 
power vacuums, regional instabilities and even military conflict. The independence 
declaration of Kosovo, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, referendum announcements 
in Bougainville, militia clashes in Somaliland and the formation of two new de facto 
states in eastern Ukraine in 2014 highlight the wide-ranging effects of de facto states 
on world politics. It is therefore unsurprising, that Walter (2006) and Marshall and 
Gurr (2003) identified secessionist movements as central sources for conflict in the 
last decades. While policy makers struggle to adequately engage with de facto states 
politically and legally (de Waal 2018), their external patrons have been frequently 
criticised by parent state representatives and political operatives for their alleged 
involvement in the military, political and economic spheres of de facto states. These 
concerns surrounding external patron engagement and the appropriate way to 
address de facto states did not prevent some de facto states to attain de facto 
statehood in the meantime. Florea (2017) finds that a de facto state’s path towards 
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statehood benefits, among other contributing factors, from higher degrees of state 
building development in the unrecognised entity. Advancing the present 
understanding of the state and institution building processes of de facto states and 
the associated direct and indirect involvement of patron states may therefore offer 
insights into the ways in which de facto states sustain on an international level. 
The aforementioned developments and research outputs directed the focus 
of this thesis on the ways and extent to which patron states influence state and 
institution building processes of de facto states. Approaching this research project 
not only necessitated a conceptualisation of patron states in the context of patron-
de facto state relations, but also a distinction between direct and indirect diffusion 
influences of patron states on de facto states. This approach also emphasised the 
role of legitimisation and bounded agency in the context of dependency relationships 
to explain some of the observable state building outcomes in de facto states. These 
theoretical and conceptual tools enabled this thesis to offer explanations for the 
variations in patron engagement ranging from limited to extensive involvement in 
the state and institution building processes of de facto states.  
The term patron state has evolved from its original meaning of the Cold War 
period and no longer refers exclusively to bilateral relations that are primarily 
motivated by patron competition, because some patron-de facto state relations 
would exist outside the realm of patron conflict. Patron support has also moved 
beyond mere military support and instead represents a symbiotic relationship that 
oftentimes involves financial and political and in some instances state building 
involvement. This thesis found that domestic characteristics of patron states cannot 
account for common factors of patron state identification, which necessitated a 
relational approach to conceptualising patron states instead. As all patron-de facto 
state relations are asymmetric and involve varying relative power capabilities and 
hierarchies, this thesis considered the dependency dynamics of patron-de facto state 
relations as unique identifiers of these bilateral relations. This means that one can 
only refer to patron-de facto state relations if the patron is the sole or at least 
predominant provider of support that contributes to the sustainability of the de facto 
regime. This type of patron support facilitates dependencies between the two actors 
that make up the inherent characteristics of patron-de facto state relations. The 
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proposed conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations not only benefits the 
clarity of debates surrounding patron state influences on de facto states, but also 
offers insights into behavioural patterns of patron states and dependency dynamics 
in patron-de facto state relations.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis captured the differences between 
direct and indirect patron state influences on the state building processes of de facto 
states based on diffusion theories. This theoretical model enabled the thesis to 
distinguish between direct coercive influences, on the one hand, and indirect 
influences of the patron in form of mimicry, normative and competitive diffusion, on 
the other hand. Considerations of the role of legitimacy in patron-de facto state 
relations and the implications of bounded agency in dependency relations 
complemented the theoretical framework in form of transition variables. Both 
legitimacy and bounded agency dynamics may shape the ways in which diffusion 
sources enter de facto states and influence their state building processes. Thus, the 
theoretical framework granted the freedom to consider how domestic, external and 
structural factors allow domestic elites to challenge certain external diffusion 
influences. Furthermore, the theoretical framework suggested a set of causal 
mechanisms that explained state and institution building outcomes in de facto states. 
The theoretical framework therefore serves as a potential tool to fill a gap in the 
literature that has not offered causal explanations for legislative and institutional 
isomorphism between patron and de facto states. Gerrits and Bader (2016), for 
instance, observed legislative and institutional mimicry in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, but did not produce a causal mechanism that facilitated this form of 
isomorphism. By following the causal chains of direct and indirect diffusion channels 
laid out in the theoretical framework and applying process tracing to the qualitative 
source material, this thesis empirically established that coercive, mimetic, normative 
and competitive diffusion mechanisms are at work in Abkhazia’s state and institution 
building processes.  
In this context, the thesis proposes that the relative prevalence of direct and 
indirect diffusion influences can be context dependent. Normative and mimetic 
diffusion influences, for instance, are more common during periods of high levels of 
direct coercive diffusion influences from the patron. An upsurge in competition 
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between the de facto state and its parent encourages both direct and indirect 
diffusion influences. Also the changes in the Russo-Abkhaz relationship in 1999 
shaped the relative prevalence of direct and indirect diffusion influences by widening 
the range of potential coercive diffusion instruments to official agreements as well 
as financial and military support, which subsequently encouraged further normative, 
mimetic and competitive diffusion. 
The conceptual and theoretical basis informed the statistical and case study 
analyses of this thesis, which permitted the framing of state building in de facto 
states and the role of patron states in a new light. The proposed conceptualisation of 
patron-de facto state relations of this thesis, for instance, challenged the common 
perception of Russia as Abkhazia’s patron since the early 1990s. Despite some 
Russian regional support in the 1990s, Russia only took on the position as Abkhazia’s 
patron from 1999 onwards when the relationship met the dependency criteria of the 
patron-de facto state relations conceptualisation. Russian involvement in Abkhazia 
therefore represents an insightful case study of change in the nature of patron 
support that captures the variations in Russia’s engagement before and after 1999.  
This thesis argued that patrons can nurture the dependence of de facto states 
on patron support by pursuing a multi-layered policy of granting de facto state 
agency in an international setting of limited alternatives and providing support that 
discourages self-sufficiency. The statistical results of this thesis underscored that 
patron states support de facto states in guaranteeing minimal civilian governance in 
order to ensure a degree of sustainability of the unrecognised entity and thereby 
support the regime in attaining internal legitimacy. In the early phases of the state 
building process, de facto state governments are more susceptible to the influence 
of external actors, whereas with proceeding developments and more domestic 
accountability, de facto state governments are slightly less reliant on external 
support. At the same time, patrons appear to not support de facto states in achieving 
coherent government structures including an economic extraction and redistribution 
system, border management and internal security, as this would reduce the level of 
de facto state dependence on the patron state. Striving for a status quo of 
dependence may also explain why the number of governance institutions in de facto 
states tends to decrease when a patron state is present, as patrons and their clients 
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pursue a policy of institution sharing. The focus on dependence and the distinction 
between direct and indirect diffusion channels ultimately explains why patron state 
not always directly intervene in de facto states, because de facto authorities tend to 
orient their state and institution building developments according to the perceived 
interests of the patron state. 
The qualitative analysis of Russia’s attempts to nurture Abkhaz dependence 
on patron support reinforced some of the quantitative findings of this thesis. Russian 
involvement, for instance, is linked predominantly to infrastructural reconstruction 
rather than capacity building, which equips the Abkhaz regime with an institutional 
infrastructure that enables basic public service provision but not the necessary skills 
and capabilities to utilise the infrastructure independently. The lack of support for 
Abkhazia’s soft capacity development ties Abkhazia closer to Russia and appears to 
be the biggest threat to output legitimacy of Russian actions. Nonetheless, Russian 
support is largely legitimised and accepted, partly due to the limited viable 
alternatives for Abkhazia. An additional instrument that nurtures Abkhaz 
dependence on Russia is the patron’s control of relevant de facto politicians to 
ensure their loyalty through the provision of significant financial contributions and 
military support. While the Russian authorities are not necessarily concerned about 
micromanaging politics and state building in Abkhazia, the patron is interested in 
having candidates in place that have a favourable view of Russia. This can be 
considered a strategy by Russia to encourage mimetic and normative diffusion 
channels, rather than coercive diffusion.  
Since Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence in 2008, Russia has 
passed treaties and agreements with the de facto state that specify state building 
measures. Particularly the Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty of 2014 indicates 
specific state building plans in form of health care reforms, legislative changes, 
education sector advancements and social sector payments. The institutionalisation 
of the Russo-Abkhaz relationship in form of agreements and treaties also increases 
the likelihood for both mimetic and normative diffusion, because they set specific 
institutional and public service provision standards. Russia’s use of agreements and 
treaties represents a foreign policy instrument that functions as a coercive diffusion 
instrument and simultaneously has unintended or indirect diffusion influences on the 
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capacity and public service provision of Abkhazia’s de facto regime. Moreover, the 
bilateral nature of the agreements and treaties safeguards Russia’s quasi monopoly 
position over the external influences on Abkhazia’s state building processes.  
By 1999, Abkhazia had already developed most central governance 
institutions. In that sense, Russia did not necessarily contribute to the development 
of new governance institutions but helped sustain the existing state capacity. With 
the direct patron involvement from 1999 onwards, the scope of the state, on the one 
hand, expanded along with the enhancement of Abkhazia’s security and economic 
situation, but, on the other hand, Russia took on specific service provision functions 
and responsibilities from the Abkhaz de facto authorities, despite Abkhazia’s 
relatively strong statehood and wide penetration of the state. Institution sharing in 
these instances has reduced Abkhazia’s self-sustainability, because it disincentivised 
institutional development particularly in the military and security sector. In that 
sense, governance institutions in Abkhazia are not outright missing due to Russian 
patronage, however the underdevelopment of some sectors of the Abkhaz de facto 
state that deny independent public service and goods provision can be traced back 
to Russia. The phenomena of institution sharing may also explain the statistical 
finding of this thesis that de facto states with a patron have fewer governance 
institutions.  
Despite this degree of Russian involvement in Abkhazia’s state building 
process, this thesis demonstrated that direct engagement and control does not 
always appear to be necessary for the de facto elites to adhere to Russian state and 
institution building. Even during a period of partial isolation and limited direct 
Russian involvement, Abkhaz elites adjusted their actions and plans at least partly 
according to Russian interests and activities due to normative, mimetic and 
competitive diffusion influences, which encouraged legislative and institutional 
isomorphism and a degree of endogenous state building. Thus, Abkhazia achieved 
the most notable state building boost during a period of uncertainty and partial 
isolation in the 1990s when Russia did not officially function as Abkhazia’s patron. 
Soviet legacies provided Abkhaz officials with the basic political institutional 
structure to develop its institutions further and sporadic trade with Russian regions 
and Turkish diaspora groups sustained the de facto regime at least partially. These 
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findings also highlight the importance of distinguishing between developments that 
can be attributed to a de facto state’s attempt to adapt to the patron through indirect 
diffusion channels, on the one hand, and institutional path dependencies, on the 
other hand. Abkhaz officials attained control over the existing set of state institutions 
by strategically regulating the hiring of ethnic groups to influential state positions. In 
this period, competition with Georgia presented a likely motivating force for 
continued state building developments in Abkhazia, which is in line with the 
statistical findings of this thesis that indicate that stronger parent states compared 
to patron states encourage state and institution building in de facto states.  
Furthermore, the prioritisation of certain state building developments by the 
Abkhaz de facto authorities shaped the scope of Abkhazia’s statehood. In the 
immediate post-war period, the war legacies, lack of international recognition and 
geopolitical context necessitated a prioritisation pursuit by the Abkhaz regime that 
shaped the perception of what constitutes the state and its responsibilities vis-à-vis 
the population. In this period, the Abkhaz public depended on itself more than it did 
on the state, because the de facto regime prioritised a set of core tasks over basic 
service and goods provision. These core tasks covered the management of Abkhazia’s 
external relations, setting up a basic resource extraction and distribution system 
including trade as well as the provision of law and order. Abkhazia’s education sector 
illustrates that the degree of patron involvement in addition to domestic neglect of 
particular state sectors can have consequences for the involvement of competing 
diffusion sources. Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2011: 182) identify similar prioritisation 
patterns in Transnistria’s state building process. The Transnistrian de facto regime 
focused first and foremost on the establishment of physical control, securing the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence as well as economic development.  
The domestic developments in Abkhazia under fluctuating dependencies on 
Russian support illustrates the agency of de facto state under dependence. This 
framework challenges the simplistic dichotomy of de facto states either representing 
puppet states or exhibiting full-fledged agency. Patron-de facto state relations 
ultimately represent a playing field where the de facto state exhibits agency that is 
constrained by perceived patron interests and mimetic, normative and competitive 
diffusion influences. The patron is likely to shape domestic developments in de facto 
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states through coercive diffusion influences as well. Due to the susceptibility to 
indirect diffusion influences in form of mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion, 
the agency of dependent de facto states is likely to be bound by the (perceived) 
interests of the patron. Due to the limited availability of alternative viable choices, 
de facto entities are also less likely to resist coercive influences. This bounded agency 
increases the likelihood for legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de 
facto state and its patron. In this arena of limited manoeuvre and course of action, 
the Abkhaz de facto authorities continued to signal autonomy by protecting symbolic 
institutions and legislations relating to private property and language rights.  
This playing field accommodates for the possibilities of fluctuating 
dependencies and represents a more or less comfortable framework for both teams. 
For the inherent dynamics of patron-de facto state relations to change, either side 
would have to break with the relative comfort that it provides. In practical terms, this 
means that the Russian government is unlikely to pursue policies that further 
encourage self-sufficient statehood of Abkhazia, whereas the Abkhaz regime works 
towards continued support inflow that guarantees the entity’s security and welfare 
provision, as long as Abkhaz private property and language privileges are upheld and 
internal legitimacy is not impaired. This would explain why the Abkhaz regime 
appears to strategise its legitimacy by flexibly dealing with the issue of legitimacy, 
which involves holding certain criticisms back and restricting Russian influence in 
certain areas in order to ensure sustained support. 
Due to the complexity of state building in de facto states and the extensive 
scope of potential patron involvement, it is necessary to account for a set of 
limitations of the presented research. This thesis focused predominantly on the 
policies, institutions and practices of the central government of the de facto Republic 
of Abkhazia to capture state and institution building processes in Abkhazia, rather 
than covering regional and community developments. Based on Lake’ (2014: 516) 
differentiation of “three distinct levels of governance – the central, local and 
community levels,” it is insufficient to consider central governments as the only 
settings for state building in de facto states. Indeed, in the case of Abkhazia, one can 
observe significant differences in state building trajectories across regions such as 
Upper and Lower Gali. While this study touched upon some community and local 
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developments, further research needs to be conducted to capture the full extent of 
state building developments in Abkhazia. These findings would have also offered 
insights into the levels of governance that patron states tend to penetrate, be it the 
central government, local administration or community developments. An overview 
of the socio-economic transformations and realities on the ground could have also 
offered a more wholesome understanding of state building in Abkhazia. In addition, 
a variety of actors would have deserved separate attention to grasp their influence 
on the state building developments in Abkhazia, such as NGOs and international 
donors, clan and family structures, as well as individual Abkhaz leaders such as 
Ardzinba, Bagapsh, Khajimba and Ankvab.  
The research findings of this thesis uncovered a set of questions and research 
directions that might be worth pursuing in the near future. First, Adrian Florea has 
been working on an updated version of his data set of de facto states from 2014 that 
has not been published yet. It would be appealing to test the statistical findings of 
this thesis on a wider range of cases that also cover, for instance, the Luhansk and 
Donetsk People’s Republics. Second, it is worth examining in more detail why and in 
what ways Abkhazia challenges Russian coercive or mimicry diffusion sources in 
sectors such as private property or language reform, while permitting external 
involvement in other sectors. Third, analysing diffusion dynamics across de facto 
states could uncover whether these entities perceive themselves similar enough to 
consider institutional and legislative mimicry. At the same time, this research would 
contribute to the growing literature on the international relations of de facto states. 
Fourth, building on the proposed conceptualisation of patron states, it would be 
insightful to test whether it is possible to differentiate between Russia’s actions as a 
regional power in its near abroad and Russia’s action as a patron. Relatedly, it is 
worth conducting more research on dependency relations between actors such as 
Russia and Central Asian countries or development contexts to tease out the nuances 
of dependencies even more clearly. Fifth, the research findings of this thesis speak 
to greater questions surrounding statehood and world order.445 At what stage of 
 
445 These questions are largely informed by a discussion with Jesse Driscoll from the 
University of California San Diego at the APSA Annual Meeting in 2019.  
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state and institution building development, for example, can one refer to de facto 
states and nascent states exhibiting characteristics of statehood? And to what extent 
is the answer to this question informed by the point in time that the question is asked 
and the nature of the respective world order? De facto states would likely not have 
survived in a pre-1945 world order setting. What did the transformations in the 
international system entail that facilitated these arguably lower requirements of 
statehood and differences from the Weberian archetype one can now observe? 
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Appendix A 
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Shared History 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 13 
Shared Ethnicity 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 10 
Shared Ideology 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Integration 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Economic 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Security 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 13 
Democratisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix B 
Table 22 Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Instruments (Florea) 
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Appendix C 
      Table 23 Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Interests (Spanke) 
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Appendix D 
      Table 24 Classification of Patron-De Facto State Relations by Patron Instruments (Spanke) 
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Appendix E 
Even though dfsinst represents a discrete count variable, I decided to run linear 
regressions to analyse the dependent variable, because it shares many 
characteristics with a continuous variable rather than a traditional count variable 
(see table 25 and figure 30 below). Traditional count data tends to follow a Poisson 
distribution and a Poisson regression could calculate the rate of occurrence.  
 
Table 25 Number of Governance Institutions 
 
 
Figure 30 Histogram Number of Governance Institutions 
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Appendix F 
 
Table 26 Moderate Degrees of State Building Across Units 
 
 
  
                                                          
           Total     .624359  .4845987         0         1
                                                          
  Western Sahara           1         0         1         1
    Transnistria           1         0         1         1
     Tamil Eelam           1         0         1         1
          Taiwan           1         0         1         1
     South Sudan    .5535714  .5016207         0         1
   South Ossetia           1         0         1         1
      Somaliland    .9047619  .3007926         0         1
Rwenzururu Kingd           1         0         1         1
Republika Srpska           1         0         1         1
        Puntland    .6666667  .4830459         0         1
       Palestine           1         0         1         1
 Northern Cyprus           1         0         1         1
Nagorno-Karabakh           1         0         1         1
        Mindanao    .4102564  .4983102         0         1
       Kurdistan           1         0         1         1
         Krajina           1         0         1         1
          Kosovo           1         0         1         1
         Katanga           0         0         0         0
     Karen State           0         0         0         0
    Kachin State    .3529412  .4826398         0         1
            Gaza           1         0         1         1
        Gagauzia           0         0         0         0
         Eritrea           1         0         1         1
Eastern Slavonia           1         0         1         1
      East Timor    .1428571  .3563483         0         1
        Chechnya           0         0         0         0
       Casamance           0         0         0         0
         Cabinda           0         0         0         0
    Bougainville    .3478261  .4869848         0         1
          Biafra           1         0         1         1
         Anjouan           1         0         1         1
          Ajaria           0         0         0         0
            Aceh           1         0         1         1
        Abkhazia    .8571429  .3585686         0         1
                                                          
         dfsname        mean        sd       min       max
     by categories of: dfsname (dfsname)
Summary for variables: dfsbuildmod
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Table 27 High Degrees of State Building Across Units 
 
 
                                                          
           Total    .4076923  .4917207         0         1
                                                          
  Western Sahara           1         0         1         1
    Transnistria    .6666667  .4830459         0         1
     Tamil Eelam           1         0         1         1
          Taiwan           1         0         1         1
     South Sudan        .125  .3337119         0         1
   South Ossetia    .5238095  .5117663         0         1
      Somaliland    .5238095  .5117663         0         1
Rwenzururu Kingd           1         0         1         1
Republika Srpska           1         0         1         1
        Puntland           0         0         0         0
       Palestine           1         0         1         1
 Northern Cyprus    .7631579  .4308515         0         1
Nagorno-Karabakh    .7619048  .4364358         0         1
        Mindanao           0         0         0         0
       Kurdistan    .3809524  .4976134         0         1
         Krajina           1         0         1         1
          Kosovo    .8181818  .4045199         0         1
         Katanga           0         0         0         0
     Karen State           0         0         0         0
    Kachin State    .3529412  .4826398         0         1
            Gaza           1         0         1         1
        Gagauzia           0         0         0         0
         Eritrea          .3  .4660916         0         1
Eastern Slavonia           0         0         0         0
      East Timor           0         0         0         0
        Chechnya           0         0         0         0
       Casamance           0         0         0         0
         Cabinda           0         0         0         0
    Bougainville           0         0         0         0
          Biafra           0         0         0         0
         Anjouan           0         0         0         0
          Ajaria           0         0         0         0
            Aceh           0         0         0         0
        Abkhazia    .7142857    .46291         0         1
                                                          
         dfsname        mean        sd       min       max
     by categories of: dfsname (dfsname)
Summary for variables: dfsbuildstrong
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Table 28 State Institutions Across Units 
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Table 29 Heterogeneity Across Independent and Control Variables 
 
 
 
Appendix G 
 
Table 30 Hausman Test Governance Institutions  
 
  
         within                126.5195  -173.2808   570.7192   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               94.47486      16.25        384       n =      34
duration overall    198.7192   159.2024          1        756       N =     780
                                                               
         within                .0090992  -.0568021    .068931   T-bar = 22.8235
         between               .0223714  -.0586133   .0640664       n =      34
relpar~h overall   -.0043858   .0207582  -.1024379   .1033478       N =     776
                                                               
         within                1.406668  -.4645877   8.375824   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               2.106797          1          9       n =      34
frag2    overall    3.994872   2.340682          1          9       N =     780
                                                               
         within                .2635548   .5576923   3.636264   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               .8829207          1          4       n =      34
relcap   overall    2.207692   .9151091          1          4       N =     780
                                                               
         within                       0   2.620513   2.620513   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               1.134847          1          4       n =      34
typeon~t overall    2.620513   1.182712          1          4       N =     780
                                                               
         within                .0320462   .3282051   1.328205   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               .4935592          0          1       n =      34
dfspri~d overall    .5282051   .4995241          0          1       N =     780
                                                               
         within                .4918799  -1.044872    2.47942   T-bar = 22.9412
         between                .519789          0          2       n =      34
dfswar~t overall    .5320513   .6799897          0          2       N =     780
                                                               
         within                       0   .6333333   .6333333   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               .4748581          0          1       n =      34
dias     overall    .6333333   .4822036          0          1       N =     780
                                                               
         within                .1396591  -.2562271   1.219963   T-bar = 22.9412
         between               .4916567          0          1       n =      34
patro~ke overall    .3628205   .4811222          0          1       N =     780
                                                                               
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =   -71.89    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    duration      .0034672     .0035044       -.0000373               .
relparentg~c      .0000464     .0000372        9.13e-06        4.10e-06
       frag2       .050862     .0471817        .0036803        .0058248
          4       1.458337     1.444559         .013778        .0607887
          2       .5584083     .5759435       -.0175352        .0240677
      relcap  
          2      -.5939688     -.593852       -.0001169               .
          1      -.6501902    -.6695853        .0193951               .
   dfswarint  
1.patronsp~e     -.7233969    -.6130195       -.1103773        .0224962
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Appendix H 
The frequency table below (see table 31) suggests that more than half (59.23%) of 
individual observations are in the low or moderate degrees of state building category. 
While 33.08% of observations are in the high degrees of state building category, only 
7.69% of observations have very high degrees of state building.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A snapshot of all 34 de facto states in their first and last observed year reveals a 
slightly different and possibly more insightful picture (see tables 32 and 33). While 
76.46% of the 34 de facto states in their first year of existence show low or moderate 
degrees of state building, only Taiwan has very high degrees of state building in its 
first year. The state building mean in de facto states in their first year is 1.82. In the 
final observed year of all 34 de facto states, the majority (55.78%) of de facto states 
have achieved a high or very high degree of state building. The state building mean 
in de facto states in their last observed year is 2.5 and therefore 0.68 points higher 
than in the first observed year. While these tables omit the period between the first 
and final observation, they nonetheless reveal the state building potential of de facto 
states. While the number of de facto states with low degrees of state building in the 
first observed year is quite high with 15 out of 34 de facto states, the last observed 
year shows that the majority (19 out of 34) of de facto states is in the high or very 
high degrees category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33 State Building (first observation) Table 32 State Building (last observation) 
Table 31 State Building Frequency Table 
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Appendix I 
The second dependent variable of this thesis is the number of governance 
institutions a de facto state has in a given year (dfsinst). The variable measures the 
number of governance institutions from 1 to 10. The frequency tables below (tables 
34 and 35) show that in the first year of observation, there is no clear trend to either 
low or high numbers of state institutions among de facto states. However, in the first 
year, 41.18% of de facto states have only up to 3 out of 10 state institutions.  
 
Table 34 Number of Institutions (first observation) 
 
 
 
Table 35 Number of Institutions (final observation) 
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Appendix J 
 
Table 36 Relative Parent GDP per Capita 
 
 
  
                                                          
           Total   -1809.894  11713.38  -46506.1  24860.32
                                                          
  Western Sahara   -1854.109  345.3924 -2485.801 -1316.115
    Transnistria   -6844.683  1853.273 -9486.901 -4527.803
     Tamil Eelam    1561.373  582.8684  605.0262  2616.087
          Taiwan   -35572.81  7389.713  -46506.1 -23537.46
     South Sudan    909.1351  272.0716  517.6121  1592.964
   South Ossetia    -6095.01  1289.142 -8268.849 -4155.131
      Somaliland           .         .         .         .
Rwenzururu Kingd    303.2819         .  303.2819  303.2819
Republika Srpska   -773.7242   588.597 -2286.443  698.5643
        Puntland           .         .         .         .
       Palestine     8903.62   1626.44  5943.391  11383.35
 Northern Cyprus    14421.15   5659.96  2650.715  22052.27
Nagorno-Karabakh    843.7623  870.6757  97.62772  2624.424
        Mindanao    1630.477  206.6635  1380.682  2171.492
       Kurdistan    3461.662  1012.778  1427.921  4695.357
         Krajina    5321.757         .  5321.757  5321.757
          Kosovo    1345.715  269.1454   972.567  1733.678
         Katanga   -1141.667  63.03701  -1202.89 -1053.378
     Karen State    334.0469  239.0076  164.2937  1034.772
    Kachin State    334.0469  239.0076  164.2937  1034.772
            Gaza    23877.92  632.2252  23302.29  24860.32
        Gagauzia           .         .         .         .
         Eritrea     206.344  21.32461  163.6233  234.7267
Eastern Slavonia    6061.579  526.2167  5321.757   6538.14
      East Timor    1657.489    458.93  948.7627  2433.341
        Chechnya    6533.666  1178.854  5505.628  9033.072
       Casamance    321.9739  109.0687  78.53233  463.1699
         Cabinda    2201.382  638.3733  1323.345  3579.703
    Bougainville    1230.359  647.4178  192.2292  1873.905
          Biafra    -17734.3  758.0622 -18442.49 -16934.67
         Anjouan    -38248.6  2011.221 -40839.73 -34361.28
          Ajaria   -5333.137  753.9557 -6417.253 -4155.131
            Aceh    2343.591  129.5638  2190.766   2519.51
        Abkhazia    -6095.01  1289.142 -8268.849 -4155.131
                                                          
         dfsname        mean        sd       min       max
     by categories of: dfsname (dfsname)
Summary for variables: relparentgdppc
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Table 37 Relative Parent Strength 
 
  
                                                          
           Total   -.0043858  .0207582 -.1024379  .1033478
                                                          
  Western Sahara   -.0001108  .0003336 -.0006951  .0005811
    Transnistria   -.0524826  .0144627 -.1024379 -.0390851
     Tamil Eelam   -.0070282  .0209376 -.0565644   .002115
          Taiwan   -.0043643  .0297463 -.0567806  .0689525
     South Sudan    .0012686  .0014037 -.0020459    .00292
   South Ossetia     -.05241  .0144662  -.102253 -.0388767
      Somaliland    .0005951  .0000978  .0004852  .0008053
Rwenzururu Kingd    .0006826  .0001112  .0004773  .0008297
Republika Srpska   -.0012067  .0003928 -.0018863 -.0006117
        Puntland    .0005951  .0000978  .0004852  .0008053
       Palestine   -.0069613  .0010202 -.0086492  -.005347
 Northern Cyprus   -.0128887  .0024073 -.0162392 -.0083604
Nagorno-Karabakh    .0006863  .0001244  .0004138  .0008593
        Mindanao    .0050935  .0004126  .0039835  .0056357
       Kurdistan    .0063149  .0009405  .0045582  .0083689
         Krajina   -.0011326  .0003269  -.001389 -.0007044
          Kosovo    .0012985  .0003577  .0007942  .0020188
         Katanga   -.0057247  .0001651 -.0059216 -.0055279
     Karen State    .0038367  .0014399  .0020677  .0070645
    Kachin State    .0042147  .0013419  .0026011  .0070645
            Gaza   -.0101597  .0004589  -.010969 -.0098253
        Gagauzia    .0006931  .0001554  .0005623  .0009099
         Eritrea    .0027614  .0008087  .0016984  .0039108
Eastern Slavonia   -.0012945  .0001006  -.001387  -.001176
      East Timor    .0135176   .001179  .0118299  .0166369
        Chechnya    .0640664  .0158494  .0512986  .1033478
       Casamance    .0005297  .0000411  .0004593  .0006253
         Cabinda    .0015552  .0004817  .0007264  .0023175
    Bougainville    .0001903   .000013  .0001785  .0002174
          Biafra   -.0200306   .001244 -.0215797 -.0185965
         Anjouan   -.0196246  .0013619 -.0220633 -.0179964
          Ajaria   -.0586133  .0140481  -.102253 -.0472187
            Aceh    .0146772  .0003718   .014142  .0150144
        Abkhazia     -.05241  .0144662  -.102253 -.0388767
                                                          
         dfsname        mean        sd       min       max
     by categories of: dfsname (dfsname)
Summary for variables: relparentstrength
353 
 
Appendix K 
 
Table 38 Adapted Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) State Building Model (Logistic Regression) 
 
  (1) (2) 
Degrees of State Building Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 23.91*** 1.053 
 (3.46) (1.063) 
Diaspora 10.46*** 6.185* 
 (2.552) (2.733) 
Parent State GDP per capita 0.00447*** 0.00228*** 
 (0.000566) (0.000313) 
Autonomy Rights -1.022 -0.375 
 (0.524) (1.011) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.829 -3.948*** 
 (0.51) (0.745) 
   War -3.068** -4.959*** 
 (1.091) (1.182) 
Prev. Autonomy -18.6*** -6.413* 
 (2.582) (2.778) 
Constant -4.746 -9.629*** 
 (2.499) (1.975) 
Pseudo R² 0.8456 0.5745 
N 643 643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
 
 
The results of the adapted model do indeed confirm some of the arguments put 
forward by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) beyond the de facto states of the South 
Caucasus, while rejecting the statistical significance of other independent variables. 
An analysis of the results supports the claim that patrons and a diaspora positively 
enhance the log odds of moderate state building in de facto states all other variables 
held constant, which is statistically significant at a 99.9 per cent confidence interval. 
Interestingly, the presence of a patron does not appear to significantly affect the 
change from low or moderate to high degrees of state building in de facto states. In 
terms of the capabilities of the parent state, one can observe that an increase in the 
GDP per capita of the parent state minimally increases the likelihood of achieving 
both moderate and high degrees of state building at a 99.9 per cent confidence 
interval. Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s argument that a more lenient attitude of the parent 
state towards the de facto state in terms of autonomy rights has a negative influence 
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on the log odds of the degree of state building in de facto states cannot be confirmed 
for moderate and high degrees of state building. Contrary to what Kolstø and 
Blakkisrud argued, severe war intensity can indeed impede state building in de facto 
states outside the de facto states of the south Caucasus. Rather surprisingly and 
going beyond Kolstø and Blakkisrud’s argument that previous autonomy status in the 
Soviet Union does not matter, de facto states that experienced previous autonomy 
are less likely to achieve both moderate and high degrees of state building. 
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Appendix L 
 
Table 39 State Building in De Facto States Model Stages (Logistic Regression) 
Degrees of State 
Building 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Moderate High Moderate High Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 12.97*** 3.407** 11.5*** 3.544* 57.65*** 5.516 
 (3.285) (1.277) (3.163) (1.498) (7.377) (2.93) 
Diaspora 15.87** 9.106** 16.93** 9.223 52.52*** 7.412 
 (5.868) (2.959) (5.561) (5.019) (10.07) (5.02) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -1.952*** -5.126*** -2.099*** -4.966*** -2.123 -2.713 
 (0.552) (0.777) (0.559) (0.759) (1.95) (2.386) 
   War -3.883*** -4.723*** -4.044*** -4.623*** -5.19 -5.546 
 (1.152) (0.958) (1.147) (0.969) (10.77) (3.042) 
Prev. Autonomy -16.76** -9.361*** -17.07*** -8.37*** -53.06*** -11.91** 
 (5.37) (2.61) (5.077) (2.279) (12.21) (4.096) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -5.731 2.041 -3.758 0.223 -57.38*** -10.56 
 (5.094) (3.411) (4.882) (7.376) (10.55) (5.776) 
   State Collapse -17.45*** -6.612* -17.05*** -4.65* -73.82*** 2.715 
 (4.136) (2.694) (3.814) (2.264) (6.992) (3.162) 
   Decolonisation -28.49*** -12.18** -27.91*** -12.46*** -114.2*** -46.77*** 
 (7.213) (3.993) (6.768) (3.065) (13.97) (4.746) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 1.381 3.701 1.969 4.897 18.51*** 9.294* 
 (1.597) (2.605) (1.642) (3.674) (3.531) (4.634) 
   Stronger 21.59* 9.993** 23.94** 11.79* 81.55*** 17.77** 
 (8.438) (3.787) (7.812) (5.702) (20.19) (6.746) 
   Much Stronger 13.45** 5.884* 14*** 7.319 72.38*** 11.09* 
 (4.44) (2.837) (3.899) (3.865) (9.697) (5.056) 
Rebel 
 Fragmentation 
1.532*** 
(0.305) 
1.376*** 
(0.214) 
1.538*** 
(0.299) 
1.28*** 
(0.257) 
4.041** 
(1.305) 
0.336 
(0.586) 
Relative Parent  
 Strength   
-31.65 
(31.11) 
140.1*** 
(34.42) 
-71.62 
(68.62) 
203.8** 
(62.42) 
Months Survived     0.164*** 0.115*** 
     (0.0166) (0.0085) 
Constant 3.436 -9.83** 1.657 -10.98* -7.823 -35.4*** 
 (3.842) (3.646) (3.876) (4.515) (7.677) (5.88) 
Pseudo R² 0.9665 0.575 0.9775 0.4783 0.9306 0.3742 
N 780 780 776 776 776 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses446 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
    
    
 
  
 
446 The t-statistics for all regressions are two-tailed. 
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Appendix M 
 
Table 40 Governance Institutions in De Facto States Model Stages (Linear Regression) 
Number of Governance Institutions (7) (8) (9) 
Patron (Spanke) -0.308 -0.313 -0.584** 
 (0.237) (0.239) (0.222) 
Diaspora 3.322*** 3.459*** 3.651*** 
 (0.953) (0.96) (0.914) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.831*** -0.844*** -0.703*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.0985) 
   War -0.778*** -0.79*** -0.441** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.138) 
Prev. Autonomy -1.455* -0.598 -0.687 
 (0.693) (0.808) (0.77) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.194 0.0481 -0.0436 
 (1.466) (1.477) (1.407) 
   State Collapse 1.366 1.341 1.846* 
 (0.959) (0.963) (0.919) 
   Decolonisation -1.822 -1.638 -1.789 
 (1.192) (1.2) (1.144) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.694** 0.69** 0.964*** 
 (0.217) (0.219) (0.204) 
   Stronger 1.956** 2.431*** 2.8*** 
 (0.609) (0.66) (0.617) 
   Much Stronger 1.449*** 1.582*** 1.627*** 
 (0.392) (0.398) (0.369) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.242*** 0.239*** 0.0813** 
 (0.0277) (0.0289) (0.0301) 
Relative Parent Strength  1.244 -7.896* 
  (3.854) (3.66) 
Months Survived   0.00369*** 
   (0.000326) 
Constant 3.315** 2.597* 2.291 
 (1.196) (1.255) (1.194) 
R² 0.5495 0.5729 0.5835 
N 780 776 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses447 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
 
 
  
 
447 The t-statistics for all regressions are two-tailed. 
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Appendix N  
 
Table 41 State Building and Patrons without Post-Soviet Cases (Logistic Regression) 
 Degrees of State Building Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 8.243** -0.847 
 (2.824) (1.269) 
Constant 2.191 -3.946** 
 (2.241) (1.366) 
Pseudo R² 0.2195 0.0011 
N 669 669 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Appendix O  
 
Table 42 State Building in De Facto States Model without Post-Soviet Cases (Logistic Regression) 
Degrees of State Building 
(1) (2) 
Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 196.7 3.656 
 (46856.2) (2.538) 
Diaspora 236.4 5.291* 
 (46881.6) (2.496) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -2.348 -5.496** 
 (2.422) (1.855) 
   War 3.107 -4.477* 
 (1979.7) (2.112) 
Prev. Autonomy -238.5 -5.918** 
 (46881.6) (2.16) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -104.8* -6.869* 
 (43.02) (3.307) 
   State Collapse -26 3.566 
 (47187.7) (2.774) 
   Decolonisation -314.4 -8.837*** 
 (46881.7) (2.259) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity -8.249 1.298 
 (35.57) (2.933) 
   Stronger 255.1 2.022 
 (46881.7) (4.923) 
   Much Stronger -10.04 2.589 
 (47187.7) (3.116) 
Rebel Fragmentation -0.145 
(2.022) 
0.697* 
(0.308) 
Relative Parent Strength -129.9 
(489.2) 
-238.5** 
(72.63) 
Months Survived 0.201*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0181) (0.00499) 
Constant 25.39 -11.36** 
 (37.92) (3.699) 
Pseudo R² 0.9924 0.5401 
N 665 665 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Appendix P  
 
Table 43 Institution Building Model without Post-Soviet Cases (Linear Regression) 
 Number of Governance Institutions  
Patron (Spanke) -1.072*** 
 (0.294) 
Diaspora 4.129*** 
 (0.942) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.715*** 
 (0.11) 
   War -0.421** 
 (0.156) 
Prev. Autonomy -0.0808 
 (0.752) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.124 
 (1.291) 
   State Collapse 2.698** 
 (1.02) 
   Decolonisation -1.325 
 (1.035) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.924*** 
 (0.218) 
   Stronger 1.428 
 (0.775) 
   Much Stronger 1.59*** 
 (0.391) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.0776* 
 (0.0326) 
Relative Parent Strength -16.04*** 
 (4.689) 
Months Survived 0.00374*** 
 (0.000351) 
Constant 1.939 
 (1.155) 
R² 0.5598 
N 665 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Appendix Q 
I identified the most appropriate way to account for time dependence by comparing 
various time variable models using the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Each model models time dependency in a 
different way (duration squared, the log of duration, cubic splines, lowess, linear 
duration and duration dummies) and the estimates are then compared to a model 
that does not accounts for time. The likelihood-ratio and AIC tests suggest that for 
moderate degrees of state building a linear time model models time dependency the 
best, because the AIC of the linear model is the smallest number among all models 
and it also performs well for the log-likelihood coefficient. A model that includes 
splines or duration squared would also be a suitable alternative, because the log-
likelihood coefficients are small. For strong state building, a linear time model, 
squared time or cubic splines would be most appropriate. For the sake of a more 
straightforward interpretation I decided to account for time dependence with a 
linear duration variable.  
 
Tables 44 AIC and BIC Tests for Moderate Degrees of State Building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
  lowess_mod          776         .  -120.1186      16    272.2372   346.7037
      notime          776         .  -123.9654      15    277.9308   347.7431
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in lowess_mod)             Prob > chi2 =    0.0055
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      7.69
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
    splt_mod          776         .  -39.27279      18    114.5456   198.3203
      notime          776         .  -123.9654      15    277.9308   347.7431
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in splt_mod)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =    169.39
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
   tquad_mod          776         .  -44.15453      16    120.3091   194.7755
      notime          776         .  -123.9654      15    277.9308   347.7431
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in tquad_mod)              Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    159.62
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               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
    time_mod          776         .  -36.77856      16    105.5571   180.0236
      notime          776         .  -123.9654      15    277.9308   347.7431
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in time_mod)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    174.37
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
  logdur_mod          776         .  -59.81236      16    151.6247   226.0912
      notime          776         .  -123.9654      15    277.9308   347.7431
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in logdur_mod)             Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    128.31
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
  lowess_mod          776         .  -142.0638      16    316.1276    390.594
      notime          776         .   -142.429      15    314.8581   384.6704
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in lowess_mod)             Prob > chi2 =    0.3927
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.73
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
    splt_mod          776         .   -62.4337      18    160.8674   244.6421
      notime          776         .   -142.429      15    314.8581   384.6704
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in splt_mod)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =    159.99
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
   tquad_mod          776         .  -72.83449      16     177.669   252.1354
      notime          776         .   -142.429      15    314.8581   384.6704
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in tquad_mod)              Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    139.19
               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
    time_mod          776         .  -63.50595      16    159.0119   233.4783
      notime          776         .   -142.429      15    314.8581   384.6704
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in time_mod)               Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    157.85
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               Note: N=Obs used in calculating BIC; see [R] BIC note.
                                                                             
  logdur_mod          776         .  -79.64239      16    191.2848   265.7512
      notime          776         .   -142.429      15    314.8581   384.6704
                                                                             
       Model          Obs  ll(null)  ll(model)      df         AIC        BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
(Assumption: notime nested in logdur_mod)             Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    125.57
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Table 46 State Building in De Facto States Model Stages Florea Patron (Logistic Regression) 
Degrees of State 
Building 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Moderate High Moderate High Moderate High 
Patron (Florea) 15.99*** 1.748 18.7*** 3.009 45.76*** 7.848*** 
 (3.804) (2.021) (4.957) (1.548) (6.106) (1.721) 
Diaspora 23.06*** 9.188*** 23.79*** 9.642** 53.15*** 6.185** 
 (6.196) (2.763) (6.479) (3.18) (7.731) (2.148) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -1.951*** -5.124*** -1.99*** -5.016*** -1.862 -1.752 
 (0.541) (0.771) (0.543) (0.758) (1.524) (1.113) 
   War -3.883*** -4.738*** -3.911*** -4.7*** -4.692 -3.133* 
 (1.153) (0.954) (1.179) (0.998) (4.854) (1.383) 
Prev. Autonomy -23.55*** -9.177*** -24.85*** -8.394*** -53.8*** -6.265** 
 (5.771) (2.504) (6.079) (2.163) (8.47) (2.371) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -7.155* 2.055 -9.04 1.471 -31.38*** -4.721 
 (4.489) (3.577) (5.089) (3.643) (6.165) (3.311) 
   State Collapse -22.92*** -5.717* -24.2*** -4.315 -40.22*** -1.179 
 (4.924) (2.751) (5.184) (2.235) (7.592) (2.768) 
   Decolonisation -38.04*** -11.89*** -40.52*** -14.38*** -86.21*** -16.02*** 
 (7.934) (3.314) (8.604) (3.171) (10.75) (2.296) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.607 3.727 0.306 4.437 12.3** 6.15 
 (1.664) (2.593) (1.869) (3.269) (4.365) (2.481) 
   Stronger 20.62*** 10.3** 20.25*** 10.4* 50.19*** 6.241* 
 (5.746) (3.863) (6.012) (5.006) (8.129) (2.899) 
   Much Stronger 18.37*** 5.893* 19.12*** 6.829* 49.94*** 6.512* 
 (4.024) (2.831) (5.31) (3.461) (7.29) (2.792) 
Rebel 
 Fragmentation 
1.727*** 
(0.336) 
1.343*** 
(0.213) 
1.722*** 
(0.341) 
1.284*** 
(0.229) 
2.603* 
(1.184) 
0.206 
(0.291) 
Relative Parent  
 Strength   
32.3 
(36.42) 
147.6*** 
(37.28) 
-20.25 
(58.23) 
83.61* 
(40.41) 
Months Survived     0.12*** 0.0535*** 
     (0.0125) (0.00482) 
Constant 3.139 -9.572** 4.28 -10.93** -22.26*** -16.31*** 
 (3.636) (3.633) (3.947) (4.047) (5.627) (3.453) 
Pseudo R² 0.9833 0.5721 0.9817 0.489 0.9617 0.5641 
N 780 780 776 776 776 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses448 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
    
    
 
  
 
448 The t-statistics for all regressions are two-tailed. 
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Table 47 Governance Institutions in De Facto States Model Stages Florea Patron (Linear Regression) 
Number of Governance Institutions (1) (2) (3) 
Patron (Florea) -0.586* -0.616* -1.008*** 
 (0.287) (0.296) (0.276) 
Diaspora 3.397*** 3.549*** 3.767*** 
 (0.966) (0.97) (0.924) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.816*** -0.829*** -0.679*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.0984) 
   War -0.784*** -0.795*** -0.441** 
 (0.144) (0.145) (0.137) 
Prev. Autonomy -1.475* -0.583 -0.659 
 (0.699) (0.817) (0.778) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.00506 0.269 0.278 
 (1.49) (1.499) (1.428) 
   State Collapse 1.442 1.409 1.933* 
 (0.972) (0.973) (0.928) 
   Decolonisation -1.778 -1.575 -1.7 
 (1.208) (1.214) (1.157) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.672** 0.676** 0.948*** 
 (0.217) (0.219) (0.203) 
   Stronger 2** 2.522*** 2.931*** 
 (0.611) (0.664) (0.619) 
   Much Stronger 1.445*** 1.585*** 1.628*** 
 (0.392) (0.398) (0.368) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.0744* 
 (0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0301) 
Relative Parent Strength  -0.207 -10.28** 
  (3.949) (3.752) 
Months Survived   0.00374*** 
   (0.000325) 
Constant 3.429** 2.658* 2.393* 
 (1.212) (1.268) (1.206) 
R² 0.5335 0.5607 0.5607 
N 780 776 776 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses449 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
 
  
 
449 The t-statistics for all regressions are two-tailed. 
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Appendix T 
The first model (1) in regression table 41 represents the institution building model of 
this thesis as a Poisson model, the second model (2) includes time since last change.  
 
Table 48 Institution Building in De Facto States Models (Poisson Regression) 
 Number of Governance Institutions (1) (2) 
Patron (Spanke) -0.0271 -0.0703 
 (0.09) (0.135) 
Diaspora 0.673*** 0.467* 
 (0.162) (0.194) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.133** -0.184*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0533) 
   War -0.0769 -0.144* 
 (0.0696) (0.72) 
Prev. Autonomy -0.127 -0.126 
 (0.139) (0.163) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.218 -0.473 
 (0.24) (0.314) 
   State Collapse 0.217 0.0753 
 (0.168) (0.189) 
   Decolonisation -0.503* -0.423* 
 (0.198) (0.214) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.097 0.0297 
 (0.116) (0.118) 
   Stronger 0.262 0.0196 
 (0.189) (0.223) 
   Much Stronger 0.0891 0.0572 
 (0.153) (0.174) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.0104 0.0674*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0158) 
Relative Parent Strength -2.725* 0.998 
 (1.38) (2.525) 
Months Survived 0.000793***  
 (0.000169)  
Months since last Institution Change   -0.00772** 
  (0.00241) 
Constant 1.185*** 1.371*** 
 (0.225) (0.262) 
N 776 602 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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   (1 vs 0)       .048135   .0250578     -.0009773    .0972473
patronspanke  
                                                              
                 Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                              
                                                
patronspanke            1        3.69     0.0547
                                                
                       df        chi2     P>chi2
                                                
Expression   : Pr(dfsbuildstrong=1), predict(pr)
Model VCE    : OIM
Contrasts of predictive margins
. margins r.patronspanke, contrast
                                                              
   (1 vs 0)      .2817227   .0349244       .213272    .3501733
patronspanke  
                                                              
                 Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                              
                                                
patronspanke            1       65.07     0.0000
                                                
                       df        chi2     P>chi2
                                                
Expression   : Pr(dfsbuildmod=1), predict(pr)
Model VCE    : OIM
Contrasts of predictive margins
. margins r.patronspanke, contrast
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Table 49 State Building Model including Relative GDP per Capita Variable (Logistic Regression) 
Degrees of State Building 
(1) (2) 
Moderate High 
Patron (Spanke) 17.6 8.933* 
 (7.868) (4.481) 
Diaspora 40.46 -3.719 
 (58.26) (23.35) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -1.944 -2.909 
 (1.221) (2.845) 
   War -2.856 -6.877 
 (2.79) (3.965) 
Prev. Autonomy -54.92*** -26.28*** 
 (7.398) (6.922) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -19.95 -66.9** 
 (57.2) (24.99) 
   State Collapse -10.53 7.914 
 (11.71) (5.41) 
   Decolonisation -62.98 -80.9*** 
 (.) (8.674) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 4.849 -1.889 
 (2.803) (4.183) 
   Stronger 58.71 26.26 
 (57.7) (23.21) 
   Much Stronger 0 1.176 
 (.) (6.72) 
Rebel Fragmentation 2.647 
(1.352) 
-0.285 
(0.856) 
Relative Parent GDP per capita -0.00125 
(0.00106) 
0.000689* 
(0.00031) 
Months Survived 0.0523*** 0.146*** 
 (0.00711) (0.0116) 
Constant -5.41 -16.98 
 (57.29) (24.32) 
Pseudo R² 0.9584 0.4545 
N 572 643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 50 Institution Building Model including Relative GDP per Capita Variable (Linear Regression) 
Number of Governance Institutions (3) 
Patron (Spanke) -0.613** 
 (0.206) 
Diaspora 3.604*** 
 (1.06) 
War Intensity 
   Minor -0.67*** 
 (0.0934) 
   War -0.594*** 
 (0.144) 
Prev. Autonomy -0.484 
 (0.793) 
Emergence Type 
   Non-Conflictual -0.649 
 (1.474) 
   State Collapse 2.306* 
 (0.929) 
   Decolonisation -1.83 
 (1.13) 
Rebel Capability 
   At Parity 0.576** 
 (0.214) 
   Stronger 2.505* 
 (1.058) 
   Much Stronger 1.445*** 
 (0.374) 
Rebel Fragmentation 0.0472 
 (0.032) 
Relative Parent GDP per capita 0.0000372** 
 (0.0000129) 
Months Survived 0.0035*** 
 (0.000344) 
Constant 2.613 
 (1.339) 
R² 0.5168 
N 643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 51 Kaplan-Meier Estimator Strong State Building 
 
 
Appendix X 
 
Table 52 Kaplan-Meier Estimator Moderate State Building 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
   756        1      0      1             0.2119    0.1641     0.0161    0.5580
   600        2      1      0             0.2119    0.1641     0.0161    0.5580
   468        3      0      1             0.4239    0.1337     0.1713    0.6587
   444        4      0      1             0.4239    0.1337     0.1713    0.6587
   407        5      1      0             0.4239    0.1337     0.1713    0.6587
   349        6      0      1             0.5299    0.1179     0.2830    0.7265
   318        7      0      1             0.5299    0.1179     0.2830    0.7265
   259        8      0      1             0.5299    0.1179     0.2830    0.7265
   256        9      1      0             0.5299    0.1179     0.2830    0.7265
   252       10      0      1             0.5961    0.1126     0.3472    0.7765
   159       11      1      0             0.5961    0.1126     0.3472    0.7765
   157       12      0      1             0.6557    0.1069     0.4067    0.8204
   132       13      1      0             0.6557    0.1069     0.4067    0.8204
   128       14      1      0             0.7104    0.1008     0.4623    0.8593
   127       15      0      1             0.7650    0.0926     0.5223    0.8954
   113       16      1      0             0.7650    0.0926     0.5223    0.8954
    94       17      0      1             0.8160    0.0836     0.5794    0.9270
    88       18      1      0             0.8160    0.0836     0.5794    0.9270
    80       19      1      0             0.8640    0.0734     0.6333    0.9543
    63       20      1      0             0.9120    0.0598     0.6896    0.9774
    53       21      0      1             0.9600    0.0392     0.7484    0.9943
    40       22      0      1             0.9600    0.0392     0.7484    0.9943
    32       23      0      1             0.9600    0.0392     0.7484    0.9943
    30       24      0      1             0.9600    0.0392     0.7484    0.9943
    29       25      1      0             0.9600    0.0392     0.7484    0.9943
    25       26      0      1             1.0000         .          .         .
                                                                               
  Time    Total   Fail   Lost           Function     Error     [95% Conf. Int.]
           Beg.          Net            Survivor      Std.
                                                                               
   756        1      0      1             0.2554    0.1435     0.0469    0.5438
   444        2      0      1             0.2554    0.1435     0.0469    0.5438
   407        3      1      0             0.2554    0.1435     0.0469    0.5438
   349        4      0      1             0.3830    0.1479     0.1210    0.6466
   312        5      1      0             0.3830    0.1479     0.1210    0.6466
   289        6      1      0             0.4788    0.1508     0.1822    0.7272
   288        7      1      0             0.5746    0.1474     0.2532    0.7996
   184        8      1      0             0.6703    0.1374     0.3354    0.8637
   157        9      0      1             0.7661    0.1191     0.4333    0.9186
    96       10      1      0             0.7661    0.1191     0.4333    0.9186
    94       11      0      1             0.8512    0.0973     0.5234    0.9607
    44       12      1      0             0.8512    0.0973     0.5234    0.9607
    40       13      0      1             0.9286    0.0688     0.5908    0.9896
    36       14      1      0             0.9286    0.0688     0.5908    0.9896
    30       15      0      1             1.0000         .          .         .
                                                                               
  Time    Total   Fail   Lost           Function     Error     [95% Conf. Int.]
           Beg.          Net            Survivor      Std.
